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1
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Phenomenon and Enigma”, in: Collected Philosophical Papers, pp. 61-73, p. 69/“Énigme et 
Phénomène”, in: En découvrant l‟existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, pp. 283-302, p. 296. 
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Introduction – The face and the beginning of language 
                                                                                                         I think that the beginning of language is in the face.    
                                                                                                         In a certain way, in its silence, it calls you.
2
 
  
         In his abstract painting “The Word” (1933), reproduced on the previous page, the Russian 
painter Alexej Jawlensky represented a colorful face, looking frontally toward the observer.
3
 The 
face is an important topic of the art of Jawlensky, who had been since his youth deeply impressed 
by the icon paintings of his home country. Jawlensky focused on the human face, especially in 
his later work: “A face is not just a face for me but the whole cosmos,” he said; “In the face the 
whole cosmos reveals itself.”4 By elaborating this subject through endlessly different variations, 
the artist wanted to capture the transcendence of the face through the colors of his paintings. He 
wanted to express something that lies deeper than what eyes can see and, thus, transcends 
visibility: he wanted to paint the invisible. For Jawlensky, art is longing for God [“Kunst ist eine 
Sehnsucht zu Gott.”] and a kind of “worship” [“Gottesdienst”]. His paintings are “prayers with 
colors”,5 as he said. The painting reproduced here takes this theme further by exploring the notion 
of the “word” and representing it through a face Ŕ however, it is a face that can hardly be 
recognized as such, being reduced to some lines and geometrical figures. In fact, this symphony 
of colors evokes feelings, sensations, and an état d‟âme which go beyond what is represented.6 
Thus, the represented head is a sort of a metaphysical head that reveals the “face” of “the word”.  
 
 The connection between the “face” and the “word” lies at the center of the thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995).  As he points out in his article “Signature” in Difficult Freedom, 
                                                 
2
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas”, conducted by Tamra 
Wright, Peter Hughes and Alison Ainley, in: The Provocation of Levinas. Rethinking the Other, ed. by Robert 
Bernasconi and David Wood, pp. 168-180, p. 169. 
3
 For detailed picture credits regarding the reproduced images see Table of Figures. For Jawlensky‟s painting “The 
Word” see especially: Alexej von Jawlensky. Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil Paintings, Volume Two, 1914-1933, ed. 
by Maria Jawlensky, Lucia Pieroni-Jawlensky and Angelica Jawlensky, p. 506.  
4
 Weiler, Clemens, Alexej Jawlensky. Köpfe, Gesichte, Meditationen, see illustration no. 18: “Ein Gesicht ist für mich 
nicht ein Gesicht, sondern der ganze Kosmos. Im Gesicht offenbart sich der ganze Kosmos.” 
5
 Ibid., the citations can be found, after p. 26, at illustration no. 12 and no. 22, and at p. 99. 
6
 On the topic of “the spiritual in art”, revelation and modern Jewish thought, see Braiterman, Zachary, The Shape of 
Revelation. Aesthetics and Modern Jewish Thought. Braiterman focuses on the art and art theories of Wassily 
Kandinsky, Paul Klee and Franz Marc (painters whose works are near to Jawlensky) and puts them in dialogue with 
the works of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber. 
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“[t]he expressing of the face is language.”7 In Levinas‟s view it is precisely through the face that 
language as such becomes possible. It is the face that gives human beings the possibility of 
having a language and of being able to speak, as Levinas underlines in his interview with 
Philippe Nemo: “The face speaks. It is in this that it renders possible and begins all discourse.”8 
So, in a certain way, Jawlensky‟s painting provides a visualization of the link between word and 
face that characterizes Levinas‟s thought. This little detour to modern art allows us to introduce 
the concept of the face, by situating it in a broader artistic context which emphasizes the 
connection between face, language and transcendence. In fact, the link between art and the 
concept of the face goes even further, as formulated by Levinas: “Perhaps art seeks to give a face 
to things, and in this its greatness and its deceit simultaneously reside.”9 
  
         According to Levinas, the face cannot be seen as such. It is beyond representation and 
cannot be grasped through perception. The face is beyond visibility which makes it at first sight 
difficult to understand this important notion in Levinas‟s work. Yet in this beyond of visibility 
lies the crucial feature of the face for Levinas, as Edith Wyschogrod points out: “Far from 
yielding an essence of the human or a universal moral law as a distillate of faciality [sic], the face 
transcends images, remains exterior to them.”10 In this sense it can be conceived as the starting 
point of Levinas‟s whole philosophy. It is a decisive impulse for stepping out of the framework of 
phenomenology, which he followed, for instance, in his doctoral thesis on Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938).
11
 Levinas explains the great significance of the face for his philosophy as follows:  
 
The face is not the mere assemblage of a nose, a forehead, eyes, etc.; it is all that, of course, but takes 
on the meaning of a face through the new dimension it opens up in the perception of a being. [...] The 
face is an irreducible mode in which being can present itself in its identity.
12
 
 
                                                 
7
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Signature”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 291-295, p. 294/“Signature”, in: Difficile Liberté, pp. 
405-412, p. 410.  
8
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87/Éthique et Infini, p. 82. 
9
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Ethics and Spirit”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 3-10, p. 8/“Éthique et Esprit”, in: Difficile 
Liberté, pp. 13-23, pp. 20-21, emphasis added. 
10
 Wyschogrod, Edith, “Corporeality and the Glory of the Infinite in the Philosophy of Levinas”, in: Crossover 
Queries. Dwelling with Negatives, Embodying Philosophy‟s Others, pp. 29-44, p. 37. 
11
 See e.g. Levinas‟s thesis on the topic The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology/La théorie de l‟intuition 
dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, published in 1930. 
12
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Ethics and Spirit”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 3-10, p. 8/“Éthique et Esprit”, in: Difficile 
Liberté, pp. 13-23, p. 20. See further Perpich, Diane, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, chapter 2, “Singularity: The 
Unrepresentable Face”, pp. 50-77. 
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 From the beginning, the face possesses for Levinas an ethical dimension which is connected to 
language and discourse. It is precisely through its specific physical appearance that the face holds 
this important metaphysical position in Levinas‟s thinking:  
 
[...] those eyes, which are absolutely without protection, the most naked part of the human body, none 
the less offer an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder is inscribed: the temptation of 
absolute negation. The Other is the only being that one can be tempted to kill. This temptation to 
murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the very vision of the face. To see a face is already 
to hear „You shall not kill‟, and to hear „You shall not kill‟ is to hear „Social justice‟.13  
 
The face speaks and in its silent language it states what lies at the very basis of language and 
what provides the sine qua non for discourse: the commandment „You shall not kill‟. Hence, 
Levinas concludes that “language is not only a system of signs in the service of a pre-existing 
system. Speech belongs to the order of morality before belonging to that of theory.”14 These 
introductory remarks on the significance of the face and its connection to language outline the 
setting out of which Levinas‟s thought evolves.      
                                                                                   
 In the following chapters, I will compare the notion of language and its various aspects in 
Levinas‟s work with the thought of Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929). Many essential ideas of 
Rosenzweig‟s work had a significant impact on Levinas‟s thought. Originally attracted to 
Rosenzweig‟s work by “the opposition to the idea of totality”,15 Levinas developed a thinking 
that is essentially influenced by Rosenzweig. The often quoted sentence of the foreword of 
Levinas‟s first major work Totality and Infinity (1961),16 which states that Rosenzweig‟s Star of 
Redemption (1921) would be “too often present in this book to be cited”,17 is a highly interesting 
remark in this context. It underscores the fact that Levinas‟s discourse as a whole is so deeply 
penetrated by Rosenzweig‟s thought that he does not even try to separate it through quotation 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., pp. 8-9/p. 21.  
14
 Ibid., p. 9/p. 21, emphasis added. 
15
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, p. 28. Henceforth cited as TI/Totalité et Infini. 
Essai sur l‟extériorité, p. 14, henceforth cited as Ti: “L‟opposition à l‟idée de totalité nous a frappé dans le Stern der 
Erlösung de Franz Rosenzweig, trop souvent présent dans ce livre pour être cité.” On the critique of totality in the 
work of Franz Rosenzweig see further Mosès, Stéphane, “La critique de la totalité dans la philosophie de Franz 
Rosenzweig”.       
16
 Usually Levinas‟s Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) are regarded 
as his first and second major works because in these two writings crucial notions of his thinking are worked out in a 
broader context. 
17
 Levinas, Emmanuel, TI, p. 28/Ti, p. 14. 
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marks. The transitions to Rosenzweig‟s Star are thus fluent and inherent in the entire discourse of 
Totality and Infinity. In fact, as observed by Robert Gibbs, one could even say that Levinas‟s 
work would not have been possible without Rosenzweig: “Would Levinas‟s work be possible 
without Rosenzweig? No Ŕ for Rosenzweig permeates Levinas‟s schema and even his key 
concepts.”18   
 
 Also in their biographies one can find remarkable parallels: for both thinkers, Judaism was 
not a mere private or doctrinal matter, but an element that deeply influenced their lives and 
thought. For example, Rosenzweig was the founder of the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in 
Frankfurt, an independant Jewish „House of Learning‟ for adult education in Jewish culture, 
while Levinas worked many years as a teacher and director of the École Normale Israélite 
Orientale (ENIO) in Paris. Judaism was for both of them a lived experience, realized in concrete 
existence, and not just an abstract philosophical or theological thought. This fact is stated by 
Levinas in his reflections on Rosenzweig, where he points out that in The Star of Redemption 
“Jewish existence […] itself is an essential event of being; Jewish existence is a category of 
being.”19 I will explain this important aspect, in the first chapter “Emmanuel Levinas and Franz 
Rosenzweig on Judaism and philosophy”. This chapter deals in particular with the works Levinas 
dedicated to the interpretation of Rosenzweig‟s philosophy, i.e., two articles and a smaller text 
written as a foreword to Stéphane Mosès‟s study on Rosenzweig‟s philosophy System and 
Revelation.
20
 These texts provide evidence of an ongoing confrontation with Rosenzweig‟s 
thought in Levinas‟s work. I analyze these texts and put them in the broader context of the 
discussion on the relationship between Judaism and philosophy in the work of both thinkers. This 
                                                 
18
 Gibbs, Robert, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, p. 32. For more recently published comparative studies on 
Rosenzweig and Levinas, see also Fonti, Diego, Levinas und Rosenzweig. Das Denken, der Andere und die Zeit, and  
Anckaert, Luc, A Critique of Infinity. Rosenzweig and Levinas. 
19
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “„Between Two Worlds‟ (The Way of Franz Rosenzweig)”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 181-
201, p. 183/“Entre deux mondes. La voie de Franz Rosenzweig”, in: Difficile Liberté, pp. 253-281, p. 256, emphasis 
in the original. 
20
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “„Between Two Worlds‟ (The Way of Franz Rosenzweig)”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 181-
201/“Entre deux mondes. La voie de Franz Rosenzweig”, in: Difficile Liberté, pp. 253-281; “Franz Rosenzweig. A 
modern Jewish thinker”, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, Outside the Subject, pp. 37-50/“Franz Rosenzweig. Une pensée 
juive moderne”, in: Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Vol. 15, 1965, pp. 208-221, reprinted in: Hors sujet, 
Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1987, pp. 67-89; “Foreword”, in: Mosès, Stéphane, System and Revelation. The 
Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, pp. 13-22. Reprinted under the title “The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig. Préface 
to Système et Révélation by Stéphane Mosès”, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, In the Time of the Nations, pp. 135-
144/“Préface d‟Emmanuel Levinas”, in: Mosès, Stéphane, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz 
Rosenzweig, pp. 7-16.   
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offers the reader an overview of the spiritual connection between Rosenzweig and Levinas as the 
background upon which their thoughts developed. 
 
          The outlined aspects of Levinas‟s philosophy will be put into dialogue with Rosenzweig‟s 
work by taking into consideration the correspondence of Rosenzweig with Margrit (Gritli) 
Rosenstock-Huessy (1893-1959).
21
 Gritli was the wife of Rosenzweig‟s friend Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) and had a love affair with Rosenzweig from 1918 until 1922. 
The extensive correspondence between Gritli and Rosenzweig was published in 2002. These 
letters provide a new impetus for research on Rosenzweig‟s philosophy and the complexity of his 
life. There can be no doubt that these letters are very important for adequate research into 
Rosenzweig‟s life and work; they give us the possibility to reread his oeuvre in new light.22 The 
“Gritli”-letters offer thus a new approach to the work of Rosenzweig.  
 
         An aspect that has been less considered, but attracts more and more attention in the last 
decade of years, concerns the fact that Levinas‟s thought evolved in a twofold way: on the one 
hand, in his philosophical writings and, on the other hand, in his Talmudic lectures.
23
 From the 
end of the fifties until late in his life, Levinas regularly held a Talmudic reading at the Colloque 
des intellectuels juifs de langue française, which were subsequently published in collections such 
as Quatre lectures talmudiques (1968) and Du sacré au saint (1977).
24
 These texts, often 
neglected or presented as secondary to his philosophical work, are fundamental to elaborating the 
key notions of Levinas‟s philosophy. Therefore, the present thesis focuses on both text genres of 
Levinas‟s work in order to get an appropriate view of his whole work. 
 
                                                 
21
 Rosenzweig, Franz, Die “Gritli”-Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, henceforth cited as Gritli-Briefe. 
For a review of this edition see the article of Michael Zank, “The Rosenzweig-Rosenstock-Triangle, or, What Can 
We Learn from „Letters to Gritli‟?: A Review Essay”. See also the critical review by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “Ein 
Éditionsskandal. 1053 neue Briefe von Franz Rosenzweig und viel zu viele Lücken”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 3.6.2002. Unfortunately, the letters Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy wrote to Rosenzweig have been lost or 
destroyed. Thus the editon can only render a partial image of their correspondence. Almost all the Gritli-letters were 
put on the internet by Michael Gormann-Thelen on behalf of the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund, see: 
http://www.argobooks.org/gritli/index.html (7.5.2011). 
22
 The first significant contribution to research in this area was made by Ephraim Meir in his study Letters of Love. 
Franz Rosenzweig‟s Spiritual Biography and Oeuvre in Light of the Gritli Letters, published in 2006. 
23
 See for example the studies of Nordmann, Sophie, Philosophie et Judaïsme, and Meir, Ephraim, Levinas‟s Jewish 
Thought Between Jerusalem and Athens.   
24
 For an English translation of some of Levinas‟s Talmudic readings, see Levinas, Emmanuel, Nine Talmudic 
Readings, trans. by Annette Aronowicz. 
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How much Levinas‟s Jewish and philosophical thinking are related can be further seen 
from his recently published notebooks, which he wrote during his captivity as a prisoner of war in 
the Second World War: the Carnets de captivité [captivity notebooks].
25
 These notebooks 
provide a new view on the development of his work and, thereby, can be seen as crucial to the 
exegesis of Levinas‟s work.26 This new edition provides an indispensable tool for scholars to 
obtain an overview of Levinas‟s work. In fact Levinas‟s seven captivity notebooks allow 
captivating insights into the laboratory of his thoughts.
27
 First and foremost, a new style in 
Levinas‟s work can be found: that of aphorism, i.e. a thought in fragments, due to the 
circumstances of his captivity. Through its “broken” style, Levinas‟s thinking reflects the “reality 
fracture” he experienced and which he described at the beginning of his book Existence and 
Existents as “„a world in pieces‟ or „a world turned upside down‟”.28 While he later only rarely 
gave testimony of his experiences during the war, he described in his captivity notebooks very 
vividly the sufferings of monotony and the never-ending task of labor, the seeming standstill of 
time and the persistent feeling of being deprived of human dignity and individuality; it is above 
all the experience of having lost one‟s “face” Ŕ precisely the term that became so important in his 
philosophy.  
          
         In the second and third chapters, entitled “Time and Language” and “Language and Speech-
Thinking”, I confront the concept of speech in Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking (Neues Denken) with 
the notion of an „ethical language‟ in Levinas‟s thought. Levinas elaborated the notion of an 
                                                 
25
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets de captivité, suivi de Écrits sur la captivité et Notes philosophiques diverses, 
henceforth cited as Carnets. In the following, all translations are mine, followed by the French version. For reviews 
of the Carnets see Weill, Nicolas, “Emmanuel Levinas, philosophe du désastre”, in: Le Monde, 23.10.2009, p. 9, 
Richter, Silvia, “Der Weg zum Anderen beginnt in der zerbrochenen Welt”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
7.11.2009, p. 32, and Hanus, Gilles, “Recension „Lévinas, Emmanuel, Œuvres complètes, tome 1, Paris, 
Grasset/IMEC, 2009‟”. See also the anthology Levinas et l‟expérience de la captivité, ed. by Danielle Cohen-
Levinas, which discusses various topics Levinas dealt with in the Carnets de captivité.  
26
 The juridical quarrels between Levinas‟s children made it impossible for researchers to study and work with the 
unedited material of Levinas‟s work, which is kept at the Institut de memoires de l‟édition contemporaine (IMEC), 
situated in a former abbey in Normandy in France. See the website of the Levinas archive at: http://www.imec-
archives.com/fonds_archives_fiche.php?i=LVN (7.5.2011) The publication of these writings is the merit of Michaël 
Levinas, the son and literary executer of Emmanuel Levinas. Under the aegis of Jean-Luc Marion, an international 
research team has been working together to publish the present volume, Carnets de captivité, which is the first 
volume of the collected works (Œuvres complètes) of Levinas. The whole edition will consist of seven volumes, 
three with unpublished material, and four volumes reediting the already edited writings, taking into account the 
unpublished, preliminary studies.  
27
 Levinas started to write his notebooks in 1937. He continued to write them also after the war, until 1950, be it only 
two pages a year; cf. Calin, Rodolphe and Chalier, Catherine, “Préface”, pp. 13-40, p. 13, in: Carnets.  
28
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Existence and Existents, p. 21. Henceforth cited as EE/De l‟existence à l‟existant, p. 25. 
Henceforth cited as DEE. Levinas speaks of “a world in pieces” (“monde cassé”) and “a world turned upside down” 
(“monde bouleversé”), see EE/DEE, ibid. 
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„ethical language‟ especially in his second major work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 
(1974), which reflects this question by using a special vocabulary such as “accusation”, 
“persecution”, “obsession”, “substitution” and “hostage”. These at first sight unusual 
philosophical terms play a crucial role in Levinas‟s philosophy. By means of these notions he 
deploys his concept of an ethical language that attempts to express what he calls “the paradox in 
which phenomenology suddenly finds itself [le paradoxe où se trouve brusquement jetée la 
phénoménologie]”.29 The paradox expressed here is the fact that ethical language seeks to 
thematize the unthematizable. According to Simon Critchley, “as so often in the later Levinas, it 
is a question of trying to say that which cannot be said.”30 In order to find an adequate solution to 
this problem, Levinas dedicates a whole chapter in Otherwise than Being to the notions of the 
Said (le Dit) and the Saying (le Dire) and emphasizes the importance of the spoken, face-to-face 
word.
31
 According to Levinas, the Said has to be broken up by means of a Saying which always 
allows for a new and different expression of that which has already been said. In the foreword of 
Totality and Infinity Levinas underscores this idea, emphasizing that  
 
[…] the very essence of language […] consists in continually undoing its phrase by the foreword or 
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what has already been 
ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said delights.
32  
 
Though the aspect of the Said and the Saying appears already in Totality and Infinity, it manifests 
its whole significance especially in the writing of Otherwise than Being, where Levinas 
emphasized the importance of language for his philosophy in a radical manner.
33
 However, it is 
much debated in the research literature on Levinas whether this development of his philosophy 
                                                 
29
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Substitution”, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, Emmanuel Levinas. Basic Philosophical Writings, 
pp. 79-96, p. 92.  
30
 Critchley, Simon, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity, p. 185. On this topic see further Franke, William, On What Cannot 
Be Said. Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts. 
31
 See Waldenfels, Bernhard, “Levinas on the Saying and the Said”, in: Addressing Levinas, ed. by Eric Nelson, 
Antje Kapust and Kent Still, pp. 86-97. In the following I capitalize, where necessary, “Saying” and “Said” in order 
to highlight the special notions of Levinas‟s work. My use follows Levinas‟s own writing of “Dire” and “Dit”, 
however differs from the English translation of Otherwise than Being, where one can find the use of small letters for 
these notions, i.e. “saying” and “said”.           
32
 Levinas, Emmanuel, TI, p. 30/Ti, p. 16, emphasis added. 
33
 See Weber, Elisabeth, Verfolgung und Trauma. Zu Emmanuel Levinas‟s „Autrement qu‟être ou au-delà de 
l‟essence‟, and the work of Wiemer, Thomas, the German translator of Levinas‟s Otherwise than Being, Die Passion 
des Sagens. Zur Deutung der Sprache bei Emmanuel Levinas und ihrer Realisierung im philosophischen Diskurs.      
 17 
can be seen as partly influenced by the reception of Jacques Derrida.
34
 The problem pointed out 
by Derrida in his essay Violence and Metaphysics highlights the question: how can one speak in 
the scope of a philosophical work about problems which can not be expressed in a philosophical 
manner?
35
 Derrida claims that Levinas‟s ethical rupture with the ontological and 
phenomenological tradition can only be accomplished through a renunciation of the linguistic 
resources of that tradition. Therefore, Levinas‟s thought is for Derrida “consequently caught in a 
double bind, between belonging to the tradition and achieving a breakthrough that goes beyond 
the tradition.”36 I discuss this problem further in chapter two.37   
 
         In this context, two aspects are fundamental for Rosenzweig and Levinas: revelation and 
language. The latter is at the core of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking, which is to be thought of as a 
“speech-thinking” or “speaking-thinking” [Sprachdenken], unlike the abstract thinking of 
academic philosophy, which is a thinking for no one because it speaks to no one.
38
 In 
contradistinction, Rosenzweig explains that “the New Thinking‟s method originates out of its 
temporality. […] Into the place of the method of thinking, as all previous philosophy developed 
it, steps the method of speaking.”39 The two main aspects on which this new method focuses are 
“[…] needing the other and, what amounts to the same, on taking time seriously.”40 The living 
speech is also central for Levinas‟s philosophy. In his view, “the banal fact of conversation […] 
quits the order of violence. This banal fact is the marvel of marvels.”41 It is in the word spoken to 
a fellow man face-to-face where the idea of peace is realized for Levinas: “The face is what one 
                                                 
34
 See e.g. the writings of the Levinas scholar Richard A. Cohen, who argues that Derrida‟s reception of Levinas‟s 
work was in fact “a total misreading” (personal communication to the author).    
35
 Derrida, Jacques, “Violence and Metaphysics”, in: Writing and Difference, pp. 79-153/“Violence et 
Métaphysique”, in: L‟Ecriture et la différence, pp. 117-228. Regarding Levinas‟s work Derrida furthermore 
published “At this very moment in this work here I am”/“En ce moment même dans cet ouvrage me voici” as well as 
Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas/Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas for his part argued with the philosophy of Derrida 
in his text “Jacques Derrida: Wholly Otherwise”, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, Proper Names, pp. 55-62/“Tout 
autrement”, in: Noms Propres, pp. 81-89. 
36
 Critchley, Simon, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, pp. 69-70. 
37
 See chapter II, 2. b), “„In the heart of a chiasmus‟ Ŕ Jacques Derrida‟s critique of language in Levinas‟s work and 
the problem of narrativity”. 
38
 Glatzer, Nahum N., “The Concept of Language in the Thought of Franz Rosenzweig”, p. 183. 
39
 Rosenzweig, Franz, “The New Thinking”, in: Rosenzweig, Franz, Philosophical and Theological Writings, pp. 
109-139, p. 125, emphasis added/“Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum „Stern der Erlösung‟”, 
in: Rosenzweig, Franz, Der Mensch und sein Werk, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. III, pp. 139-161, p. 151, henceforth 
cited as GS, followed by the respective volume number.  
40
 Ibid., p. 127/pp. 151-152.  
41
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Ethics and Spirit”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 3-10, p. 7/“Éthique et Esprit”, in: Difficile 
Liberté, pp. 13-23, p. 19.   
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cannot kill, or at least it is that whose meaning consists in saying: „thou shalt not kill‟.”42 
Therefore, the dialogue holds such a crucial position in his thought. According to Levinas 
nothing less than “the Infinite passes in the saying.”43 Rosenzweig, on his part, stated the 
importance of the dialogue in a letter to Gritli as follows: “Word must be response, in order to be 
word.”44 Since the mentioned categories, developed by Rosenzweig, also play a crucial role in the 
philosophy of Levinas, a close reading of both works may be helpful in shedding new light on the 
interpretation of Levinas‟s writings, especially regarding the notions of the Said and the Saying, 
but furthermore also concerning the role of language and speech as such in Levinas‟s thought.  
 
         Finally, in the fourth chapter, I connect these insights by drawing special attention to the 
phenomenon of the voice. In the research on Levinas‟s work, the notion of the voice has been 
only marginally considered until now. However, this notion can nonetheless offer an interesting 
new approach for an innovative reinterpretation of Levinas‟s later work, as I demonstrate. In this 
context, I rely on the recently increased research literature on the notion of the voice, which will 
be connected to the notion of the Saying (le Dire) in Levinas‟s thinking in order to highlight the 
coming-into-being (the mise-en-scène) of subjectivity in his thought.
45
 I hope my insights will 
give impulses for postmodern ethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87/Éthique et Infini, p. 81. See on this topic the article by Butler, Judith 
“Être en relation avec autrui face-à-face, c‟est ne pas pouvoir tuer”.  
43
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, henceforth cited as OBBE, p. 147/Autrement 
qu‟être ou au-delà de l‟essence, henceforth cited as AQE, p. 188.  
44
 Rosenzweig, Franz, “Gritli”-Briefe, p. 648, 26.8.1920: “Wort muss Antwort sein, um Wort sein zu können.” 
Emphasis added. 
45
 See the works of Mladen Dolar, Dieter Mersch, Doris Kolesch/Sybille Krämer and Friedrich Kittler/Thomas 
Macho/Sigrid Weigel in the bibliography.   
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Part I - Judaism 
 
Chapter I 
 
Emmanuel Levinas and Franz Rosenzweig on  
Judaism and philosophy 
 
 
                                                                                             In spite of the years of terrible experience that      
                                                                                             already separate us from his day, [...] we recognize   
                                                                                             Rosenzweig as a contemporary and a brother. 
46
 
 
                                                                                             Contrary to appearances, one can‟t escape the feeling   
                                                                                             that life is not primarily an organically incoherent   
                                                                                             mass of phenomena, but that it has a transcendence.
47 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                             
 
 To start with an overview of the relationship between Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel 
Levinas, I present in the following the texts Levinas dedicated to the life and work of Franz 
Rosenzweig and place them in dialogue with Rosenzweig‟s own views on Judaism and 
philosophy. In order to situate Levinas‟s reflections on Rosenzweig in a broader framework, I 
begin by outlining the central themes of Levinas‟s early philosophical writings, e.g. On Escape 
(1935), and his views on Judaism prior to the Second World War. Special attention will be paid 
in this context to Levinas‟s statements on Judaism during his captivity in the Second World War. 
These aspects will then be further discussed by taking into account Levinas‟s text on Rosenzweig 
after the war. 
 
                                                 
46
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Between Two Worlds (The Way of Franz Rosenzweig)”, in: Difficult Freedom, pp. 181- 
201, p. 183/“Entre deux mondes. La voie de Franz Rosenzweig”, in: Difficile Liberté, pp. 253-281, p. 257. 
47
 Kertész, Imre, Ich – ein Anderer, p. 100: “Man wird das Gefühl nicht los, dass das Leben nicht primär eine 
organisch zusammenhanglose Masse von Phänomenen ist, wie es den Anschein macht, sondern dass es eine 
Transzendenz hat.” 
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 To provide some background information on what follows, I give a short summary of 
Levinas‟s biography. After becoming a French citizen in 1930, Levinas was called up for military 
service in 1939. However, shortly afterwards he came into German captivity, which he spent first 
in France (in Rennes, Laval and Vesoul), from 1940 until 1942, then from June 1942 until May 
1945 in Germany, in Fallingbostel, a camp near Hanover in the Luneburg Heath.
48
 Whilst 
Levinas survived the war, as did his wife and small daughter, who through the help of Maurice 
Blanchot could hide under a false name in a French monastery, his whole family in Lithuania fell 
victim to the Nazi persecution.
49
 This led Levinas to the decision never again to set foot on 
German territory Ŕ a decision he remained faithful to throughout his life, without however 
abandoning the intellectual exchange with German scholars. 
 
 
 
1.)     Levinas‟s early philosophical reflections on being and death in light of his                                   
                 Carnets de captivité         
 
 
 Levinas‟s captivity notebooks, the Carnets de captivité, are an impressive testimony of the 
difficult times he endured during his captivity and the manner in which he coped with them. In 
the Carnets one can find many statements which testify to the significance Judaism held for 
Levinas in these years. Further, it becomes clear that the experiences of the war and the captivity 
had a certain influence on his thoughts on Judaism and philosophy.
50
 By means of the Carnets 
one can trace back to the point where Levinas‟s thinking begins, for example in the famous 
opening sentence of Totality and Infinity: “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest 
importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.”51 This recalls the statements in the 
Carnets, where Levinas deals with the experience of the Second World War:  
 
                                                 
48
 Calin, Rodolphe, “Notice sur les Carnets de captivité”, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets, p. 50. See also Malka, 
Salomon, Emmanuel Levinas. La vie et la trace, p. 80 ff. 
49
 Malka, Salomon, Emmanuel Levinas. La vie et la trace, pp. 94-95.  
50
 See Levinas‟s texts “Écrits sur la captivité”, written shortly after the war, in: Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets, pp. 
199-215, in particular “La spiritualité chez le prisonnier israélite”, pp. 205-208, and “L‟expérience juive du 
prisonnier ”, pp. 209-215. 
51
 Levinas, Emmanuel, TI, p. 21/Ti, p. 5. 
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The real problem of the concentration camp situation is, on the one hand, the relativity of most of the 
peaceful values Ŕ only fools will continue to respect the peaceful values, property Ŕ health Ŕ respect; 
and yet, in this reversal of values, not to absolutely lose all morals. Practically, it is to conceive the 
possibility of a return to peace and responsibility to this peace.
52
 
 
This statement, dated “déc. 1948”, can be found on the last pages of Levinas‟s Carnets de 
captivité. It proves how much Levinas‟s thinking was shaped as a reflection of the experience of 
war he endured; although it must be stated in this context that Levinas was in a labor camp and 
not in a concentration camp. The outlined issue is also taken up in Levinas‟s philosophical notes, 
written during the fifties, mostly as preparatory notes for Totality and Infinity, where Levinas 
emphasizes: “War is a type of violence like no other. It destroys the entire order of morality Ŕ it is 
morally pure disorder.”53 Hence, it seems to me that a line of thought can be drawn from his war 
experience to his first major philosophical work Totality and Infinity, published in 1961. This is a 
fact which had been assumed by researchers, but was only recently clearly revealed through the 
publication of Levinas‟s Carnets de captivité.  
  
          However, also during the thirties Levinas‟s work was influenced by political developments. 
He published, for example, many articles in various Jewish journals concerning the current 
situation of Judaism and the political situation in Europe, with special attention to the rise of 
European anti-Semitism. In these articles Levinas reveals an astonishing foresight into the 
consequences of the political changes. In his article “L‟inspiration religieuse de l‟Alliance”, 
published in 1935 in Paix et Droit, the journal of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Levinas 
points out what it means to be Jewish against the background of National Socialism rising to 
power:  
 
Hitlerism is the greatest trial Ŕ the incomparable trial Ŕ that Judaism has had to go through. […] The 
pathetic destiny of being Jewish becomes a fatality. We can no longer flee it. The Jew is ineluctably 
                                                 
52
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets, p. 189: “Le vrai problème de la situation concentrationnaire: d‟une part la relativité 
de la plupart des valeurs pacifiques Ŕ seuls les imbéciles continuent à respecter les valeurs pacifiques, propriété Ŕ 
santé Ŕ respect; et cependant dans ce renversement des valeurs, ne pas perdre toute morale absolue. Pratiquement: 
concevoir la possibilité d‟un retour de la paix et la responsabilité à l‟égard de cette paix.” 
53
 Ibid., p. 403: “La guerre n‟est pas une violence comme une autre. Elle détruit tout l‟ordre de la morale Ŕ elle est 
moralement le désordre pur.” 
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riveted to his Judaism. […] [I]n the barbarian and primitive symbol of race […] Hitler has reminded 
us, that we cannot abandon Judaism.
54
 
 
Further, Levinas connects the historical situation with a particular state of mind: the sentiment of 
being riveted to one‟s being which one cannot escape. In his article “Martin Heidegger et 
l‟ontologie”, published in 1932, Levinas first used the French word “rivé” in connection with 
Heidegger‟s notion of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit).55 According to Levinas‟s article, Heidegger 
shows “that Dasein is riveted [rivé] to its possibilities, that its „right-there‟ is imposed upon it. In 
existing, Dasein is always already thrown into the midst of its possibilities and not positioned 
before them.”56 The simultaneous appearance in this article of Levinas‟s discussion of 
Heidegger‟s ontology and the first reference to the notion of “being riveted” does not occur 
accidentally in my view. Rather it marks the beginning of Levinas‟s impulse to move beyond the 
concepts of Heideggerian philosophy as an attempt at “getting out of being by a new path”,57 in 
the words of the concluding sentence of On Escape. In this way, Levinas seeks to work out 
nothing less than “a new definition of being”.58 The similar occurrence of the problem of „being 
riveted‟ to being, on the one hand, and, „being riveted‟ to Judaism, on the other hand, in 
Levinas‟s writings during the thirties is remarkable. Nonetheless it has to be underscored that 
these notions differ on one important point: in the first case, there is a phenomenological 
problem, in the second an ontological. The latter offered no chance to escape since the racial anti-
Semitism of National Socialism offered no chance for the Jews to escape from „being Jewish‟. In 
contradistinction, Levinas outlines in his work, especially in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise 
                                                 
54
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “L‟inspiration religieuse de l‟alliance”, in: Cahier de l‟Herne, ed. by Catherine Chalier and 
Miguel Abensour, pp. 144-146, here p. 144 and p. 146: “L‟hitlérisme est la plus grande épreuve Ŕ l‟épreuve 
incomparable Ŕ que le judaïsme ait eue à traverser. […] Le sort pathétique d‟être juif devient une fatalité. On ne peut 
plus le fuir. Le juif est inéluctablement rivé à son judaïsme. […] [D]ans le symbole barbare et primitif de race […] 
Hitler a rappelé que l‟on ne déserte pas le judaïsme.” Emphasis in the original.  
55
 Heidegger develops this notion in § 29 of Being and Time/Sein und Zeit. 
56
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Martin Heidegger and Ontology”, p. 24/“Martin Heidegger et l‟ontologie”, p. 417: “Mais la 
disposition affective [Befindlichkeit] dont la compréhension ne se détache point nous révèle un caractère 
fondamental de cette dernière. Elle nous révèle le fait que le Dasein est rivé à ses possibilités, que son „ici-bas‟ 
s‟impose à lui. En existant le Dasein est d‟ores et déjà jeté au milieu de ses possibilités et non pas placé devant 
elles.” Emphasis in the original. The article has been re-edited in a slightly abbreviated and revised version in 
Levinas, Emmanuel, En découvrant l‟existence avec Husserl and Heidegger, pp. 77-109, p. 99: “La disposition 
affective qui ne se détache pas de la compréhension Ŕ par laquelle la compréhension existe Ŕ nous révèle le fait que 
le Dasein est voué à ses possibilités que son „ici-bas‟ s‟impose à lui. […] En existant le Dasein est d‟ores et déjà jeté 
au milieu de ses possibilités et non pas placé devant elles.” Emphasis in the original.        
57
 Levinas, Emmanuel, On escape, p. 73/De l‟évasion, p. 127. 
58
 Ciaramelli, Fabio, “De l‟évasion à l‟exode: Subjectivité et existence chez le jeune Levinas”, p. 564. 
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than Being, a possibility to escape from Being “by a new path,” as announced in On Escape.59 By 
bringing Being under the wings of ethics and the infinite call of the other, which demands 
responsibility, Levinas presents ethics as prima philosophia. Ethics precedes ontology for 
Levinas. The claimed responsibility is fundamental in his eyes. Its demand cannot be rejected. 
Being is conceived of as being elected to a responsibility to which each man is called upon in 
his/her very own uniqueness. For this responsibility one cannot be replaced and, in this sense, 
man also cannot escape the responsibility imposed on him. However, the issue of being riveted to 
an infinite responsibility towards the other belongs to the realm of metaphysics for Levinas, 
beyond the ontological problem of „being riveted to being‟.             
 
 The notion of being riveted to oneself is central for Levinas‟s early thinking. It is present in 
his philosophical writings, first and foremost in his study On Escape (1935), but also in his 
articles on Judaism during the same period. Starting from “[t]he elementary truth that there is 
being”60, Levinas argues in On Escape that “the ground of suffering consists of the impossibility 
of interrupting it [being] and of an acute feeling of being held fast [rivé].”61 He links his 
philosophical point of departure with a reminiscence of the First World War, emphasizing that, 
“[t]he being of the I [moi], which war and war‟s aftermath have allowed us to know, leaves us 
with no further games [plus aucun jeu]. The need to be right, or justified [d‟en avoir raison], in 
this game can only be a need for escape.”62 Levinas characterizes this need to escape as “the 
fundamental event of our being”.63 Through an analysis of need and its specific structure, Levinas 
intends “to renew the ancient problem of being qua being”.64 In this context he defines existence 
as an identity which necessarily entails an enchainment of man to his or her identity, that is, to 
the fact of being one-self. Thus, to feel the need to escape lies actually at the heart of every 
further inquiry of being, as Levinas points out:  
 
In the identity of the I [moi], the identity of being reveals its nature as enchainment for it appears in 
the form of suffering and invites us to escape. Thus, escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to 
                                                 
59
 Levinas, Emmanuel, On escape, p. 73/De l‟évasion, p. 127.  
60
 Ibid., p. 52/pp. 94-95, emphasis in the original.   
61
 Ibid.  
62
 Ibid., p. 53/p. 95. 
63
 Ibid., p. 60/p. 106. 
64
 Ibid., p. 56/ p. 99. 
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break that most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the I [moi] is one-self [soi-
même].
65
 
 
Levinas goes on, then, to analyze pleasure as the impulse to fulfill one‟s need. In order to flee 
oneself, man searches satisfaction in pleasure and is deeply disappointed because what he finds is 
precisely not the desired escape, but an even more intensified feeling of being held fast. In fact 
Levinas sees being riveted to oneself by means of pleasure as the conditio humana par 
excellence. He argues that “the satisfaction of a need does not destroy it. Not only are needs 
reborn, but disappointment also follows their satisfaction. […] What gives the human condition 
all its importance is precisely this inadequacy of satisfaction to need.”66 As man finds himself in 
the desperate position that his desire is essentially insatiable, a feeling of shame arouses. It is 
precisely here, according to Levinas, that the human being discovers himself as such: “What 
shame discovers [découvre] is the being who uncovers himself [se découvre].”67 Thus, the 
identity of being goes hand in hand with shame and the feeling of being held fast to oneself.
68
  
 
 In a second step, Levinas explains in On Escape the feeling of being riveted to one‟s 
existence by referring to the feeling that precedes vomiting: nausea.
69
 He argues that  
 
[…] this fact of being riveted, constitutes all the anxiety of nausea. In nausea Ŕ which amounts to an 
impossibility of being what one is Ŕ we are riveted to ourselves, enclosed in a tight circle that 
smothers. We are there, and there is nothing more to be done, or anything to add to this fact that we 
have been entirely delivered up, that everything is consumed: this is the very experience of pure being 
[…].70  
 
By connecting nausea with the „impossibility of being what one is‟ and, further, with the 
experience of pure being, Levinas confronts us with a paradoxical situation: this means, strictly 
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 Ibid., p. 55/p. 98. 
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 Ibid., pp. 59-60/pp. 105-106. 
67
 Ibid., p. 65/p. 114: “Ce que la honte découvre c‟est l‟être qui se découvre.” 
68
 See Rolland, Jacques, “Sortir de l‟être par une nouvelle voie”, the foreword of On escape/De l‟évasion, note 51, p. 
84. Rolland notices that on the famous Renaissance fresco of Masaccio Adam and Eva expelled from Paradise, in the 
Brancacci Chapel in the church Santa Maria del Carmine in Florence, Adam covers precisely his face, not his 
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nakedness as “the need to excuse one‟s existence”, in: On escape, p. 65/De l‟évasion, p. 114, emphasis added.  
69
 On the topic of nausea see also the novel by Sartre, Jean-Paul, Nausea/La nausée, published in 1938, only three 
years after Levinas‟s On Escape (1935).  
70
 Levinas, Emmanuel, On escape, pp. 66-67/De l‟évasion, p. 116, emphasis in the original.  
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speaking, that being discovers itself precisely through the discovery of the impossibility of being 
what one is. The Heideggerian concept of ontology which is grounded in “Dasein […] [dem es] 
in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht”71 is revealed as insufficient with regard to the situation 
described by Levinas. This paradoxical situation finds an echoe in the thoughts of Ernst Bloch. In 
fact, one of Bloch‟s aphorisms in Traces [Spuren] draws attention to the uncanny feeling one has 
when one is all alone: “One is alone with oneself. Together with others, most are alone even 
without themselves. One has to get out of both.”72 This experience reveals that it is simply “Not 
enough” Ŕ the title of Bloch‟s aphorism Ŕ just to be. Bloch highlights this experience by pointing 
out the same malaise that Levinas had discovered in being:  
 
By ourselves we are still empty. So we easily fall asleep with no external stimuli. […] When 
one lies awake at night, that is hardly waking, but rather a stubborn, exhausting creeping in 
place. One notices then how unpleasant it is with nothing but oneself.
73
 
 
However, unlike Bloch, for Levinas this situation is not just unpleasant, but impossible to 
support. Therefore, Levinas speaks of the “need for escape [besoin d‟évasion]”74 which is 
connected in On Escape with an implicit criticism of Heidegger‟s notion of ontology. Although 
Heidegger‟s work is not directly cited in the text, Levinas develops his reflections in constant 
discussion with his former teacher‟s views. In this sense, as Jacques Rolland points out, Levinas‟s 
statement in his introduction to Existence and Existents (1947) is also important a posteriori for 
his essay On Escape (1935):  
 
If at the beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the relationship which man sustains with 
Being, they are also governed by a profound need to leave the climate of that philosophy, and by the 
conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be pre-Heideggerian.
75
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 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p. 32: “Dasein is […] ontically distinguished by the fact, that in its very 
Being, that Being is an issue for it.”/Sein und Zeit, p. 12 
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 Levinas, Emmanuel, On Escape, p. 56/De l‟évasion, p. 100, emphasis added. 
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 Levinas, Emmanuel, EE, p. 19/DEE, p. 19. See also Rolland, Jacques, “Sortir de l‟être par une nouvelle voie”, pp. 
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 Thus, starting with his studies and articles in the thirties, namely On Escape, Levinas began to 
work out a new conception of being, which develops a notion of being „beyond‟ the solipsism of 
the Heideggerian subject.
76
 
 
 It is noteworthy in this context that Levinas elaborates another notion during the period 
here analyzed, which has to be seen in connection with the above mentioned: the impossibility of 
dying.
77
 This notion is conceived of as an impossibility of not being. Already during the thirties, 
in On Escape, where Levinas states that “death is not the exit toward which escape thrusts us,”78 
and later on in his Carnets de captivité and Existence and Existents, Levinas develops this notion. 
It is recurrently present in many passages of the Carnets de captivité, where Levinas notes: 
“Death is not an exit. It does not protect from the desperate engagement without return, from the 
fact of being absolutely devoted, of not being able to escape Ŕ which is precisely existence.”79 In 
this context he alludes several times to Shakespeare‟s Hamlet and Macbeth in order to underscore 
an important aspect of this notion, that is, the fact that death does not free us from being: “Death 
is not an exit Ŕ it delivers to be, but it loses. The game is compromise. Hence the despair of 
Macbeth […].”80 And further, also in the Carnets de captivité: “Death. Not a solution by itself. 
1.) The game is lost. Macbeth. Job cursed his birth: death would not save him.”81 Levinas comes 
back to this aspect shortly after the war in Time and the Other (1947), where, alluding to Hamlet, 
he points out that “Hamlet […] understands that the „not to be‟ is perhaps impossible and he can 
no longer even through suicide, master the absurd.”82 He further argues that  
 
[t]he notion of irremissible being, without exit, constitutes the fundamental absurdity of being. Being 
is evil not because it is finite, but because it is without limits. According to Heidegger, anxiety is the 
experience of nothingness. On the contrary, if by death one means nothingness, is it not the fact that it 
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 For a detailed analysis of Levinas‟s discussion of Heidegger‟s work see Peperzak, Adriaan, “Einige Thesen zur 
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82
 Levinas refers to Shakespeare‟s plays Hamlet and Macbeth also in EE, p. 62/DEE, p. 101, and TO, p. 231/Ti, 256. 
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is impossible to die? […] „To be or not to be‟ is a sudden awareness of this impossibility of 
annihilating oneself.
83
 
 
In contrast to Heidegger who emphasized in Being and Time the notion of a being toward death 
(Sein zum Tode) and described death as the possibility of the impossibility [“Death is the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.”],84 since in death we get rid of all 
possibilities, Levinas characterizes death as the impossibility of the possibility of dying. This line 
of thought can be traced back in Levinas‟s work to the time during the war, as his Carnets 
demonstrate.
85
 It is taken up in Totality and Infinity (1961) in the notion of a being against death, 
in contrast to Heidegger‟s being toward death: “To be temporal is both to be for death and to still 
have time, to be against death.”86 Thereby Levinas distances himself clearly from Heidegger‟s 
notion of a being toward death, as Marc Crépon has pointed out.
87
 Furthermore, in Totality and 
Infinity Levinas cites again, with similar wording as in his earlier writings, the experience that 
„death is not an exit [sortie]‟, referring to the example of Macbeth:  
 
Suicide is tragic, for death does not bring a resolution to all the problems to which birth gave rise, and 
is powerless to humiliate the values of the earth Ŕ whence Macbeth‟s final cry in confronting death, 
defeated because the universe is not destroyed at the same time as his life.
88
 
 
In his captivity notebooks Levinas repeatedly speaks of the “impossibility of dying 
[l‟impossibilité de mourir]” as well as of “the impossibility of death [l‟impossibilité de la 
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mort]”.89 This aspect causes the horror of death for Levinas: “The horror of death is the horror of 
its „impossibility‟.”90 In this context the notion of the „lost game‟ is the most important aspect for 
Levinas, as he underlines in the captivity notebooks: “The concept of the „lost game‟ is for me 
the true concept of the impossibility of death.”91 Accordingly, this entails for Levinas that death 
is not as strong as being:  
 
I come back to the theme of death: The fact that death = lost game proves that death is not as strong 
as being. Even if it ends up being it does not exhaust all it [life] has done.
92
  
 
In his studies published shortly after the war, Time and the Other and Existence and Existents, 
Levinas puts particular emphasis on several instances of man‟s power regarding a possible 
“victory over death”93 which he sees realized through fecundity or, more concretely, in “the 
possibility of […] having a son”.94 Levinas‟s thoughts are in this context in a certain way similar 
to those of Franz Rosenzweig in The Star of Redemption, where Rosenzweig argues that “love is 
as strong as death”.95 Hence, for both thinkers death does not have the last word. This does not 
mean however that death is completely unimportant. Rather it shows that for both thinkers death 
should not be conceived as the ultimate perspective of their works. As Levinas repeatedly notes: 
death is not a solution for the problem at stake which being imposes on man. Accordingly it 
becomes comprehensible why Levinas underlines in his later work that what is at stake is first of 
all the mortality of the other man.
96
 It is not my death which frightens me but the death of the 
other. As Ephraim Meir points out  
 
[f]rom this perspective, the encounter with death is less my time that threatens to end and that creates 
Heideggerian Angst as basis of all emotions, than the encounter with the Other, who is mortal and 
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absolutely other, and whose mortality provokes my responsibility and causes an emotion, which is the 
source of intentionality.”97  
 
This underlines further how the early works of Levinas, namely On Escape with its profound 
critique on Heidegger‟s concept of ontology, already outline key notions, such as death, of his 
later works. 
 
 Another important aspect regarding the impossibility of dying is that it is derived from the 
idea that existence is not the experience of freedom as profiled in affirmation. Rather it is what 
we seek to evade in a movement of flight, what simply reveals paradoxically how deeply riveted 
we are to existence. Namely in Existence and Existents Levinas cites the notion of the 
“impossibility of dying” and illustrates it with a scene from the theater piece Phaedra (1677) of 
the French dramatist Jean Racine (1639-1699).
98
 In his Carnets de captivité, Levinas elaborates at 
length on this scene, which he sees as the central passage of Phaedra, and connects it as an 
illustration to his philosophical argumentation.
99
 It becomes clear from the notes in his Carnets 
de captivité that the aspect of the impossibility of dying plays a crucial role for the development 
of Levinas‟s thinking, as he points out:  
 
Besides, the „not-being-an-end‟ of death does not mean the „future life‟. The second part of the 
monologue to be or not to be is too precise and can have only a meaning as an image. As the 
desperation of Phaedra who found his father in the region of death. It is the fact that „the game is lost‟. 
It is in the order of fulfillment Ŕ „everything is used up‟ Ŕ that death is not an exit. To dissect this 
order of fulfillment Ŕ that‟s the methodological side Ŕ the philosophical plan Ŕ of my philosophy.100  
 
To conclude my illustrations of this notion, it is noteworthy that, alongside the example of 
Phaedra, Levinas quotes also several times in his Carnets de captivité a Biblical example in this 
context, which demonstrates the interweaving of literary and Biblical sources in his thinking: it is 
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the figure of Jonas which is outlined as an archetype of one who tries to flee and to hide before 
his destiny.
101
 Therefore, the problem in this context is not death but being, according to Levinas, 
as he underlines in On escape: “[b]eing is „imperfect‟ inasmuch as it is being, and not inasmuch 
as it is finite.”102 It is precisely for this reason that Levinas develops a sense which goes beyond 
the pleasure of the satisfaction of personal needs through which man tries to escape from being: 
“A sense which is not a finality. For there is no end, no term. The desire of the absolutely other 
will not, like need, be extinguished in a happiness.”103 In the notion of the metaphysical desire, 
nourished by the other and unfulfillable in its very essence, Levinas outlines at the beginning of 
Totality and Infinity a concrete possibility of escaping being:  
 
The metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other. […]; it 
desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness Ŕ the Desired does not fulfill 
it, but deepens it.
104
  
 
This shows how Levinas elaborated concretely a way of getting out of being in his later works.         
 
         Coming back to On Escape, Levinas characterizes the main problem of being as a 
“condemnation to be oneself”, which reveals a being “driven back to the problem of one‟s 
origin”.105 It has been pointed out by Jacques Rolland that this central issue in On Escape, 
besides the influence of the Heideggerian notion of Geworfenheit
106
, has also another origin: 
“Jewishness Ŕ in the sense in which Nazi anti-Semitism was able to brutally unveil, during these 
years, its precisely non-remittable quality.”107 He cites Levinas‟s article “L‟inspiration religieuse 
de l‟Alliance”, published in 1935, in order to highlight the striking similarities in Levinas‟s 
discourse. However, Rolland sees a clear difference between „being-riveted-to-being‟ and „being-
riveted-to-Judaism‟: the latter is conceived of as an election in a positive sense, i.e. a service 
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toward the other man and, in this sense, it is in fact the metaphysical identity of all men, 
according to Levinas.
108
 Although Rolland‟s distinction seems appropriate to me, it does not 
however explain the striking similarities between Levinas‟s article “L‟inspiration religieuse de 
l‟Alliance” and his study On Escape, both published in 1935. It is in my view not a coincidence 
that Levinas elaborates on the same subject, i.e. the notion of being riveted to oneself, in his 
philosophical texts as well as in his articles on Jewish subjects in the same period. The notion of 
the impossibility of dying, which figures as a leitmotif in the early work of Levinas, holds a 
crucial place in this context. In his Carnets de captivité Levinas clearly gives the notion of the 
impossibility of dying a higher significance in his thinking than the Heideggerian notion of 
Geworfenheit, as he emphasizes: “What is important for me, is precisely the plan of the il y a. It 
is not the inexplicability of existence Ŕ the Geworfenheit Ŕ but the impossibility of dying.”109 To 
set aside for a moment the concept of the il y a (there is), on which I elaborate in detail in the 
following chapter,
110
 prominent here is the aspect of timelessness and the fact of an existence 
beyond history. In this context, one has to think not only of Hermann Cohen‟s famous sentence 
“But we are eternal!” [“Aber wir sind ewig!”], but moreover to focus on Franz Rosenzweig‟s 
concept of time. Rosenzweig cites Cohen‟s dictum in The Star of Redemption with the highest 
respect for his teacher:  
 
This triumphant „but‟ Ŕ „but we are eternal‟ Ŕ our great master proclaimed as the final word of his 
wisdom, when he spoke for the last time before a crowd about the relationship of his We with his 
world. The We‟s are eternal; before this triumphant cry of eternity, death is hurled down into the 
nothing. Life becomes immortal in the eternal song of praise of Redemption. This is the eternity in the 
moment.
111
  
 
However, the notion of eternity is used throughout The Star with different accentuations: there is 
the notion of the eternity of the Jewish people, to which the cited statement of Hermann Cohen 
refers. In Part II, entitled “The path or the ever renewed world”, eternity is seen as the „fullness of 
time‟ which transforms the silent Self of Creation into a soul, which loves and is loved: “Eternity 
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is not a very long time, but a tomorrow that just as well could be today. Eternity is a future, 
which, without ceasing to be future, is nevertheless present. Eternity is a today that would be 
conscious of being more than today.”112 This idea is further reflected in Part III in the notion of 
an eternal life beyond time, as expressed in the blessing after the lecture of the Thora: “Blessed 
be He who has planted eternal life in our midst.”113 Rosenzweig‟s notion of eternity is mirrored in 
a broader philosophical context in Levinas‟s notion of the impossibility of dying. Although the 
latter has a negative connotation, as discovery of the “condemnation to be oneself,”114 whereas 
Rosenzweig gives his notion of eternity a positive significance, both notions correspond in the 
experience of timelessness, i.e. in the fact of being-beyond-time. We cannot stop time, that is to 
say die, since there is no „time‟ in eternity. For Levinas we cannot escape being, unless we bring 
being under the wings of ethics, as I have outlined above refering to Levinas‟s notion of 
metaphysical desire. In the metaphysical desire we respond to the infinitely demanding call of the 
always exterior other. For Rosenzweig the notion of eternity, as realized e.g. in the eternity 
experienced in the Jewish community, is also a life beyond time and beyond history. Rosenzweig 
inverses the metaphor of the „wandering Jew‟, in contrast to the Christian who has already found 
in Jesus the Redeemer, by emphasizing that the Jews, the “people of eternity [das ewige 
Volk],”115 are already living beyond time, in a historical timelessness: “Its peoplehood is already 
at that place to which the peoples of the world only aspire. Its world is at the goal.”116 The 
impossibility of dying becomes in this sense a positive connotation: it is conceived of as the 
eternity of the Jewish people. Furthermore, regarding the single human being, Rosenzweig links 
death and love in the way that we cannot escape death as we cannot escape the „commandment of 
love‟.117 As Diego Fonti points out, death and love are radical experiences for the subject, 
according to Rosenzweig, and are both linked to exteriority in The Star of Redemption.
118
 For 
Levinas also we cannot escape the being, unless we bring being under the wings of ethics, which 
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precedes ontology and links being to the infinitely demanding call of the other. Rosenzweig‟s 
notion of eternity can be seen therefore in connection to Levinas‟s notion of infinity. 
 
 
 
2.   a)      “The mysterious voices of the blood” – The redemption of time and the 
                presence of Jewish existence 
 
 
Regarding the above outlined problem of being riveted to oneself, Levinas‟s article 
“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” is of great importance. As Miguel Abensour points 
out, this small article, published in 1934, finds its completion in the longer study On Escape 
(1935).
119
 In “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, Levinas describes the dangers brought 
on by German National Socialism which “questions the very principles of […] civilization.”120 
The article has to be seen in the context of Levinas‟s discovery that his teacher, Martin 
Heidegger, was openly affiliated with Adolf Hitler‟s party, a fact that shocked Heidegger‟s  
former Jewish students who were deeply influenced by his thinking.
121
 Against the background of 
the political changes in Germany and the irrevocable turn of Heidegger‟s thinking, the issue at 
stake was then how to further conciliate two mutually exclusive facts: to be “a Jew and a 
Heideggerian”.122 In an article published in 1987, entitled “As If Consenting to Horror”, Levinas 
reflected on this problem and his difficulty in coping with it:  
 
I learned very early, perhaps even before 1933 and certainly after Hitler‟s huge success at the time of 
his election to the Reichstag, of Heidegger‟s sympathy toward National Socialism. It was the late 
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Alexandre Koyré who mentioned it to me for the first time on his return from a trip to Germany. I 
could not doubt the news, but took it with stupor and disappointment, and also with the faint hope that 
it expressed only the temporary lapse of a great speculative mind into practical banality. It cast a 
shadow over my firm confidence that an unbridgeable distance forever separated the delirious and 
criminal hatred voiced by Evil on the pages of Mein Kampf from the intellectual vigor and extreme 
analytical virtuosity displayed in Sein und Zeit, which had opened the field to a new type of 
philosophical inquiry.
123
  
 
Levinas further points out that Heidegger, when confronted with the crimes of the Nazis, 
remained silent about what had happened, which reveals in his eyes “a soul completely cut off 
from any sensitivity”.124 However, Levinas emphasizes that Heidegger was not completely silent, 
because:  
 
There is a statement in a fine book on Heidegger by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe that Professor Miguel 
Abensour has pointed out to me. Martin Heidegger made it clear during one of the unpublished 
lectures from the cycle of four talks given in Bremen on technology in 1949, but it is quoted in the 
book by Wolfgang Schirmacher, Technik und Gelassenheit
125: „Agriculture is now a mechanized food 
industry. As for its essence, it is the same thing as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and 
the death camps, the same thing as the blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same 
thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.‟”126 
 
Levinas resumes in some sense his attitude to his former teacher, by concluding this passage with 
the following meaningful statement: “This stylistic turn of phrase, this analogy, this progression, 
are [sic] beyond commentary.”127 
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Returning to Levinas‟s situation in the thirties, his article “Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism” is of utmost interest. The text reflects on the spiritual background of National 
Socialism and analyzes its sources within the philosophical setting of the popular mentality at 
that time. It is neither an historical nor a sociological or ideological analysis of Hitlerism. Rather, 
it seeks to demonstrate by virtue of phenomenological observations, to unveil the world view 
which finds its expression in Hitlerism. The modest title “some reflections” (quelques réflexions) 
indicates that Levinas does not intend to give a complete analysis of the phenomenon at stake, 
rather he wants to work out some essential hints to grasp the Stimmung (attunement, mood) of 
Hitlerism. The notion of Stimmung holds a crucial place in Martin Heidegger‟s philosophy.128 In 
Being and Time (1927) he underscores the great significance of this notion by pointing out that 
“in every case Dasein always has some mood [gestimmt ist].”129 He develops further the notion of 
Stimmung in detail in his lectures on “The fundamental concepts of metaphysics” (1929/30) 
where he explains that “[a]ttunement belongs to the being of man.”130 According to Heidegger  
 
[a]ttunements are not side-effects, but are something which determine in advance our being with one 
another. […] An attunement is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way [Weise] Ŕ in the sense 
of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets 
the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and determines the manner and way [Art und Weise] of his 
being.
131
 
 
Referring to the commentary of Miguel Abensour on Levinas‟s article “Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism”, I would agree that it is the concept of a certain Stimmung of Hitlerism, 
which Levinas seeks to demonstrate.
132
 In his argumentation, the bodily aspect of man is 
particularly emphasized: “The body is not only a happy or unhappy accident that relates us to the 
implacable world of matter. Its adherence to the Self is of value in itself. It is an adherence that 
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one does not escape [...].”133 It is obvious that Levinas elaborates here on previously discussed 
topics. As outlined above, he first uses the notion of “being that is „riveted‟”134 in his article 
“Martin Heidegger and ontology” in 1932. This issue is elaborated in a new context in Levinas‟s 
article “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, taking into consideration the particular 
ideology of Nazism. In this context, the notion of the body is of prime importance, as Levinas 
points out:  
 
The importance attributed to this feeling for the body [...] is at the basis of a new conception of man. 
The biological, with the notion of the inevitability it entails, becomes more than an object of spiritual 
life. It becomes its heart. The mysterious voices of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for 
which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle, lose the character of being problems that are subject to 
a solution put forward by a sovereignly free Self.
135
 
 
Furthermore, Levinas underlines the inextricability of body and soul by highlighting the specific 
bodily connection of being:  
 
Man‟s essence no longer lies in freedom, but in a kind of bondage [enchaînement]. To be true to 
oneself does not mean taking flight once more above contingent events that always remain foreign to 
the freedom of Self; on the contrary, it means becoming aware of the ineluctable original chain that is 
unique to our bodies, and above all accepting this chaining.
136
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The aspect of the body is a key notion in this context which leads Levinas later on, during the 
war, to the link between escape and transcendence, as underlined in the Carnets de captivité: 
“The fact of the body. Hence the need to escape, a real way out of oneself, a transcendence.”137 
 
         Considering issues similar to those in On Escape and in the Carnets de captivité (i.e. the 
ineluctable bondage to being and the impossibility to flee one‟s body), Levinas connects 
important topics of his early thinking with what he called the „philosophy‟ of Hitlerism. In the 
following, I show that Levinas‟s argumentation has some astonishing similarities with the 
thoughts of Rosenzweig Ŕ even though the latter is not directly mentioned in the text.138 
However, also in Totality and Infinity Rosenzweig is not cited in the main text, only in the 
foreword in order to point out somewhat paradoxically that Rosenzweig is “too often present […] 
to be cited”.139 Hence the absence of Rosenzweig‟s name might not be considered as a guarantee 
that he is completely absent from this text. The only two philosophers to whom Levinas refers by 
name are Socrates and Nietzsche. That the latter occur in this context is not surprisingly since 
there was given much attention at that time in France to Nietzsche‟s work with respect to 
National Socialism. The journal Acéphale even dedicated a special issue in January 1937 to 
Nietzsche, with the telling title “Nietzsche and the Fascists Ŕ a reparation [Nietzsche et les 
fascists – une réparation]”. Levinas‟s article is extensively cited in the leading article “Nietzsche 
and the Fascists” by Georges Bataille.140 Regarding Rosenzweig, Levinas stated in an interview 
with François Poiré that he had read Rosenzweig‟s Star of Redemption around 1935, i.e. around 
the time he wrote “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” (1934).141 Yet as the article 
obviously echoes themes of Rosenzweig‟s work, it can be assumed that he read Rosenzweig even 
earlier, i.e. around 1934. This becomes evident when taking a closer look at how Levinas 
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determines the relationship of man‟s physical presence in connection with time and, in particular, 
the way he refers to Judaism in this context. Starting his argumentation with the remark that the 
notions of political freedom “do not exhaust the content of the spirit of freedom”,142 he goes on to 
explain that “[t]rue freedom, the true beginning would require a true present, which, always at 
the peak of a destiny, forever recommences that destiny.”143 This „true beginning‟ is 
demonstrated by Judaism, as Levinas underlines:  
 
Judaism bears this magnificent message. Remorse Ŕ the painful expression of a radical powerlessness 
to redeem the irreparable Ŕ heralds the repentance that generates the pardon that redeems. Man finds 
something in the present with which he can modify or efface the past. Time loses its very 
irreversibility. It collapses at the feet of man like a wounded beast. And he frees it.
144
  
 
The interpretation of time developed in this passage has much in common with the temporal 
concept Rosenzweig elaborates in The Star of Redemption. To illustrate this, let me quote at 
length the passage in which Rosenzweig argues that simultaneity is realized only in eternity and 
that it is through brotherliness and through the intersubjective relations among men that man 
receives access to eternity.  
 
Simultaneousness is something that does not exist at all in temporality. […] But in eternity there is 
simultaneousness. That from the shore, all time is simultaneous goes without saying. But even time 
that, as eternal way, leads from eternity to eternity admits of simultaneousness. For only insofar as it is 
the center between eternity and eternity is it possible for people to meet in it. He who therefore 
beholds himself on the way is at the same point, namely the exact central point of time. The 
brotherliness is that which transposes men into this central point. Time is already laid conquered at its 
feet; only love has still to fly over the separating space.
145
  
 
The simultaneous occurrence of the metaphor of „conquered time lying at the feet of man‟ in 
Levinas‟s and Rosenzweig‟s text is eye-catching. Further, both refer in this context to the role of 
Judaism. For Rosenzweig, time and death are conquered by love, which is stronger than death. 
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This means that with regard to time, not death, but love and its power to infinitely renew the 
work of Creation has the final word. Rosenzweig emphasizes with regard to love that  
 
[…] the whole world of the Creation […] is placed at its feet, conquered; death, the conquerer of all, 
and Orcus, who jealously holds onto all that is mortal, collapses before its strength and the violence of 
its ardor; the mortal cold of the frozen past as the object is warmed up again by its glowing embers 
and its divine flames.
146
  
 
The similarities with Levinas‟s argumentation are evident in my view. The outlined line of 
thought can be traced back also during the period of war, where one can find the remarkable note 
in Levinas‟s captivity notebooks: “Revelation without creation, without a link to the origin. 
Paganism.”147 This shows that Levinas, like Rosenzweig, considers the relationship between 
Revelation and Creation as important and sees paganism as the outcome if this relationship is not 
realized.    
    
The idea of revelation as renewal of the world is also mirrored in another aspect of 
Levinas‟s article: the interpretation of presence in the above cited passage.148 This passage 
obviously hints at the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) and the three states of reversal (tschuvah) 
by emphasizing remorse, repentance and pardon. Levinas points out that even if history 
represents a kind of “fundamental limitation”149 for man, because time is an irreparable condition 
of human existence, man is nevertheless “renewed eternally in the face of the Universe. Speaking 
absolutely, he has no history.”150 Levinas‟s interpretation echoes in some way Rosenzweig‟s 
views of the Jewish people developed in The Star of Redemption, where Rosenzweig points out 
that the Jew  
 
[…] possesses already […] in the annual cycle, the immediateness of all individuals to God in perfect 
mutual participation of everyone with God, he no longer needs to win in a long march of a world 
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history. The Jewish people are themselves already at the goal toward which the people of the world 
are just setting out.
151
  
 
Living in this sense „beyond history‟, the Jewish people have access to the experience of eternity 
in time. The act of Creation is renewed in every instance for Rosenzweig. Accordingly, he 
highlights that Creation did not  
 
[…] [take] place once and for all, but momentarily; it is, of course, universal providence, but one that 
is renewed in every tiniest particular moment, for all existence of the sort that God „renews from day 
to day the work of the beginning‟. This providence renewed every morning is thus what is really 
meant in the idea of the creature.
152
 
 
This idea is taken up in similar words by Levinas in Time and the Other by pointing out the 
power of time to create a constant renewal in every moment: “More than the renewal of our 
moods and qualities, time is essentially a new birth.”153 This is also expressed in Existence and 
Existents: “Each instant is a beginning, a birth.”154 The idea that man is in his very essence 
timeless echoes the Jewish idea of the renewal of time as an everlasting presence.
155
 This thought 
is taken up by Rosenzweig in his own words in The Star of Redemption where he begins and ends 
Book one of Part III with the same motif: “The seed of eternal life has been planted […]. […] 
Blessed be He who has planted eternal life in our midst.”156  
 
 Hence the issue at stake in the present arguments of Levinas and Rosenzweig is the 
relationship between eternity and the body and how the latter, although forced by nature to vanish 
within time, can be living in a certain relationship with eternity, or infinity, to draw on a 
Levinasian term. This relationship highlights a paradox because it connects two elements, the 
perishing body and eternity, which are obviously mutually exclusive. Levinas elaborates on this 
aspect in his article “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” by pointing to the problem of 
seeing the body as value. In one of the central passages of his article Levinas‟s argues:  
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What does it mean to traditional interpretations to have a body? It means tolerating it as an object of 
the external world. It weighs on Socrates like the chains that weigh him down in the prison at Athens; 
it encases him like the very tomb that awaits him. The body is an obstacle. It breaks the free flight of 
the spirit and drags it back down to earthly conditions, and yet, like an obstacle, it is to be 
overcome.
157  
 
Against this traditional point of view, Levinas outlines another aspect of the body: the fact that 
the body undeniable belongs to man. It is through the body that we first discover ourselves and 
constitute our identity, as Levinas emphasizes:  
 
But the body is not only something eternally foreign. […] The body is not only a happy or unhappy 
accident that relates us to the implacable world of matter. Its adherence to the Self is of value in itself. 
It is an adherence that one does not escape […].158  
 
This echoes the topics discussed in Levinas‟s On Escape, published one year after “Reflections 
on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, and indicates an ongoing discussion of the bodily presence of 
man, e.g. through a reflection of notions like nausea, insomnia, being riveted, etc. Further, the 
aspect of religion is examined in “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” emphasizing that 
Hitlerism “questions the very principles of a civilization. […] Christianity itself is threatened 
[…].”159 Regarding Judaism, Levinas further outlines that  
 
[m]an is renewed eternally in the face of the Universe. Speaking absolutely, he has no history. […] 
True freedom, the true beginning would require a true present, which, always at the peak of a destiny, 
forever recommences that destiny. Judaism bears this magnificent message.
160
 
 
This underscores that Levinas attributes to Judaism an important role in the relationship of 
eternity, conceived of as timelessness and infinity, and the human body. Through Judaism a 
specific message comes into the world that shows man a path to a life connected to a 
transcendence, i.e. to a beyond being. This message is endangered by Hitlerism, as Levinas 
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demonstrates in his article in 1934 Ŕ a danger not only for Judaism, but for civilization as such 
and for “the very humanity of man”.161  
 
         In a different context, Rosenzweig also discusses the relationship between eternity and the 
concrete body of man by pointing out that the Jewish community represents “the people of 
eternity [das ewige Volk]”.162 According to Rosenzweig, the Jewish community is based on a 
„community of the same blood‟ [Blutsgemeinschaft] as he points out: “The community of the 
same blood alone feels even today the guarantee of its eternity running warmly through its 
veins.”163 Although for today‟s readers the notion of a Blutsgemeinschaft is a suspect term, 
Rosenzweig wanted in no way to highlight a biologically funded racism. Hence Stéphane Mosès 
argues that the term „blood community‟ is in this regard “a poor choice of words because of its 
racist connotations, completely alien to his thought.”164 Mosès emphasizes that “the term „blood 
community‟ must be understood to mean what we would now call an ethnic community.”165 
However, as I will show, this interpretation is revised in up to date research literature. Further, it 
must be noted in this context that Rosenzweig precisely neglects the most important aspect of the 
racial theories of the Nazi ideology, i.e. the soil [Boden], and on the contrary, highlights the 
eternal and timeless existence of the Jewish people through a community based on “blood 
without soil”.166 This marks a profound difference between the Jewish people and other people of 
the world, as Rosenzweig goes on to explain:  
 
Among the peoples of the earth, is, the Jewish people is [sic], as on every Sabbath, that high point of 
its life, it calls itself: the one people. The peoples of the world cannot be satisfied with a community 
made up of the same blood; they put forth their roots into the night of the earth, itself dead yet life-
bestowing, and appropriate from its permanence a guarantee of their own permanence. Their will to 
eternity clings to the soil and to the soil‟s dominion, the territory. The blood of their sons flows round 
the earth of the homeland; for they do not have confidence in the living community of blood, which 
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would not be anchored in the solid ground of the earth. […] For this reason, the tribal legend of the 
eternal people begins otherwise than with indigenousness.”167  
 
Without putting them in any way on the same footing, it can be noted that Rosenzweig‟s idea of a 
“living community of blood” of the Jewish people and the conception of a consanguinity of 
“German Blood” postulated by the Nazi ideology overlap in the discourse about „blood‟ and 
consanguinity. It is thus in no way surprising that the issue of blood in Rosenzweig‟s work has 
attracted increasing attention in recent research literature, as is pointed out by Peter Eli Gordon, 
who emphasizes that the idea of a Jewish „blood-community‟ is “perhaps one of the most 
troubling aspects of Rosenzweig‟s philosophy […].”168 I will elaborate on this aspect in more 
detail in the following section. In this context I only wish to point out a reference to Levinas‟s 
article “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, which also emphasizes in particular the 
significance of the bodily presence of man:  
 
Do we not affirm ourselves in the unique warmth of our bodies long before any blossoming of the Self 
that claims to be separate from the body? Do these links that blood establishes, prior to the birth of 
intelligence, not withstand every test? […] A society based on consanguinity immediately ensues from 
this concretization of the spirit. And then, if race does not exist, one has to invent it!
169
  
 
Hence, Levinas concludes that the concept of racism is the last resort of the notion of man in 
Hitlerism. The consanguinity of its society is attached by the Nazi ideology to the German 
territory as well as to the conquest of Lebensraum (living space).
170
 Thus, as this concept of 
consanguinity places its relevance to a specific territory, it is precisely opposed to Rosenzweig‟s 
non-territorial concept of a Jewish „community of blood‟. Obviously, these two concepts of 
consanguinity remain diametrically opposed to each other. However, the appearance of the same 
notion in the analysis of Levinas‟s „philosophy of Hitlerism‟ and in Rosenzweig‟s discourse on 
„blood‟ in The Star of Redemption is striking. The issue of a society based on consanguinity, as 
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raised by National Socialism, was thus by no means a marginal question, but one for which 
Judaism itself offered an alternative as can be seen in Rosenzweig‟s line of argument. It is 
plausible that Levinas, who read The Star of Redemption precisely in the mid-30s, when Hitler 
rose to power and confronted the Jews with “the greatest trial Ŕ the incomparable trial Ŕ that 
Judaism has had to go through,”171 as Levinas underlines, was inspired by Rosenzweig‟s concept 
of the Jewish people. It opened up to him a new horizon in the intellectual landscape of that time. 
Furthermore, it offered him an alternative to Heidegger, who became an official representative of 
the world view of the „philosophy of Hitlerism‟, critized by Levinas. Heidegger‟s world remained 
henceforth inaccessible for Levinas, as he noted in his Carnets de captivité: “The nation as access 
to reality. World of Heidegger.”172 
 
The lack of transcendence in Hitlerism becomes an important topic in the articles of 
Levinas from this period. In a way similar to that of Rosenzweig, Levinas highlights the fact that 
the Jew never experiences in the same way as others the feeling of „being at home‟ in the world. 
This is the fundamental difference of the Jewish existence towards a pagan mentality. One year 
after his article “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, Levinas points out this aspect in his 
article “The actuality of Maimonides” [“L‟actualité de Maïmonide”], published in 1935: “The 
Jew has not the definitive foundations in the world like the pagan has. In the midst of the most 
complete confidence in things he is plagued by a gnawing worry.”173 Furthermore, the mentality 
of Hitlerism must be seen, according to Levinas, in connection with paganism as he points out: 
“The Judeo-Christian civilization is challenged by an arrogant barbarism installed in the heart of 
Europe. With an unmatched boldness, paganism raises his head, [...]. [...] Paganism is a radical 
inability to escape the world.”174 In contradistinction, Levinas highlights the ability of the Jew to 
                                                 
171
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “L‟inspiration religieuse de l‟alliance”, p. 144: “L‟hitlérisme est la plus grande épreuve Ŕ 
l‟épreuve incomparable Ŕ que le judaïsme ait eue à traverser”.   
172
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets, p. 105: “La nation comme accès au reel. Monde de Heidegger.” See also ibid., p. 
75: “Partir du Dasein ou partir du Judaïsme.” The notion Dasein obviously refers in this context to Heidegger.  
173
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “L‟actualité de Maïmonide”, in: Emmanuel Levinas. Cahiers de l‟Herne, ed. by Catherine 
Chalier and Miguel Abensour, pp. 142-144, p. 144: “Le juif n‟a pas dans le monde les assises définitives du païen. 
Au milieu de la plus complète confiance accordée aux choses il est rongé par une sourde inquiétude.” It is 
noteworthy in this context that Jacob Gordin, who worked at the library of the Alliance Israélite Orientale in Paris, 
an institution for which Levinas too worked at that time, wrote an article on Maimonides with the same title 
“Actualité de Maïmonide”, which appeared just one year earlier than Levinas‟s article, in: Les Cahiers juifs, Vol. 10, 
June-July 1934, pp. 6-18. Reprinted in: Gordin, Jacob, Écrits. Le renouveau de la pensée juive en France, pp. 123-
144. 
174
 Ibid., “La civilisation judéo-chrétienne est mise en cause par une barbarie arrogante installée au coeur de 
l‟Europe. Avec une audace encore inégalée, le paganisme relève la tête, […]. […] Le paganisme est une impuissance 
radicale de sortir du monde.”  
 45 
experience the wonder of the miracle of Creation in every moment anew Ŕ through the Jew‟s 
essential alienation towards the world that surrounds him. In his article “The meaning of religious 
practice”, published in 1937, Levinas describes the relation of the Jew towards the concept of 
wonder as a fundamental aspect of Jewish existence. It is through religious ritual that the Jew 
remains outside the flow of time because the ritual constantly marks a pause within time and a 
sudden stop: “Before accomplishing an elementary gesture such as eating, the Jew pauses to give 
a blessing. Before entering a house, he stops to kiss the „mezuzah‟.”175 This constantly 
interrupted relation to the world through ritual creates a feeling of an always renewed wonder 
about what exists and what surrounds the Jew. As a consequence, according to Levinas, the Jew 
constantly experiences the wonder of Creation anew:  
 
At the bottom, the world never appears to the practicing Jew as a natural thing. Others feel themselves 
immediately at home there, immediately at ease. […] For the Jew, by contrast, nothing is entirely 
familiar, entirely profane. To him, the existence of things is something infinitely surprising. It strikes 
him as a miracle. He experiences wonder at every instant at the fact Ŕ so simple and yet so 
extraordinary Ŕ that the world is here. The belief in creation Ŕ the basis of Judaism Ŕ is nothing other 
than this wonder. It is not an abstract dogma of theology.
176
 
 
 Similar to Rosenzweig‟s argument in The Star of Redemption, Levinas emphasizes that the belief 
in the wonder of Creation is not a dry subject of theology, but the concrete living experience of 
the Jew. Levinas sees the ritual as an “event”177 which has the power to renew time ever anew. In 
this context, he rehabilitates the notion of mystery as being a sine qua non for realizing the ritual 
and giving it its profound meaning, as he explains:  
 
We have become accustomed to giving the word mystery a negative meaning. The mystery is the 
hidden and the incomprehensible. We neglect the fact that it originally designates divine worship [un 
culte] and, above all, that part of worship that allows the religious man to master the very order of 
space and time. Do not the mysteries have the power always to repeat over again, and in their initial 
inspiration [leur originalité première], the events of holy history?
178
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Thus, in conclusion, it seems plausible that the concepts of time and transcendence which 
Levinas worked out with respect to Judaism in his articles on Jewish topics during the thirties 
were most likely inspired by his reading of Rosenzweig‟s Star of Redemption.  
 
 
 
b)      “Language is yet more than „blood‟…” – From a „community of blood„ 
       [Blutsgemeinschaft] to a „community of language‟ [Sprachgemeinschaft] 
 
 
In this context, the question of what Rosenzweig precisely meant by „blood‟ and „blood-
community‟ in The Star of Redemption is of great importance. As I have emphasized in the 
previous section, former interpretations of this issue are partly outdated. For example, revising 
Stéphane Mosès‟s reading of the term „blood community‟ as a mere „ethnic community‟,179 the 
Israeli researcher Haggai Dagan puts forward the hypothesis that Rosenzweig provides the notion 
„blood‟ with a “metaphorical meaning”.180 This metaphorical meaning must be seen in a far 
broader sense than as a simple biologicalization or ethnicization of Judaism. According to Dagan, 
blood is “a symbol of life and continuity,”181 a metaphor for the inescapable existence, which is 
always tied to a particular existence. The motif of blood would be in this sense used by 
Rosenzweig especially to reject the idea of the primacy of the „spiritual‟ in idealism. Unlike the 
romantic tradition, which connects blood and people with the land, i.e. the territory, Rosenzweig 
strictly separates the Jewish people and the territory they live in. This gives his discourse an anti-
nationalist character, as he argues: “We alone have put our trust in the blood and parted with the 
land […]”182 However, according to Dagan, the eternity of Judaism is not an eternity beyond life 
because Rosenzweig focuses precisely on an “eternity […] that flows from life itself; eternity that 
is none other than life itself, or to be more precise, the essence of life itself, cut off from every 
extraneous thing associated with it (soil, spirit).”183 In contrast to the interpretation of Dagan, I 
would not claim a difference in this regard between the thought of Levinas who, according to 
                                                 
179
 Mosès, Stéphane, System and Revelation. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, p. 177/Système et Révélation. La 
philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, p. 184. 
180
 Dagan, Haggai, “The Motif of Blood and Procreation in Franz Rosenzweig”, p. 247. 
181
 Ibid.  
182
 Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, p. 318/Stern, p. 332. 
183
 Dagan, Haggai, “The Motif of Blood and Procreation in Franz Rosenzweig”, p. 247. 
 47 
Dagan, “bases Jewish existence on ethics” (as Hermann Cohen), and that of Rosenzweig who on 
the contrary “emphasizes pure existence (as expressed in blood and propagation) which he places 
before ethics and reason.”184 For Rosenzweig there is a profound connection between the 
commandment “Thou shalt love!” which he puts at the center of The Star of Redemption, and the 
Jewish existence, realized through “the living community of blood”.185 The ethical claim finds its 
concrete expression in Jewish existence, realized through the religious laws, as Michael Mack 
points out: “By keeping the law, the Jew, in Rosenzweig‟s view, enacts love […]. Law, which 
helps to set limits to violence, constitutes the rationality of caritas […].”186 Hence the concept of 
blood and the relation of love and law are deeply connected in Rosenzweig‟s thinking. 
Rosenzweig underlines this connection by emphasizing that “[i]n the Law […] all created 
existence is already immediately endowed with life and soul for becoming content of the world to 
come.”
187
 
 
 It must be noted in this context that for Rosenzweig the essence of the Jewish existence is a 
nationality without territory, i.e. the experience of an exile which is physically embodied by the 
Jews. In this sense, blood always entails a political dimension. The view of Judaism as an organic 
body from which it is impossible to separate oneself from being a Jew finds an echo in the 
revealing remark of Levinas in his Carnets de captivité: “The nothingness of the assimilated.”188 
In this context, the above outlined paradox of how to realize eternity through a body that vanishes 
in time finds a concrete solution according to Rosenzweig in the existence of the Jewish people, 
because “in the natural propagation of the body it has the guarantee of its eternity.”189 In this 
sense, blood is a key term in understanding the specific temporality of the Jewish people, which 
finds its expression, as Rosenzweig outlines, in “the creating of its own eternity out of the 
obscure sources of blood.”190 This connection is also emphasized at the beginning of Book one of 
Part III of The Star, entitled “The Fire or Eternal Life”. Here Rosenzweig identifies Judaism with 
the fire that burns in the middle of The Star, i.e. the Magen David (“Shield of David”) which 
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serves as a guiding symbol for the structure of his argumentation throughout the book, and 
Christianity with the rays of light that emerge from this fire. With regard to Judaism, Rosenzweig 
underlines its particular temporality, which is eternity, as he points out:  
 
The fire must beget its own time. It must beget itself eternally. It must make its life eternal in the 
succession of generations, each of which begets the following one, as it itself again will bear witness 
to the preceding one. The bearing witness takes place in the begetting. [Das Bezeugen geschieht im 
Erzeugen.] In this connection with the double meaning and single effect of begetting and bearing 
witness, eternal life becomes real.
191
 
 
Hence, it seems obvious to me that a connection between a specific kind of „Jewish‟ temporality 
and the concept of a Jewish „blood-community‟ can be deduced in the thoughts of Rosenzweig. 
In this sense, I would follow the interpretation of Peter Eli Gordon, who points out in his study 
Rosenzweig and Heidegger that throughout Rosenzweig‟s explanations  
 
[…] on the Jewish role in redemption, there is significant linkage between the concept of blood and a 
specifically „Jewish‟ sort of temporality. […] As a fluid rather than static medium, blood captures the 
idea that philosophy must move within the temporal flow of life. […] Accordingly, blood might be 
regarded as a name for the Jew‟s special temporality as against the normal temporality of the world.192  
 
The “rooted unrootedness”193 of the Jewish existence finds a temporal anchor in the cyclical and 
ritually repeated structure of its specific temporality, which I would assume when following 
Gordon‟s interpretation is in fact the deeper meaning behind the notion of blood. This is also in 
accordance with Levinas‟s view regarding the concept of blood in Rosenzweig, as he points out 
in his article “Between Two Worlds” in Difficult Freedom:  
 
Rosenzweig uses the dangerous term of an eternity of blood, which we must not take in the racist 
sense, for at no moment does this term signify a naturalist concept, justifying a technique of racial 
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discrimination; on the contrary, it signifies a strangeness throughout the course of history, a 
rootedness within oneself.
194
 
 
Yet, this specific Jewish temporality entails at the same time the consequence that the Jew never 
feels like being “entirely at home”.195 As Gordon goes on to explain, Rosenzweig argues that “to 
be Jewish is to be ontologically unlike all other peoples of the world.”196 As I argue in the coming 
section, Rosenzweig‟s point of view outlined by Gordon is not at all “an extreme sort of Jewish 
chauvinism”,197 because the „community blood‟ is transcended into a „community of language‟ in 
which, according to Rosenzweig, all people can (and should) participate. Furthermore, I wish to 
highlight the continuity of this argument by pointing out that it is precisely this idea of „Judaism 
as a category of being‟ which is readopted in Levinas‟s reception of Rosenzweig‟s thought.198 
 
Before elaborating on this point in the following section, I would like to focus on a letter 
Rosenzweig wrote only some months before his death and which seems to me to be of great 
importance in this context:  
 
Dear Mother, on ...‟s word, I ask myself. My German identity would be exactly what it is, even if 
there was no longer a German Reich. Language is yet more than „blood‟… [Liebe Mutter, über ...‟s 
Wort wundre ich mich. Mein Deutschtum wäre doch genau was es ist, auch wenn es kein Deutsches 
Reich mehr gäbe. Sprache ist doch mehr als „Blut‟…]199 
 
 The letter is dated 6
th
 October 1929, i.e. it was dictated roughly two months before Rosenzweig‟s 
death on 10
th
 December the same year. It must be kept in mind that since 1923 Rosenzweig had 
been unable to write by himself.
200
 It is therefore remarkable that despite his almost complete 
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paralysis and the great efforts required to dictate a letter, he gave much energy to place the word 
„blood‟ in quotation marks. This indicates that he especially wanted to highlight a distinction 
from the normal use of the word „blood‟ and, in contrast, emphasize that he intended to point out 
with the term „blood‟ the implicated ideas and concepts that I have discussed above. 
Additionally, in order to correctly evaluate the temporal context of Rosenzweig‟s statement , one 
has to take into consideration the historical circumstances of the year 1929. Since the 
assassination of the German foreign minister Walther Rathenau in June 1922, which was 
preceded by persisting anti-Semitic propaganda against him,
201
 it was obvious that the Weimar 
Republic had to face open anti-Semitism among the German population that burdened its political 
decisions. “About these things I do not like to talk”, Rosenzweig stated in a letter to Rudolf Hallo 
in January 1923,  
 
since the assassination of Rathenau even less than before. Our work will be rewarded by Germany, at 
the most, posthumously; nevertheless we do it, as long as we do it in Germany, for Germany. [...] And 
The Star will indeed Ŕ and rightly so Ŕ be seen a gift, which the German spirit owes to its Jewish 
enclave.
202
  
 
In the cited letter to his mother in 1929, Rosenzweig alludes to this context by pointing out that 
even if the German Reich were not to exist for him anymore Ŕ a situation which would indeed be 
realized some years later by the expulsion and persecution of the Jews by Nazi Germany Ŕ his 
German identity would remain intact, since it is bound neither to the German territory nor to the 
concept of German „blood‟. In taking his distance from these bodily centered identity concepts, 
Rosenzweig in contrast emphasizes that for him language is “yet more than blood” and thus 
underlines a profound conviction in the cultural heritage which is conveyed through the German 
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language. The word “yet” [“doch”] deserves special attention in this context: “Language is yet 
more than blood.”203 This can be read as a statement against racial theories of „German blood‟, as 
Rosenzweig‟s letter alludes to this context by referring to the question of what his „German 
identity‟ [“Deutschtum”] essentially consists of. Further, by putting the word „blood‟ in quotation 
marks, Rosenzweig differentiates this use from that in The Star of Redemption, where „blood‟ 
never appears in quotation marks; this is further to be seen in contrast to his early use of this 
notion, e.g. in his article “Atheistic Theology” from 1914, where „blood‟ is set in quotation 
marks.
204
 By using the mode of improper speech, the quotations marks indicate in any case a 
distance of the author from the word. Emphasizing that “language is yet more than „blood‟,” 
Rosenzweig clearly highlights the primacy of language over identity concepts centered on the 
notion of blood. His statement expresses his conviction in the power of language, which he 
attributes to be “the organon of Revelation”205 in The Star of Redemption:  
 
For language is truly the wedding gift of the Creator to humanity; and yet at the same time the mutual 
possession of the children of men, in which each has his particular share and finally the seal of 
humanity in man. It is whole from the beginning, man became man when he spoke; and all the same 
there is until this day no language of humanity, on the contrary this will be only at the end.
206
  
 
This desired goal of a „language of humanity‟ is not a question of nationality, because the essence 
of language stays the same in each and every language, “for it is possible for many languages to 
exist, but there is only one language.”207 Moreover what is important for Rosenzweig in language 
is the face to face interaction of spoken language and the actual act of speaking between men. He 
emphasizes this aspect in a letter to Eugen Rosenstock in October 1917: “But seriously, language 
must be neither German nor un-German but face to face.”208 
  
„Blood‟ can thus be seen as a metaphor in The Star for a specific kind of Jewish 
temporality, i.e. eternity. It refers to the „beyond of history‟ of the Jewish people. On the 
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contrary, language is time-bound [zeitgebunden] and time-nourished [zeitgenährt], as 
Rosenzweig explains in his essay, The New Thinking.
209
 It needs time to be expressed and, 
equally importantly, it needs the other person for its realization. In language there is the 
possibility of naming and describing the world and thus, as a way of understanding the world in 
communication with fellow men, man holds the key to Creation in his hands. The experience of 
this power is what Rosenzweig calls Revelation, which is not conceived of as a mystical notion. 
“It is faith, looked upon not as a theological notion but as a fact of origin, as a lived experience 
[…],”210 as Stéphane Mosès emphasizes. Even if it must also be underscored that Revelation has 
to be accepted “primarily in the context of a philosophical discourse”,211 the reference to the 
transcendental dimension of Revelation is important. Rosenzweig points out that in his 
conception of a New Thinking the method of thinking is replaced by the “method of speaking”, 
which he calls Sprachdenken (speaking thinking), which clearly reveals the importance of 
language for his thought.
212
 Furthermore, Rosenzweig argues in The Star of Redemption that 
language and Revelation are closely connected because  
 
[…] language […] only awakens to its real life in Revelation. And so there is nothing new in the 
miracle of Revelation, nothing of a magical intervention in the created Creation; on the contrary, it is 
entirely sign, entirely a making visible and a becoming audible of the Providence originally hidden in 
the mute night of Creation, entirely Ŕ Revelation.213  
 
Although everything has been created in the universal act of Creation it is nonetheless only 
through language that things really become alive. This power of language is bound to love 
because  
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[…] in the love, the soul awakens and begins to speak, but it only gains being, a being visible to its 
own eyes, when it is loved; […]. […] The mute Self comes of age under the love of God to become 
speaking soul: it was here that we had recognized Revelation.
214
 
 
Love, language and revelation are thus closely connected, particularly in Book two of Part II, 
which is central in The Star of Redemption. In this sense, language is indeed „more than blood‟, 
as Rosenzweig stated, because it opens a new horizon to a „speaking community‟ 
(Sprachgemeinschaft) and, through the spoken word and face to face interaction, provides the 
condition for creating something like a society amongst people.  
 
The outlined concept of the Jewish „community of blood‟ transcends itself through the 
spoken word into a „speaking community‟, in which all people can and must participate in order 
to realize redemption. This does not mean that „blood‟ somehow loses its importance for 
Rosenzweig‟s argument, but simply underlines that it is through language that the „guarantee of 
eternity‟, i.e. blood, of the Jewish people is actually realized in the world. Language is the sine 
qua non for the „coming into being‟ of man and, thereby, is connected to being as such for 
Rosenzweig. In the following I work out how these connections are related to Judaism and in 
which way they have inspired the work of Levinas. 
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3.   a) A new aspect of ontology: Judaism as a “category of being” 
 
 
 In the following I will focus on the impact Rosenzweig‟s thought had on Levinas during the 
thirties. Taking into account the time during the war through a close-reading of Levinas‟s 
notebooks during his captivity, the Carnets de captivité, I further connect my analysis with 
Levinas‟s writings on Rosenzweig after the war.215 In the second part of this section, I will 
demonstrate how Levinas‟s interpretations on Rosenzweig also influenced his own philosophy, 
namely his views on the issues at stake here, i.e. being, language and Judaism. 
 
 The philosophical reflections of Levinas on Rosenzweig after the war come in fact as no 
surprise. In his Carnets de captivité Levinas clearly points out that Rosenzweig is amongst the 
main subjects of his interest in terms of his future work. In the fashion of an agenda Levinas lists 
the following points of interest: “My work to come: Philosophically: 1.) Being and Nothingness, 
2.) Time, 3.) Rosenzweig, 4.) Rosenberg […].”216 As can be seen from the various texts he 
dedicated to Rosenzweig, what probably attracted Levinas the most in the work of Rosenzweig 
was the role of Judaism or, in a broader sense, the critique of totality elaborated by means of a 
new approach to religion. In the “system of philosophy,”217 as Rosenzweig called The Star of 
Redemption, religion is not an attitude which one can adopt or not. On the contrary, it is right 
from the very beginning a concrete element of human reality. This can be derived from the 
system Rosenzweig outlines in The Star, which I briefly refer to here: “the All” (das All) consists 
of three elements Ŕ God, World and Man, which according to Rosenzweig exist individually and 
are yet profound in terms of how they are interwoven. Hence in the act of Creation, which is 
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conceived by Rosenzweig as the relation of God to the world, Revelation, i.e. the relation 
between God and Man, is already announced: 
 
In the flash of light that shines from the moment of the lived miracle of Revelation, it is a past 
preparing for and anticipating this miracle that becomes manifest; the Creation which becomes visible 
in Revelation is Creation of Revelation. […] The historicity of the miracle of Revelation is not its 
content Ŕ this content is and remains its present actuality Ŕ but its ground and its guarantee. It is only 
in this its [sic] historicity, this „positivity‟, that personally experienced faith finds the highest certitude 
available to it […].218  
 
Thus, right from his creation man is, according to Rosenzweig, in a relationship with God, 
although this relationship becomes present only in the event of revelation. I have outlined that 
language plays a crucial role in this context as it provides assurance of the possibility for man to 
experience revelation. Language is thus seen by Rosenzweig as the “seal of humanity in man” 
and “truly the wedding gift of the Creator to man”.219  
 
 It is obvious that Levinas was impressed by the strong significance Rosenzweig attached to 
religion. He underlines in several instances the specific role of religion in Rosenzweig‟s thought. 
In the article “Franz Rosenzweig: A modern Jewish thinker”, published in 1965, Levinas points 
out:  
 
Religion is not here a „confession‟, but the texture or drama of being, prior of philosophy‟s 
totalization. […] Judaism and Christianity, analyzed in this inner signification and these „sociological‟ 
manifestations, take on the meaning of primordial „structures‟.220  
 
The lived experience of religion is thus anchored in the center of life itself and not just a marginal 
fact. It is not a decision that one can choose or a way of life that one can either adopt or renounce. 
In contrast, life itself is the source and the raison d‟être of religion, as Levinas emphasizes in his 
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interpretation of Rosenzweig: “Life, miracles of miracles, the original fact of religion!”221 In this 
context it is interesting to point out that, in terms of the concept of religion which man cannot 
adopt or refuse, responsibility is, in a similar way for Levinas, not something which man can 
adopt or refuse as one pleases, but which is inscribed in being as such. As Levinas emphasizes in 
Totality and Infinity, metaphysics precedes ontology.
222
 Thus, he grounds responsibility not in 
freedom or reason, as has been done in Western thought throughout the centuries, but in 
sensibility and vulnerability, that is to say, on our essential openness towards our fellow human 
beings.
223
 According to Levinas, just as the lived religious experience conceived by Rosenzweig, 
responsibility is not an attitude which one can adopt or refuse. It has to be seen rather as a mode 
of being, i.e. a beyond-being in the being, which one cannot choose, as it is prior to any 
conclusion of an agreement taken consciously. As Levinas pointed out with respect to 
Rosenzweig‟s notion of religion, responsibility is in this sense a primordial structure of 
consciousness. 
 
 In this context, the notion of Judaism as a category of being is a very important aspect 
which is mentioned several times in Levinas‟s texts on Rosenzweig. Judaism, Levinas points out  
for instance in “Franz Rosenzweig: A modern Jewish thinker”, is not conceived by Rosenzweig 
“as an archeological given or as an opinion among opinions, but as an inevitable moment in the 
general economy of Being and thought, as a category.”224 Similarly, in a lecture on Rosenzweig 
given in September 1959 on the Colloques des intellectuels juifs de langue française [Colloquia 
of French-speaking Jewish Intellectuals],
225
 Levinas points out with regard to The Star of 
Redemption:  
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Yet this book of general philosophy is a Jewish book, which founds Judaism in a new way. Judaism is 
no longer just a teaching whose theses can be true or false; Jewish existence […] itself is an essential 
event of being; Jewish existence is a category of being.
226
  
 
The important aspect lies in the fact that Judaism is attributed here a categorical function. Far 
from being a mere attribute of Rosenzweig‟s thinking, it is characterized by Levinas as decisive 
impulse which influences Rosenzweig reflections on being as such.     
 
         To fully grasp the whole extent of the notion of „Judaism as a category of being‟, it seems 
to me helpful to illustrate briefly the importance of Judaism for Rosenzweig through some 
biographical remarks, especially in order to outline why Judaism plays such an important role in 
the development of his intellectual biography. Rosenzweig was tempted to convert to Christianity 
in 1913 just before the First World War broke out. Even though, as Stéphane Mosès points out, 
“Rosenzweig does not mention explicitly this experience in any of his writings” it is “without a 
doubt […] the decisive event of his spiritual biography.”227 The global crisis and the war in 
Europe were reflected in the difficult personal situation Rosenzweig went through during this 
period. By that time nearly all of Rosenzweig‟s friends and intellectual peers were either 
Christians or Jews who had converted to Christianity, e.g. his cousins Hans and Rudolf 
Ehrenberg and his close friend Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. They tried to convince him also to 
convert.
228
 Thus Rosenzweig found himself in an intellectual crisis which became more and more 
difficult and even led him to the threshold of suicide.
229
 After an intensive discussion with Rudolf 
Ehrenberg and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy in Leipzig during the the night of the 7
th
 to the 8
th
 of 
July 1913, the so-called Leipziger Nachtgespräch, Rosenzweig finally agreed to convert. 
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However, he wanted to convert as a Jew and therefore decided to attend for the last time an office 
of Yom Kippour (Day of Atonement) in a small Orthodox synagogue in Berlin. He left the 
synagogue as a changed person and a few days later on October 31
st
 1913, he wrote his famous 
letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg with the often-cited statement: “Ich bleibe also Jude.” [“I remain thus 
a Jew.”].230 Another person who played a crucial role for Rosenzweig was Margrit (Gritli) 
Rosenstock-Huessy, the wife of Eugen Rosentsock-Huessy. Rosenzweig met Gritli in Kassel in 
1917 and became her lover for several years. The dialog on Judaism and Christianity and the 
question of conversion, which were at stake in the letters between her husband Eugen and Franz 
Rosenzweig, continued via the love letters of Franz and Gritli.
231
 Whereas Rosenstock frankly 
stated his wish to persuade Rosenzweig to renounce Judaism and to accept conversion, Gritli on 
the contrary encouraged him to follow his own way by affirming: “Franz, ich suche dein 
jüdisches Herz.” [“Franz, I am searching for your Jewish heart.”].232 Their correspondence 
provides an impressive example of the appreciation of the otherness of the fellow man. It is 
further remarkable that it was by means of his love for Gritli, a Christian woman, that 
Rosenzweig managed to completely overcome the idea of conversion and found the inspiration to 
compose a masterpiece of modern Jewish thought, i.e. The Star of Redemption. Furthermore, the 
decision not to convert to Christianity was by no means a marginal fact or a nice anecdote in his 
biography as it has often been treated.
233
 Instead it was the turning point of his whole existence 
and the starting point of what Rosenzweig later called the “New Thinking”. As Bernhard Casper 
points out,  
 
[…] the necessity for Rosenzweig to reflect on philosophy from Ionia to Jena arose just as much from 
personal conflicts. The question of how reality is to be understood was for Rosenzweig certainly a 
question for thought. But it was for him simultaneously a highly personal, existential question Ŕ 
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namely in the encounter with Eugen Rosenstock. Implied in Rosenzweig‟s much considered decision 
to remain a Jew is his remark to Rosenstock: „Recognize that there is the other.‟234  
 
This issue was indeed fundamental for Rosenzweig, who himself wrote from the threshold of 
death via his (non)conversion into life (ins Leben) Ŕ the words with which The Star of 
Redemption ends. It was a matter of life and death as Nahum Glatzer, a friend and colleague of 
Rosenzweig emphasizes: “The story of Franz Rosenzweig is the story of a conversion.”235 This is 
also proved through Rosenzweig‟s own statements concerning this crucial event of his life which 
is further echoed in his letters of later years. On August 27, 1919, after a difficult night of 
discussion concerning his Judaism, he wrote to Eugen Rosenstock for example: “I cannot forget 
the night when you suddenly wanted to „exterminate‟ my roots, not thinking that this would be 
my death (for the Spiritus qui me vivificat rises in me from this root).”236 In this letter 
Rosenzweig talked very directly by clearly emphasizing his Jewish identity against his Christian 
friend and underscoring that  
 
I know and feel as alive (in my mind) only to the unspeakable disgust towards Christ; and equally the 
inexpressible happiness to be a Jew and to have to search for the truth not through the medium of the 
lie.
237
  
 
It is thus nothing but consequent when Rosenzweig conceived his magnum opus The Star of 
Redemption as “a Jewish book”, as he underscored in a letter to Martin Buber.238  
 
 Secondly, to understand what is meant by Levinas‟s notion of „Judaism as a category of 
being‟, it is necessary to stress the historical development of this statement: it is already used in 
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fact in Levinas‟s captivity notebooks, his Carnets de captivité and, thereby, anticipates what he 
writes after the war on Rosenzweig‟s work. In his Carnets, Levinas first works out the notion of 
“Judaism as category”.239 He explains it as follows: “Judaism as category: where the individual 
salvation becomes collective Ŕ has but only one collective form: The „I‟ in the „We‟.”240 Hence 
Levinas reflected already during the war on the concept of Judaism as a category. As I have tried 
to show, Rosenzweig‟s interpretation of Judaism, which Levinas became acquainted with during 
the thirties through his reading of The Star of Redemption, offered him an innovative 
philosophical perspective. It opened a new horizon beyond Heidegger‟s philosophy centered on 
ontology. When, after the war, Levinas challenges Hamlet‟s famous question Ŕ “To be or not to 
be Ŕ the question par excellence probably does not lie therein”241 Ŕ, this can be seen as an echo of 
Rosenzweig‟s idea of the eternity of the Jewish people, beyond history and also as an echo of 
Hermann Cohen‟s dictum: “But we are eternal! [Aber wir sind ewig!]”242 Since Judaism is 
conceived by Rosenzweig and Cohen as an eternal existence, it relates to an existence beyond 
„Being and Time‟, i.e. beyond the Heideggerian approach of philosophy centered in ontology. It 
refers to a being “otherwise than being”243 [autrement qu‟être] which renders being as such 
ultimately meaningful. Taking into consideration the reflections that Judaism is beyond time, i.e. 
eternal, and transports thereby a message beyond being, it becomes comprehensible why Levinas 
argues that „to be or not to be‟ is precisely not the question. The negation of this question appears 
like a leitmotif also in his later works, e.g. in Otherwise than Being where Levinas writes at the 
opening pages: “To be or not to be is not the question where transcendence is concerned.”244 
Obviously, this issue touches in a certain sense the nerve of Levinas‟s conception of metaphysics.  
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These views are equally reflected in Levinas‟s harsh critique of Western philosophy. He 
defines the latter in Totality and Infinity as an “egology”,245 finding its best expression in the 
ideal of the Socratic truth which “rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its 
identification in ipseity, its egoism.”246 This critique expresses Levinas‟s profound opposition to 
the common tradition of philosophy from which he clearly distances himself. In his view,  
 
Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by 
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. This primacy of 
the same was Socrate‟s teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all 
eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside […].247 
 
Beyond the limits of this traditional concept of philosophy, Levinas points out that “metaphysics 
precedes ontology,”248 which means there is something „beyond being‟ and beyond ontology, 
which gives sense to this very being and which finds its expression precisely through language. 
Similarly to Rosenzweig, Levinas emphasizes in Totality and Infinity that “thought consists in 
speaking.”249 In the next sentence, immediately after this statement about language, he goes on to 
develop his notion of religion which he conceives as an opposition to totality: “We propose to 
call „religion‟ the bond that is established between the same and the other without constituting a 
totality.”250 This development of Levinas‟s thinking can be traced back to the time of his 
captivity during the war. In this period he discusses his conflict with a philosophy centered in the 
primacy of ontology, as represented by Heidegger‟s philosophy. In his Carnets de captivité 
Levinas succinctly sums up the issue at stake as follows: “Departing from Dasein or departing 
from Judaism.”251 It seems that he gave himself the answer by defining the framework of his 
future work for which he emphasizes the importance of Judaism, in contrast to the influence of 
Heidegger‟s philosophy of Dasein:  
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An essential element of my philosophy Ŕ that by which it differs from the philosophy of Heidegger Ŕ 
is the importance of the Other. Eros as the central moment. On the other hand it follows the rhythm of 
Judaism […].252  
 
The accentuation of the profound relationship between his thinking and Judaism is repeated in 
nearly the same words at several points in his Carnets. By trying to give a definition of his 
philosophy, key notions of Levinas‟s later work emerge in this context and provide an impressive 
insight into the development of his thought:  
 
My philosophy Ŕ is a philosophy of face-to-face. Relationship with others, without any intermediary. 
That is Judaism. God has spoken. Prophets Ŕ the language, those who speak against their will Ŕ total 
transparency.
253
  
 
Judaism is conceived of by Levinas as a possible solution for a way out of the impact 
Heidegger‟s thinking exerted on him in order to attain an original philosophical point of view. It 
is plausible in my view that his reception of Franz Rosenzweig‟s The Star of Redemption in the 
thirties plays an important role in this context.  
 
The outlined intellectual development of Levinas can also be seen from his various 
philosophical notes [Notes philosophiques diverses] published recently in the volume Carnets de 
captivité. In these notes Levinas deals with the question:  
 
Heidegger Ŕ extension of Greek thought Ŕ to oppose him Judaism? But his mind is completely 
Christianized. Löwith opposes him the Greek world. But Heidegger argues an extension of Greek 
thought. Whatever the concepts are with which we want to discuss with Heidegger, Heidegger 
denounces them as devoid of thought because not yet revised in light of his thought. Ŕ What is needed 
is a new perspective.
254
  
 
                                                 
252
 Ibid., p. 134: “Un élément essentiel de ma philosophie Ŕ ce par quoi elle diffère de la philosophie de Heidegger Ŕ 
c‟est l‟importance de l‟Autre. Eros comme moment central. D‟autre part elle suit le rythme du judaïsme […].” 
253
 Ibid., p. 186: “Ma philosophie Ŕ est une philosophie du face-à-face. Relation avec autrui, sans intermédiaire. C‟est 
cela le judaïsme. Dieu a parlé. Prophètes Ŕ le langage, ceux qui parlent malgré eux Ŕ transparence totale.”, emphasis 
added.   
254
 Ibid., p. 467: “Heidegger Ŕ prolongement de la pensée grecque Ŕ Lui opposer le judaïsme? Mais sa pensée est 
entièrement christianisée. Löwith lui oppose le monde grecque {grec}. Mais Heidegger se dit prolongement de la 
pensée grecque. Quels que soient les concepts à l‟aide desquels on voudrait discuter avec Heidegger, Heidegger les 
dénoncerait comme dépourvus de pensée parce que encore non révisés à la lumière de sa pensée. Ŕ Ce qu‟il faut, 
c‟est un point de vue nouveau.”, emphasis added.  
 63 
This note is dated approximately from the period 1956-1963. It shows how Levinas was 
concerned by defining his own philosophical point of view as opposed to the thought of 
Heidegger. In his captivity notebooks Levinas anticipates a possible answer to this question as he 
explains that this new perspective is found through language, or more precisely, through 
expression. He even puts this aspect at the basis of his future philosophy:  
 
The transcendence that I place at the basis of my philosophy Ŕ that is neither the transcendence to the 
object Ŕ the transcendence to the future Ŕ or the transcendence to love Ŕ but the transcendence of the 
expression.
255
  
 
As expression and language are connected (because each expression is automatically a sort of 
communication, also unintentionally), Levinas implicitly underlines the transcendence of 
language as one of the key notions of his thinking.
256
  
 
From this statement during the war, a connection can be drawn to his article “Is Ontology 
fundamental?”, published in 1951. In this article Levinas argues that language precedes ontology. 
Language and reason are mutually dependent and complement one another. In this context, 
Levinas clearly explains the differentiation of his thought to that of Heidegger:  
 
To Heidegger, being-with-the-other-person Ŕ Miteinandersein Ŕ thus rests on the ontological relation. 
We reply: Is our relation to the other a letting be? Is not the independence of the other achieved 
through his or her role as one who is addressed? Is the person to whom we speak understood 
beforehand in his being? Not at all. The other is not first an object of understanding and then an 
interlocutor. The two relations are merged. In other words, addressing the other is inseparable from 
understanding the other.
257
  
 
Language and knowledge and particularly the knowledge that we can achieve of another person 
are thus deeply connected to one another. Hence Levinas draws the conclusion: “To understand a 
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person is already to speak to him.”258 It is important to stress that for Levinas „knowing‟ is not 
first of all objectifying, that is to say a question of reason, but first and foremost an act of re-
cognition and of approaching the other. The notion of proximity is of great importance in this 
context. It is linked with the face as Levinas explains in Totality and Infinity:  
 
The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. […] It is here that the Transcendent, 
infinitely other, solicits us and appeals to us. The proximity of the Other, the proximity of the 
neighbor, is in being an eluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute presence […], which 
expresses itself.
259
 
 
Therefore, what is at stake in a face-to-face conversation for Levinas is not the mere content of 
the communication, but the presence of the other, that is to say the presentation of his being 
through language:  
 
The primordial essence of expression and discourse does not reside in the information they would 
supply concerning an interior and hiden world. In expression a being present itself […] and 
consequently appeals to me.
260
 
 
Levinas‟s conception of expression and understanding differs thus from those concepts that 
emphasize the rational accentuation of language seen as an exchange of information between two 
beings. Language and moreover precisely the face-to-face of spoken language establishes for 
Levinas a relationship among men which is „otherwise than being‟ and otherwise than what 
ontological concepts contain. Speaking goes hand in hand with getting acquainted with the other, 
in getting to know him, through proximity. According to Levinas, there can be no knowledge of 
the other without language and without speaking to the other face-to-face. It is in fact through 
language that a new conception of consciousness is developed by Levinas as he points out: 
 
Speech delineates an original relation. The point is to see the function of language not as subordinate 
to the consciousness we have of the presence of the other, or of his proximity, or of our community 
with him, but as a condition of that conscious realization.
261
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That means that in perceiving the other I am already in expressive relation to the other. Even by 
ignoring him, I nonetheless express to him this ignoring. In this sense Levinas emphasizes that  
 
[m]an is the only being I cannot meet without my expressing this meeting to him. […] In every 
attitude toward the human being there is a greeting Ŕ even if this is the refusal of a greeting. […] This 
impossibility of approaching the other without speaking means that here thought is inseparable from 
expression.
262
  
 
Thus, the encounter with a fellow man and moreover, the verbal expression of this encounter 
represents an ethical recognition which precedes the ontological cognition. Hence, in his article 
“Is ontology fundamental?” Levinas stresses the fact that ontology plays a subordinate role in the 
encounter with the other:  
 
The relation to the other is therefore not ontology. This bond with the other is not reducible to the 
representation of the other, but to his invocation, and in which invocation is not preceded by an 
understanding, I call religion. The essence of discourse is prayer.
263
  
 
This remarkable statement connects discourse, i.e. language, with religion and thereby shows the 
interference of religious notions, e.g. the one of prayer, in Levinas‟s views on language. It is 
noteworthy that this statement appears in one of Levinas‟s philosophical argumentations and not 
in one of his Talmudic readings. Levinas goes on to point out in “Is ontology fundamental?” that 
with the word „religion‟ he does not want to express any mystical concept whatsoever:  
 
No theology, no mysticism is concealed behind the analysis I have just given of the meeting with the 
other, the formal structure of which I felt it was important to stress. […] „Religion‟ remains the 
relationship to a being as a being.
264
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This means that the primordial concept of „fundamental ontology‟ as outlined by Heidegger is 
substituted by Levinas with an innovative concept of „religion‟ conceived of as a “relationship to 
a being as a being”.265 
  
 This means further that the truth which is worked out through discourse and language is 
experienced according to Levinas first and foremost in the face-to-face relationship towards the 
other. Rosenzweig too stresses the fact that truth is essentially experienced. In the New Thinking 
only those truths are accepted which are well-proven [bewährt] in life; notwithstanding the fact 
that there may be many other truths equally proven scientifically. However, these truths represent 
a specific „scientific‟ category of truth which cannot as such provide a meaning to human life 
(even if it is able to explain many parts of human living). As Levinas underlines, religion takes 
part in „the drama of being‟,266 in the relationship to the other. Furthermore, in Rosenzweig‟s 
view, religion requests man to live a life in dialogue with the other religions, rather than being 
concentrated only on one‟s own truth. This dialogical symbiosis is however reduced in The Star 
of Redemption to two religions: Judaism and Christianity. Levinas points this out in the last text 
he dedicated to Rosenzweig: the foreword he wrote for Stéphane Mosès‟s study System and 
Revelation in 1982. In this small but very revealing text regarding Levinas‟s reception of 
Rosenzweig, he describes the close relationship of truth, religion and the structure of being in 
Rosenzweig‟s work as follows:  
 
Truth does not anymore mean statements and affirmations but rather an event and an eschatological 
drama in the process of unfolding.
267
 […] The absolutely true splits up, on account of its truth itself, 
into Judaism and Christianity and is played out in their dialogue.
268
 It is a life in common. But 
Judaism, thus brought to its ontological dignity, thenceforth demands of its followers not a distracted 
attendance at a few services but all of the dimensions of the Torah that they knew at the times of their 
isolation.
269
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Similarly to the way he characterizes Judaism in Rosenzweig‟s thinking, Levinas, in an article of 
the same period, “Demanding ontology” (1980), works out a notion of a biblical ontology Ŕ in 
contrast to the ontological notion of the subject outlined by Idealism:  
 
God holds you without letting you go, but without enslaving you: a relation in which, despite the 
subordination it formally outlines, the difficult freedom of man arises. It is even for this reason that 
God is God and not some logical term, and that the biblical ontology of the person departs from the 
subjectivity of the idealistic subject.
270
 
 
The repercussions of Rosenzweig‟s influence on Levinas‟s thinking can be thus traced back from 
the mid-thirties up to Levinas‟s articles in the eighties, which prove an ongoing discussion with 
Rosenzweig‟s work. This influence is implicitly mirrored in Levinas‟s writings throughout his 
work, in particular with respect to the notions of language, being and religion. Further, in 
Levinas‟s refusal of any theological dimension of the word „religion‟,271 another aspect relating 
to Rosenzweig is highlighted. In fact, in The Star of Redemption the word „religion‟ is not the 
center of attention, but moreover the lived experience of religion as an outcome of true 
spirituality. Religion is in this sense an umbrella term for different religious experiences which 
find their worldly expressions in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and so on, even though, 
among these religions, Judaism and Christianity play the central role in The Star. Rosenzweig 
succinctly makes clear that he did not first and foremost focus on religion in The Star: “God did 
not create religion, but instead the world. [Gott hat eben nicht die Religion, sondern die Welt 
geschaffen.]”272  
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b)      Levinas‟s “awakening of consciousness” as a new mode of being – at the          
           intersection of Judaism, being and language 
 
 
 Coming back to the notion of „Judaism as a category of being‟ one can now better evaluate 
the influence of Rosenzweig‟s thought on Levinas and also why the latter dwelled in such a 
detailed manner on the notion of „Judaism as a category of being‟. In my view this aspect marks a 
central aspect of Levinas‟s reception of Rosenzweig. In highlighting the categorical aspect of 
Judaism as a category of being, Levinas develops a notion of being in which being is essentially 
transformed in a being-for-the-Other. This is worked out in a radical manner in Otherwise than 
Being where Levinas conceives subjectivity as a “hostage” and “substitution”.273 However, the 
line of thought which leads to this particular notion of being begins to take shape in fact very 
early in Levinas‟s thinking. This can be seen in his captivity notebooks, where Levinas concisely 
points out the issue at stake: “Departing from Dasein or departing from Judaism.”274 It is 
noteworthy to stress this continuity in his work by citing again the remarkable notes Levinas 
wrote during his captivity: “My philosophy Ŕ is a philosophy of face-to-face. Relationship with 
others, without any intermediary. That is Judaism.”275 This shows how early Levinas worked out 
key notions of his thinking and how they differ from the philosophy of his teachers (Husserl and 
Heidegger) as well as about the important role of Judaism for his thinking. Furthermore one can 
read in Levinas captivity notebooks: “An essential element of my philosophy Ŕ that by which it 
differs from the philosophy of Heidegger Ŕ is the importance of the Other. Eros as the central 
moment. On the other hand it follows the rhythm of Judaism […].”276 The impact of Rosenzweig 
is remarkable in this context in my view. Levinas‟s searching for a new way to develop his work 
by taking into account Judaism can be seen as inspired by Rosenzweig; e.g. in his captivity 
notebooks Levinas notes: “Itinerary of coming back Ŕ starting from the fact that one is Jewish Ŕ 
and not from doctrine.”277 As Gilles Hanus points out, this note, though small, proves that 
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Levinas was reflecting on issues Rosenzweig dealt with.
278
 The topic of „being Jewish‟ became 
an important issue for Levinas, not only for daily life but also as an issue for philosophy. This is 
mirrored for instance in Levinas‟s article “Being Jewish” (1947). Through his reception of 
Rosenzweig‟s work in the mid-thirties, Levinas gets in fact a decisive impulse to develop a new 
concept of consciousness and, furthermore, a new concept of being which is essentially related to 
Judaism, e.g. by emphasizing key notions of Judaism, like election, as characterizing human 
subjectivity.
279
   
 
         This development can be traced back to his later writings. In his previously mentioned 
essay “Demanding Judaism” (1980), Levinas develops his views on being and Judaism by 
elaborating a new concept of consciousness related to the notions of insomnia and continued 
revelation. Let me quote at length an important passage of this article in order to place it later on 
in the context of my interpretation of Levinas‟s notion of Judaism as a mode of being linked to 
transcendence. In the mentioned article Levinas gives an interpretation of Jewish consciousness 
which he outlines as follows:  
 
As if Jewish destiny were a crack in the shell of imperturbable being and the awakening to an 
insomnia in which the inhuman is no longer covered up and hidden by the political necessities which 
it shapes, and no longer excused by their universality. As a prophetic moment of human reason where 
every man Ŕ and all of man Ŕ ends up re-finding one another, Judaism would not mean simply a 
nationality, a species in a type and a contingency of History. Judaism, rather, is a rupture of the natural 
and the historical that are constantly reconstituted and, thus, a Revelation which is always forgotten. It 
is written and it becomes Bible, but the revelation is also continued [révélation continuée]; it is 
produced by way of Israel: the destiny of a people that is jostled and jostles through its daily life that 
which, in this life, is content with its natural or „historical‟ meaning.280  
 
         In the following I seek to show how the two crucial notions in this passage, i.e. insomnia 
and continued revelation, can be seen as central aspects regarding the interweavement of 
Judaism, being and language in Levinas‟s thought. At stake in this passage is nothing less than an 
innovative interpretation of consciousness constructed through a specific definition of Judaism. 
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By defining it as a “prophetic moment of human reason,”281 Levinas attributes to Judaism a 
universal significance for humankind. As a constant rupture of the historical and natural, it points 
at something „beyond being‟, a transcendence which is realized through the presence of Judaism. 
This aspect of a universal importance of Judaism was also emphasized by Levinas in a roundtable 
discussion with theologians and other scholars where he stated frankly: “Do not be shocked by 
this, but what is genuinely human is that part of being which is being-a-Jew, an echoing in the 
particular. [Das echt Menschliche ist das Judesein im Menschen […].]”282 Indeed, as Hilary 
Putnam points out, “Levinas is universalizing Judaism. To understand him, one has to understand 
the paradoxical claim implicit in his writing that, in essence, all human beings are Jews.”283 This 
link between being (in general) and Judaism (in particular) is an important aspect. Nonetheless it 
has often been neglected in interpretations on the philosophy of Levinas in order to blind out a 
correlation between his confessional and philosophical writings. However, it is no longer 
unknown today that the two types of writings obviously overlap with regard to many of the key 
issues of Levinas‟s thinking. Up-to-date research literature increasingly takes into account the 
fact that the “Judaic heritage […] is crucial for a proper understanding of Levinas‟s work” and 
tries to work out “an interpretation of Levinas‟s philosophy from the sources of Judaism”.284 In 
my view, this is essential for an adequate evaluation of his work. 
 
 As I have shown above through a discussion of Levinas‟s articles from the thirties, dealing 
with the Jewish situation in the face of the dangers of Nazism, the idea of a connection between 
being and Judaism can be traced back to the inter-war period. Shortly after the war Levinas took 
up again this idea. In his article “Being Jewish” (1947) he investigates the question “in what 
Jewish existence consists. Without claiming a theology, by simply analyzing the Jewish will to 
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be, which posits itself anew.”285 In linking the experience of the Jews in their confrontation with 
the Nazi Anti-semitism to a universal human experience, Levinas ties (once again) the general 
issue of being to a reference of the experience of being Jewish:  
 
The recourse of Hitlerian anti-Semitism to racial myth reminded the Jew of the irremissibility of his 
being. Not to be able to flee one‟s condition Ŕ for many this was like vertigo. Granted this is a human 
situation, and in this the human soul is perhaps naturally Jewish.
286
  
 
It is striking that a general connection between being as such (i.e. the human soul) and being 
Jewish is outlined. Furthermore, Levinas points out that “to be Jewish is […] to feel for oneself a 
place in the economy of being.”287 This statement echoes obviously Levinas‟s thoughts on 
„Judaism as a category of being‟ in his captivity notebooks. It is further noteworthy that in 
Levinas‟s argumentation „being Jewish‟ is linked a priori to a certain reference to religion. He 
defines the characteristics of the Jewish people as introducing a religious sphere into the world, 
whether the single Jew defines himself as religious or not. This aspect is clearly emphasized in 
Levinas‟s article: “[…] the Jew is the very entrance of the religious event into the world; better 
yet, he is the impossibility of a world without religion.”288 Aside from the self-assessment of the 
single Jew, in terms feeling Jewish or not, this fact is experienced by the Jew according to 
Levinas through the concrete “feeling that he exists metaphysically.”289 In Levinas‟s view, even 
“[t]he least rag-seller who thinks himself „liberated‟, the intellectual who thinks himself an 
atheist, breathes still the mystery of his creation and his election […].”290 When taking a closer 
look at what is meant by Levinas‟s statement “to exist metaphysically”, it comes to the fore that 
the pivotal issue of his argumentation in this article is the notion of „election‟. The coming-into-
being of the subject as an election opens the path for Levinas‟s interpretation, e.g. in Otherwise 
than Being, to conceive being as linked to an „otherwise than being‟. By borrowing the notion 
„election‟ from a Jewish context Levinas links general notions of his philosophy, i.e. being, 
subjectivity, etc., to a Jewish background. To become a personality, that is to say a human being 
tout court, means for Levinas to be elected, to be unique and irreplaceable. The Jewish people as 
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the chosen people, as outlined in the biblical stories of the Old Testament, represent an archetype 
of this experience. Levinas stresses that the notion of „election‟ in his philosophy is in no way to 
be understood as a privilege or a preferential treatment:  
 
The meaning of election, and of revelation understood as election, is not to be found in the injustice of 
a preference. […] Thus, Jewish election is not initially lived as pride or particularism. It is the very 
mystery of personhood.
291
 
 
Election and personality are thus linked together in his interpretation. Levinas concludes his 
article by underscoring that the Jewish existence expresses, in this sense, a general fact of human 
existence: “Jewish existence is thus the fulfillment of the human condition as fact, personhood 
and freedom.”292 A description of Jewish being is thus elaborated in this article through an 
interpretation of being in general. 
 
 This early exegesis of Judaism as linked to being in general, as conducted in the article 
“Being Jewish” (1947), is extremely important. It points the way to Levinas‟s further 
interpretations of subjectivity, responsibility and language. His argumentation outlines the 
background for his works to come, in which the notion of election or vocation,
293
 especially in 
connection to responsibility, can be found throughout as a common theme. The article “Being 
Jewish” is in my view a pivotal point between Levinas‟s studies and articles in the thirties, 
namely On Escape, and his later writings, published after the Second World War. In order to give 
an interesting example in this context, I would like to emphasize that after the war Levinas 
outlines another mode for an „escape from being‟ realized through religion or more precisely, 
through the Jewish religion, i.e. Judaism. In an article on the Jewish writer Samuel Joseph Agnon 
(1888-1979) published in 1973, Levinas describes this line of thought as follows: 
 
Religion (or, more precisely, Judaism) would be the way in which a de-substantiation of being is of 
itself procured, of itself possible Ŕ an excluded middle in which the limits between life and non-life 
disappear. This modality is diametrically opposed to the reality of the substrata, sculpture-being, 
architecture and structure-being, solid being, each term of which begins in its own causality, and, 
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nucleate, sustains itself. The symbolism of the rite, like the enigma of the Hebraic mode of expression 
[dire], de-nucleates ultimate solidity beneath the plasticity of forms, as taught by Western ontology.
294
  
 
Judaism is presented here as an alternative to the ontological conceptions of Western thought. 
The „solid being‟ de-nucleates itself through an impact of religious transcendence. This statement 
refers to the mentioned article from 1947, “Being Jewish”, where Levinas states that Judaism 
introduces the religious into the world and that the Jew signifies “the impossibility of a world 
without religion.”295 Given this background, it is no surprise that in his article on Agnon in 1973, 
Judaism is said to have the power of a “de-substantiation of being”. Furthermore, this elucidates 
what is at stake in the introductory citation of Levinas‟s article “Demanding Judaism”, where the 
Jewish being is portrayed as “a crack in the shell of imperturbable being”.296 The philosophical 
elaboration of a concept of being as linked to Judaism has to be seen as an outcome of Levinas‟s 
general critique of a philosophy focused in ontology, represented e.g. in Heidegger‟s concept of 
„fundamental ontology‟ or in the Socratic ideal of truth, as he points out in Totality and Infinity:  
 
Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by 
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. This primacy of 
the same was Socrates‟s teaching: to receive nothing of the Other [sic] but what is in me, as though 
from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside Ŕ to receive nothing or to 
be free.
297
  
 
It is obvious that Judaism holds in this line of thought a remarkable place as a counterweight 
against the traditional concepts of ontology. It is further noteworthy that the article on Agnon is 
not a part of Levinas‟s confessional texts, e.g. his Talmudic readings, but appeared in one of his 
philosophical anthologies on secular topics. 
  
 To come back to the above cited passage of his article “Demanding Judaism”, Levinas 
connects his interpretation of the relationship between being (in general) and a being linked to 
Judaism (in particular), i.e. the Jewish existence, to the notion of insomnia. The latter is a very 
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important notion of Levinas‟s thinking which I would like to point out in more detail in the 
following and to place it further into context to the aforementioned. On various occasions 
Levinas explained what he meant by „insomnia‟, a term that is at first sight rather exceptional for 
a philosophical context. In an interview he gave in 1987, entitled “On the Usefulness of 
Insomnia”, Levinas stated that this experience, far from being a marginal phenomenon, is in fact 
a crucial event for every human being: 
 
Awakening is, I believe, that which is proper to man. The search, on the part of the one who has been 
awakened, for a new sobering, more profound, philosophical. The encounter with texts which result 
from the conversations between Socrates and his interlocutors calls us to wake up, but so too does the 
encounter with the other man.
298
  
 
In his article “Philosophy and Awakening” (1976) Levinas furthermore outlines a notion of 
insomnia conceived as a sobering up. He refers to Husserl in his argumentation and points out 
that “Husserl‟s theory of the Inter-subjective Reduction describes the astonishing or traumatizing 
(trauma, not thauma) possibility of a sobering up in which the I, facing the Other, is freed from 
itself, and awakens from the dogmatic slumber.”299 Similarly in another article of this period, 
Levinas emphasizes this aspect succinctly: “One must not sleep, one must philosophize.”300 In his 
article “Philosophy and Awakening” he admits to have borrowed this notion of a „sobering up‟ 
from Heidegger‟s philosophy. However Levinas obviously uses it in an independent and 
innovative way by raising the following rhetorical questions:  
 
And is not ethical relation to the other that event in which this permanent revolution of sobering up is 
concrete life? […] An awakening to consciousness, the truth of which is not the consciousness of that 
awakening? An awakening that remains a first movement toward the other, the traumatism of which is 
revealed in the Inter-subjective Reduction, a traumatism secretly striking the very subjectivity of the 
subject?
301
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As an answer, Levinas succinctly adds after these questions, the crucial notion in this context: 
“Transcendence: this term is used without any theological presupposition. It is, to the contrary, 
the excess of life that is presupposed by theologies.”302 This permanent revolution that Levinas 
speaks of can also be seen as a continued revelation in which the mode of transcendence occurs 
in concrete life Ŕ not in heaven or some lofty theological sphere. The event of transcendence is 
conceived as an event taking place among people. In this sense I respectfully disagree with the 
interpretation of Samuel Moyn who sees a contrast in Levinas and Rosenzweig by emphasizing 
that “for Rosenzweig, divinity is the only alterity; for Levinas, humanity is.”303 Since the relation 
of man to God is reflected in the inter-human relationship among people, divinity and humanity 
are fundamentally connected to each other in the philosophy of both thinkers.
304
 
 
 As a result of his critique on the concept of consciousness, Levinas strives to outline in the 
same period a new concept of rationality. In his article “From Consciousness to Wakefulness” 
(1974) he argues against “precisely [an] ontological interpretation of reason”, a concept which 
had already been implicitly criticized in his argument that „language precedes ontology‟ in his 
article “Is Ontology fundamental?” from 1951, in order to pave the way “toward a reason 
understood as watchfulness or vigil”.305 Levinas‟s critique of reason starts by pointing out that 
reason is always an “act of identification”306 through which self-consciousness is produced Ŕ 
“[...] and if it is a sobering up, then it is a sobering up in the Same, a coming-back-to-oneself.”307 
Referring to Husserl‟s phenomenological analysis and his notions of “sleep” and “sleeplessness” 
[veille], Levinas intends in this article to go beyond Husserl and to sketch a new mode of 
consciousness by means of such terms like “awakening”, “insomnia” and “vigilance”. These 
notions are used by Levinas with regard to a special relationship of the I to the other:  
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Transcendence in immanence, the strange structure (or the depth) of the psyche as a soul within the 
soul; it is the awakening that always recommences in sleeplessness itself; the Same infinitely carried 
back in its most intimate identity to the Other. […] In awakening, between the Same and the Other 
there is shown a relationship irreducible to adversity and conciliation, alienation and assimilation. […] 
This is a heteronomy of freedom that the Greeks have not taught us.
308
 
 
Thereby, the autonomy of the I is “torn out of [his] rootedness.”309 Levinas expresses this 
relationship to the other with a paradoxical notion that underscores being “[i]n oneself, liberation 
of self.”310 In this context the notion of insomnia is of crucial importance because it indicates 
precisely the “scission of identity” and the “enucleation of the very atomicity of the one”, which 
is the aim of Levinas‟s analysis.311 Contrary to “attention”, which is directed toward objects, 
“vigilance” is “absorbed in the rustling of unavoidable being” and “anonymous”.312 In its 
irreducibility to a namable subject of consciousness, this “vigilance” shakes up the 
phenomenological terminology within which Levinas is working. The innovative concept of 
identity Levinas outlines, leads him also to a new definition of reason and furthermore, to a 
rupture with the conventional concept of ontology:  
 
A sobering up always yet to be further sobered, a wakefulness watchful for a new awakening, the 
Same always awakening from itself Ŕ Reason. […] The frame of ontology is here broken, with the 
subject passing from the Same Ŕ excluding or assimilating the other Ŕ to the awakening of the Same 
by the other, sobering up from its identity and its being.
313
  
 
In Otherwise than Being, the second major work of Levinas which appeared in the same year 
(1974) as the cited article “From Consciousness to Wakefulness”, Levinas connects this line of 
thought with the notion of substitution.
314
 The latter is also of central importance for his 
philosophy. It indicates the point to which his argumentation culminates in a certain sense: “The 
vigilance Ŕ as the waking up in awakening Ŕ signifies the defection of identity. This is not 
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identity‟s extinction but its substitution for the neighbor.”315 The aspect of a „substitution‟ for the 
other as the ultimate consequence of a radical responsibility is further elaborated by Levinas in 
his article “God and philosophy” (1975). Here the connection of the mentioned notions becomes 
evident: “The referring to another is awakening [éveil], awakening to proximity, which is 
responsibility for the neighbor to the point of substitution for him.”316 Furthermore, in this article 
Levinas speaks of “[i]nsomnia as a category” that “comes out of the logic of the categories, prior 
to all anthropological attention and dullness”. 317 He speaks similarly in his article on Rosenzweig 
of the fact that, for Rosenzweig, the “Jewish existence […] itself is an essential event of being; 
Jewish existence is a category of being.”318 Likewise, as I stated above, Levinas speaks in his 
Carnets de captivité of “Judaism as category”319. Insomnia also has to be understood as a 
category of Levinas‟s thinking as he emphasizes:  
 
This is precisely the insomnia that one cannot state otherwise than by these words, which have a 
categorical signification. […] An irreducible category of the difference at the heart of the Same, 
which pierces the structure of being, in animating or inspiring it.
320
 
 
Hence, a certain connection of the notions insomnia and Judaism can be pointed out here and 
linked to Levinas‟s concept of human consciousness. What is furthermore at stake in this new 
concept of reason and consciousness is, according to Levinas, nothing less than a rediscovering 
of life, a question “of reanimating Ŕ or of reactivating Ŕ this life in order to reach, under the name 
of indubitable being, the living presence. It is a question, in presence, of rediscovering life.”321 
Rosenzweig too was concerned in the Star of Redemption with life as such, as Amos Funkenstein 
emphasizes: “Zest for life is the deepest drive in the Stern der Erlösung. It was also the secret of 
his ability to suffer and work throughout his debilitating illness. The point can be made briefly, 
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yet it is more important […] than all our theoretical considerations hitherto.”322 Levinas too 
focuses ultimately not merely on theoretical questions of philosophy, but on a question 
concerning life as such: how to outline a new mode of consciousness that adequately takes into 
account the presence of the fellow human being. Against the background of the outlined 
explanations it becomes clearer now what Levinas meant by his aforementioned statement that 
“[r]eligion (or, more precisely, Judaism) would be the way in which a de-substantiation of being 
is of itself procured, of itself possible Ŕ an excluded middle in which the limits between life and 
non-life disappear.”323 At the intersection of being and Jewish being as linked to a beyond the 
„here and now‟, Levinas‟s concept of being becomes itself a „beyond-of-being‟. Because the 
ethical dimension which takes place in the face-to-face relationship of an everyday encounter and 
is linked to everyday being, is according to Levinas something „beyond being‟. Therefore, 
Levinas‟s thinking is not centered in the philosophy of being, but in the exploration of the 
significance of a „beyond of being‟, i.e. metaphysics and transcendence. Therefore ethics 
precedes ontology and being. In his article “God and Philosophy” Levinas underlines this aspect 
as follows: “Ethics is not a moment of being, it is otherwise and better than being; the very 
possibility of the beyond.”324  
 
 Another important aspect of Levinas‟s new interpretation of consciousness is the notion of 
a continued revelation, cited at the beginning of this section in the aforementioned passage of his 
article “Demanding Judaism”. It is noteworthy to point out that this line of thought is close to that 
of Rosenzweig: for the latter revelation was also not something that happened only once at Mount 
Sinai and then never again. As Rivka Horwitz demonstrates, Rosenzweig “denies that prophecy 
ever stopped. […] There is no difference apparent in his writings between revelation in classical 
prophecy (on the basis of which religion is established) and revelation in later generations.”325 
Revelation is thus conceived as a “continuous creation of believers”326 which requires the active 
participation of man in order for it to be realized as revelation. This underlines that revelation is 
in fact a mutual event between God and man; that is to say man‟s acknowledgment of God and 
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God‟s being are interwoven. With reference to a rabbinical citation, Rosenzweig points out this 
aspect in The Star of Redemption as follows: “When the soul confesses before the face of God 
and with this confesses and thus attests God‟s being, then only does God, too, the manifest God, 
acquire being: „When you confess me, then I am.‟”327 Levinas refers to the movement of a 
„continued revelation‟ which occurs in the relationship of man to God in his last text on 
Rosenzweig, published as a foreword in Stéphane Mosès‟s study System and Revelation. Here 
Levinas highlights the specific connection of a continued revelation and love in Rosenzweig‟s 
thought: “God‟s coming out toward man locked into his selfhood: Revelation that is a presence 
always renewed, that is, love.”328 He further demonstrates that it is through language that “the 
shattering of the enclosure”329 of the self takes place in Rosenzweig‟s system: “Language, a 
coming out movement, is also the event of ex-is-tence.”330 According to Levinas, language, love 
and ontology are thus connected in Rosenzweig‟s system. Levinas highlights that revelation 
creates nothing new, but connects an event at the intersection of the triad language, sociability 
and love: “The entering-into-relation by Revelation establishes nothing; it binds that which 
cannot be added up; it binds with a tie whose language or sociability or love would be the 
originary metaphor.”331 This underscores the importance Levinas attributes to language with 
regard to The Star of Redemption and defines it as a key notion required to understand the whole 
of Rosenzweig‟s system.  
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4. Between Judaism and philosophy – Rosenzweig‟s influence on Levinas‟s 
thinking  
 
 
To briefly sum up the references to Judaism regarding the development of Levinas‟s and 
Rosenzweig‟s philosophy, it can be emphasized first of all that Judaism obviously served as a 
motor of their reflections and not just as one matter among others.
332
 The fact that Levinas 
attributes Judaism to be „a category of being‟ can be seen, in my view, on the one hand as a result 
of his reception of Rosenzweig‟s Star of Redemption; on the other hand it is a reflection which 
mirrors his experiences during his captivity in the Second World War, which had thrown him 
back on his Judaism in a radical way. Moreover, it is also an outcome of Levinas‟s search for an 
alternative to Heidegger‟s philosophy, compromised through its adherence to Nazism. In giving 
Judaism the state of an ontological category, „being Jewish‟ is conceived of not as a mere 
accidental fact of an existence but as of a categorical significance. This is how Levinas described 
the fact of „being Jewish‟ in his captivity notebooks as well as shortly after the war in his article 
“Being Jewish” (Être Juif).333 Being Jewish is conceived of in these writings as an important 
figure of being as such. Thereby it points out the way towards a concept for an innovative „mode 
of being‟, which took shape in Levinas‟s later work, e.g. in Otherwise than Being. In the latter, 
Levinas develops the concept of a being as „otherwise than being‟, i.e. as substitution, election 
and radical responsibility Ŕ notions that were ignored by Western concepts of ontology.  
 
Nonetheless it should not remain unmentioned that the relationship of Judaism and 
philosophy in Levinas‟s work is a controversial topic of discussion. As I pointed out, the up-to-
date research literature on Levinas (mostly) takes into account the influence of Judaism and 
Jewish sources on Levinas‟s thinking. However, one must also face the fact that Levinas himself 
openly denied any theological aspirations. He claims that the starting point of his philosophy is 
“absolutely non-theological” and points out: “I insist upon this. It is not theology that I am doing, 
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but philosophy.”334 On another occasion, in a conversation 1975 with scholars of the University 
of Leyden, Levinas further argues: “I think that in spite of everything, what I do is 
phenomenology, [...] even if all of the Husserlian methodology is not respected.”335 In the same 
discussion, Levinas emphasized on the other hand: “There is no choice: philosophy is spoken in 
Greek. [...] My concern everywhere is precisely to translate this non-Hellenism of the Bible into 
Hellenic terms [...].”336 When considering the key notions of Levinas‟s thought, one is thus 
confronted with notions and concepts apparently borrowed from biblical contexts. Levinas 
elucidates for example his notions of illeity and trace with a reference to Exodus 33.
337
 Further he 
explains in Otherwise than Being the central notion „to-be-obsessed‟ by the other with a reference 
to the Song of Songs: “I am sick with love.”338 To explain this interweaving of Biblical citations 
in his philosophical texts some scholars have stressed Levinas‟s Jewish origins by pointing out 
that his “criticism of the occidental way of life and thought would probably have been impossible 
if he had not been educated as a Jew.”339 In contradistinction to this notion, other scholars pointed 
out the particular impact of contemporary philosophical trends on Levinas‟s intellectual 
development; e.g. Samuel Moyn underscores:  
 
Levinas‟s conception of ethics as interpersonal encounter [...] is quite simply unthinkable except 
against the modern recasting of revelation as subjective experience and the Weimar-era understanding 
of revelation as interpersonal encounter. [...] The origins of the other occurred [...] through the 
transplantation of theology into phenomenology.
340
 
 
 While I agree with the importance of the influence that contemporary philosophy had on 
Levinas‟s thinking, I think that Moyn‟s interpretation falls short of the active impact Judaism had 
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on Levinas‟s life and work.341 It is remarkable in this context that Levinas placed his active 
professional life after the war in the service of Judaism, as being the director of the Ecole 
Normale Israélite Orientale (ENIO), a Jewish school devoted to educating teachers for the 
Maghreb region.
342
 Levinas‟s work at the ENIO “was more than a job; it was a return to Jewish 
culture [...],”343 and a clear decision to support and reconstruct Jewish life after the catastrophe of 
the Shoah.  
 
Another aspect of the relationship between Judaism and philosophy in Levinas‟s thinking 
lies in the fact that the influence he gained through his annual Talmudic readings at the Colloques 
des intellectuels juifs de la langue française [Colloquia of French-speaking Jewish Intellectuals] 
is somewhat disproportionate to the actual training he had with regard to the Talmud, as Ethan 
Kleinberg underlines: “Levinas was not trained as a Talmudic scholar and the errant assumption 
that he was is the „myth‟ of Emmanuel Levinas.”344 Calling himself a “talmudiste de 
dimanche,”345 that is to say “an „amateur Talmudist‟”, Levinas was engaged in studying the 
Talmud only at a certain age, in contrast to the education regarding the Bible he received. In an 
interview he described his intellectual development as follows:  
 
I learnt Hebrew and biblical texts, and studied modern Hebrew from my childhood. From the age of 6 
we had a special teacher for this purpose. But that was the Bible. I didn‟t know anything about the 
background of the Talmud and the Rabbinic commentaries. I took this seriously only at a very much 
later stage, and it was in Paris that I undertook study in this area, privately, and I made contact with a 
teacher of exceptional skill, quite remarkable, and I often describe our encounter.
346
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Despite this late interest, Levinas was deeply impressed by Talmudic thinking; as he goes on to 
explain:  
 
The essential thing was the invitation to think that I found in these documents. Among my 
publications there is a whole series of works drawn from this, but I never run together my general 
philosophy with what I call the more confessional writing. [...] But there‟s certainly some infiltration 
from one side to the other.
347
  
 
Hence it seems to me inadequate to blind out the confessional writings from a general 
interpretation of Levinas‟s philosophy.  
 
 Levinas further plays an important role in the so-called movement of the „renouveau-juif‟ 
in post-war intellectual France.
348
 As one protagonist of the phenomenon Judith Friedlander 
called „Vilna on the Seine‟, Levinas doubtlessly had a certain impact on the contemporary 
Judaism of his time.
349
 It therefore seems to me problematic to characterize Levinas‟s Judaism as 
a pure “invention”,350 as Samuel Moyn argues. Surely Levinas had in fact “to reinvent Judaism, 
for himself and others, and he did so within philosophy.”351 However, I would rather call it a re-
actualization of Jewish sources within a philosophical framework. This was a highly creative act 
and in this sense outstanding in the intellectual landscape of post-war France. If it had not been so 
innovative, Levinas‟s work would have hardly gained the interest it earned among the post-war 
generation of Jews in France, who were (mostly) politically left-wing and hardly attracted by 
religious thoughts. In my view, this innovative approach of Levinas‟s work, merging Jewish 
thought and contemporary philosophy, led to the effect of the delayed reception of his work. 
Caught between two stools, the subtle construction of Judaism and philosophy requires a multi-
layered reading, which reveals the whole ingenuity of Levinas‟s thinking. In terms of Levinas‟s 
influence on the „renouveau Juif‟ in France, the impact of Rosenzweig cannot be overestimated. 
Even though in recent scholarship it has been pointed out that Rosenzweig‟s work is partly 
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obscured through the tendency to see his work exclusively culminating in Levinas‟s interpretation 
of him,
352
 Rosenzweig has had a significant impact on contemporary Jewish thought precisely via 
Levinas. This is apparent first of all by the fact that the questions and problems raised by 
Rosenzweig remained highly important to the shaping of a new Jewish identity after the Second 
World War and the catastrophe of the Holocaust, in which Levinas holds a crucial place. Apart 
from the conceptual differences between both thinkers, Levinas clearly acknowledged the aspect 
of the contemporary importance of Rosenzweig‟s work. In his article “Franz Rosenzweig: A 
modern Jewish thinker” (1965) he points out that Rosenzweig “was quick to have a premonition 
of the dangers facing Europe, of which Hegel‟s philosophy remains a remarkable expression.”353 
By elaborating a counter-philosophy to Hegel, Rosenzweig outlined a possible philosophical 
escape from the totality of Hegel‟s dialectic system: “To an existence frozen into a system of 
which it becomes a moment, Rosenzweig opposes „the individual in spite of it all‟ and the 
inexhaustible newness of life‟s instants.”354 It is a philosophy of lived experience rather than 
abstract thinking. Hence Levinas concludes that “The Star of Redemption […] introduces a new 
and profound concept into the consciousness of modern Judaism.”355 This concept was taken up 
and further elaborated in Levinas‟s work, as I have sought to show by elaborating Levinas‟s 
concept of an “awakening of consciousness”. The latter parts from Husserl, however goes beyond 
phenomenological analysis, inspired by Rosenzweig‟s reflections on a new concept for the 
consciousness of modern Judaism. Levinas brings Rosenzweig‟s views in a fruitful discussion 
with his own philosophical concepts and opened in this way his thinking to the Jewish sources. 
Repercussions of Rosenzweig‟s influence can be found, as I have worked out, in Levinas‟s later 
work, e.g. in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), and in his other articles of that 
period.  
 
         Furthermore, Rosenzweig‟s work remains to the present day up to date in the context of the 
Teshuvah movement. Through his biographical experience, Rosenzweig showed a way to live 
with the Jewish identity in the modern world without ignoring modernity but, on the contrary, by 
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actively participating in it. Levinas points out that the experience of a return to Judaism, for 
which Rosenzweig stands as an outstanding example, marks in fact a central event for modern 
Judaism:  
 
The question was of a universal order, the answer, Jewish. [...] What characterizes contemporary 
Jewish thought after Rosenzweig is that special new thrill of the Return. [Ce qui marque la pensée 
juive contemporaine par-delà Rosenzweig, c‟est ce frisson particulier du Retour.]356 
 
This experience was reflected not only in the works and the spiritual path of well-known Jewish 
scholars who were inspired by Levinas Ŕ the work of Benny Levy357 is of particular interest in 
this regard Ŕ, but also via the numerous Jewish students of Levinas‟s work at the ENIO, whose 
life was shaped by the experience of learning with Levinas. One of them is Ariel Wizman, today 
a well-known DJ and French TV performer, who explains this experience and the repercussions it 
made on his life recently in an inspiring book of interviews:  
 
One feels Jewish in reading Levinas [...]. […] One can be a Jew who reads Plato, but one cannot feel 
Jewish while reading Plato. In the philosophy of Levinas, on the contrary, there is an integration of the 
history of philosophy, there is a philosophical project and this project is Jewish. [...] I find myself in 
this project. This is why I have almost a physical link with Levinas.
358
  
 
In this philosophical project described by Wizman in which Levinas was engaged, Rosenzweig 
holds a remarkable place. As Levinas emphasizes, for modern Judaism Rosenzweig “remains our 
great contemporary”359 because he “opened the path to new research and new solutions.”360 
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 Part II – Philosophy  
 
Chapter II 
 
Time and Language  
 
 
1.    Language, time and death in Levinas and Rosenzweig 
  
                                                                                                              There is no remedy for death; not even health.
361
                                               
                                                                                                     
         The importance of death for the thought of Franz Rosenzweig is obvious right from the 
beginning of The Star of Redemption, which opens with the impressive scenario of the following 
remarks:  
 
From death, it is from the fear of death that all cognition of the All begins. Philosophy has the 
audacity to cast off the fear of the earthly, to remove from death its poisonous sting, from Hades his 
pestilential breath. All that is mortal lives in this fear of death; every new birth multiplies the fear for a 
new reason, for it multiplies that which is mortal.
362
  
 
By putting the emphasis where it affects most deeply man‟s existence, i.e. the inevitable fact of 
death, Rosenzweig points out that philosophy has no remedy to fulfill its promise to rescue man 
from the fear of death. The “poisonous sting” of death will not lose its danger since “philosophy 
refutes these earthly fears” and leaves man alone, threatened by an “unimaginable 
annihilation”.363 Instead of offering a solution, philosophy “smiles its empty smile”, pointing to 
“a world beyond”, from which man wants to know nothing at all: “For man does not at all want 
to escape from some chain; he wants to stay, he wants Ŕ to live.”364 Rosenzweig alludes to 
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Goethe‟s Faust when he describes the existential solitude of the human being. However, this is 
seen by Rosenzweig as a necessary experience man has to cope with, as he points out: “It is, of 
course, necessary that man step out one day in his life; he must one day devoutly fetch down the 
precious vial; in his dreadful poverty, he must have felt at some time lonely and adrift from the 
whole world, standing for a night facing the nothing.”365 The Faustian man is all alone in this 
world which is hiding its secrets before him. Rosenzweig anticipates in this sense what Heidegger 
writes about anxiety in § 40 of Being and Time (1927) as well as in “What is Metaphysics?” 
(1929).
366
 The parallel of their points of view becomes particularly transparent in Heidegger‟s 
phrasing, emphasizing the link of night and nothing: “In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety 
the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings Ŕ and not nothing.”367  
 
          Hence already in these first pages one can find the red thread which conducts the whole 
discourse to come. The impetus of Rosenzweig‟s book, however, changes its center of gravity 
from page to page Ŕ from death, in the opening pages, “into life”, the words by which The Star of 
Redemption ends.
368
 Some biographical experiences have to be mentioned in this context: firstly, 
the impressions of the First World War which profoundly marked the life and work of 
Rosenzweig.
369
 He wrote The Star of Redemption during only six months, from August 23, 1918 
to February 16, 1919, mostly at the front in the Balkans, by sending his text via field postcards to 
his mother, but also during several vacation stays in Freiburg, Kassel and Säckingen.
370
 In fact 
The Star is born out of the merging of two experiences: Rosenzweig‟s war experience, on the one 
hand, and his love for Margrit (Gritli) Rosenstock-Huessy (1893-1959), the wife of his friend 
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Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973), on the other hand.
371
 Further, the book can be seen as 
Rosenzweig‟s response to the deep intellectual crisis into which European thought had sunk, as 
well as a response to his own intellectual and personal crisis and the overwhelming force of love 
he experienced. Just at the time when he was as close to death as never before in his life, 
Rosenzweig was as much in love as ever before Ŕ a fact that can be seen by the letters he wrote to 
his beloved Gritli. In these letters of love, death is not absent. In fact Rosenzweig openly 
confessed to Gritli the fear of death he experienced, e.g. on March 2, 1918 he wrote: “Of mere 
mortality I tremble in all my limbs. Help me, if you can.”372 In the previous chapter I further 
pointed out that Rosenzweig was tempted to convert to Christianity and that this led him to a 
deep personal crisis and even to the threshold of suicide. This spiritual experience, besides his 
war experience, is reflected in The Star of Redemption, where death holds an important place.
373
 
Some interpreters, like Elliot Wolfson for example, consider the topic of death even as the 
leitmotif of the whole book. According to Wolfson, the Star seeks to show first and foremost how 
“to overcome death” and to demonstrate throughout its argumentation “the victory of eternity 
over time”.374 Rosenzweig‟s starting point in the Star is the statement that “the nothing of death is 
a something, each renewed nothing of death is a new something that frightens anew, and that 
cannot be passed over in silence, nor be silenced. […] The nothing is not nothing, it is 
something.”375 In the following, I elaborate some central aspects of this “something”, that is to 
say death, in the works of Rosenzweig and Levinas. I will focus, firstly, on Levinas‟s work in 
order to explain how the notion of death is connected with his early philosophical writings and 
his notion of the there is (il y a). In a second step, I argue how Levinas‟s notion of death is 
connected to his views on creation and eros and how this relates to Rosenzweig‟s notion of death, 
outlined here in the introductory pages.       
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a)     “When the world disappears...” – Night, death, and the discovery of the  
           there is (il y a) 
 
         In the following, I discuss Levinas‟s notion of the there is (il y a) with a special focus on 
how it relates to the notions of the night and death in his thinking. In conclusion, I outline briefly 
the influence of Maurice Blanchot‟s (1907-2003) work on Levinas‟s development of the there is.  
 
         It is remarkable that Levinas, just like Rosenzweig, was deeply impressed by the war with 
respect to his thinking about death. One of his first philosophical writings, Existence and 
Existents, written for the most part in captivity during the Second World War and published 
shortly afterwards in 1947, develops for the first time his philosophical considerations on 
death.
376
 However, unlike Rosenzweig, whose thinking starts with the experience of the fear of 
death, Levinas, on the contrary, was rather shocked by the “horror of Being”.377 Thus, he does not 
begin his argumentation with the fear of death, but with the fear of Being, as he points out at the 
beginning of Existence and Existents:  
 
Is not anxiety over Being Ŕ horror of Being Ŕ just as primal as anxiety over death? Is not the fear of 
Being just as orginary as the fear for Being? It is perhaps even more so, for the former may account 
for the latter. Are not Being and nothingness […] phases of a more general state of existence, which is 
nowise constituted by nothingness? We shall call it the fact that there is. […] It is because the there is 
has such a complete hold on us that we cannot take death and nothingness lightly, and we tremble 
before them.
378
 
 
In a previous section I have demonstrated the notion of the „impossibility of dying‟ in Levinas‟s 
early thinking and how it is connected to the development of his later work.
379
 This notion 
remains an important aspect also in this context since it is linked with the notion elaborated here: 
the il y a (there is). In Existence and Existents Levinas argues that the central concept of his study 
is that of an “anonymous existence”.380 To illustrate this concept, he gives the following example 
and, thereby, gives a definition of the there is:  
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Let us imagine all beings, things and persons, reverting to nothingness. […] Something would happen, 
if only night and the silence of nothingness. […] This impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 
„consummation‟ of being, which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the 
term there is. The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is „being in general‟.381  
 
Hence, in contrast to Rosenzweig, for Levinas the „horror of being‟ is the starting point of his 
reflections: “The rustling of the there is… is horror. […] Horror is nowise an anxiety over 
death.”382 In a very similar way Levinas introduces this concept of anonymous being and the 
notion of the there is also in his book Time and the Other.
383
 So, already in the introductory pages 
of Existence and Existents, Levinas explains the concept of the there is. He links it, in the 
following pages, to a concrete experience which he sees in the absence of life and world:  
 
For where the continual play of our relation with the world is interrupted we find neither death nor the 
„pure ego‟, but the anonymous state of being. […] For the Being which we become aware of when the 
world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the sum total of persons and things; it is the fact that 
one is, the fact that there is.
384
 
 
However, the question remains how one should imagine this happening, which Levinas describes 
with the words: „when the world disappears‟? What does he mean by this? In this context, a look 
in his captivity notebooks can help to illustrate this statement. It further helps us to better 
understand Levinas‟s meaning of the “absence of world” that (nevertheless) apparently continues 
in some way. Already in the first pages of his captivity notebooks, Levinas mentions “the laziness 
of Being”,385 and “the fact of breathing”,386 which is in fact the last movement a totally paralyzed 
body experience. A few pages afterwards, he goes on to describe more precisely the impressions 
and effects the captivity made upon him:  
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This captivity Ŕ with the long leisure hours it has provided, the books we would have never read Ŕ like 
a period of school where grown-up men find themselves, where exercise becomes essential, where one 
discovers that there were a lot of superfluous things Ŕ in relations, eating, occupations.387  
 
It is noteworthy to refer in this context to Levinas‟s short article “Captivity”, written shortly after 
the war and published only recently together with his captivity notebooks. In this article Levinas 
reflects upon the experience he had during his captivity as a new rhythm of life:  
 
We have come to learn the little space and the few things necessary for living. We have learned 
freedom. These are the real experiences of captivity. Suffering, despair, grief Ŕ certainly. But above all 
this: a new rhythm of life. We had set foot on another planet, breathing another atmosphere of an 
unknown mixture and handling a material that no longer weighed.
388
  
 
This new rhythm of life was filled first and foremost with boredom and the absence of any 
meaningful activities, as Levinas notes further: “The fatigue of rest Ŕ boredom. Time without 
activity. Hence the emptiness of boredom. Return to the time of the there is.”389 From this 
passage, it becomes evident that Levinas uses the term of the there is already in his captivity 
notebooks to describe a certain kind of experience.
390
 However, it is only in his philosophical 
writings after the war that he gives a clear definition of this complex notion. Hence, for a reader 
with little knowledge of Levinas‟s early work, the notes in his captivity notebooks must remain 
opaque. Nevertheless, what Levinas describes in the cited passages allows us to imagine and 
illustrate the background of his thinking. This helps to understand what he had in mind when he 
reflects in his early works upon an experience in which “the world disappears”.  
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         The experience of the captivity also had an impact on Levinas‟s questioning of being. In his 
early philosophical writings he describes being as strangeness and as an alien experience, e.g. in 
Existence and Existents where he argues:  
 
The questioning of Being is an experience of Being in its strangeness. It is then a way of taking up 
Being. That is why the question about Being Ŕ What is Being? Ŕ has never been answered. There is no 
answer to Being. […] Being is essentially alien and strikes against us. We undergo its suffocating 
embrace like the night, but it does not respond to us. There is a pain in Being. [Il est le mal d‟être.]391  
 
This corresponds with the notes Levinas wrote down during his captivity. In his captivity 
notebooks he mentions the strangeness of reality he experienced, e.g. he notes: “The meaning of 
nightmare. Reality motionless Ŕ absolutely strange. Night in broad daylight.”392  
 
         The experience of the night is very important in this context. It holds a key position in 
Existence and Existents, where Levinas links it with the central notion of the there is (il y a):  
 
We could say that the night is the very experience of the there is, if the term experience were not 
inapplicable to a situation which involves the total exclusion of light. When the forms of things are 
dissolved in the night, the darkness of the night, which is neither an object nor the quality of an object, 
invades like a presence. In the night, where we are riven to it, we are not dealing with anything. But 
this nothing is not that of pure nothingness. There is no longer this or that; there is not „something‟. 
But this universal absence is in its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence.
393
  
 
In fact, the term „night‟ is one of the key notions in Existence and Existents, where Levinas even 
distinguishes “different forms of night that occur right in the daytime”.394 The experience of the 
night is connected further to „being exposed‟ Ŕ a term that becomes especially important in his 
later work, e.g. in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Ŕ and the experience of being turned 
over to being as he explains in Existence and Existents: “One is exposed. […] nocturnal space 
delivers us over to being.”395 An echo of the horrible experience of the night can be also found in 
Elie Wiesel‟s Night (1958). The experience of the first night after the author‟s arrival at the 
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concentration camp Auschwitz impressed him so deeply that he later named his entire account 
precisely after this event Ŕ Night: 
 
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned my life into one long night, 
seven times cursed and seven times sealed. […] Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which 
deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments which murdered 
my God and my soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am 
condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.
396
  
Putting aside the difference that Levinas was in a labor camp whereas Wiesel was in an 
extermination camp, it is remarkable that both describe in their accounts the night as an 
outstanding experience.   
      
        The „night‟ has to be seen further in context with silence and the absence of discourse and 
speech. Levinas even speaks of a „voice of the silence‟,397 which does not respond to man‟s fear 
and thereby denies man‟s existence. It confronts him with his existential solitude, leaving him 
nowhere to turn to and no escape from the there is of being:  
 
There is no discourse. Nothing responds to us, but this silence; the voice of this silence is understood 
and frightens like the silence of those infinite spaces Pascal speaks of. […] There is is an impersonal 
form, like it rains, or it is warm. Its anonymity is essential.
398
  
 
The aspect of the „silence of space‟ is particularly important for Levinas. He cites it on various 
occasions, referring to the famous expression of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662): “The eternal silence 
of these infinite spaces terrifies me.”399 The absence of language is frightening because it 
deprives man of contact with his fellow beings and thereby reveals to him his solitude as an 
essential human reality.
400
 Levinas alludes to the quotation from Pascal in the Carnets de 
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captivité Ŕ where he notes, e.g., “The ear that is tired of scrutinizing the silence”401 Ŕ, and takes it 
up in Existence and Existents as well as later on in Totality and Infinity.
402
 It expresses an idea 
that pervades Levinas‟s entire work and finds a late echo in Levinas‟s God, Death, and Time 
(1993), where he connects it with the silence of death: “Death is the no-response [sans 
réponse].”403 In a way, Levinas‟s notion of an „eternal silence‟ corresponds with the silence to 
which the figure of the „tragic hero‟ in Part I of The Star of Redemption is condemned.404  
 
        In this universal void, however, something remains, against all odds:  
 
Being remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to no one, universal, returning 
in the midst of the negation which it puts aside, and in all the powers to which that negation may be 
multiplied. There is a nocturnal space, but it is no longer empty space […]. Darkness fills it like a 
content; it is full, but full of the nothingness of everything.
405
 
 
Obviously the experience of anonymity and namelessness in the camp had a considerable impact 
on Levinas. He was profoundly impressed by it, as can be seen in his captivity notebooks: “This 
way of counting men without seeing them.”406 The monotony of labor and the standstill of time 
were burdening and hard to accept for Levinas. He lived in fear for the life of his wife and his 
little daughter and, furthermore, was troubled by the worry of developing his philosophical work. 
He felt the lost time as paralyzing his forces, as he writes: “Envy for people […] who don‟t have 
restlessness for lost time as I have; the concern for an oeuvre.”407 Given the difficult 
circumstances of the captivity, especially regarding the exhausting work Levinas was forced to 
do as a forester, it is astonishing that he was nevertheless able to have the time and the quiet to 
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write such extensive notebooks. The prisoner camps, though, did sometimes have abundant 
libraries where the prisoners could spend their spare time reading.
408
  
 
         As one can see from the notes of his captivity notebooks, the monotony of his existence in 
this period had surely encouraged Levinas to focus on the development of the notion of the there 
is. Hence, in Existence and Existents, Levinas describes the subject as being exposed to the there 
is and, thereby, submerged by the totality of its own existence which it cannot escape: “The I 
does not turn to its existence; it is enthralled by it. One possesses existence, but is also possessed 
by it.”409 Against the background of an all-encompassing being with neither beginning nor end, 
which Levinas identifies as the there is, he describes the coming into being of the subject as a 
hypostasis.
410
 It is the manner in which the subject posits itself in the world: “The event by which 
the existent contracts its existing I call hypostasis.”411 The connection between the there is and 
hypostasis is very close; in fact, the former is the place where the latter takes places. Hence, the 
two notions are deeply interwoven in Levinas‟s thinking, as he emphasizes: “This existing 
without existents, which I call the there is, is the place where hypostasis will be produced.”412 In 
Levinas‟s captivity notebooks the term hypostasis is mentioned only once, though in a very 
similar context to that used shortly afterwards in his philosophical writings: “Hypostasis Ŕ as a 
term by which I will be able to replace the notion of subjectivity.”413 Thus, a close reading of 
Levinas‟s captivity notebooks and his early philosophical writings illustrates the fact that key 
notions of his early thinking were developed during his captivity. This difficult period of his life, 
the five years of captivity, can be seen, in terms of the development of his work, not as an 
interruption, but rather as an intensification of his thinking.              
 
         In order to give an adequate definition of the there is and the event that Levinas described 
with the words “when the world disappears”, it is necessary to refer to the influence of Maurice 
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Blanchot on Levinas‟s work.414 The long-standing ties of friendship between the two thinkers 
were established during their common years as students at the University of Strasbourg.
415
 They 
shared a life-long friendship which was also reflected in their works and articles they dedicated to 
each other.
416
 This close relationship is also mirrored in the development of the notion of the 
there is. In Existence and Existents Levinas points out that in Blanchot‟s novel Thomas l‟Obscur 
(1941/1950)
417
 [Thomas, the Obscure, 1995] one can find a precise description and excellent 
illustration of what he himself intends to state with the there is: “The presence of absence, the 
night, the dissolution of the subject in the night, the horror of being, the return of being to the 
heart of every negative moment, the reality of irreality are there [in Thomas, the Obscure] 
admirably expressed.”418 Indeed, Georges Bataille emphasizes very early, in his review article 
“From Existentialism to the Primacy of Economy” [“De l‟existentialisme au primat de 
l‟économie”] published in 1947, that Levinas and Blanchot are using the term there is in a similar 
way.
419
 Furthermore, the influence of Blanchot‟s work on Levinas has been clearly pointed out 
by Levinas himself. In his interview with Philippe Nemo, Levinas characterized it as follows:  
 
[The there is] is a theme I found in Maurice Blanchot. […] [H]e speaks of the „rumpus‟ [remue-
ménage] of being, of its „clamour‟, of its „murmur‟. A night in a hotel room where, behind the 
partition, „there‟s endless moving about‟; „there‟s no way of knowing what they‟re doing next door‟. 
This is something very close to the there is.
420
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Similarly, in another interview, Levinas highlights further the particularity of Blanchot‟s work:  
 
In his magnificent and strange work, Maurice Blanchot thinks death starting from this impossibility of 
breaking off. And there lies Ŕ upon the mystery of death Ŕ a profound and obsessional view. Ontology 
as obsession. In the anguish of death, the impossibility of nothingness. An impossibility of „stopping 
the music‟ or interrupting the „hustle-bustle‟ of existence! And yet an impossibility of continuing.421  
 
In the recent scholarly literature it has been thus stated that the there is would be a common 
discovery of both thinkers, Levinas and Blanchot.
422
 However, it has also been pointed out by 
researchers that Blanchot‟s views on Levinas‟s work have been in some sense limited to the 
notion of the there is, disregarding the development of Levinas‟s thinking in his later works. In 
this sense, I would agree to characterizing Blanchot‟s relationship to Levinas‟s thinking as a 
slightly “regressive one, seeking as it does to hold Levinas to his initial version of the experience 
of the there is and so in effect hold his thinking back.”423 
 
         As I have shown, the there is is connected to the impossibility of “stopping the music”,424 as 
Levinas states, and to escape from being; however, it is nonetheless equally bound to a certain 
experience of death. In fact in Blanchot‟s thinking death holds a noteworthy place.425 It is even 
connected to the event of writing as such, as Blanchot points out in The Writing of the Disaster 
(1983):  
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To write is no longer to situate death in the future Ŕ the death which is always already past; to write is 
to accept that one has to die without making death present and without making onself present to it. To 
write is to know that death has taken place even though it has not been experienced, and to recognize 
it in the forgetfulness that it leaves […].426  
 
Levinas refers to this approach in his essay on Blanchot, “The Poet‟s Vision”, describing the 
impact it had on Blanchot‟s way of writing: 
 
To write is to die. To Blanchot, death is not the pathos of the ultimate human possibility, the possibility 
of the impossibility, but ceaseless repetition of what cannot be grasped, before which the „I‟ loses its 
ipseity. […] Death is not the end, it is the never-ending ending.427  
 
It is remarkable in this context that Levinas very early, well before Blanchot‟s mentioned citation 
from The Writing of the Disaster, expressed very similar ideas on the connection of writing and 
dying. In his philosophical notes, written approximately between 1949-1950, one can find the 
following note: “The text is always a testament Ŕ not only in the sense of testimony Ŕ but as a last 
word, saying of a dead person. Writing Ŕ Dying.”428 This shows that the line of thought 
connecting death and writing, which is an important concept for Blanchot, appears very early also 
in Levinas‟s work and is by no means of merely marginal interest for his thinking.  
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b)     Death – Eros – Creation and the role of language     
 
                                                                                                              Put me like a seal over your heart,  
                                                                                                                                    Like a seal on your arm;  
                                                                                                                                    for love is as strong as death.
429
 
 
         Coming back to Rosenzweig‟s critique portrayed at the beginning of this chapter, I 
elaborate in the following in more detail a comparison between Levinas and Rosenzweig with 
respect to their thinking of death, linked to the notions of eros and creation. 
  
         The topics of death and time are significant for the development of Levinas‟s work, as 
Ze‟ev Levy underscores: “The concepts of „death‟ and „time‟ manifest the continuity of his 
philosophical thought but at the same time also illustrate his gradual progression from ontology 
to ethics.”430 These notions play thus a key role in Levinas‟s thinking. A pervasive analysis of 
death, in constant discussion with Heidegger, can be found, e.g., in Levinas‟s God, Death, and 
Time. The book consists of the transcripts of the two last lecture courses Levinas delivered at the 
Sorbonne in 1975-1976. The lectures were held shortly after the publication of his second major 
work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), and have to be seen in context with it. In 
these lectures, Levinas treats the death of the other with the empathy which is missed in 
Heidegger‟s thinking. He emphasizes that the I is responsible for the death of the other in the 
sense that the other is mortal: “It is for the death of the other that I am responsible to the point of 
including myself in his death. […] The death of the other: therein lies the first death.”431 This 
approach is significant for Levinas‟s notion of death as well as his conception of being.432 The 
death of the other affects the I and cannot be seen separated from it. It has a “dramatic character; 
it is emotion par excellence, affection or being affected par excellence.”433 Levinas links the 
experience of seeing the face of the other with the experience of death itself: “We encounter 
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death in the face of the other.”434 This approach opens up a new perspective on death which 
Levinas develops in opposition to Heidegger‟s notion of a „being toward death‟ [Sein zum 
Tode].
435
 According to Levinas, this new approach entails  
 
[…] the possibility for man to get his identity from somewhere other than the perseverance in his 
being, to which Heidegger accustomed us; that is, from elsewhere than this conatus where death 
strikes its blow to the highest of all attachments, the attachment to being. Here, on the contrary, man is 
not primarily preoccupied with his being. […] Time, here, is not pure destruction Ŕ quite the 
contrary.
436
  
 
Unlike Heidegger, for Levinas it is not my death that frightens me the most and grounds the 
relationship to death, but the death of the other. This approach to death is bound to a new 
significance of death. Since, according to Levinas,  
 
[…] the meaning of death does not begin in death. This invites us to think of death as a moment of 
death‟s signification, which is a meaning that overflows death. We must note carefully that „to 
overflow death‟ in no sense means surpassing or reducing it; it means that this overflowing has its 
signification, too. Expressions like „love is stronger than death‟ (in fact, the Song of Songs says 
precisely: „Love, as strong as death‟) have their meaning.437  
 
This interpretation reveals a certain relationship of death toward eros and love which has to be 
taken into account. This relationship is inscribed in Levinas‟s approach to death, as he points out: 
“The love of the other is the emotion of the other‟s death.”438 For Rosenzweig also the statement 
“Love is as strong as death [Stark wie der Tod ist Liebe.]”,439 taken from the Biblical source of 
the Song of Songs (8:6), is of crucial importance for the interpretation of his notion of death. It is 
because of eros, which opens up a new dimension of transcendence in the encounter with the 
fellow man, that death, although not surpassed, however is pushed ultimately into the 
background. What really is at stake for Rosenzweig and Levinas regarding death, is moreover the 
encounter with the other and not the fear of my personal death. Of course, death remains 
individual and ruptures the totality. It throws man back into his existential solitude, as 
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Rosenzweig underscores: “There is no greater loneliness than in the eyes of one who is dying, 
[…].”440 However, besides this aspect, there is also something stronger, which reveals to man that 
death is not the final word. In this context Rosenzweig argues that there are in fact two births of 
man: one is the physical, the other is the birth of the Self which takes place when man encounter 
eros for the first time:  
 
The Self […] this blind and mute daimon, enclosed in itself, which surprises man for the first time in 
the mask of Eros, and from then on accompanies him throughout his life up to that moment where it 
removes its mask and reveals itself to him as Thanatos.
441
  
 
Death and eros are thus linked together for Rosenzweig. Both are a radical experience of 
exteriority. The experience of transcendence which man encounters through eros is not outside 
the human life. It is experienced inside time which indicates that death ultimately does not have 
the final word. In this sense, Ephraim Meir emphasizes with respect to Levinas‟s lectures God, 
Time, and Death in his foreword to the Hebrew translation: “What makes time human and what 
makes real transcendence possible is the beyond time in time.”442 This first correlation in 
Levinas‟s and Rosenzweig‟s approach toward death is important for the entire analysis in this 
paragraph.   
 
         It is further of interest in this context to cite one of Levinas‟s later essays “On Death in the 
Thought of Ernst Bloch”, published in 1976. In words similar to Rosenzweig‟s, Levinas describes 
in this essay the situation of man, left alone with his fear of death. Levinas points out that, 
 
Idealism must not only console man for the violences he undergoes in reality, by assuring him of the 
freedom of his transcendental consciousness in which the being of the real is constituted […]. The 
accord between being and man requires, beyond these consolations, the alleviation of the Ego‟s 
inevitable anguish before death. This would not be possible unless justice and the fulfillment of Being 
could receive a new meaning and show a very intimate kinship, and unless the subjectivity of the 
subject in his relation to Being might admit an unsuspected modality in which death loses its sting.
443
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Especially the last words of Levinas‟s analysis recall the introductory pages of Rosenzweig‟s Star 
of Redemption with its harsh critique of the philosophy of Idealism, pretending to have “the 
audacity to cast off the fear of the earthly, to remove from death its poisonous sting”,444 in the 
long run, however, failing to do so.  
 
        Similar to Rosenzweig‟s critique, Levinas further points out from his early writings on that 
the importance of death has been underestimated in the philosophical discourse. In Time and the 
Other Levinas emphasizes: 
 
Death is […] the limit of idealism. I even wonder how the principal trait of our relationship with death 
could have escaped philosopher‟s attention. It is not with the nothingness of death, of which we 
precisely know nothing, that the analysis must begin, but with the situation where something 
absolutely unknowable appears.
445
  
 
This „absolutely unknowable‟ is represented precisely by death, according to Levinas. It is even 
conceived of as the main trait of death, as Levinas highlights in a late interview from 1982, where 
he points out:  
 
Death is utterly unknown. It is, moreover, unknown otherwise than any other unknown. It seems to 
me, whatever the subsequent reactions within philosophy, and even within opinion, death is firstly the 
nothingness of knowledge. I do not say that it is nothingness. It is also the „plentitude‟ of the question, 
but first one says, „I do not know‟. These are the first words that come, and which are fitting.446  
 
By emphasizing the aspect of the nothingness of knowledge represented by death, Levinas 
situates his thinking on death at a similar point as did Rosenzweig: For both thinkers death is not 
just nothingness. However, while being the nothingness of knowledge, death is precisely the 
starting point of knowledge to come. Death has, so to speak, a double face, since it is nothing and 
precisely as nothing it is Ŕ something. Rosenzweig underlines this aspect by pointing out that 
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“death is truly not what it seems, not nothing, but a pitiless something that cannot be 
excluded.”447  
 
         Regarding his concept of nothingness, Rosenzweig was deeply influenced by Hermann 
Cohen‟s (1842-1918) theory on differential and infinitesimal calculus.448 In the introduction of 
The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig discusses Cohen‟s theory of the differential. He emphasizes 
his admiration for the work of his teacher, who has paved the way for his own thinking on 
nothingness: “The differential combines in itself the properties of the nothing and of the 
something; it is a nothing that refers to a something, to its something, and at the same time a 
something that still slumbers in the womb of the nothing.”449 Hence Norbert Samuelson points 
out that Rosenzweig “explicitly claims that this calculus provided him with a model for 
constructing reality from what is practically (but not absolutely) nothing.”450 Being the starting 
point of his thinking, the notion of the Nichts and of death cannot be overestimated in 
Rosenzweig‟s thinking. On the contrary, as I have demonstrated above, it is the „horror of being‟ 
and the „impossibility of dying‟ which marks the starting point of Levinas‟s philosophy.451   
 
          Levinas‟s early notion of the „impossibility of dying‟ is further developed in his work by 
drawing attention to the mystery of death which cannot be totally grasped by reason alone. For 
Rosenzweig as well as Levinas the exteriority of death is of great importance in this context. 
Death cannot be grasped by means of reason or knowledge. This aspect is underscored by 
Levinas in his article “Poetry and Resurrection: Notes on Agnon”, published in 1973, where he 
argues:  
 
If everything were comprehensible in death, as a reasonable enterprise, it would fit into the limits of 
life. It would lose the surplus with which it exalts life. Life, sustaining its allegiances to the confines of 
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death, thus goes beyond its being, its limits reaching beyond those limits; and, beyond being, it tastes 
the taste of the Resurrection.
452
 
 
Levinas emphasizes clearly the aspect of mystery in death, in which he even sees the categorical 
expression of death: “[…] the word mystery is fitting here. Death is the site of this category: 
mystery.”453 In the aspect of mystery, which remains opaque and cannot be fully grasped by the 
intellect, Levinas assumes further an analogy between death and love as well as language. He 
states this idea in a note of his captivity notebooks: “Verb Ŕ is made of the inability to express 
oneself. Love Ŕ mystery of the other Ŕ Verb mystery of myself.”454 Although it has to be kept in 
mind that the cited phrase is only a small note in Levinas‟s captivity notebooks, it reveals 
nonetheless that Levinas had considered at some point a certain analogy between love, language 
and death in the notion of mystery.     
  
          Furthermore, similarly to Rosenzweig in one of the central parts of the The Star of 
Redemption, e.g. the second Book of Part II, Levinas also stresses the importance of eros in the 
attitude of man towards his death as well as in man‟s relationship with the other:  
 
The relationship with the other will never be the feat of grasping a possibility. One would have to 
characterize it in terms that contrast strongly with the relationships that describe light. I think the 
erotic relationship furnishes us with a prototype of it. Eros, strong as death, will furnish us with the 
basis of an analysis of this relationship with mystery […].455 
 
Levinas‟s notion of „eros, strong as death‟, refering obviously to the Biblical source of the Song 
of Songs, indicates thus a mode by which one can overcome the essential solitude of the 
individual mortal subject by means of the encounter with the other. Although the erotic 
relationship represents for Levinas a “prototype” of the relationship with the other, this 
relationship is nonetheless not without difficulties in his eyes. He expounds the problems of the 
ambiguity of eros and love in Totality and Infinity and in fact calls the erotic “the equivocal par 
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excellence.”456 Furthermore, the erotical relationship is not the only mode in which the 
relationship with the other takes place since language too plays a crucial part in this context. In 
the movement of overcoming death and the essential human solitude by means of the encounter 
with the other, however, one can see similar approaches in Rosenzweig‟s and Levinas‟s thinking 
since both emphasize the aspect of love and the erotical.  
 
         Eros is further connected in Levinas‟s thought to the notion of fecundity and creation.457 
This allows us to trace a line of thought from Levinas‟s early writings to his later works. E.g. in 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas takes up the thought of the there is again and connects it further 
with the notion of creation:  
 
The absolute indetermination of the there is, an existing without existants, is an incessant negation, to 
an infinite degree, consequently an infinite limitation. Against the anarchy of the there is the existent is 
produced, a subject of what can happen, an origin and commencement, a power.
458
  
 
Hence the process of coming-into-being is linked to the notion of creation in Levinas‟s view and, 
implicitly, to the notion of fecundity. In Totality and Infinity Levinas goes on to explain his 
notion of fecundity, by emphasizing that it is not a solution to escape death for the I in the sense 
of a possibility given to the I. Levinas points out that  
 
[l]ife flows on in a dimension of its own where it has meaning, and where a triumph over death can 
have meaning. This triumph is not a new possibility offered after the end of every possibility Ŕ but a 
resurrection in the son in whom the rupture of death is embodied. Death Ŕ suffocation in the 
impossibility of the possible Ŕ opens a passage toward descent. Fecundity is yet a personal relation, 
though it be not given to the „I‟ as a possibility.459  
 
Regarding the relationship between death and eros, fecundity holds thus a crucial place. It is seen 
by Levinas as a “personal relation”, however, it is not a property of the I. How then fecundity has 
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to be conceived if it is not realized as a capacity of the I? Does the possibility of “having a son”, 
as Levinas states, not entail a certain personal ability of the I?  
 
         To fully understand Levinas‟s notion of fecundity, a more detailed examination of the 
notion of creation is necessary. This notion appears at several crucial points throughout Levinas‟s 
work. Already in his study On Escape (1935), Levinas introduces the concept of creation as a 
symptom of the need to overcome ontological categories: “The urge toward the Creator expresses 
a taking leave of being.”460 In this sense, at the end of his study Existence and Existents (1947) he 
goes on to elaborate on the notion of fecundity as follows: “Asymmetrical intersubjectivity is the 
locus of transcendence in which the subject, while preserving its subject, has the possibility of not 
inevitably returning to itself, the possibility of being fecund and […] having a son.”461 However it 
is only in his other writings, e.g. Time and the Other and Totality and Infinity, where respectively 
a whole sub-chapter is devoted to fecundity, that the notion of fecundity is outlined in more 
detail. Levinas explains it as follows:  
 
The relation with such a future, irreducible to the power over possibles, we shall call fecundity. 
Fecundity encloses a duality of the Identical. It does not denote all that I can grasp Ŕ my possibilities; 
it denotes my future, which is not a future of the same Ŕ not a new avatar: not a history and events that 
can occur to a residue of identity, an identity that holding on by a thread, an I that would ensure the 
continuity of the avatars. And yet it is my adventure still, and consequently my future in a very new 
sense, despite the discontinuity.
462
  
 
In his study Time and the Other, Levinas even speaks of a “victory over death”463 with respect to 
fecundity. This is indicated in the relationship between a child and his parents, as Levinas 
emphasizes: “Paternity is the relationship with a stranger who, entirely while being Other, is 
myself; the relationship of the ego with a myself who is nonetheless a stranger to me. […] I 
began with the notions of death and the feminine, and ended with that of the son.”464 This 
demonstrates that in Levinas‟s line of thought the feminine, death and fecundity, that is to say the 
possibility of having a child, are connected. 
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          It thereby becomes obvious that Levinas implicitly emphasizes the function of eros, which 
plays a crucial role in this context. According to Levinas, one would utterly fail “if one wants to 
characterize the erotic by „grasping‟, „possessing‟ or „knowing‟. But there is nothing of all this, or 
the failure of all this, in eros. If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be the 
other.”465 In Time and Other he goes on to explain his specific notion of eros, in contrast to the 
wide spread views of eros:  
 
[…] the relationship with the other is generally sought out as a fusion. I have precisely wanted to 
contest the idea that the relationship with the other is fusion. The relationship with the Other is the 
absence with the other, not absence pure and simple, not the absence of pure nothingness, but absence 
in a horizon of the future, an absence that is time. This is the horizon where a personal life can be 
constituted in the heart of the transcendent event, what I called above the „victory over death‟.466  
 
Thus, eros ultimately links the three aspects: death, fecundity and the feminine.
467
 The erotical 
relationship with the other is not conceived of as a fusion, yet in a paradoxical manner as a 
relationship with „an absence that is time‟. The other remains essentially absent in the sense that 
he remains exterior to the I. However, the temporal perspective of the future allows us to draw up 
a common life among men „in the heart of the transcendent event‟, as Levinas points out. This 
possibility of having a future beyond our personal life, e.g. through the possibility of having 
children, is thus what he calls the „victory over death‟.  
 
         However, the cited passages allude not only to the biological sense of fecundity, i.e. the 
production of a child through the parents. Fecundity has to be understood ultimately in a broader 
sense, according to Levinas: “The biological structure of fecundity is not limited to the biological 
fact.”468 In an interview, Levinas further explains this aspect of fecundity in more detail, pointing 
in particular to its connection to responsibility:  
 
The father-son relationship, for example, should not be thought of only in biological terms. The 
father-son relationship can exist between beings who, biologically, are not father and son. Paternity 
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and filiality, the feeling that the other is not simply someone I‟ve met, but that he is, in a certain sense, 
my prolongation, my ego, that his possibilities are mine Ŕ the idea of responsibility for the other can 
go that far.
469
  
 
In this sense, fecundity, according to Levinas, is found in relations between one person and 
another, as well as between the I and itself.
470
 
 
         In Otherwise than Being Levinas takes up his concept of creation again and links it with a 
critique of Western philosophy, which has developed a too restrictive view of creation, in 
Levinas‟s view. In the chapter “Substitution”, “the germ of [the] work”,471 as Levinas underlines, 
he links his concept of creation with his theory of subjectivity outlined in this work:  
 
Western philosophy […] remains faithful to the order of things and does not know the absolute 
passivity, beneath the level of activity and passivity, which is contributed by the idea of creation. 
Philosophers have always wished to think of creation in ontological terms, that is, in function of a 
preexisting and indestructible matter.
472
 
 
In the enclosed note Levinas explains furthermore: “This freedom enveloped in a responsibility 
which it does not succeed in shouldering is the way of being a creature, the unlimited passivity of 
a self, the unconditionality of the self.”473 Unlike most of the theories of creation worked out by 
Western philosophies, Levinas‟s concept of creation, as it is for the most part elaborated in 
Totality and Infinity,
474
 is a creation ex nihilo, which has to be conceived as an absolute upsurge. 
This creation as ex nihilo is accomplished, for example, in fecund production, e.g. the production 
of a child who, though the father‟s issue, is nonetheless absolutely other than the father Ŕ a 
creation ex nihilo, a true other.
475
 This idea had been originally elaborated by Levinas already in 
Time and the Other, where he clearly points out: “How can the ego become other to itself? This 
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can happen only in one way: through paternity.”476 However, as I have shown, in his later works, 
Levinas extends his notion of fecundity also beyond the biological structures of paternity.  
 
          It comes thus as no surprise that notions like eros and desire occupy in this context an 
important role in Levinas‟s thinking. Levinas characterizes “desire in its positivity” as “affirmed 
across the idea of creation ex nihilo”, which opens up “the possibility of a sabbatical 
existence”.477 Desire is conceived by Levinas as a metaphysical desire which cannot be fulfilled 
by satisfaction and which is, on the contrary, nourished and even augmented by its very 
realization.
478
 It is in fact “desire for the invisible”,479 as Levinas explains: “To die for the 
invisible Ŕ this is metaphysics.”480 The significant issue, in this context, is that Levinas conceives 
being, in the sense of a creation ex nihilo, as a separated being which breaks with the totality of 
ontological systems. Beyond these ontological structures, the being as a creation ex nihilo entails 
a transcendent structure which open up the idea of Infinity for Levinas, and which is realized 
through language. In this resistance of the separated I to be subsumed by ontological systems, one 
can see a parallel to Rosenzweig‟s idea of the human self, which is left alone with its mortal fear 
by philosophy and which, after all systems have been worked out, is still there Ŕ regardless of the 
system: “I, a completely common private-subject, I fore- and surname, I dust and ashes. I am still 
there,” Rosenzweig emphasizes in his famous letter in 1917 to his cousin Rudolf Ehrenberg 
(1884-1969), called the “Urzelle” of his later major work The Star of Redemption.481 In a similar 
sense, Levinas explains that his concept of creation is based upon “a being outside of every 
system”, similar to Rosenzweig‟s silent Self of creation, which is left outside by the philosophical 
systems. In Totality and Infinity Levinas argues that  
 
[…] the idea of creation ex nihilo expresses a multiplicity not united into a totality; the creature is an 
existence which indeed does depend on an other, but as a part that is separated from it. Creation ex 
nihilo breaks with system, posits a being outside of every system, that is, there where its freedom is 
possible. […] What is essential to created existence is its separation with regard to the Infinite. This 
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separation is not simply a negation. Accomplished as psychism, it precisely opens upon the idea of 
Infinity.
482
  
 
It is noteworthy in this context to point out that Levinas‟s reflections upon death evolve during 
the decades. This can be seen from his captivity notebooks. Whereas Levinas here notes that the 
only real point of contact between life and eternity is death, which highlights the tragical 
dimension of death Ŕ “The tragedy of death Ŕ the only situation where there is a communication 
between time and what may be called eternity”483 Ŕ, he continues in his later works to point out, 
on the contrary, that there is a certain solution for man to overcome the tragical aspect of death. 
This solution, according to Levinas, is located in fecundity, as I have shown.  
 
         For Rosenzweig, the relationship between death and eros holds a crucial place in The Star 
of Redemption. Although it is obvious that the end of creation is death, it is nonetheless precisely 
in the event of death that the miracle of creation is announced according to Rosenzweig. He 
explains this with a Talmudic citation of Bereshit Rabba 40, where the word “very” in the phrase 
“behold, it was very good!” (Gen. 1:31) is interpreted as “death”. Referring to the Biblical 
description of creation, Rosenzweig points out that, among all creatures, it is only after the 
creation of man that the Bible mentions that it is said not only “good” but “very good” (in 
Hebrew: tov me‟od). In the word “very” (me‟od) the Talmudic explanation Rosenzweig cites, an 
allusion to the word “death” (in Hebrew: mot) can be seen.484 He explains this as follows in The 
Star of Redemption:  
 
Within the framework of the universal Yes of Creation which carries all the singular on its broad back, 
a domain is delimited which receives a different Yes, a Yes qualified by „very‟, different from 
everything else, something that, while in the Creation points beyond Creation. This „very‟ which 
announces a trans-creation right within Creation, within the world, a beyond of the world, something 
other than life while belonging to life and only to life, created at the same time as life, as its ending 
point, and yet allowing life to have an inkling of a fulfillment beyond it: this is death.
485
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That means that only human beings, who are conscious of their death and live their lives in the 
awareness of their coming deaths, possible at each moment, are therefore the only creatures on 
earth capable of experiencing transcendence, i.e. a beyond of life Ŕ realized not only through 
death, but also through love.
486
 The superlative „very good‟ indicates a trans-creation within the 
very heart of creation, i.e. within the world there is indicated a beyond the world. Death belongs 
to every creature but it announces also the capacity of the creature to experience transcendence 
and revelation, as Ephraim Meir points out.
487
 Only mortal human beings are able to experience 
revelation according to Rosenzweig. This defines man‟s destiny in contrast to the existence of 
animals, which had been pointed out poetically by the German poet Rilke in the eighth elegy of 
his Duino Elegies: “Death leaves beasts free. Only we foreknow it. Animals keep death behind 
them, and before them, God. And when a beast passes, it passes in eternity, as rivers run...”488 
Levinas underlines this specific human destiny in the following words: “To be conscious is to 
have time […]. [Etre conscient, c‟est avoir du temps.]”489 In contradistinction to animals, for man 
time is the guarantee of his mortality since it brings him closer with each moment to the moment 
of his death. Levinas underlines this by pointing out that the process „to die‟ is not beyond time, 
but realized in time and deeply connected to life:  
 
To die, for Dasein, is not to reach the final point of one‟s being but to be close to the end at every 
moment of one‟s being. Death is not a moment of one‟s being. It is not a moment, but a manner of 
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being
490
 of which Dasein takes charge as soon as it is, such that the expression „to have to be‟ also 
signifie „to have to die‟.491  
 
This means that death is inscribed in being as such Ŕ media vita in morte sumus Ŕ since “Dasein 
in fact dies, inasmuch as it exists […].”492 The fact of being mortal gives man the possibility of 
experiencing transcendence within life and of having sense of what is beyond life. In this sense, 
as the sine qua non of experiencing transcendence, death holds a crucial place for Levinas‟s 
thinking. 
  
          In a similar way, Rosenzweig points out at the end of his treatise Understanding the Sick 
and the Healthy that every true human life lives face-to-face with death at every moment, 
accepting death as the veritable “brother of life”. Rosenzweig emphasizes that in the long run life 
falls silent before death, which asks: “Do you finally recognize me? I am your brother.”493 
However, in time, there lies also the capacity for man to be born and, thereby, to conquer death. 
Levinas points this out as follows: “More than the renewal of our moods and qualities, time is 
essentially a new birth. […] Vanquishing death is not a problem of eternal life. Vanquishing 
death is to maintain, with the alterity of the event, a relationship that must still be personal.”494 
This personal relationship can be seen as realized through language, i.e. in the face-to-face 
encounter with the other person. This encounter entails language since the face as such is 
language, as Levinas emphasizes: “The face speaks.”495 Therefore, language as a mode of 
transcendence must be seen in connection with the notions of death, creation and eros.  
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2.    a)      Language and eschatology in the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
 
 
         In the following, I elaborate on the above mentioned aspects by focusing more deeply on 
Levinas‟s work and, in particular, on the relationship between time and language in his thinking. 
Speaking is profoundly connected to time. Speech is developed through and in time and, thus, 
cannot be seen independently from it. In order to draw an important parallel between the 
relationship of time and language in the work of Levinas, I focus in the following on the relation 
between language and one specific mode of time: eschatology.  
 
         At first sight eschatology seems to play a minor role in Levinas‟s thought because when we 
look at his first major work, Totality and Infinity, eschatology appears, apart from the foreword, 
only one more time in the entire work.
496
 However in the foreword it holds nonetheless a 
remarkable position, because it is through eschatology that the totality and with it the “ontology 
of war” is broken up.497 This function of eschatology expresses a crucial point in Levinas‟s 
philosophy. It is linked to the fundamental notions of the face as well as to language, because 
eschatology appeals to  
 
[…] existents [étants] that can speak, rather than lending their lips to an anonymous utterance of 
history. Peace is produced as this aptitude for speech. The eschatological vision breaks with the 
totality of wars and empires in which one does not speak.”498 
 
Since eschatology is realized through language, it is strongly linked to the notion of the face 
because it is the foremost characteristic of the face to speak: “It expresses itself,”499 as Levinas 
states. But it is a silent speech which is expressed by the face, a speech without words or, 
moreover, beyond the articulation of words. It is precisely for this reason that it opens up “the 
very possibility of eschatology, that is, the breach of the totality, the possibility of a signification 
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without a context.”500 It is inevitable that the face expresses itself through a so-called 
“signification without a context” because it expresses the idea of infinity, which, as Levinas 
argues, cannot be “stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks 
it.”501 The function of eschatology lies exactly in the realization of this relationship of the same to 
the other, manifested in the experience of being faced by the other which relates the Same to a 
beyond of history: “Eschatology institutes a relation with being beyond the totality or beyond 
history.”502 But Ŕ and this is the crucial point in Levinas‟s notion of eschatology regarding its role 
for history and politics Ŕ this beyond “is reflected within the totality and history, within 
experience.”503 So although eschatology and history with respect to totality are fundamentally 
different categories for Levinas, they are nevertheless linked together in an experience all of us 
have nearly every day: the encounter with another person face-to-face.  
 
         Furthermore, Levinas points out in his Talmudic interpretations that there are different 
concepts of eschatology: “[E]schatology possesses a number of styles and genres, and it was the 
Jewish Bible which probably discovered the one which consists in feeling responsible in the face 
of the future one hopes for others. Yet ever since the creation, it was to be found in the humanity 
of man. It cannot be the cause of wars.”504 Levinas draws a parallel here between the biblical 
heritage and the notion of eschatology, from which it can be derived that for him one aspect of 
eschatology is rooted in the Jewish tradition. An idea strongly related to this statement can be 
found in Totality and Infinity, where Levinas states: “Of peace there can be only an 
eschatology.”505 Hence it can be seen that the concepts of eschatology overlap in Levinas‟s 
philosophical and Jewish writings.
506
 The aspect of various concepts of eschatology can also be 
found in Levinas‟s Talmudic interpretation published in his book Difficult Freedom under the 
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title “Messianic Texts.” In this text eschatology is linked to the notion of a messianic subjectivity, 
which seems to mark the central aspect of ontology for Levinas as he postulates:  
 
Messianism is no more than this apogee in being, a centralizing, concentration or twisting back on 
itself of the Self [Moi]. And in concrete terms this means that each person acts as if though he were 
the Messiah. Messianism is therefore not the certainty of the coming of a man who stops History. It is 
my power to bear the suffering of all. It is the moment when I recognize this power and my universal 
responsibility.
507
  
 
Hence the notion of eschatology is not a static idea in the thought of Levinas, but has to be 
considered as a dynamic configuration through which it manifests itself in different concepts and 
at different places in Levinas‟s work. Through these various concepts Levinas tries to describe 
the idea of Infinity in its realization to temporality. Therefore, the notion of eschatology and of 
messianic peace is highly important also for Levinas‟s views on politics, because the deeds of 
men which are realized through temporality and manifest themselves in history, since politics is 
the actual form of history.
508
 However, in this context the role of language is of crucial 
importance, as Levinas emphasizes: “Language is perhaps to be defined as the very power to  
break the continuity being or of history.”509 
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 b)     “In the heart of a chiasmus” – Jacques Derrida‟s critique of language in Levinas‟s    
          work and the problem of narrativity   
 
 
         As Simon Critchley points out, Jacques Derrida stresses a central problem at the heart of 
Levinas‟s philosophy by emphasizing the aspect of language in his essay Violence and 
Metaphysics (1964).
510
 Derrida‟s study is not only one of the earliest important receptions of 
Levinas‟s first major work Totality and Infinity (1961), but is also of great influence for the 
reception of Levinas‟s thought as such, which, aside from some small academic circles, was not 
very popular at the time. The problem Derrida points out is concerned with the question: How 
can one speak in the scope of a philosophical work about problems which cannot be expressed in 
a philosophical manner? This is a central problem for Levinas because in his philosophy he wants 
to get rid of what he calls the „language of ontology‟. Instead, he wants to reveal the „ethical‟ 
sense of language. Levinas gets his motivation from his conviction that the thinking of the 
totality, the so-called Totalitätsdenken, which is focused on ontology and uses for its thinking an 
ontological language, has failed. After the Shoah, one could no longer philosophize as before and 
Levinas tries to integrate this into his thinking by trying to elaborate a new approach to 
philosophy which does not focus primarily on ontology, but on the primacy of ethics. In this 
sense he stated in an interview: “My critique of the totality has come in fact after a political 
experience that we have not yet forgotten.”511 According to Levinas, „ontological‟ language tries 
to capture every phenomenon, as well as the fellow man, by means of thematization within its 
discourse and a subordination of the Saying (le Dire) to that what is finally Said (le Dit).
512
 The 
Said and the Saying are central notions of the later philosophy of Levinas. Jacob Meskin 
summarizes these terms very concisely:  
 
Levinas calls the formulated ideas, sentences, propositions Ŕ in short the discourse Ŕ of philosophy 
„the said‟. […] Levinas argues that philosophy has almost totally ignored the enigmatic yet profound 
reality through which and in which the said comes into being. Levinas calls this the „saying‟. […] The 
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saying produces the said, whether in speech or in writing. The said can by definition always be 
synchronized, included in an encompassing totality of space and time; it is always part of a narrative. 
The saying, by contrast, is not included in the said; it is not by definition, something that can be 
synchronized, nor is it part of a narrative.
513
  
 
         According to Derrida, Levinas has necessarily failed in his attempt to situate transcendence 
within his discourse because in Totality and Infinity he still uses ontological language and 
determinations of which his philosophy wants to discard. The central remark of Derrida‟s critique 
lies in the fact that violence emerges at the same time as articulation. Hence, language, and 
moreover speaking itself, is deeply infected with violence, as Derrida states: “Violence appears 
with articulation.”514 Derrida claims that Levinas‟s ethical rupture with the ontological and 
phenomenological tradition can only be accomplished through a renunciation of the linguistic 
resources of that tradition. Thus, Levinas‟s thought is for Derrida “consequently caught in a 
double bind, between belonging to the tradition and achieving a breakthrough that goes beyond 
the tradition.”515 According to Derrida, language is of fundamental importance for the philosophy 
of Levinas because it is here that he deals with that which literally cannot be said, but which 
nevertheless marks the point where meaningful discourse breaks through to its inner silence. This 
inner silence that can never be conquered by words provides, paradoxically, precisely the 
motivation for writing and speaking. For this methodological problem Derrida proposes a 
solution in Violence and Metaphysics by formulating the idea of closure. The word closure, or 
clôture, and moreover the aspect of a closure of metaphysics, signifies the problem of finding an 
ethical language in an ontological context. A language focused on ontology, trying to grasp the 
essence of what it is talking about by naming it, is inadequate for the claim of Levinas‟s 
philosophy. Given that the latter focus first and foremost on doing justice to the infinite demand 
of the recognition of the other, it requires a new kind of philosophical expression which takes into 
account the mentioned linguistic problem.   
 
         There is no doubt about the fact that Levinas indeed changes his way of writing in his 
second major work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) by expressing his thought in 
a manner that undermines the Said (le Dit) for the sake of the Saying (le Dire) at every moment. 
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He even dedicates a whole chapter to this aspect of The Said and the Saying.
516
 However, a 
similar idea can already be found before Derrida‟s critical essay in the foreword of Totality and 
Infinity where Levinas states that 
 
[…] the very essence of language […] consists in continually undoing its phrase by the foreword or 
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what has already been 
ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said delights.
517
  
 
However, the idea that the essence of language consists in the continual unsaying of the said, 
manifests its whole significance in Otherwise than Being, where Levinas emphasizes the 
importance of language for his philosophy in a very radical manner.
518
 This aspect can be further 
considered as a basic development of Levinas‟s thought, which Derrida metaphorically compares 
in Violence and Metaphysics with the crashing of a wave on a beach, which is always the same 
wave, but every time expressed otherwise. In this sense, Derrida argues that 
 
[…] in Totality and Infinity the thematic development is neither purely descriptive nor purely 
deductive. It proceeds with the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and repetition, always of 
the same wave against the same shore, in which, however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also 
infinitely renews and enriches itself. Because of all these challenges to the commentator and the critic, 
Totality and Infinity is a work of art and not a treatise.
519
  
 
In fact, Levinas had ambitions to be a writer and in the beginning wanted to evolve his work 
twofold, literarily and philosophically, like Sartre did for example. This can be seen from his 
captivity notebooks where he drew up scenes for two novels he had in mind, which however 
remained uncompleted after the war.
520
 Further, the many literary sources Levinas cites 
throughout his philosophical texts Ŕ e.g. Totality and Infinity begins with a citation of Rimbaud‟s 
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Une saison en enfer and ends with one of Baudelaire‟s Les fleurs du mal Ŕ indicates that literature 
was not at all a marginal source of inspiration for his thinking. It is by no means far fetched that 
this affinity for literature is reflected in his style of writing. Furthermore, the particular way of 
writing in Levinas‟s philosophy has to be seen in connection to the content of his philosophy, as 
Tina Chanter points out: “There is an intricate relationship between the way in which Levinas‟s 
language works, and what he wants to say.”521 By emphasizing this point she stresses a central 
aspect, which Levinas himself underlines in Otherwise than Being as “the very ambiguity of 
every said.”522 Therefore, I agree with Chanter‟s suggestion that there is “a necessary betrayal 
involved in the very attempt to do philosophy, and that this betrayal concerns the very function of 
language as thematization.”523 
        
         Nevertheless, thematization in philosophy is “inevitable”524 for one wants to state at least 
something. Levinas points out this aspect when he concedes that “the saying calls for the said.”525 
In emphasizing the Saying and the importance of the spoken word face-to-face, Levinas 
underlines the importance of the dialogue between human beings for ethics. For him “the banal 
fact of conversation […] quits the order of violence. This simple fact is the marvel of marvels.”526 
It is through language that the relationship of the I to the other is created: “The claim to reach and 
to know the other is realized in the relationship with the other that is cast in the relation of 
language […].”527 However, the other for Levinas can be neither thematized in a philosophical 
discourse nor grasped by means of defining and describing language. The other endlessly escapes 
a language that would encapsulate it in a narrative. The only adequate way to approach the other 
lies in the saying itself, because in the saying the subject gives itself away through its breathing Ŕ 
and it gives away nothing less than itself. As one has to breathe while one speaks, one gives 
through one‟s speech one‟s breath to the other and, hence, gives away that which is actually the 
most valuable for oneself, i.e. one‟s time, and thereby one‟s life which passes away like the 
breath of one‟s spoken words. In this sense the core aspect of language is first conceived by 
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Levinas in the saying itself, i.e., in the gesture of saying in which the subject offers itself to the 
non-thematizable other. However, as the saying escapes the philosophical discourse by passing 
away after being said, the problem remains of how this gesture of saying could find an adequate 
narration within the scope of a philosophical text.  
 
 
 
3.    a)        The notion of an „ethical language‟ in Levinas‟s thought – breathing, voice and  
                  the saying of “things that can‟t be said”
528
   
 
                                                                                                                Breathing, you invisible poem!529 
 
         As we have seen, the relation between „Saying‟ and „Said‟, and further also the problem of 
narrativity, is fundamental for the work of Levinas, as he searches for an adequate language for 
his thought. Therefore, in his later work, especially in Otherwise than Being, Levinas develops 
the conception of a so-called „ethical language‟ (langage éthique), which focuses on the 
importance of the saying before anything which is actually said.
530
 This „ethical language‟ is not 
to be understood as an empirical language and therefore cannot be compared to any written or 
spoken language according to the common sense. Levinas defines it as a speaking that indeed 
does not say anything at all because the meaning exceeds the language. The meaning overflows 
the words which try to express it; the act of speaking overflows the capacity of the intentional 
mind. Phenomenologically noëma is no longer in correlation with its noësis but goes beyond the 
borders of intentionality and phenomenology. Thus, the act of speaking attains its importance for 
Levinas‟s notion of ethical language because it opens up the subject in a radical manner towards 
the other.  
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         Furthermore, Levinas characterizes this relationship between the I to the other as proximity, 
which adds a sensual or physical aspect to the ethical language:  
 
This relationship of proximity, this contact unconvertible into a noetico-noematic structure, in which 
every transmission of messages, whatever be those messages, is already established, is the original 
language, a language without words or propositions, pure communication.
531
  
 
But how is this „pure communication‟ to be conceived when it is „without words and sentences‟? 
At first, this statement seems strange when it speaks of an original language without words. 
Nevertheless, it leads us to the key notion of an „ethical language‟, which is based on the notion 
of the Saying (le Dire). The Saying has to be conceived of as a radical exposure to the other: 
“[…] an exposure without holding back, exposure of exposedness, expression, saying. […] 
[S]aying uncovering itself, that is, denuding itself of its skin, sensibility on the surface of the skin 
[…] wholly sign, signifying itself.”532 It is “not an act at all, but a modality of passivity which in 
substitution is beyond even passivity. To be oneself […] as a pure withdrawal of oneself […].”533 
Strictly speaking, it is therefore not the communication of the said which immediately covers and 
extinguishes the said,  
 
[…] but saying holding open its openness, without excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering itself 
without saying anything said. […] It is to exhaust oneself in exposing oneself, to make signs by 
making oneself a sign […], the saying of this very saying, a statement of the „here I am‟ which is 
identified with nothing but the very voice that states and delivers itself, the voice that signifies.
534
  
 
         In this context the aspect of the voice assumes an important role not only for the conception 
of an ethical language, but for the entirety of Levinas‟s later writings. This aspect, however, has 
received little attention in the scholarly literature to date. This is surprising because the 
phenomenon of the voice and the simple act of addressing another person within language 
doubtlessly plays a crucial role in the everyday encounter with the other. It is through its voice Ŕ 
which is shaped out of nothing else than its own breath Ŕ that the subject conveys itself to the 
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other and bears witness to the other‟s existence. It interrupts its own being-for-itself in turning its 
attention to the other. The subject is driven out of itself through the voice of the other. And, 
finally, it is through his voice that the other is exposed to me and shows his or her unique 
meaning in the saying. As I have cited, saying is characterized as being wholly sign, signifying 
nothing but itself. This saying is commensurate for Levinas with the biblical statement „Here I 
am‟ (Gen. 22:1), יננה (hinneni) in Hebrew, which he identifies with the voice.535 Thus, the 
subjectivity of the subject is realized for him through the voice: “„Here I am‟ as a witness of the 
Infinite, but a witness that does not thematize what it bears witness of […]. It is by the voice of 
the witness that the glory of the Infinite is glorified.”536 It has to be noticed here that the Infinite 
takes place in the everyday encounter, in every saying that happens in daily life among people. 
By using a biblical citation for highlighting his conception of subjectivity, the religious 
connotation of Levinas‟s thinking becomes evident. He brilliantly merges the biblical phrase with 
his understanding of the saying. In this context the voice is so to say the dress of the body for the 
saying to bear witness to the glory of the Infinite. But it is even more than a dress. Behind its role 
as a pure transmitter of a bodily expression, the voice has a body as such: a body of pure breath. 
This is the naked skin through which the saying exposes and expresses itself Ŕ “breathing is 
transcendence in the form of opening up.”537 Therefore, breathing can be seen as the kernel of 
subjectivity in Levinas‟s thought and furthermore as the inherent aim of philosophical language:  
 
[…] in reducing the said to the saying, philosophical language reduces the said to breathing, opening 
to the other and signifying to the other its very signifyingness. This reduction is then an incessant 
unsaying of the said in which the meaning shows itself, eclipses and shows itself.
538
  
 
The impetus for discourse is engendered in “human breathing, in its everyday equality” because it 
brings out the “breathlessness of an inspiration […] an inspiration by the other, an inspiration that 
is already expiration […]. It is the longest breath there is Ŕ spirit.”539 Out of this spirit, which in 
its core is nothing but breath, philosophical discourse has evolved. How deep these notions are 
interwoven can also be seen, if we reverse our view of the process, tracing the way back from the 
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thought to the voice, as Giorgio Agamben points out: “The search for the voice in language, this 
is what is called thought”540 Ŕ it is “the search for what exceeds language and meaning.”541         
          
         The act of breathing entails pure passivity in that it subjects the subject in every moment to 
the exigencies of respiration. It is the sine qua non of living:  
 
The approach of the neighbor is a fission of the subject beyond lungs, in the resistant nucleus of the 
ego, in the undividedness of its individuality. It is a fission of self […]. That the breathing by which 
entities seem to affirm themselves triumphantly in their vital space would be a consummation, a 
coring out of my substantiality, that in breathing I already open myself to my subjection to the whole 
of the invisible other, that the beyond or the liberation would be the support of a crushing charge, is to 
be sure surprising. It is this wonder that has been the object of the book proposed here.
542
  
 
Against the background of this quote, which appears in the last chapter of Otherwise than Being 
entitled Outside, I am inclined to say that the whole discourse of this book clings to the notion of 
breathing which takes shape in the voice. Perhaps the notion of the voice is of similar importance 
for the development of Levinas‟s conception of the subject in Otherwise than Being as the notion 
of the face in Totality and Infinity. Just as the face appears as a singular trace of alterity, a unique 
aura is inherent in the voice, which somehow makes it analogous to the face.
543
 Like the face of 
the other, the voice possess the power to call me to my responsibility and to disrupt my being-for-
myself into a being-for-the-other. Levinas illustrates this aspect through the fate of Robinson 
Crusoe who, in the beautiful tropical landscape of his island, experiences the greatest event of his 
life in his encounter with the man he calls Friday. It is an experience “in which a man who speaks 
replaces the ineffable sadness of echoes.”544 There is no doubt that the phenomenon of the voice 
plays a crucial role in the encounter with another person. It is through the voice that the other is 
exposed to me and shows his or her unique meaning in the saying: “Only the meaning of the 
other is irrecusable, and forbids the reclusion and reentry into the shell of the self. A voice comes 
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from the other shore. A voice interrupts the saying of the already said.”545 As Levinas points out 
in his essay Proximity and Language, the very essence of the ethical language is realized by 
speaking, which consists basically in contact: “The contact in which I approach the neighbor is 
not a manifestation or knowledge, but the ethical event of communication which is presupposed 
by every transmission of messages […].”546 It is remarkable that the ethical language Levinas 
speaks of is not based in a kind of moral experience, but in the approach to the other:  
 
The ethical language we resort to does not proceed from a special moral experience […]. It comes 
from the very meaning of approach, which contrasts with knowledge, of the face which contrasts with 
phenomena. Phenomenology can follow the reverting of thematization into ethics in the description of 
a face. Ethical language alone succeeds in being equal to the paradox in which phenomenology is 
abruptly thrown […].547 
 
Regarding the question of how an ethical language is to be realized in the scope of philosophical 
discourse, it must be conceded that the saying can be grasped by philosophical language only 
ephemerally in what Levinas calls a “trace of saying”.548 Hence, one may object that the 
possibilities of philosophical writing according to Levinas are extremely limited. However, 
Levinas still seems to be confident about the abilities of philosophical speaking, as he tries to 
realize the conception of an ethical language in his later writings: “The philosophical speaking 
that betrays in its said the proximity it conveys before us still remains, as a saying, a proximity 
and a responsibility.”549 In this context, I accede to the conclusion drawn by Jan de Greef that the 
discourse, in which the saying resonates, “cannot close itself and have the last word; for in 
addressing itself to someone, it once again breaks open its own totality. […] The final word 
therefore is that there is no final word.”550 Words follow words endlessly since the word, in order 
to be a word, always requires a response. According to the communication theories of Habermas 
and Apel, in the very moment a total consensus between two interlocutors had been reached, this 
endless succession of words would actually collapse into silence, because if one consents 
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completely with the other, one does not have to say anything any more.
551
 This absolute harmony 
and notion of an absolute peace, which corresponds to an absolute silence, has been rejected by 
Derrida in Violence and Metaphysics as illusory. Instead of this absolute or pure silence, Derrida 
highlights the notion of a “certain silence” in which an eschatological peace is produced: “Peace 
is made only in a certain silence, which is determined and protected by the violence of 
speech.”552  
 
 
 
b)       Ethics of representation: Language, poetry and narrativity 
 
                                                                                               Because, what is left of the representable if the   
                                                                                               essence of the object is to evade the representation?   
                                                                                               It remains to represent the conditions of this evasion.”553 
 
        This apparently impossible and paradoxical assignment, which Derrida elaborates on in 
regard to the philosophy of Levinas, was formulated in a similar way more than a decade 
previoulsy by Jean-Paul Sartre in his essay Black Orpheus [Orphée noir] (1948), where he 
discusses the works of the literary movement Négritude.
554
 Although his thinking is quite far 
from the essential claim of Levinas‟s philosophy, Sartre points out in this essay an aspect that 
relates to the above mentioned aporia in Levinas‟s thought when he states that “because we 
cannot remain silent, we have to create silence within language […].”555 Indeed one of the main 
characteristics of the modern poem may be seen in this paradoxical notion of a silence within 
language. This idea is also taken up by another French philosopher, the contemporary leftist 
thinker Alain Badiou, who argues in his essay Language, Thought, Poetry that “[f]olded and 
reserved, the modern poem harbours a central silence. This pure silence interrupts the ambient 
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cacophony. The poem injects silence into the texture of language.”556 Furthermore, in his essay 
Sartre highlights the “self-destruction of language [autodestruction du langage]” as the basic 
impetus of French modern literature “from Mallarmé to the Surrealistes.”557 Where language 
ends, poetry begins. What cannot be said, “poetry signifies.”558 This „certain silence‟, of which 
Derrida speaks, is therefore in my opinion best represented in the silence created through a poetic 
language which states always more than it states. This surplus is expressed through the sound of 
the voice as Levinas underlines: “It all goes back to a past concerning which we are justified in 
wondering whether it could ever be contained within a present, and whether today it can be 
represented. Poetry signifies it, but not in its theme. It signifies it as song.”559 This citation can be 
seen in connection to the paradox of the saying which remains inexpressible, i.e., beyond words. 
In fact the saying renders the subject without words. Although saying, it is incapable of actually 
say anything other than the fact of this saying itself. Levinas highlights this paradox at the end of 
his essay Proximity and Language as follows:  
 
The first word says the saying itself. It does not yet designate beings, does not fix themes and does not 
mean to identify anything. […] Otherwise communication and proximity would reduce to the logical 
function of language and would again presuppose communication.
560
  
 
         In order to situate the problem of an adequate language for Levinas‟s philosophy within 
a broader context, I would like to cite some examples of literary texts. As shown above, the 
problem of integrating the saying, the centerpiece of ethical language according to Levinas, into a 
narrative is linked to the problem of thematization. In Virginia Woolf‟s novel Jacob‟s Room 
(1922) the narrator wants to adequately describe the protagonist of the novel, and in describing 
him, he also gives an account of his failure to do so. In effect, what Woolf‟s novel attempts to 
enact is the literary expression of “an ethics of representation that does not totalize the object it is 
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narrating, but rather opens up through absence the possibility for an ethics of representation.”561 
In this sense, Woolf draws attention to absence as a locus for positing ethical representation.
562
 
Furthermore, the novel requires that readers consider “their own attitudes and reactions to an 
unseen narratorial voice.”563 In relation to the notion of the voice elaborated above, this narrative 
voice has to be conceived, in this context, as a voice without any bodily appearance because it 
does not appear as an actor itself in the narration. This highlights the different modes the voice 
can adopt within language. Just like the mythological figure of the nymph Hχώ (echo), who 
receives the punishment of existing as a voice that can only repeat the last words spoken, but 
does not have a voice of her own, the narrative voice of Woolf‟s text only renders images of the 
past, i.e., reflections of her protagonist about which situations might have been. Hence, the 
narrator concludes: “Nobody sees any one as he is […]. It is no use trying to sum up people. One 
must follow hints, not exactly what is said, not yet entirely what is done […].”564 At the limits of 
narrative representation, absence shines through the words of what is actually said: “There are 
things that can‟t be said.”565 
 
         The difficulties of thematization, and of writing itself, are apparently not only a problem for 
Levinas, but belong to any literary and artistic expression. To cite only two examples in this 
context, let me quote firstly a writer who was personally close to Levinas, Maurice Blanchot, 
who gives the following definition of the act of writing in The Space of Literature:  
 
To write is to enter the affirmation of the solitude in which fascination threatens. It is to surrender to 
the risk of time‟s absence, where eternal starting over reigns. It is to pass from the first to the third 
person, so that what happens to me happens to no one, is anonymous insofar as it concerns me, repeats 
itself in an infinite dispersal. To write is to let fascination rule language.
566
  
 
In Blanchot‟s description the act of writing takes place in a sort of no man‟s land, where the „I‟ of 
the author is faded out and stripped of of any ego-centrism in order to cede all its skills to the 
power of language which rules with a fascination independent of the author‟s will. The 
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subjectivity of writing consists thus in pure passivity, in letting to be writing. Blanchot‟s account 
depicts writing as a gift, something that comes essentially from outside the author‟s power and 
which cannot be commanded, only accepted. This aspect of the „impossibility of writing‟ as an 
intentional act becomes even more clear from the following citation from Margeruite Duras‟ 
essay Writing which reflects in its own manner on the pitfalls of any narrative act:  
 
To write. I can‟t. No one can. We have to admit: we cannot. And yet we write. It‟s the unknown one 
carries within oneself: writing is what is attained. It‟s that or nothing. One can speak of a writing 
sickness. What I‟m trying to say isn‟t easy, but I believe we can find our way here, comrades of the 
world. There is a madness of writing that is in oneself, an insanity of writing, but that alone doesn‟t 
make one insane. On the contrary. Writing is the unknown. Before writing one knows nothing of what 
one is about to write. And in total lucidity. It‟s the unknown in oneself, one‟s head, one‟s body. 
Writing is not even a reflection, but a kind of faculty one has, that exists to one side of oneself, 
parallel to oneself: another person who appears and comes forward, invisible, gifted with thought and 
anger, and who sometimes, through his own actions, risks losing his life. If one had any idea what one 
was going to write, before doing it, before writing, one would never write. It wouldn‟t be worth it 
anymore. Writing is trying to know beforehand what one would write if one wrote, which one never 
knows until afterward; that is the most dangerous question one could ever ask oneself. But it‟s also the 
most widespread. Writing comes like the wind. It‟s naked, it‟s made of ink, it‟s the thing written, and 
it passes like nothing else passes in life, nothing more, except life itself.
567
  
 
For Duras the act of writing apparently somehow goes beyond the possibility of writing. In her 
view writing is somehow a rationally inexplicable phenomenon which in fact nobody can do, 
literally speaking, though the writer does it nonetheless. In her complex work Duras tried to cope 
with this paradox which corresponds with Levinas‟s aporia that the saying goes always beyond 
what is said, i.e. the noëma overflows the noësis.
568
 In reference to this paradoxical experience 
that goes beyond the borders of logic and rationality, Adorno states in his study Aesthetic Theory: 
“All artworks Ŕ and art altogether Ŕ are enigmas […]. That artworks say something and in the 
same breath conceal it expresses this enigmaticalness from the perspective of language.”569 The 
enigma of the artwork [“Rätselcharakter der Kunst”] is one of the main characteristics of art for 
Adorno: Good art is always rationally inexplicable, not entirely comprehensible, and it is 
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precisely for this reason that it is so fascinating.
570
 Therefore, it seems to me appropriate to take a 
closer look in the following on the relation of art and rational intentionality, in particular the 
conception of a non-intentional artwork formulated by John Cage.   
 
 
 
 
Excursus:     At the crossroads of music, poetry and ethics – poethics in the thought of  
                      Levinas and John Cage 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                            To Thee silence is praise.
571
 
                                                                                                  All the arts, even the sonourous ones, create silence.
572
 
                                                                            Do not oppose silence and noise. They operate in relentless relay.
573
 
 
         
          In the following section the above mentioned aspects are further elaborated by reference to 
the writings of John Cage (1912-1992). Cage is usually regarded as one of the most innovative 
musicians of the 20
th
 century. His widespread work consists not only of musical pieces, but also 
of many essays, poems, visual art works, as well as numerous interviews. In an interview given to 
Richard Kostelanetz, Cage points out that his most important legacy for the upcoming 
generations would be to have “shown the practicality of making works of art nonintentionally.”574 
The question what Cage means by „non-intentional‟ works of art leads us to the core of his 
conception of art. Within the limited scope of this chapter, however, I can only outline some 
aspects of his highly complex aesthetic views. Undoubtedly, one of his main goals is to “allow 
the experience of sounds as perceived in themselves, „in their suchness‟, rather than as a means of 
communication, expression, or emotional arousal or as subordinate elements in a structure.”575 
                                                 
570
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This is as relevant for his writings as it is for his music, as Cages states: “I have more and more 
written my texts in the same way I write my music.”576 Indeed, Cage is the author of  
 
[…] several hundred pages worth of essays and lectures […] [and] these writings are not to be 
regarded as mere peripheral supplements to his music, art or poetry, but as the central means to the 
comprehension of [his] works. […] Cage‟s texts […] are nothing less than the keys into his world.577 
 
 Relating Cage‟s ideas to the problem of ethics and narrativity in the work of Levinas, the main 
point of interest lies in the fact that Cage tries to break up the syntax of the written language, and 
to allow the words to become what they basically are Ŕ sound.578 This is especially true for the 
poems he wrote from 1967 to 1992, “most of which are an alogical and „asyntactical‟ collage, 
word-strings of language elements.”579 It is poetry totally “freed from „the arrangement of an 
army‟, which Norman O. Brown told him was the original meaning of „syntax‟, derived from the 
Greek word σύνταξις.”580 At the beginning of his work Empty Words Cage relates to this by 
formulating his intention as follows: “Language free of syntax: demilitarization of language. […] 
Opening doors so that anything can go through.”581  
 
         In my view, this demilitarization of language is similar to the Levinasian project of 
abandoning the language of ontology and finding a new way of philosophical narrativity that 
takes into account the ethical demand of the other. This „ethical language‟ finds its expression, as 
I have been arguing, in the saying. Actually, this mode of saying is precisely what Cage tries to 
realize through his poems and writings as Dieter Mersch points out: “Cage does not want to 
demonstrate anything. He just speaks.” 582 Hence, Cage realizes something similar to an „ethical 
language‟ in his poems by using the saying emphasized by Levinas in his own particular way. 
Through the saying the identity is broken up. The subject makes itself a sign purely through its 
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voice: “Nameless identity. It says I which is identified with nothing that presents itself, if not the 
very sound of its voice. […] [P]ure sign made to others, sign made of the very donation of the 
sign, the messenger being message […], outside the acquired, outside civilization.”583 In 
Levinas‟s view, the very sound of the voice is the placeholder of identity and it has this power 
only because it disappears in its representation. This aspect of the saying also coheres with the 
function of poetry. As Badiou points out: “The poem does not consist in communication. The 
poem has nothing to communicate. It is only a saying, a declaration that draws authority from 
itself alone.”584 In this sense, non-intentional art works require that the author be as passive as 
possible in the creation of his work, referring to the Levinasian subject which is centered in une 
passivité plus que passive, as he states in Otherwise than Being: “Subjectivity […] comes to pass 
as a passivity more passive than all passivity.”585  
 
         It is noteworthy to highlight in this context, that Cage, in his most famous musical piece 
4‟33‟‟, the so-called silent piece, the only intentional sound he “created” was silence. Through 
the absence of any intentional sound, he tries to show in a musical manner the passivity of 
subjectivity Levinas speaks of by letting sounds emerge out of pure silence. The recognition of 
sound as such demands a great deal of an audience because creates a ruptures in our habits and 
usual views on music, as Cage emphasizes:  “There are people who say, „If music‟s that easy to 
write, I could do it.‟ Of course they could, but they don‟t.”586 Similarly, Levinas has tried to 
break with our usual views on communication by elaborating in his philosophical works an 
„ethical language‟ to make room within his narrativity for the au-delà of being and the ethical 
approach to the other. Just as, for Cage, music is present in any sound, the recognition of the 
other is realized for Levinas in any saying. However, beyond this structural analogy, one may 
legitimately ask whether Cage shares Levinas‟s concern for the ethical demand originating from 
the other. In other words: Is there an ethics implicit in Cage‟s conception of poetry? According to 
Cage, there is no such thing as pure silence. He demonstrates this in his score 4‟33‟‟, which 
offers to the listener not only the experience of a particular duration of silence, but moreover that 
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silence is never simply so Ŕ indeed, that the sounds in which we are immersed can be perceived 
as art.
587
 The experience of 4‟33‟‟ makes us realize that we are always surrounded by sounds, we 
just have to listen to them. Or, as Blanchot puts it in his philosophical essay The Writing of the 
Disaster which reflects on the notion of the disaster as a key issue for modern metaphysical 
philosophy: “[…] without language, nothing can be shown. And to be silent is still to speak. 
Silence is impossible. That is why we desire it.”588 
 
         For Levinas also there is always the unfulfillable demand of the other which endlessly 
escapes any discourse, i.e. the power of narrativity and the said, and to whom one has to answer 
again and again always anew with the saying Ŕ without having the choice to close his ears or to 
look away. One is always in demand. In this context, Levinas states at the beginning of Otherwise 
than Being that he focuses in his philosophy not on being, i.e., the heart of ontology, but instead 
on a so-called “disinterest”589 (désintéressement) of being. Levinas emphasizes a detachment of 
the ego from being and instead highlights a being as pure gift and as a commitment to the other, 
before any option to choose. He further conceives of language as a gift, as a “speech-gift”.590 The 
gift is also an important notion for Cage, e.g. he describes his work Empty Words as an 
“uncultivated gift” to his readers. 591 Arguably, it seems plausible to me to characterize Cage‟s 
work as a whole as a Zeit-Gabe, a gift of time.
592
 Furthermore, Cage‟s texts offer their readers the 
possibility to experience what Cage is trying to state Ŕ rather than just giving an account of it: 
“My intention has been often to say what I had to say in a way that would exemplify it; that 
would, conceivably, permit the listener to experience what I had to say rather than just hear about 
it.”593 The notions discussed within the previous sections, i.e., voice and breathing, play a crucial 
role in the experience of Cage‟s artworks. 
 
 The „ethical language‟ as a pure saying, a saying beyond words and significations which 
transforms itself into a sign, is indeed very close to the conception of poetry John Cage wants to 
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realize in his work: “I have nothing to say and I am saying it and that is poetry as I need it.”594 
This self-reference of poetry is similar to Levinas‟s view that the essence of poetry comes from 
poetic expression and not any particular content that the poem may express: “Poetry signifies […] 
not in its theme. It signifies […] as song.”595 Levinas‟s view that the process of saying is 
ostensibly unending, that what has already been said requires once again a saying, can be further 
clarified by a passage from the beginning of Cage‟s Lecture on nothing: “I am here, and there is 
nothing to say. If among you are those who wish to get somewhere, let them leave at any 
moment. What we require is silence; but what silence requires is that I go on talking.”596 The 
impossibility of remaining silent lies at the heart of communication. Even if there is “nothing to 
say” this has to be said because we cannot remain silent toward each other. This paradoxical 
feeling is stated by Levinas in the experience that “[m]an is the only being I cannot meet without 
my expressing this meeting itself to him. […] In every attitude toward the human being there is a 
greeting Ŕ even if it is the refusal of a greeting.”597 The saying and the recognition of the other are 
tied together even beyond rational discourse, beyond knowledge. Even if we cannot (or never 
fully) understand a man, we have to recognize him as such.
598
     
 
          I have offered in the preceding section a comparision of Levinas and Cage concerning the 
notions of „saying‟ and poetry. In this context I pointed out that one may legitimately ask if there 
is an ethics implicit in Cage‟s conception of poetry. In order to approach this question in more 
detail, I would like to elaborate in the following on the notion of poethics, as formulated by 
Gerald Bruns and Joan Retallack. The latter author relates the notion of poethics to the intention 
of Cage‟s work:  
 
For John Cage the significance of art lay, not in the production of artifacts, but in the making of 
meaning in an active collaboration with medium, performers, and audience. So the work that John 
Cage has left behind can be seen as just that Ŕ work that has always to be done […]. What I mean to 
                                                 
594
 Ibid., p. 109. 
595
 Levinas, Emmamuel, “Poetry and Resurrection Ŕ Notes on Agnon”, in: Proper Names, pp. 7-16, p. 8/“Poésie et 
résurrection: Notes sur Agnon”, in: Noms propres, pp. 13-25,  p. 21: “La poésie signifie poétiquement la résurrection 
qui la porte: non pas dans la fable qu‟elle chante, mais par son chanter même.” 
596
 Cage, John, Silence. Lectures and Writings, p. 109. 
597
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Is Ontology fundamental?”, in: On Thinking-of-the-Other. Entre nous, pp. 1-11, p. 
6/“L‟ontologie est-elle fondamentale?”, in: Entre nous. Essais sur le penser-à-l‟autre, pp. 12-22, p. 18. 
598
 This is in particular the case with people suffering from Alzheimer‟s or other neurological diseases. For a 
discussion of Levinas philosophy in the context of current biomedical issues see Pelluchon, Corine, L‟autonomie 
brisée. Bioéthique et philosophie.  
 134 
say is that what we call the work of John Cage exists entirely in the form of […] invitations to 
realization […] of our aesthetic potential in a poethics (a practice or form of life in which ethics and 
aesthetics come together) of everyday life.
599
  
 
The innovative idea behind Cages artworks lies in the fact that ethics and aesthetics can be tied 
together in the intersection of what can be called poethics. The concept of poethics realizes art as 
a “living experience, rather than a simulation or mimesis.”600  
 
         Hence, Cage‟s art requires an audience that is open to a wholly new experience of art, 
letting it be involved in the creation of meaning rather than being merely passive consumers of 
what the artist has presented. Cage‟s art requires a responsive and responsible audience that 
thinks independently, because the author does not give any answers in his work, but rather leaves 
the audience on its own: “[…] [I]t is the poethical work of the audience to make […] meaning Ŕ 
the responsibility of imaginative collaboration that this kind of art requires. It is the work of the 
composer (or artist of any kind) only to create the occasion for the making of meaning.”601 
Cage‟s art is demanding and it may be exactly this highly demanding aspect that keeps people 
from his work, or simply encourages them to make fun of a score such as 4‟33‟‟. “People have 
great difficulty paying attention to what they do not understand,”602 Cage states. The tendency to 
understand and to capture each phenomenon under a subsuming concept of knowledge is a 
persistent human desire. In our struggle to survive we are forced to subsume even unusual events 
and the most exceptional phenomena under a cognitive scheme. Levinas underlines this by 
pointing out the human attitude to attach to every sound a certain meaning, i.e. the significance of 
a word: “The sounds and noises of nature are words that disappoints us. To really hear a sound is 
to hear a word. Pure sound is the word. [Le son pure est verbe.]”603 This means, that according to 
Levinas sound is essentially linked to a certain signification, to a word which has a specific 
meaning. Perceiving sounds is thus always also a cognitive act for Levinas and not only a pure 
aesthetic sensation. However, on the other hand, Levinas points out that one never captures the 
fellow human being adequately by means of a cognitive approach, and it is precisely this 
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experience that such a conception of poetry outlined by Cage gives access to. The other escapes 
our understanding and transcends it, as Levinas states: “To meet a man is to be kept awake by an 
enigma.”604 It is this enigma which inspires the work of both Levinas and Cage. In this sense, 
Gerald Bruns speaks of  
 
[...] Cage‟s aesthetics of disturbance or (borrowing from Levinas) of „restlessness‟, in which the artist 
allows chance to recompose the order and fixity in which we otherwise frame things, not simply to 
undo this order, but to set free what it tries to contain (or, much to the same point, to let in what it tries 
to exclude).
605
  
 
In regard to the Levinasian concept of a totally passive subject, a real sub-iectum vis-à-vis the 
demand of the other, I agree with Bruns, that the subject is also unsettled in Cage‟s art. It can be 
conceived as “an I-think turned inside out by what is refractory, irreducible, uncontainable, 
anarchic. It would be not too much to speak of the Cagean I as the subject of the ethical, that is, 
the non-egological ego [...].”606 Besides the different frameworks of their works, this non-
egological ego highlighted by Bruns in regard to Cage‟s art is close in my view to the Levinasian 
concept of an I which finds itself under the demand of an “anarchic situation of responsibility”607 
and which identity lies in nothing other than the very sound of its voice which blows away and 
disappears in its representation.  
 
 The works of Cage and Levinas in regards to the problem of ethics and narrativity overlap 
in a certain approach to performance.
608
 Obviously, the musician Cage and the philosopher 
Levinas do not explicitly have common concerns. Yet, they share the problem of narrativity, i.e., 
the concern how to express something which is beyond words and beyond music, something that 
escapes the philosphical discourse as well as the borders of a score. Their specific modes of 
addressing that which endlessly escapes thematization lies at the intersection of aesthetics and 
ethics. In the event of the performance, ethics and aesthetics are tied together in the presence of 
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the representation (of sound or saying) which is acknowledged as such Ŕ no matter what it 
actually contains. According to Levinas, “everything shows itself and is said in being for justice 
[Mais tout se montre pour la justice.].”609 Hence the performance cannot be separated from a 
certain ethical approach to the other, which is addressed by the performance itself. The other is 
involved in the event of the performance and is concerned as a person and not just as a mere 
spectator. Thus, the other addressed in the work becomes an undeniable part of it. As a result this 
realizes an ethical approach in the way one creates music respectively philosophy, at least if one 
has the claim to realize poethical art, open for the other. In this sense, Dieter Mersch speaks of an 
“aesthetics of the performance” (Ästhetik des Performativen) in his captivating study Ereignis 
und Aura and argues that Cage‟s art of the event (Eventkunst) is one of the best expressions of 
what is at stake in the notion of poethics: “Vom Anderen her zu denken, statt auf es zu.”610 It is a 
thinking based on the inspiration of the other which takes place in a radical openness towards 
him. It does not want to subsume the other under its proper thinking but rather let itself be 
inspirated by something which is forever outside. The recognition of the other is realized 
precisely through this openness. In this sense, one can indeed find astonishing methodological 
similarities between the oeuvres of Levinas and Cage; just to point out one more example with 
Gerald Bruns:  
 
Levinas speaks of a „radical non assemblable diachrony [that] would be excluded from meaning‟, 
where meaning means something like „undisturbed, uninterrupted, uninvaded self-identity (Otherwise 
than Being, p. 135). A „non assemblable diachrony‟ describes very well Cage‟s anarchic Mureau 
(1970), which is a mix of letters, syllables, words, phrases, and sentences [produced] by subjecting all 
the remarks of Henry David Thoreau about music, silence, and sounds he heard that are indexed in the 
Dover publication of the Journal to a series of I Ching chance operations.
611
  
 
         Surely, at first sight it seems that an explicitly ethical thinker such as Levinas and an avant-
garde musician like John Cage have little in common. Nonetheless, as I have shown, there are 
many analogies, in particular regarding the aspect of recognition, if one takes a closer look at the 
structure of their works. Indeed, the issue of an „ethical language‟ in the work of Levinas can be 
illustrated by means of Cage‟s aesthetic views. Due to the relevance of both thinkers in the 
postmodern era, the link between narrativity and ethics appears to be one of the basic problems of 
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language in postmodern thought. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the silence and the 
passivity of an artistic creation are parallel with the ungraspable inspiration Levinas points out in 
his work. I have tried to show that a parallel can be revealed regarding Cage‟s and Levinas‟s 
approaches to express the ineffable, be it through music or through language. Cage did not 
expound an ethical concern realized in his work and did not consider ethics to be an important 
issue for his work. Taking up again Dieter Mersch‟s expression of a Zeit-Gabe, a gift of time, as a 
characterization for Cage‟s work, it seems to me noteworthy that in the aspect of the giving there 
resides an ethical moment Ŕ even if Cage did not highlight this aspect explicitly. Levinas, for his 
part, recognizes in some expressions of art an ethical concern. In his anthology Proper Names he 
outlines for instance the ethical concern expressed in the works of Paul Celan (1920-1970) and 
Joseph Agnon (1888-1979). Regarding the latter, Levinas argues that his poetry would have tried 
successfully to bring back into the presence of language that which cannot be represented and 
captured by language: “It all goes back to a past concerning which we are justified in wondering 
whether it could ever have been contained within a present, and whether today it can be 
represented. Poetry signifies it, but not in its theme. It signifies it as song.”612 Poetry is situated in 
a sphere of language beyond the realm of the ordinary transmitting of information. It therefore 
has the capability, as Levinas emphasizes, to signify by its very song. In his article on Paul Celan 
“From Being to the Other”, Levinas further expounds on the characteristics of poetry. He 
particularly draws attention to the ethical moment of the giving which is expressed in the poem:  
 
A chant rises in the giving, the one-for-the-other, the signifying of signification. A signification older 
than ontology and the thought of being, and that is presupposed by knowledge and desire, philosophy 
and libido.
613
  
 
Levinas begins his article by citing a letter of Celan written on May 18, 1960 to Hans Bender: “I 
cannot see any basic difference […] between a handshake and a poem.”614 Levinas interprets this 
statement as a recognition of the other which is expressed in every poem because it is essentially 
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addressed to the other Ŕ as Levinas underscores: “The poem goes toward the other. [Le poème va 
vers l‟autre.]”615 Ŕ, as well as in a handshake: “A gesture of recognition of the other, a 
handshake, a saying without a said Ŕ these things are important by their interpellation rather than 
by their message; important by their attention!”616 In these gestures of recognition an act of 
openness toward the other is expressed. In my view, this is also what is at stake in Cage‟s art, that 
is, the Zeit-Gabe, a gift of time, referred to above. The attention Levinas speaks of is realized by 
Cage in his basic artistic attempt to renew people‟s attentiveness to music. In order to give music 
this renewed attention, beyond the borders of traditional concepts of „what is music‟, Cage 
wanted to point to the everyday music that surrounds us and for which we have lost the 
sensitivity. To hear the world with new ears was the central issue for Cage. In a similar approach 
Levinas draws attention to the lost sensitivity for otherness, for „what is alterity‟, which was not 
adequately taken into account in the traditional ontological concepts. In this sense, Cage‟s 
musical piece 4‟33‟‟ illustrates acoustically Levinas‟s notion of a “signifying of signification”, 
being „music‟ as a pure sign Ŕ nothing composed, only arranged by chance, realized in the very 
moment of the giving. This offers the possibility to hear anew the forgotten moment of sound Ŕ 
silence. Similarly, Levinas‟s work has shown us the forgotten moment of being Ŕ the other.    
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Part III – Language 
 
Chapter III 
 
Language and Speech-Thinking  
 
 
 1.      On “needing the other and [...] taking time seriously” – Rosenzweig‟s concept of      
          speech-thinking (Sprachdenken) and Levinas‟s notion of language    
              
 
                                                                                                Speech is a vital process, without which no other life              
                                                                                                process is understandable. Biologists who study life  
                                                                                                without taking as a basis the effects of the word to   
                                                                                                every living thing, take a false basis. He who has     
                                                                                                never trembled at the call of his name, has not yet    
                                                                                                lived. Only the addressed life becomes the full life.
617
 
 
 
         Coming back to Franz Rosenzweig in this chapter, I outline his concept of the New 
Thinking (das neue Denken) as well as his concept of speech-thinking (Sprachdenken) and will 
set it in relation to Levinas‟s views on language, in particular the notion of the „saying‟. I will 
start by pointing out in which sense the model of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking was a novum on 
the philosophical scenery in his time and why it can be compared to Levinas‟s views on 
language. The sources of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking and his concept of speech-thinking can be 
found in his biography and in his intellectual development, which I outlined already.
618
 However, 
I want to add some more details here in order to provide background information for my 
following analyses. 
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        Although Rosenzweig was a brilliant student, receiving his doctor‟s degree summa cum 
laude in 1912, and thereby designated to make an excellent academic career with the support of 
his mentor, the historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954) Ŕ one of the most famous German 
professors at that time Ŕ the world of the university left Rosenzweig unsatisfied.619 Even though 
Meinecke, in 1919, repeatedly offered him Habilitation and in 1921 invited him to work 
regularly on the Historische Zeitschrift, Rosenzweig invariably refused. The academic life left 
him unfulfilled as he discovered that he did not find what he was searching for. He explained the 
consequence of this fundamental spiritual change in a letter to his teacher Meinecke on August 
30
th 
1920 as follows: 
 
Now I only inquire when I find myself inquired of. Inquired of, that is, by men rather than by scholars 
or the „scholarship‟. [Ich frage nur noch, wo ich gefragt werde. Von Menschen gefragt werde, nicht 
von Gelehrten, nicht von „der Wissenschaft‟.]620  
 
Rosenzweig‟s letter to Meinecke is of outstanding importance for the understanding of his 
intellectual development. It is here that he points out the reasons for developing his concept of a 
New Thinking and also why he abandoned an academic career for dedicating himself to Jewish 
teaching as a founder and director of the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt from 1920 
onward. However, Rosenzweig‟s sceptical attitude towards the academic life can also be found 
much earlier than 1920. In a diary note from November 20, 1906 Rosenzweig openly mocks the 
ivory tower of scholarship in which the professors live without participating in real life, as well 
as the “overestimation of their own worth” [“Überschätzung des eigenen Werts”], describing 
their profession as “a world apart” [“eine Welt für sich”].621  
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          In his letter to Meinecke, Rosenzweig traces his intellectual change back to the year 1913, 
which he highlights as a turning point of his existence:  
 
In 1913 something happened to me for which collapse [Zusammenbruch] is the only fitting name. I 
suddenly found myself on a heap of wreckage, or rather I realized that the road I was then pursuing 
was flanked by unrealities. Yet this was the very road defined for me by my talent, and my talent 
only! […] Amidst the shreds of my talents I began to search for myself, amidst the manifold for the 
One. It was then (one can speak of such matters in metaphors only) that I descended into the vaults of 
my being, to a place whither talents could not follow me; that I approached the ancient treasure chest 
whose existence I had never wholly forgotten, for I was in the habit of going down at certain times of 
the year to examine what lay uppermost in the chest: those moments had all along been the supreme 
moments of my life.
622
  
 
There can be no doubt about the fact that that which Rosenzweig designates in this context as 
“the ancient treasure chest [die alte Truhe]” was in fact nothing other than Judaism. I have 
already outlined that in 1913 Rosenzweig was tempted to convert to Christianity and that he 
finally decided to stay a Jew.
623
 Reflecting on the former years, he realized that this experience 
indeed changed his whole life. It opened his eyes for what have been for him, as Rosenzweig 
summarizes it, “the supreme moments of my life [die großen Augenblicke meines Lebens]”,624 by 
which he means his consciousness that he cannot flee his Judaism, as became clear during the 
Yamim haNoraim, i.e. the High Jewish holidays, of 1913. As a result of this development, he 
explains to Meinecke that  
 
[…] scholarship no longer holds the center of my attention, […] my life has fallen under the rule of a 
„dark drive‟, which I‟m aware that I merely name by calling it „my Judaism‟. […] Cognition 
[Erkennen] no longer appears to me as an end in itself. It has turned into service, a service to human 
beings (not, I assure you, tendencies).
625
 
 
As a consequence, Rosenzweig went on to build his own system of philosophy as formulated in 
his book The Star of Redemption, written in 1918-1919, published in 1921. Thus, the intellectual 
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development which Rosenzweig describes in the cited letter to Meinecke is of fundamental 
importance for his whole work. Without emphasizing the role that Judaism played in it, it seems 
to me incomprehensible why Rosenzweig decided to set out on this new path and to develop the 
ideas I am going to present in the following pages. According to Rosenzweig, it must be 
underscored, more important than all our studying is life itself. It seems to me therefore by no 
means to be an overestimation to call him “a worshipper of life, life as such, life of and in the 
world […],”626 as Amos Funkenstein points out. Funkenstein goes on to explain in his article 
namely the importance of Judaism for Rosenzweig in this context. Judaism represented for 
Rosenzweig “pure life, the very symbol of life, meaningful and spiritual in that it was biological, 
eternal in that its members died but gave life. Zest for life is the deepest drive in the Stern der 
Erlösung.”627 Against this background, one must also read the following explanations on the role 
of language in Rosenzweig‟s thinking and its connection to Levinas. 
 
         In his article “The New Thinking”, written in February 1925, four years after the 
publication of his major work The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig points out the main 
characteristics of his philosophical thinking in a more concise manner.
628
 The essay was 
“addressed”, as Rosenzweig later said, “to the Jewish reader.”629 Unfortunately, The Star of 
Redemption did not have much success among the readers; indeed it rather “had fallen on deaf 
ears; it was a book known by some but read by virtually no one.”630 In a letter to Hans Ehrenberg, 
Rosenzweig complained that his work Ŕ although it had achieved a ceratin reputation among the 
Jews [“Das Buch ist ja bei den Juden direkt berühmt.”]631 Ŕ had been generally misunderstood: 
“I am amazed again and again how unknown the book is to his readers. The whole world thinks it 
is an admonition to eat kosher.”632 It is thus understandable that he felt the need to give the reader 
a kind of explanation (not to be conceived of, however, as an introduction post factum), in order 
to understand its structure, its argument and its method. Furthermore, besides this motivation, the 
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essay is interesting in terms of the methodological questions it deals with. In my view, the 
outlined aspects of Levinas‟s problem with philosophical thematization in chapter two633 could 
be seen in accordance with the concept of “speech-thinking” (Sprach-Denken) elaborated by 
Rosenzweig.
634
 Therefore, it seems to me a promising task to compare Rosenzweig‟s thinking to 
that of Levinas regarding the notion of language. There are two aspects I would like to accentuate 
in this context: revelation and speech. The latter is at the core of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking, 
which is considered a “speech-thinking” Ŕ unlike the abstract thinking of academic philosophy, 
which is a thinking for no one because it speaks to no one.
635
 On the contrary, Rosenzweig 
explains that “the New Thinking‟s method originates out of its temporality. [...] Into the place of 
the method of thinking, as all previous philosophy developed it, steps the method of speaking.”636 
This emphasis on speaking and the living speech entails certain results for thinking as such. 
According to Rosenzweig, there is always an unknown side-effect in speaking that has to be 
taken into account, since, in “actual conversation, something happens; I do not know in advance 
what the other will say to me because I myself do not even know what I am going to say; perhaps 
not even whether I am going to say anything at all [...].”637 An active dialogue is always a 
creative process with an outcome that cannot be foreseen. It is this moment of the unpredictable 
that marks not only creativity and creative thinking but, ultimately, any human relation. Taking 
this fact into account, Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking focuses essentially “on needing the other and, 
what amounts to the same, on taking time seriously.”638 In terms of Rosenzweig‟s biographical 
experience, these conditions were fulfilled through his encounter with Gritli, as Ephraim Meir 
points out: “In dialogue with her, language became living speech.”639 
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          In order to draw a parallel in the following to Levinas‟s notion of language, it seems to me 
helpful in this context to highlight again briefly the central motivation of his thinking. Asked in 
an interview to give a definition of philosophy, Levinas placed the encounter with the other man 
in its center, as he points out that 
 
[…] philosophy permits man to interrogate himself about what he says and about what one says to 
oneself in thinking. No longer to let oneself be swayed or intoxicated by the rhythm of words and the 
generality that they designate, but to open oneself to the uniqueness of the unique in the real, that is to 
say, to the uniqueness of the other. That is to say, in the final analysis, to love. To speak truly, not as 
one sings; to awaken; to sober up; to undo one‟s refrain.640  
 
I have already elaborated in detail the notion of awakening, sobering up and insomnia.
641
 
However, there is more to take into account. Levinas‟s own definition of his philosophy is 
remarkable with respect to Rosenzweig‟s concept of a New Thinking because it highlights the 
central significance of the other person as well as the important role of responsibility. In the 
aforementioned interview, Levinas emphasized precisely the extraordinary event of the other for 
his thinking:  
 
The encounter with the other is the great experience, the grand event. The encounter with the other is 
not reducible to the acquisition of a supplementary knowledge. Certainly I can never totally grasp the 
other, but the responsibility on his behalf Ŕ in which language originates Ŕ and the sociality with him 
goes beyond knowledge […].642  
 
Knowledge is thus only a secondary effect, caused in the encounter with the fellow man, as it 
does not hold the central place in Levinas‟s eyes. What is really at stake is the responsibility 
which is experienced through the confrontation with the face of the other and in which, according 
to Levinas, language finds its starting point. It is notable in this context that Levinas underlines 
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the fact of „truly speaking‟, i.e. “not as one sings”, as he says. That means reasonable speaking, 
although he emphasizes that that which is the content of speaking surpasses the structures of 
knowledge and logic. In this dichotomy Levinas‟s notion of language is caught up. Even if I can 
never fully grasp the other‟s existence nor fully understand him, I have to acknowledge his 
existence since the ethical moment precedes cognition and knowledge. Thus, for Levinas as for 
Rosenzweig, the act of speaking face-to face is central to their respective philosophies.  
 
          Rosenzweig‟s method of speech-thinking could, in this context, offer an adequate way to 
get past the “said” of linear thought, which is the main problem of Levinas‟s philosophical 
thematization, and to think in terms of “Sayings” rather than “saids”. The active act of speaking 
is important for Levinas. Not just what is said, but that (and how) it is said is important for him. 
The role of the speaker holds in this process a crucial place. To diminish this aspect would entail 
diminishing also the revealing power of language, as he emphasizes, that  
 
[…] to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its 
coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts. […] The function of language would amount to 
suppressing „the other‟, who breaks this coherence and is hence essentially irrational. A curious result: 
language would consist in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the same! […] this is 
why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other. 
In this revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted.
643
  
 
The event of language, as realized in the face-to-face speaking, entails thus a revelation of the 
other, according to Levinas. In fact, revelation and speech are deeply connected in his thinking. 
This connection reflects, in my view, the two main characteristics that Rosenzweig pointed out 
with respect to the New Thinking as “needing the other and, what amounts to the same, on taking 
time seriously.”644 It is interesting to trace these two mentioned aspects in Levinas‟s thinking 
from their emergence onwards. I will go on to consider in more detail, firstly, the aspect of the 
need of the other person, then, in a second step, the aspect of the importance of temporality.    
 
                                                 
643
 Levinas, Emmanuel, TI, pp. 72-73/Ti, p. 70, in italics in the original.  
644
 Rosenzweig, Franz, “The New Thinking”, in: Rosenzweig, Franz, Philosophical and Theological Writings, pp. 
109-139, p. 127/“Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum „Stern der Erlösung‟”, in: Rosenzweig, 
Franz, GS, III, pp. 139-161, pp. 151-152. 
 146 
         That language consists fundamentally in speaking to someone is a fact clearly emphasized 
by Levinas in Totality and Infinity: “Language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality.”645 
Knowledge emerges only among people that interact with one another, i.e. in every sort of 
communication between human beings. The other is essential for the formation of knowledge 
which comes thereby always from outside to the subject. It is a surplus gained through the 
process of communication realized through language. In this context, Levinas also highlights the 
unpredictable moment Ŕ that I have also pointed out with respect to Rosenzweig‟s speech-
thinking Ŕ which is inherent in every speech searching for real knowledge and truth:  
 
[…] discourse is therefore not the unfolding of a prefabricated internal logic, but the constitution of 
truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all the risks of freedom. The relationship of language implies 
transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to 
me. […] Discourse is thus the experience of something absolutely foreign, a pure „knowledge‟ or 
„experience‟, a traumatism of astonishment.646  
 
Even though the wording of Levinas is in this context very radical, since he even speaks of a 
„traumatism‟ of astonishment, the idea that language comes essentially from outside can be traced 
back to a much earlier period. One can see, for instance, how Levinas elaborated this idea in his 
philosophical notes that preceded Totality and Infinity; here this aspect of the outside of thinking, 
connected to language, is summarized as follows: “The essence of language: A thought received 
from the outside Ŕ The outside is the essential and not the universality Ŕ nor even the fact that I 
can communicate it [the outside] to a reason.”647 This demonstrates how this idea took shape in 
his thinking and that it holds an important place in the development of his notion of language. 
Indeed this echoes also in the notion of language developed in Otherwise than Being, where 
Levinas underlines, that “[l]anguage is already skepticism”648 Ŕ and it was none other than 
Maurice Blanchot who emphasizes this aspect in his interpretation of Levinas‟s work.649 
Language is never sure of itself as it is always undermined by the presence of the other which it 
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can never fully grasp. Being confronted permanently by something which is received from 
outside, language is always haunted by something that remains outside, which cannot be 
absorbed by language, and which nevertheless is the impetus of speaking. As a consequence, 
there is always a word which is left unsaid in every saying.   
 
          The need of the other person, in order to philosophize at all, is an idea both Levinas and 
Rosenzweig underline. Levinas stresses particularly the point of the ethical relationship of 
language and thinking. In an interview, he emphasized the priority of the other as a fundamental 
aspect which grounds humanity as such:  
 
Our humanity consists in being able to recognize this priority of the other. Now you can better 
understand […] why I have been so interested in language. Language is always addressed to the other, 
as if one could not think without already being concerned for the other. Always already my thinking is 
a saying. In the profundity of thinking, the for-the-other is articulated, or, said otherwise, goodness is 
articulated, love for the other, which is more spiritual than any science.
650
 
 
In this sense, I have already pointed out in my interpretation of Levinas‟s article “Is Ontology 
fundamental?” that language precedes ontology in Levinas‟s view. Similarly, in Totality and 
Infinity he goes on to emphasize the hegemony of language over ontology: “This „saying to the 
Other‟ Ŕ this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an existent Ŕ precedes 
all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology presupposes metaphysics.”651 This very 
radical manner to emphasize the hegemony of the „saying‟ over ontology entails for Levinas, 
ultimately, a hegemony of the other over the I. As distinct from the views of Rosenzweig (and 
also, for instance, Martin Buber), the relationship between the interlocutors is not conceived as 
equal by Levinas, although it is a face-to-face situation, but as asymmetrical: the other dominates 
the I, who is troubled and, in a certain sense, „awakened‟652 by the encounter with the other Ŕ an 
infinite awakening which never comes to an end. Since language is fundamentally linked to this 
awakening through the encounter of the other, it is conceived as a putting into question (mise en 
question) the I: “The calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other 
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in the face, we call language. The height from which language comes we designate with the term 
teaching.”653 In his philosophical notes which precede the publication of Totality and Infinity, we 
can see how this idea took shape in Levinas‟s mind, as he writes, for instance: “Being taught Ŕ 
creature‟s structure,”654 and also how it is connected with philosophy as such for him: “Creation 
and power. How does philosophical inquiry itself cease to be vision and power? How does it 
seize the origin without distorting it? Therefore we cannot philosophize alone. Philosophy as 
discussion and teaching.”655 The influence of the other extends thus not only to the theoretical 
concept of philosophy, but also to the ontological structure of the I which is addressed in its being 
from the „height‟ of the other who is „teaching‟ him. This asymmetry between the interlocutors 
seems to me a fundamental difference between Rosenzweig‟s method of speech-thinking and 
Levinas‟s views on language.  
 
          Their different points of view involve also a different approach to time. Whereas for 
Rosenzweig the temporal background of the „speaking scene‟ in which the method of speech 
thinking takes place is a simultaneous one, for Levinas there is a temporal deferral between the I 
and the other which can never be bridged by any presence. Levinas calls this situation diachrony 
and conceives it as an immemorial time. Whereas the synchronous time represents for him the 
linear time of consciousness, the diachronic time means the interference of the other, as a result 
of the encounter with his asynchronicity.
656
 Diachrony is a breaking-up of synchrony, it is an 
awakening to an immemorial past as an obligation to be responsible prior to any meaning and 
freedom, prior to any agreement given by the I, as Levinas underlines: “A responsibility 
preceding freedom, a responsibility preceding intentionality! […] A responsibility which, before 
the discourse revolving around what is said, is probably the essence of language.”657 Levinas also 
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speaks of the illeity
658
 of the other, which expresses precisely not an equal relationship Ŕ as 
Rosenzweig and Buber focused on in their philosophies, i.e. the method of „speech-thinking‟ and 
the dialogical thinking respectively Ŕ, but designates the „height‟ from which the other 
approaches me, teaches me. According to Levinas, 
 
[t]his anteriority of responsibility must be understood in relation to freedom as the very authority of 
the Absolute which is „too great‟ for the measure or finitude of presence, revelation, order and being, 
and which consequently, as neither being nor non-being, is the „excluded third party‟ of the beyond of 
being and non-being, a third person that we have called „illeity‟ and that is perhaps also expressed by 
the word God. A beyond being, resistant to thematization and origin Ŕ something preceding the 
originary: beyond non-being Ŕ an authority that orders my neighbor for me as a face.659  
 
In this context, also the notion of the trace is of great importance for Levinas‟s thinking: The 
trace represents a sign of an absent presence, of a presence that has already passed, leaving only 
its trace Ŕ as the present mark of its absence.660 In order to explain this notion, Levinas refers to 
the verse in the book of Exodus where God passes in front of Moses (Ex. 34:5, vayavor hashem 
al panav) and leaves His “trace”.661 His complex interpretation of the trace interweaves 
theological and philosophical aspects, as Ephraim Meir points out:  
 
Such a trace does not indicate an archeological presence, or a sign of something that was materially 
there. God is always past presence, His absence does not „appear‟. […] Finally, God is not an idea, 
which would neutralize Him into a totality. He cannot be contaminated by the finiteness of being. Man 
in His „image‟ (Gen 1:27) nonetheless bears His trace. One may conclude, therefore, that there is a 
sign in the human being that never reaches the signified. The signifier which does not reach the 
signified is the trace of God, whom one approaches through ethical living. In traditional Jewish 
phraseology: God‟s name is ineffable.662  
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The aspect of the „ineffable‟ moment marks a difference between Levinas‟s notion of language 
and Rosenzweig‟s concept of speech-thinking, where the impossibility of synchronized, equal 
speaking is not highlighted. Nonetheless the ethical approach of both thinkers is similar.  
 
          For a last example concerning their different temporal views, I would like to draw attention 
to the early work of Levinas, i.e. his lectures Time and the Other. Levinas concludes this work 
with a remarkable statement about the connection between time, eros and the other, which I cite 
at length and will expound upon:  
 
I have tried to find the temporal transcendence of the present toward the mystery of the future. This is 
not a participation, in a third term, whether this term be a person, a truth, a work, or a profession. It is 
a collectivity that is not a communion. It is the face-to-face without intermediary, and is furnished for 
us in the eros where, in the other‟s proximity, distance is integrally maintained, and whose pathos is 
made of both this proximity and this duality. What one presents as a failure of communication in love 
precisely constitutes the positivity of the relationship; this absence of the other is precisely its 
presence as other.
663
  
 
This at first sight rather paradoxical conclusion reveals all the more how Levinas‟s views differ 
from those of Rosenzweig‟s. Even if the face-to-face relationship is a very close, unique one set 
in time, Levinas nonetheless underlines that “distance is integrally maintained.” However, this is 
by no means to be understood as a negative aspect. Levinas refers in this context to the erotic 
relationship, which ultimately furnishes the face-to-face relationship, and points out that this 
absence of the other in love is precisely his presence, in a positive sense. Or, in a nutshell, 
precisely because we cannot grasp the other‟s presence, since he remains absent and infinitely 
inaccessible to us, we are able to desire and to love him. Only the ungraspable stimulates the 
desire to touch and it is precisely this impossibility that awakens the desire. In this sense, Levinas 
points out, “[t]he Other is the only being that one can be tempted to kill.”664 It is from this 
absence of the other, which has to be also conceived as the beginning of language in the face of 
the other, that the presence of love is nourished and supported. Or, as Avital Ronell once said, “if 
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we could communicate we would not need to communicate.”665 We feel the need to speak, 
because ultimately it is impossible to fully understand each other. In fact, in a total agreement the 
dialogue would collapse and would end in silence. This aspect is addressed by Rosenzweig in 
Part III of The Star of Redemption, where he points out a notion of truth which is speechless or, 
more precisely, beyond speech; he deems that God is truth and associates this truth with light, 
concluding: “Light does not talk; but shines.”666 In a certain sense, the silence outlined by 
Rosenzweig can be seen in connection with Levinas‟s notion of the Saying, which is conceived 
of as an „ethical language‟, beyond words. However, according to Levinas, it speaks nevertheless, 
as he repeatedly underlines: the face speaks.
667
 An absolute silence, outlined by Rosenzweig at 
the end of The Star, is for Levinas thus impossible since his notion of truth is ultimately linked to 
a certain notion of language, conceived of as an „ethical language‟, realized in the face-to-face 
encounter. The other remains the other in this encounter. Thus the fundamental absence of the 
other, which I pointed out above, has to be acknowledged. In this sense, as Ludwig Wenzler 
emphasized, the structure of time, realized in the encounter, is conceived by Levinas as the 
“proximity of an absence”.668 At this point, differences between Rosenzweig and Levinas with 
respect to their temporal concepts and their relations to language emerge.
669
   
 
         Although I have outlined differences between Levinas and Rosenzweig regarding the 
notions of time and language, they have nonetheless a common approach to these themes. Taking 
up the ideas of Cage about „non-intentional artworks‟,670 one could summarize that both thinkers, 
Rosenzweig as well as Levinas, emphasize speaking as such, without a pre-fabricated intention 
behind the speaking and without reducing the other to a mere receiver of what is said. Like the 
audience required by Cage Ŕ which has to consist of more than merely passive receivers or 
consumers of what is represented Ŕ an entire openness of the speaker towards the other is 
necessary for open-minded participation in an “act of speaking” in the sense found in the work of 
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Levinas and Rosenzweig. An openness without limits and without intentions, which does not 
know where it will lead, but which is ready to inspire and to let itself be inspired by the other, in 
order to quit the banal order of logic and to generate not only knowledge, but something more 
seldom, and more precious Ŕ truth. This conception of truth has to be conceived as a dialogic 
truth which none of the interlocutors possesses alone, but which comes about through the living 
speech of each participant, and for which each participant is necessary in order to be achieved. 
This entails an ethical communication which is actually in nuce set up in the concept of an 
„ethical language‟ Levinas outlined, and for which realization the need of time and the other 
person is evident.
671
   
 
 
 
2.      Rosenzweig‟s concept of a “messianic epistemology” and his notion of truth         
 
 
         In order to point out another important aspect of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking, I outline in 
the following the concept of „messianic epistemology‟. The term is used by Rosenzweig in his 
article “The New Thinking” (1924) to illustrate the specific mode of epistemology applied in the 
New Thinking. However, one must ask: what precisely is meant with this expression, and what is 
its relation to Rosenzweig‟s notion of truth?  
 
         Firstly, it is interesting to note that Rosenzweig does not begin The Star of Redemption with 
epistemological considerations, but rather concludes his book with them. Convinced that from 
cognition (Erkennen) “from which something comes out, just as with a cake, something must also 
have been put in”, Rosenzweig starts his reflections rather with “the experience of factuality.”672 
In his eyes, factuality cannot be argued away by philosophy; for instance, that man has to die is a 
fact, and it is certainly not a coincidence that Rosenzweig starts The Star of Redemption precisely 
with this fact. He goes on to exemplify his notion of factuality with respect to three elements Ŕ 
world, man, and God Ŕ and sets them in relation to each other. The elements have to be 
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considered not in isolation, but rather in relation, as Rosenzweig underlines: “Only in their 
relations [to each other] Ŕ only as creation, revelation, and redemption Ŕ do they open themselves 
up.”673 In the relation between God and world, creation takes place, and in the relation between 
God and man, revelation. It is only in the relation between man and the world that redemption 
ultimately occurs. In this process, experience holds a crucial place. It is a key notion of 
Rosenzweig‟s thinking, since knowledge is basically gained through experience.674 In this sense, 
Rosenzweig characterizes his New Thinking as “experiential philosophy [erfahrende 
Philosophie]”.675  
 
         Furthermore, time plays a crucial role for the New Thinking. Just as experience is bound to 
time, so too is language, which finds its expression in and through time. As the New Thinking is 
conceived as a „speech-thinking‟ (Sprachdenken), knowledge is thus essentially bound to time. 
This time-bound knowledge is in fact the only possible knowledge for man, according to 
Rosenzweig, since 
 
[…] advice comes when the time comes. This secret is the whole wisdom of the new philosophy. It 
teaches, to speak with Goethe, the „understanding at the right time‟ […]. The New Thinking knows, 
just like the age-old thinking of healthy human understanding, that it cannot cognize independently of 
time.
676
 
 
Rosenzweig‟s epistemology is thus not a static one. On the contrary, it develops with and through 
time, on which it also depends. It is bound to the present, but also linked to the future since it 
develops endlessly with every new experience gained through new encounters and intellectual 
exchange. As this is a dynamic process, without an end which can be foreseen, one can call it a 
messianic epistemology. In fact, since the New Thinking is realized through language, 
Rosenzweig even draws the conclusion that there is a „messianity of language‟ (Messianität der 
Sprache).
677
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         Moreover, Rosenzweig develops a cyclical view of history which highlights the Jewish 
religious holidays as important benchmarks of the year. Through the celebration of the religious 
events every Jew has the possibility of participating in the eternal life of the Jewish community. 
Therefore, according to Rosenzweig, every individual Jew has the possibility of experiencing 
history and making it his own story: it is the change from history to his story. This allows the Jew 
to experience a universal truth in a particularistic existence. Thus the „re-actualization‟ of history 
is important for Rosenzweig‟s approach to the Jewish holidays, and these events are crucial with 
respect to his notion of time. Robert Gibbs highlights this aspect as follows:  
 
Rosenzweig‟s central claim is that to bear the full significance of eternalizing time, these events must 
not be merely left in a distant past. […] The specific claim is that the Jew lives in the past event and 
does not merely represent a past event. The exodus is experienced: the celebrant was there! […] This 
importation of eternity into time structures history into a cycle that repeats. […] History in circles 
allows for the discontinuity of messianism to break into time, bestowing meaning and promise, 
without reducing the future to the past.
678
  
 
This approach to history differs from the conventional views of history as a distant past, as a time 
far away from actual life. Rosenzweig‟s notion of truth, which is connected to his notion of time 
as developed in his messianic epistemology, requires thus not just mere distant spectators of the 
religious event, but active participants in the performance of the event. Rosenzweig emphasizes 
that the historical memory he elaborates is “a memory always equally near, really not at all past, 
but eternally present; every individual is supposed to regard the Exodus out of Egypt as if he 
himself had also gone out […].”679 It is thus a re-actualization of the historical past which is 
important in his view. 
 
         In this context, it is interesting to recall that Levinas also underlines the aspect of the 
messianic structure of time and the need for a „re-actualization‟ of creation through man. In his 
article “Judaism”, written for the Encyclopaedia Universalis in 1971 and republished in the 
anthology Difficult Freedom, Levinas highlights the specific Jewish notion of time by pointing 
out that messianic time is realized in Jewish thought through and within time. He explains: “The 
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waiting for the Messiah marks the very duration of time.”680 Hence, time as such is structured in a 
messianic way; and within it each tiny second represents “the strait gate through which the 
Messiah might enter”, as Walter Benjamin pointed out in his “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”.681 Further, the active part of man holds a crucial place in Levinas‟s view, as is made 
clear in his underlining the importance of man‟s active participation in the world in Totality and 
Infinity: “Man redeems creation. [L‟homme rachète la creation.]”682 It is thus the task of man to 
redeem the world. Hence, Levinas points out, messianism “is not the certainty of the coming of a 
man who stops history. It is my power to bear the suffering of all. It is the moment when I 
recognize this power and my universal responsibility.”683 Therefore, messianism has to be 
conceived primarily as an “interior event”,684 according to Levinas, and independent from the 
events that occur in history. In this sense, messianism requires the full participation of man. Thus, 
Susan Handelman pointed out that, in the notion of „messianic knowledge‟, key aspects of the 
thinking of Levinas and other Jewish thinkers, such as Rosenzweig and Benjamin, come to the 
fore:  
 
This phrase, „messianic knowledge‟, links together Levinas, Rosenzweig, Benjamin and Scholem; for 
despite their differences, they each confronted and reworked this „messianism‟ in the face of the 
challenge of modern secular thought […].685   
 
         But how does knowledge becomes truth? First of all, truth has to be verified [bewährt] in 
life, according to Rosenzweig.
686
 About this concept of truth, Levinas wrote in his article on 
Rosenzweig “Between Two Worlds”: “Human truth is a testimony offered by a life of the divine 
truth of the end of time. Rosenzweig calls this theory of truth the „theory of messianic 
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knowledge‟.”687 Being a truth which is attained in the verification through one‟s very life, it is 
first and foremost a personal truth, connected to the specific life of the individual and his 
experiences. It is, however, not to be understood as an arbitrary notion of truth (in the sense of 
„anything goes‟), but as a part of a universal truth, generally approved. No one can claim to 
possess the whole truth on his own since we all in fact share it. With this in mind, everybody 
participates in his own way in the general search for truth. This process is also reflected in the 
rabbinical discussions in the Talmud, where it comes to the fore that  
 
[…] interpretations are endless, for every fresh mind that reacts brings something new to perceptual 
experience and is bound to take something new out of it. […] This is the nature of all human creation; 
it partakes of the finitude of the mind in which it is born, and what one mind will accept another will 
reject. But whoever has studied the Rabbinic interpretation of the Bible will find it an exemplification 
of a vital effort on the part of man to seek wisdom for his way in the world.
688
  
 
This idea is underscored also by Levinas in his essay “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition”, where 
he emphasizes that a pluralism of different points of view are necessary in order to gain the truth 
in its whole dimension:  
 
It is as if the multiplicity of persons Ŕ is not this the very meaning of the personal? Ŕ were the 
condition for the plenitude of „absolute truth‟; as if every person, through his uniqueness, were the 
guarantee of the revelation of a unique aspect of truth, and some of its points would never have been 
revealed if some people had been absent from mankind.
689
 
 
These reflections have to be seen as central for Levinas‟s understanding of truth. It highlights the 
necessity of “the multiplicity of irreducible people” to achieve “the „Whole‟ of the truth.”690 This 
issue had been worked out in a different context also by Karl Popper who points out that a 
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pluralistic form of meaning is a basic feature of human society and moreover the sine qua non for 
the development of scientific and cultural progress. Let me quote at length a passage from 
Popper‟s theory of a free discussion in order to demonstrate his point of view:  
 
It is often asserted that discussion is only possible between people who have a common language and 
accept common basic assumptions. I think that this is a mistake. All that is needed is a readiness to 
learn from one‟s partner in the discussion, which includes a genuine wish to understand what he 
intends to say. If this readiness is there, the discussion will be the more fruitful the more the partners‟ 
backgrounds differ. Thus the value of a discussion depends largely upon the variety of the competing 
views. Had there been no Tower of Babel, we should invent it.
691
 
 
Popper‟s views on the development of knowledge are thus similar to those of Levinas regarding 
the accentuation of a pluralism of opinions needed to attain a progress of our knowledge.   
 
         Coming back to Rosenzweig, however, the eternal truth is structured first and foremost in 
the Jewish and Christian truth in Rosenzweig‟s eyes. Other religions, like Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Islam, etc., play thereby a minor role in The Star of Redemption.
692
 In order to explain 
Rosenzweig‟s notion of truth, it is important to underline also the role of theology in this context. 
To make it clear from the outset: the relationship between theology and philosophy is complex in 
the work of Rosenzweig. Theology speaks objectively about revelation, whereas philosophy 
discusses the subjective side of revelation, i.e. the experience of it. However, Rosenzweig 
conceives both, theology and philosophy, in fruitful symbiosis: theology needs philosophy just as 
philosophy requires theology. As Yehoyada Amir underlines, it is through this connection that 
the new rationalism of The Star of Redemption takes shape.
693
 Rosenzweig points out the 
relationship between theological and philosophical thoughts as follows:  
 
[…] by building knowledge on the notion of Creation, we allow it freely to deploy its own character 
which is to get „to the bottom‟ of things. We are making faith completely into the content of 
knowledge, but of a knowledge that sets itself upon a fundamental principle of faith.
694
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Rosenzweig‟s views on the relationship between philosophy and theology have a certain 
influence also on his notion of truth. By asserting concisely that “God is truth [Gott ist die 
Wahrheit]”,695 in the first sentence of Book three in Part III, Rosenzweig leaves no doubt that, in 
his view, the source of truth is beyond the power of man to comprehend. God, as the source of 
truth, is conceived, as Kenneth Hart Green points out, as a “transcendent entity to which man can 
rise and from which [man can] attain truth”; however God is at the same time,  
 
[…] one who also appears as ultimately beyond both words and form. Consequently, while man can 
attain a notion of God, the apprehension derives from a limited human experience rather than a god-
like intellection, and hence he can only represent Him figuratively or symbolically rather than 
absolutely.
696
 
 
Therefore, on the last pages of The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig describes how the abstract 
notion of truth is configured in the structure of the Star of David, which he characterizes as a 
countenance, i.e. a human face. This ultimately allows for an interpretation of truth which goes 
somehow beyond the duality of religious faith, Judaism and Christianity, which for Rosenzweig 
“summarizes in a quasi-paradigmatic manner the essential plurality of human experience.”697 In 
this sense, some of Rosenzweig‟s disciples, like Ernst Akiva Simon and Hugo Bergmann, have 
interpreted in their works his notion of truth beyond the scope of the duality of Judaism and 
Christianity.
698
 Although the notion of truth in The Star of Redemption is essentially linked to 
Judaism and Christianity, it has been rightly pointed out by Yehoyada Amir that Rosenzweig‟s 
epistemology offers ultimately a broader perspective: “In it lies a comprehensive, ecumenical 
potential, which is inclined to juxtapose Ŕ at least in principle Ŕ different experiences of faith and 
different religious configurations of these experiences and of life in the face of the divine 
eternity.”699  
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         Rosenzweig‟s messianic epistemology and his notion of truth have to be seen in the broader 
context of contemporary religious life, if one is to consider them appropriately. As Ephraim Meir 
emphasizes,  
 
[p]luralism in religion goes against absolute truth claims and exclusiveness. Although the appreciation 
of theological differences remains important, the common effort of the various communities with their 
specific languages to realize together human rights, to bring justice and peace, and to extend 
hospitality to each other is even more urgent.
700
 
 
Meir argues in his article for an innovative approach to religious difference which highlights the 
notion of “trans-difference”.701 He rejects the idea that religious thinking would be useless for our 
societies, only used as a pretext for violence and that the world would be much better off without 
religion, as e.g. Richard Dawkins argues in The God Delusion.
702
 Based on the conviction that 
religions could positively contribute to the development of the modern world, Meir explains the 
notion “trans-difference” as follows:  
 
„Trans-difference‟ between the three monotheistic religions expresses itself in an interaction between 
the religions in their functions within the broader secular society. Instead of tolerating, ghettoizing, 
privatizing, or demonizing religions, I propose a new and creative interaction between the secular 
society and religious cultures as well as a new sphere of interaction between the universal and the 
particular.
703
  
 
This openness towards other religions, ready to acknowledge other religious ideas and truths, is 
important for making Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking useful for the present times. First and 
foremost, this is useful in overcoming the hegemony of the unity of reason as well as restrictive 
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religious worldviews and the idea that there is only one absolute truth; instead, there is the 
acknowledgement of a more “pluralistic thinking of reality”,704 to which  Rosenzweig‟s work 
leads the way. 
 
 
    
3.       “Light does not talk; but shines.” – The vision of the face and the experience of            
          truth  
         
                                                                               Arriving at his highest understanding, man is reduced to stillness.
705
 
 
         On the last pages of The Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig expounds how his notion of truth 
is configured symbolically in the image of the Magen David, the Star of David. This symbol, 
which gave the name to Rosenzweig‟s book, is characterized metaphorically by Rosenzweig as 
an „image of being‟, or, more precisely, as an image of the Jewish being, as he points out in Book 
Three of Part III:  
 
In the innermost narrows of the Jewish heart there shines the Star of Redemption. Here the Star 
blazes. That which is last, the innermost and the seeming narrowness and rigidity of feeling begins to 
flow and yields to the world-illuminating configuration, which just like in its combining of God, 
world, man into Creation and Revelation toward Redemption expresses the content of Judaism, now 
also flames up still in the core of the Jewish soul. The Star of Redemption is therefore a likeness of the 
essence […]. [Der Stern der Erlösung ist so Gleichnis des Wesens…]706  
 
The truth, which is expressed by Judaism, according to Rosenzweig, is thus linked essentially to 
the symbol of the Star of David, which stands as a configuration of the eternal truth. As I have 
outlined, the eternal truth finds its expression for Rosenzweig in Judaism and Christianity. 
However, what is at stake in the last pages of The Star of Redemption is the question of how this 
truth is finally experienced by man. At this point, an ambiguous scene becomes apparent in 
Rosenzweig‟s system of philosophy: although it is well-known that Rosenzweig had a rather 
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negative attitude toward mysticism and a “rudimentary knowledge of Kabbala”,707 he 
nevertheless describes the ultimate experience of truth, outlined on the last pages of The Star, as a 
vision of “the shining of the divine face”.708 Rosenzweig underlines clearly the primacy of the 
vision in this context: “In the view we grasp eternal truth. [“In der Schau erfassen wir die ewige 
Wahrheit.”]709 This primacy of the vision is linked to the way in which truth as such shows itself, 
i.e. as light – “God is truth. […] God is light.”710 Light as a symbol of what lies beyond words 
and beyond grasp of the human mind is a well-known metaphor in the history of metaphysics. 
Since its very beginning, metaphysics has used this metaphor of light in order to provide an 
appropriate expression for its last and least conceivable issues.
711
 Describing the truth as light 
entails that truth appear immediately and does not unfold gradually in a process, as we see in 
language, which is formed by words and their concatenation; this needs time to be articulated. On 
the contrary, truth is conceived by Rosenzweig rather as a vision that steps out of the twilight of 
doubts and forces the conviction of the mind. Rosenzweig connects this „lightful‟ truth with the 
human face and links the vision of the face with the configuration of the Star of David, which 
structure he sees mirrored in the system of The Star of Redemption:  
 
In the Star of Redemption in which we saw the divine truth become configuration, nothing else lights 
up than the countenance that God turned shining toward us. We shall now recognize in the divine face 
the Star of Redemption itself as it now finally became clear for us as configuration. And only in this 
recognition is its cognition perfected. […] Only when we see the Star as countenance are we quite 
beyond all possibility of possibilities and simply see.
712
  
 
Hence, truth is ultimately experienced not as language, but as a vision or, more precisely, as a 
vision of a configuration.
713
 This shows that Rosenzweig conceives truth as something beyond 
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language, which is experienced only in the vision. The complexity of the connection between 
truth and face has been highlighted by Stéphane Mosès: “Truth is the manifestation of the hidden 
essence of God, just as the human face is the way the transcendence of the other is revealed to 
me. It is precisely because Truth appears here in its totality that it cannot give itself within the 
concreteness of lived experience but only in the pure space of vision.”714 The totality of truth 
appears to man thus only in the vision, in a sphere beyond language, whereas in life he can 
concretely experience only parts of this eternal truth. 
 
         With respect to the philosophy of Levinas, it is highly interesting in this context, that 
Rosenzweig connects the two notions face (human/divine) and truth. The last section of The Star, 
entitled with the heading “Gate”, since it opens up, in Rosenzweig‟s view, beyond the book and 
leads into real life, begins in this sense as follows:  
 
That which is eternal had become configuration in the truth. And truth is nothing other than the 
countenance of this configuration. Truth alone is its countenance. And take much care, for the sake of 
your souls: “No figure have you seen, speech only have you heard,”715 Ŕ so it is said in the world of 
Revelation with and around us. But the word grows silent in the afterworld and supra-world, in the 
redeemed world, which the blessing said at the right time and in the right place, full of higher power, 
forces hither. Of it, complete and at peace, it is said: “May he let his countenance shine upon you.”716 
This shining of the divine face alone is truth.
717
  
 
With respect to the philosophical approach of Rosenzweig‟s Star of Redemption, it must be asked 
if this “shining of the divine face” has to be understood as a metaphorical expression or if 
Rosenzweig refers in this context to a mystical experience. Therefore, before I go on to expound 
Rosenzweig‟s vision of the face, I want to draw attention to the letters Rosenzweig wrote to his 
beloved Gritli. A look at these letters can give useful information in this context about 
Rosenzweig‟s situation during the writing process, which will shed light on the mystical 
approach. In his letter from October 4, 1918, Rosenzweig describes to Gritli how he saw the 
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figure of the star before him in real life: “I saw it again with eyes and every detail in it. [Ich sah 
ihn wieder mit Augen und alles Einzelne in ihm.]”718 Thus it has been pointed out by Elliot 
Wolfson that Rosenzweig in fact attempted “to incorporate into his system his own unique 
mystical experience […].”719 Rivka Howritz has underlined how important these personal 
experiences had been for the writing of The Star of Redemption: “The book, in its entirety, was 
written in ecstasy, an outcome of these experiences.”720 The role of his muse Gritli, who inspired 
Rosenzweig profoundly and encouraged him to find an adequate expression for his experiences, 
should not be underestimated in this process.
721
 Only a few weeks after the above cited „mystical‟ 
letter, which expresses an overwhelming experience, he wrote Gritli on November 2, 1918, that 
he sometimes felt like a little child who cannot write and yet wants to, and that he is only able to 
write because she guides his hand.
722
 Some days later, on November 8, 1918, Rosenzweig added 
that “all writing is writing to you; you are looking constantly over my shoulder.”723 That this was 
not just a temporary feeling can be seen from Rosenzweig‟s statement about a year and a half 
later, in which he admits to Gritli: “I cannot properly write to you today; your words are missing. 
From what, then, do I live?”724 This shows that her letters and her inspiration through love played 
a decisive role for Rosenzweig‟s writing. In this context, the mystical experiences he had can be 
seen as intertwined with his strong feelings for Gritli and it is by no means an exaggeration to 
highlight the love he felt for her as a condition sine qua non for the writing of The Star of 
Redemption. His love for Gritli gave him the ecstatical openness for the mystical experience he 
underwent at this period. The exact connection between the love for Gritli and the mystical 
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experience can be seen in the event of opening up towards a transcendent sphere, that is to say the 
other. Rosenzweig describes this event in The Star as the metamorphosis of the silent Self to a 
speaking soul that loves and is loved and thereby animates the world. In a certain sense, 
Rosenzweig himself underwent such a metamorphosis and the excited love letters he wrote nearly 
on a daily basis to his beloved prove this. Thus, in my view, the role of Gritli has been until now 
underestimated in this context.      
  
         To elaborate further Rosenzweig‟s mystical experience, it is important to take into 
consideration the ongoing discussion of Kabbala and Rosenzweig‟s work. As early as 1931, it has 
been pointed out by Gershom Scholem, The Star of Redemption had a strong mystical tendency: 
“[…] it moves from the positions of reason to a theistic mysticism and gives support to strictly 
mystical theologoumena […]. […] It was an attempt, mystical in the strictest sense, to construct 
that which did not allow of construction, the star of redemption.”725 Furthermore, Nahum N. 
Glatzer, a friend of Rosenzweig and participant of the Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt as 
student and teacher, took up this line of thought from Scholem in 1979 in his article “Was Franz 
Rosenzweig a Mystic?”. Glatzer sums up the issue at stake as follows: “[…] although he was not 
a mystic, Rosenzweig did reach a position of „theistic mysticism‟, operating with „strictly 
mystical theologoumena‟. A paradoxical position? Perhaps, but one resolved by the peculiar 
spiritual odyssey of the man himself.”726 Both Scholem and Glatzer opted for a kind of theistic 
mysticism in order to characterize Rosenzweig‟s understanding of redemption. This tendency has 
been taken up again recently by Elliot Wolfson as an elaboration of the thought-provoking 
impulses given through the works of Glatzer and Scholem. Wolfson remarks that “the emphasis 
on the visual at the end of the Star betrays an affinity to, if not direct influence of, kabbalah 
[…].”727 Around 1980, another Kabbalah scholar, Moshe Idel, discovered parallels between 
Rosenzweig and Kabbalah and wrote a pioneering paper about the similarities between both 
subjects. In his article, he explains that Rosenzweig was clearly influenced by the so-called 
Lurianic Kabbalah, i.e. the teachings of Isaac Luria (1534-1572), and that this can be traced back 
to the so-called germ cell (Ur-Zelle) of The Star of Redemption, a letter Rosenzweig wrote to his 
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cousin Rudolf Ehrenberg on November 18, 1917.
728
 According to Idel, this line of thought started 
to take shape in Rosenzweig‟s mind even before the First World War, as can be seen in 
Rosenzweig‟s article “Atheistic Theology”. However, it is only in The Star of Redemption that  
 
[…] the kabbalistic idea of unification occupies a very important place […]. […] The expression „Star 
of Redemption‟ […] is an expression of the unique way of the Jew, the kabbalistic way, leading to 
God and the world: the Jew in his own unique way intends to redeem God, himself and the world.
729
  
 
Last but not least, in 2006 Rivka Horwitz published an inspiring essay on the topic, which 
resumed the outlined aspects and added new insights. According to Horwitz, “Rosenzweig 
anchors his theology in Kabbala, which presented him with the dynamic mythical dialogue he 
sought.”730 She further points out that, in a revealing diary note from June 30, 1922, Rosenzweig 
underlines: “The true predecessors of my problem are nevertheless in the Kabbala.”731 This 
shows not only that Rosenzweig, after having completed The Star, reflected further on the 
Kabbalah and its subjects, but that he indeed saw his own philosophical project connected to the 
Kabbalah in some sense. In her interpretation of this diary note, Horwitz highlights that in 
 
[…] this fragment Rosenzweig admits for the first time that his dialectic is from the Kabbala. 
However, his philosophy is constructed not merely on God but also on man and the world. Each 
element has an inner dialectic that resembles Kabbala. In 1922 he realized that this is the Kabbala 
present in his work.
732
  
 
To sum up the problem, Horwitz does not deny the ambivalent tendencies between, on the one 
hand, Rosenzweig‟s repudiation of mysticism and, on the other, an obvious influence of 
kabbalistic themes and motifs on his thinking. However, she emphasizes: “Rosenzweig wanted to 
hold the rope on both ends: Kabbala and life, Kabbala and the here and now, which are usually 
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considered contradictory.”733 This sums up adequately in my view the paradoxical position, 
which can be found in Rosenzweig‟s work regarding the attitude to Kabbalah. In this sense, 
reality remains, besides all “mystical tendencies”,734 ultimately decisive since it is in this sphere 
that the truth is verified for man in the long run, as Stéphane Mosès emphasizes: “[…] 
Rosenzweig‟s system does not lead to a beyond of mystical contemplation but points to the 
reality of life.”735  
 
         Rosenzweig‟s mystical approach is linked, as I have pointed out, to the figure of the Star of 
David and to the vision of the divine face. After having completed The Star, Rosenzweig sought 
predecessors in Kabbalah, which may have used the Star of David in a way similar to that which 
he used in his book. However, he did not find any Jewish thinkers who had used the symbol in 
this special way. Disappointed, he wrote to Gritli: “I have no forerunners with regard to the Star, 
Ŕ unfortunately. […] Too bad. I really have no more respect for what I have done, if it really 
starts only with me.”736 Indeed, Gershom Sholem has shown that “[t]he hexagram is not a Jewish 
symbol, much less „the symbol of Judaism‟.”737 In his article “The Star of David: History of a 
Symbol”, published in 1948, Scholem argues that the symbol does not originate in the Bible nor 
in Talmud and was in fact first used in the Middle Ages in magic formulas and practical 
Kabbalah.
738
 Given the disenchantment Rosenzweig experienced in this regard, Rivka Horwitz 
has assumed that “as a result of this disappointing conclusion he then added in the end of the 
book an analysis of the Face, that is, the Face of God, which alludes to the anthropos
739
 combined 
with the Jewish Star.”740 Indeed, in the last section of the The Star, the vision of the divine face is 
combined with the configuration of the Star of David. Rosenzweig describes in detailed manner 
how this countenance is structured, what the different functions of the organs are, and in which 
way they can be related to the figure of the Star of David. I quote the passage of Rosenzweig‟s 
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description of the face at length, since it is central for his understanding of truth, and will help me 
to expound my interpretation afterwards:  
 
Just as in the two superimposed triangles the Star reflects its elements and the collection of the 
elements into the one path, so too the organs of the countenance are divided into two levels. For the 
vital points of the countenance are after all these ones where it enters into contact with the 
surrounding world, be it receptively or actively. The ground level, the building blocks so to speak, of 
the face, the mask, is made up, is arranged according to the receptive organs: forehead and cheeks. 
The ears belong to the cheeks and the nose to the forehead. Ears and nose are the organs of pure 
receiving. The nose belongs to the forehead and it occurs in the holy language to mean the whole face. 
The fragrance of sacrifices applies to the nose as do the moving of the lips to the ears. Over this first 
basic triangle, as it is formed by the midpoint of the forehead as the dominant point of the whole face 
and the midpoints of the cheeks, there now lies a second triangle which is made from the organs 
whose action animates the rigid mask of the first one: eyes and mouth. The eyes do not as it were 
mimic each other identically, but whereas the left one sees more receptively and uniformly, the right 
one looks sharply focused on one point; only the right one „sparkles‟ Ŕ a division of labor that 
frequently also eventually engraves its traces in the soft area around the eye sockets of old heads, so 
that then that asymmetric formation of the face becomes noticeable from the front, which otherwise is 
generally noticeable only in the well-known difference between the two profiles. As forehead 
dominates the structure of the face, so its life, all that wrinkles up around the eyes and shines out from 
the eyes, collects finally in the mouth. The mouth is what completes and consummates all expression 
of which countenance is capable: both in speech and finally in the silence behind which speech fell 
back: in the kiss.
741
  
 
This description of the face is remarkable for two aspects: firstly, the interweavement between 
the figural dimension of the Star of David and the attribution of the real organs of the face (nose, 
eyes, mouth, etc.) to it. This correspondence is surprising, to say the least, after the many pages of 
rational argumentation Rosenzweig draws up in his book. The intertwining of the transcendent, 
divine sphere (the face of God) and the real, human sphere (the face of man) is eye-catching and 
requires some clarification.
742
 I want to put this connection in relation to a letter Rosenzweig 
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wrote in November 1924, entitled “The Commandments: Divine or Human?”743 In this text 
Rosenzweig highlights the aspect of the unspeakable of the exeperience of truth. In his eyes,  
 
[…] what man experiences about God […] is incommunicable, and he who speaks of it makes himself 
ridiculous. […] [I]t is man‟s own experience Ŕ utterly inexpressible Ŕ that is the fulfillment and 
realization of utterable truth. All that is needed is Ŕ to undergo this experience.744  
 
Thus the conundrum: how can we speak about God, if all we can express about him is evident in 
performing his commandments? Rosenzweig speaks in this context of a “theo-human reality of 
the commandment” [“gott-menschliche Wirklichkeit”] which reveals itself in the performance of 
the commandments. This reality is „permeable‟ for him, since he underlines that “[…] there is no 
rigid boundary in the relationship between God and man. […] [T]he only boundary lies between 
what can and what cannot be expressed.”745 The intertwining of the divine and the human face 
must be seen against this background of Rosenzweig‟s understanding of the unspeakable 
experience of truth as realized in the “theo-human reality of the commandment”. There is no rigid 
boundary in the relationship between God and man, and Rosenzweig expresses this symbolically 
in the superposition of the divine and the human face at the end of The Star. In other words, man 
finds an access to human reality through the fulfillment of the divine commandments. The aspect 
of the unspeakable (Unsagbare), mentioned in Rosenzweig‟s letter, is further connected to the 
second facet to which I would like to draw attention regarding the above cited description of the 
„face‟. This is Rosenzweig‟s highlighting of the silence, realized ultimately in the kiss, which 
takes place beyond all language. Thus, the mouth has an ambivalent function: on the one hand, it 
is through the mouth that the „organon of revelation‟, i.e. language, is proffered and, on the other, 
the mouth is precisely deprived of this central function when it reaches the truth; in the silence of 
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the kiss Rosenzweig silences all discourse conclusively.
746
 Language is attributed thus a divine 
nature. It is the primal source of knowledge, before reason, and in this sense Rosenzweig‟s 
reflections on language join in some way the critique of Enlightenment‟s concept of reason 
outlined by Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), whose conception of language is in fact close to 
Rosenzweig‟s, as Rivka Horwitz pointed out.747 Language refers for Rosenzweig (besides the 
actual real language) also to a beyond of language, which is underscored by Rosenzweig in his 
recounting the Creation: “The word of God is Revelation only because at the same time it is the 
word of Creation. God said: Let there be light Ŕ and what is the light of God? It is man‟s soul.”748 
This comparison, taken from the Bible (Proverbs, 20:27), underlines the similarity between the 
soul of man and the light of God. Thereby, man has the ability to reach knowledge, although the 
„whole of truth‟ is captured only beyond language, in a vision.   
 
         When the influence of Rosenzweig on Levinas‟s thinking is taken into account, the 
differences between their concepts of the “face” are conspicuous. This aspect has been pointed 
out by Richard A. Cohen, who summarizes the differences as follows: “Rosenzweig‟s description 
of the face on barely one page of The Star presents a face far more graphic and symbolic than 
anything found anywhere in the entire work of Levinas.”749 The main difference in their concepts 
of the „face‟ lies in the fact that Rosenzweig stresses the graphic dimension of the face, whereas 
Levinas focuses on the ethical dimension of the face. Furthermore, the focus of Rosenzweig‟s 
description of the face lies in the mouth (although it becomes silent in the end), whereas 
Levinas‟s emphasizes rather the eyes and sight as such as the locus of transcendence in the 
human face, which, however, exceeds human perception in the end:  
 
The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes 
the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The relation with the face can 
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surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to 
that.
750
  
 
Despite this ambivalent nature of the face, Levinas attaches much importance to the visual 
dimension. In his captivity notebooks, the Carnets de captivité, one can find the following note, 
which reveals the great importance Levinas attaches to vision:  
 
To look someone in the eyes is to see the soul. Not as a thing. But looking in the eyes is seeing oneself 
seeing, or even more: I see myself seeing, seeing myself seeing… Infinite repetition realized in the 
instant. That is the soul. Reflection, but through alternation and through others. Hence the primacy of 
vision. For hearing, for touch, there is nothing like this. The soul is in the eyes.
751
  
 
However, the importance of the view was relativized by Levinas later on, in his books after the 
war. In this sense, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas explains: “The relationship with the Other, 
transcendence, consists in speaking the world to the Other. […] Transcendence is not a vision of 
the Other, but a primordial donation.”752 This „donation‟ is realized in a paradoxical situation, i.e. 
through language, as a saying, which is focused not in that what is actually said, but in the 
„donation‟ of the saying itself and the very signification this saying has. In his philosophical 
notes, written approximately in the years 1949-50, Levinas points out this meta-aspect of 
language as follows: “Language – light in which one sees the light.”753 Besides the banal function 
of language, i.e. the submitting of information, a higher signification is expressed by it, according 
to Levinas. To cope with this ambivalence of language is one of the main tasks of philosophers, 
as Levinas underlines: “But the philosopher has to come back to language to translate Ŕ be it by 
betraying them Ŕ the pure and unspeakable.”754 The indispensable importance of language for 
philosophy is thus for Levinas a condition sine qua non of philosophical discourse, which has to 
find, always anew, words for the ineffable and a language for its search for truth, even if this truth 
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remains ultimately ineffable. The eyes play a central role in this context, according to Levinas: 
“The eyes break through the mask Ŕ the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye 
does not shine; it speaks.”755 Thus, Levinas emphasizes precisely the contrary of what 
Rosenzweig expounded: The face or, more precisely, the eyes speak, according to Levinas, 
whereas for Rosenzweig, as we have seen, language is ultimately surpassed by the silence of the 
vision of the light of the divine countenance.    
 
         Although language generates knowledge and is the sine qua non for the event of revelation, 
truth takes place, according to Rosenzweig, in the contemplation of the divine countenance, 
which is elevated beyond the realm of language. Truth „takes place‟ in the vision of the shining of 
the divine countenance. Being conceived as light, it is not to be understood as a sort of 
development or process in itself, but rather as an event that takes place. Aside from the process of 
gathering information and facts, truth is ultimately something eternal for Rosenzweig. It is 
beyond the „time of the clocks‟, beyond history. In this sense, Rosenzweig ends The Star of 
Redemption with an outlook of the world to come, haOlam haba, which no eye has seen yet, and 
in which truth will be experienced in its whole dimension.
756
 However, a glance of the light of 
truth can be experienced also in the present of the real world. In its shining, truth reveals itself 
without the need of words, as Rosenzweig emphasizes:  
 
Light does not talk; but shines. It is not at all turned in on itself; it radiates not inward but outward. 
Yet its radiating is also not a surrendering of itself, as language is; light does not give itself away, 
dispose of itself as does language when expressing itself, but it is visible while abiding entirely by 
itself, it does not exactly radiate outward, it only goes on radiating; it does not radiate like a fountain, 
but like a face, like an eye radiates, an eye that becomes eloquent without needing to open its lips. 
There is a silence here that is unlike the speechlessness of the primordial world that has no words yet, 
but a silence that no longer needs words. It is the silence of perfect understanding. Here, a glance says 
everything.
757
  
 
This understanding of truth has led some scholars to the interpretation that Rosenzweig elaborates 
a “mystical doctrine of truth”.758 For our question in this context, it is however more noteworthy 
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to highlight the main characteristic of Rosenzweig‟s experience of truth, i.e. that it is centered in 
silence. Rosenzweig clearly underscores that “there is nothing more deeply Jewish than a final 
suspicion of the power of the word and a heart-felt confidence in the power of silence.”759 This 
aspect of the Jewish existence is important with respect to the role of language in Rosenzweig‟s 
thinking. “In remaining silent […] the Jew keeps himself at the very heart of language,” 
Alexander Düttmann points out: “The Jew is language, he is the name: for this „reason‟ each 
Jewish generation is, as such, an attestation to the name.”760 The “inexpressible joy of being a 
Jew”761 Franz Rosenzweig experienced is echoed in this „speechlessness‟ (Sprachlosigkeit) of the 
experience of truth, which realizes itself in the concrete life of the Jew Ŕ beyond the realm of 
language Ŕ and “can only be understood existentially, not merely cognitively; […].”762 The 
silence of this experience is mirrored in the silent experience of prayer which unifies the religious 
community. Despite the high significance of language and speech in The Star of Redemption, it is 
ultimately the common liturgical gesture which transcends language and becomes „something 
more than language‟, as Rosenzweig highlights:  
 
[…] the height of liturgy is not the common word, but the common gesture. Liturgy frees the gesture 
from the chains of being the clumsy maidservant of language and turns it into something more than 
language. Only in the liturgical gesture is the „purified lip‟ anticipated that is promised for „that day‟ 
to peoples always linguistically divided. In it, the arid silence of the unbelieving members becomes 
eloquent, the overflowing talkativeness of the believing heart grows quiet. Unbelief and belief join 
their prayer.
763
  
 
         In a similar way, Abraham Heschel elaborates this idea in Man‟s Quest for God. Heschel 
claims that religious truth is liturgically realized by the community of the congregation that sings, 
whereas the individual remains silent. Heschel claims, that Jewish liturgy is  
 
[i]n a sense, […] a higher form of silence. It is pervaded by an awed sense of the grandeur of God 
which resists description and surpasses all expression. The individual is silent. He does not bring forth 
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his own words. His saying the consecrated words is in essence an act of listening to what they convey. 
The spirit of Israel speaks, the self is silent.
764
  
 
Further, Heschel points out: “True prayer is song.”765 Because it is not the logical aspect of 
language which counts but the expression of the voices as such: the pure song. This does not 
mean that the song must perforce be absurd or illogical; it just highlights the aspect that 
spirituality continues also beyond language. In fact, the moment of silence in prayer could 
represent, in this sense, a continuation of the dialogue with God „by other means‟, so to say. 
Rosenzweig refers, for instance, to the use of the shofar in the ceremonies of the New Year (Rosh 
Ha-Shana) and the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) in order to highlight that language is finally 
abandoned in favor of a non-verbal aid: the pure sound of the shofar instrument. However, this 
event is already precedented, with respect to the ceremony of the Day of Atonement, by an 
insistent repetition of the words: “The Lord, He is God.” Thus, Steven Schwarzschild points out: 
“No longer is it the meaning of the words but rather their rhythm, the scream of the soul that 
squeezes through them, the hammering of their insistent repetition, in which we place our 
hope.”766 The experience of silence as a religious expression is therefore of great importance for 
Rosenzweig. He underlines even the function of the word, as a mode to achieve silence: “The 
word itself must guide man in so that he may learn to grow mutually silent. The beginning of this 
education is that he may learn to listen.”767 This highlights again the limits of language and the 
point of view that reality contains ultimately more than only that which can be captured by 
words. This may ultimately be inherent in every expression of language since a total grasp of 
what is said and intended by the words of others is “conceptually impossible” [“begrifflich 
unmöglich”].768 It seems therefore plausible, as Almuth Bruckstein points out, that a certain 
alienation is, paradoxically, the very condition sine qua non for understanding as such 
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[“Entfremdung als Bedingung des Verstehens”].769 In this process silence holds a crucial place, 
since it lies precisely at the intersection between singular and mutual communication and opens 
up the dimension of a non-verbal, silent communication between human beings. This aspect has 
been underscored especially by Martin Buber in a passage of his book Between Man and Man, 
entitled “Silence which is communication [Das mitteilende Schweigen]”: “Speech can renounce 
all the media of sense, and it is still speech.”770 Thus, the limits of language are not to be 
conceived as the limits of understanding, neither by Rosenzweig nor by Buber. The latter has 
pointed out this experience impressively in the following description, which I would like to cite 
at length here, since it illustrates an important aspect which I want to outline in this paragraph:  
 
When Saint Louis, the king of France, decided to make a pilgrimage to the holy places and heard the 
call of holiness of Brother Aegidius, he resolved in his heart to visit him at home. When, for this 
reason, he came to Perugia during his travels where he had heard that the brother resided, he went to 
the gate of the brothers like a poor pilgrim and unknown, and there he ardently asked for the holy 
brother Aegidius. The gatekeeper went and told brother Aegidius that a pilgrim at the door was asking 
for him. He immediately knew through the Holy Spirit who it was. Stepping out of his cell as if 
drunken, he came to the gate running fast, and the two fell into a wondrous embrace and kneeling, 
kissed one another with great fervor as if they had known one another as the oldest of friends. And 
when they had given one another signs of ardent love, neither spoke a word to the other, but preserving 
silence in every way they parted. As Saint Louis was leaving, the brothers asked one of his 
companions who this man was who had been in such ardent embrace with Brother Aegidius. He 
answered that it was Louis, the king of France, who had wanted to behold the holy Brother Aegidius 
on his pilgrimage. Whereupon the brothers complained and said to Brother Aegidius: „Oh Brother 
Aegidius, why did you not want to say anything to such a great king who came from France to see you 
and to hear a good word of you?‟ Brother Aegidius replied: „Dearest brothers, do not be surprised that 
neither he could say anything to me nor I to him, for as soon as we had embraced, the light of divine 
wisdom revealed his heart to me and mine to him. Standing in the eternal mirror we learned with 
perfect consolation what he had intended to say to me and I to him, without the noise of lips and 
tongue and better than we could have spoken with the lips. And had we wanted to explain with vocal 
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sounds what we felt inwardly, such speech would rather have bestowed melancholy than consolation 
upon us. Thus you may know that he left hence wondrously comforted.‟771     
 
          In conclusion, I want to emphasize with respect to my reflections on the connection 
between eschatology and language in the thought of Levinas,
772
 that Levinas also repeatedly 
speaks of an “eschatological vision” in the preface of Totality and Infinity. He outlines his 
interpretation of an „optical approach‟ to ethics as follows:  
 
The first „vision‟ of eschatology […] reveals the very possibility of eschatology, that is, the breach of 
the totality, the possibility of a signification without a context. The experience of morality does not 
proceed from this vision Ŕ it consummates this vision; ethics is an optics. But it is a „vision‟ without 
image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an 
intentionality of a wholly different type Ŕ which this work [Totality and Infinity] seeks to describe.773  
 
Since the vision of the face cannot be seized as such, it is not a sensual experience for Levinas, 
but a transcendent one. It is the invasion of a signification without a context that disturbs the 
order of the related significations (as a word/signification is related to an object). The face thus 
„speaks‟ an absolute message, which cannot be related to something contingent (for instance, to 
this or that human face), but which has a universal significance beyond all significations and 
which gives meaning to all these significations. The interhuman relationship is in this context of 
crucial importance for Levinas. In his preparatory notes to Totality and Infinity, one can even find 
the following, telling sentence: “Man is God for man,”774 which shows Levinas‟s ongoing 
reflections on this subject. However, in Totality and Infinity Levinas clearly explains that the 
other is not God, but that it is through his or her face that man is able to experience „holiness‟. 
According to Levinas, “[t]he Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in 
which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.”775 The 
meta-vision of the face is hence of fundamental importance for the divine experience, i.e. the 
revelation of God. Even if God is conceived by Levinas as invisible, He reveals Himself through 
the vision of the face of the other, and thus becomes accessible for man: “A God invisible means 
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not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the spiritual optics. […] 
There can be no „knowledge‟ of God separated from the relationship with men. The Other is the 
very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with God.”776 In this 
relation to the other, language plays a crucial role for Levinas. It connects people with one 
another and has thereby the power to create a „common world‟ among men Ŕ the spirit of the 
word unites humanity in all its cultural and linguistic diversity, an aspect also emphasized in 
Martin Buber‟s work.777 This important role of language among men becomes evident from the 
following citation of Levinas:  
 
Language does not exteriorize a representation preexisting in me: it puts in common a world hitherto 
mine. Language effectuates the entry of things into a new ether in which they receive a name and 
become concepts. It is a first action over and above labor, an action without action, even though 
speech involves the effort of labor […]. The analyses of language that tend to present it as one 
meaningful action among others fail to recognize this offering [offre] of the world, this offering of 
contents which answers to the face of the Other or which questions him, and first opens the 
perspective of the meaningful. The „vision‟ of the face is inseparable from this offering language is. 
To see the face is to speak of the world. [Voir le visage, c‟est parler du monde.] Transcendence is 
not an optics, but the first ethical gesture.
778
  
 
One can say, in this sense, that Levinas‟s thinking is directed toward language; Rosenzweig‟s 
thinking on the other hand ultimately leads to silence as the concluding point of his discourse. 
According to Levinas, as we have seen, language begins in the face, whereas for Rosenzweig 
language ends precisely in (the „vision‟ of) the face. The common notion of revelation, which is 
located by both thinkers in language, is differently discussed with respect to their notions of the 
vision of the face. Nevertheless, since language will be elaborated under the aspect of the voice in 
the upcoming chapter IV, the following reflections could nevertheless provide a common 
approach. Language, conceived as voice, is ultimately a non-place. It is never really „here‟ since 
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it passes away and escapes the grasp in its very emerging. The place of the event of the revelation 
would be, in this sense, a non-place for both thinkers.  
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Chapter IV 
 
 
    The phenomenon of the voice in Rosenzweig and Levinas 
 
 
 
1.     Presence through voice – towards a new definition of Levinas‟s conception of       
          subjectivity 
 
    
            A voice comes from the other shore. 
             A voice interrupts the saying of the already said.
779
 
 
         In the following, I further outline issues regarding Levinas‟s concepts of the Saying and the 
Said and relate them to the recently expanded research literature on the phenomenon of the voice, 
trying to show how these new approaches to the voice could offer an innovative perspective for 
Levinas‟s studies. Some aspects of the voice with respect to Levinas‟s notion of an „ethical 
language‟ (langage éthique) have been already worked out in an earlier chapter.780 I want to take 
up and to further develop these aspects here while putting them in relation to the recently 
elaborated new interpretations of the voice.     
 
             At first, the voice seems to play a minor role in Levinas‟s Otherwise than Being, where 
he elaborates the notions of the Saying and the Said. Nonetheless, it is precisely through the voice 
that the Saying, an important notion in Otherwise than Being, expresses itself. The voice is the 
instrument through which the Saying conveys itself to the other. Saying is characterized by 
Levinas as being wholly sign, signifying nothing but itself, and the saying of this very saying is 
the statement of the “Here I am”, which is identified with the very voice. All this is exactly what 
is realized through the voice. “„Here I am‟ as a witness of the Infinite, but a witness that does not 
thematize what it bears witness of. [...] It is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the 
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Infinite is glorified.”781 In the following, I want to draw a broader parallel from Levinas‟s point 
of view to the recently increased interest in the voice.
782
 To start with, it is not an overestimation 
to characterize the voice as the pivotal point of social sciences: “The humanities are, at their core, 
voice arts.”783 The voice constitutes the human being as a social being, a zoon politikon, linked 
through language with the other members of human society. However, before there is language, 
there is the voice. The function of language is founded on the transmission of the sound by the 
voice; otherwise it would remain a mere abstract figure without concrete existence. “The voice 
seems to possess the power to turn words into acts; [...] a passage to action and an exertion of 
authority.”784 Through the voice one conveys oneself to the other, through its breath the words 
transport a meaning. Therefore, in many languages there is an etymological link between spirit 
and breath; for instance, in Hebrew the word ruach [חור] means spirit and wind. So there is, on 
the one hand, the voice as content as such (spirit), and, on the other, as a medium, an instrument 
to convey a message, i.e. the voice as pure sound (wind).
785
 The latter is, as such, nothing but air, 
the most fugitive of the elements; however, at a closer look, it is precisely not just air, but breath, 
i.e. the breath of a living spirit and a living body. The voice ties together these two elements, 
body and spirit, by constituting a unique identity of every human being: “We can almost 
unfailingly identify a person by the voice. [...] The voice is like the fingerprint, instantly 
recognizable and identifiable.”786 But Ŕ and this is the point to which Levinas draws attention Ŕ 
the spoken word also stands for itself: speaking has a meaning as such. In a similar way, this 
aspect has been highlighted by Jean-Luc Nancy: “Voice has nothing to do with speech. 
Obviously there is no speech without voice, but there can be voice without speech.”787 The act of 
speaking implicates a physical and an abstract aspect. A spoken word manifests an ephemeral 
presence that flows away with the breath that is exhausted. When the performance has finished, 
                                                 
781
 Levinas, OBBE, p. 146/AQE, p. 229. 
782
 See for example Vocabulaires de la voix, ed. by Danielle Cohen-Levinas and Barbara Cassin; Poizat, Michel, 
Variations sur la voix; Dolar, Mladen, A Voice and Nothing More; Nancy, Jean-Luc, À l‟écoute; Zwischen Rauschen 
und Offenbarung. Zur Kultur und Mediengeschichte der Stimme, ed. by Friedrich Kittler, Thomas Macho and Sigrid 
Weigel; Medien/Stimmen, ed. by Cornelia Epping-Jäger and Erika Linz; Stimme. Annäherung an ein Phänomen, ed. 
by Doris Kolesch and Sybille Krämer.   
783
 Peters, John Durham, “The Voice and Modern Media”, p. 85. See also from the same author, Speaking Into the 
Air. A History of the Idea of Communication, with reference to Levinas‟s thought especially pp. 20-21. 
784
 Dolar, Mladen, A Voice and Nothing More, p. 55. 
785
 On the voice as medium see Göttert, Karl-Heinz, Geschichte der Stimme, pp. 13-15.  
786
 Dolar, Mladen, A Voice and Nothing More, p. 22. On this and the following see also Kolesch, Doris, “Die Spur 
der Stimme. Überlegungen zu einer performativen Ästhetik”, in: Medien/Stimmen, ed. by Cornelia Epping-Jäger and 
Erika Linz, pp. 267Ŕ81. 
787
 Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Birth to Presence, p. 234. 
 180 
the presence has vanished. The voice expresses itself only in this vanishing and in its 
“consummation”,788 which is the sine qua non of its existence. Its presence is manifested by a 
constant withdrawal. In this sense, the Levinasian subject could be best described as a „presence 
with voice‟. It is the living word, represented by the voice, that interests Levinas. However, 
regarding the limits of the voice, it has to be kept in mind that “no theme, no present, has a 
capacity for the Infinite,”789 as Levinas states in Otherwise than Being. The voice consummates 
the presence out of which it is born and, in this way, constantly withdraws itself and rejects its 
presence. To sum it up briefly in a paradox: The voice is pure presence, which is never present as 
such Ŕ leaving its echo, “catch me if you can.”790  
 
          In this context, I want to draw attention to the concept of an exegetical reading, elaborated 
by Richard A. Cohen in his study Ethics, Exegesis and Philosophy. Exegesis is described by 
Cohen as a “text interpretation not through explanation derived from objective context alone, but 
through understanding derived from the text‟s as well as the subject‟s own subjective context.”791 
This requires an inspirational reading, which through its understanding goes beyond the borders 
of the text and arrives at a new horizon of meaning, unnoticed until that moment. In this sense, 
exegesis is seen as “the effort not to reduce transcendence,”792 which seems to me one of the 
main assignments of Levinas‟s philosophy. The “call for exegesis [appel à l‟exégèse]”793 lies at 
the core of the relation between the said and the saying. Levinas illustrates the complex 
relationship between the „call‟ of the artwork and the exegesis as follows: “The exegesis is not 
something laid on to the resonance of essence in the artwork; the resonance of essence vibrates 
within the said of the exegesis.”794 The task of the philosopher is therefore constantly “to awaken 
in the said the saying [réveiller dans le Dit le Dire],”795 which is by its nature an ongoing project, 
a work-in-progress, in which the philosopher‟s effort consists in “retaining an echo of the reduced 
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said in the form of ambiguity, of diachronic expression.”796 In this connection exegesis can be 
seen, as Levinas puts it, as a sort of  
 
[...] spiraling movement [that] makes possible the boldness of philosophy, destroying the conjunction 
into which its saying and its said continually enter. The said [...] thus maintains the diachrony in 
which, holding its breath, the spirit hears the echo of the otherwise.
797
  
 
This “echo of the otherwise” calls to mind a popular song by Harry Nilsson, which in my view 
renders this experience in other words Ŕ autrement dit: “Everybody‟s talking at me, I don‟t hear a 
word they‟re saying, Only the echoes of my mind. / People stopping staring, I can‟t see their 
faces, Only the shadows of their eyes.”798 This seems to be, unintentionally, a Levinasian pop 
song, because it picks up core aspects of Levinas‟s philosophy: neither the face nor even the eyes 
of the other can be seen Ŕ only “the shadows of his eyes,” just as Moses is only allowed to see the 
trace of God‟s presence, but not God‟s face, since “nobody can see Me and live on.”799 
Furthermore, the figure of the echo Ŕ Hχώ Ŕ as a voice without a body is another core aspect of 
what I have called „presence with voice‟. The notion of an „echo in the mind‟ highlights the 
aspect that the voice has a presence as such, transcending the actually spoken word Ŕ though, to 
be precise, the song reads “the echoes of my mind” which can be read also as a moment of 
solipsism. 
 
         With respect to Jacques Derrida‟s criticism of the voice, as a central aspect of his general 
diagnosis of the „phono-logocentrism‟ of Western metaphysics, I would like to argue that the 
voice is not just to be seen as a medium of meaning, but that it has a presence as such.
800
 The 
subordination of the voice as a mere significant to a signifié disregards in my view the proper 
qualities of the voice, which lies mainly in sensuality. The performance of the voice transcends 
the conveyed meaning of the words. Levinas‟s captivity notebooks show us that Levinas was 
very attentive to this proper meaning of the voice, as he argues: “We speak to children in a tone, 
to a soldier in a tone. Sometimes we break away from this way of speaking in a tone. We speak 
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man to man. In any case the only dignified way of speaking.”801 The sensitivity Levinas 
developed regarding the tone and the voice Ŕ which are different notions, as Levinas clearly 
outlines in the citation Ŕ was most probably due to the fact that he lived through the war, to which 
the citation also refers (“to a soldier in a tone”), and moreover knew the trials of being a prisoner 
of war with all the humiliating experience it brings. The experience of war, in my view, had an 
impact on his thinking and, thereby, on his attitude toward the voice as well. The voice, besides 
the other ways we have to express ourselves, stands for the main medium in which we talk to 
each other. The particular „tone‟ in which a voice speaks is obviously also a part of the message 
as such and cannot be seen independently from it. However, Levinas differentiates in the 
mentioned citation the tone and the voice, emphasizing that the “only dignified way of speaking” 
is to break away from the „tone‟ which enables man to speak “man to man”. There are thus two 
different modes of speaking: on the one hand, the voice offers the possibility to speak „man to 
man‟ (similarly Levinas highlights the „face-to-face‟ and the event of looking in the eyes of the 
other), on the other hand, however, the tone of the voice can turn the spoken words in a blind 
order, telling from on high what to do without entering into a real relationship with the other. 
This underscores the fact that it is of utmost significance for Levinas in which tone we are 
speaking. In one of his Talmudic lectures Levinas emphasizes this aspect as essential with respect 
to the different meanings which can be attributed to a certain message: “It is in the nuances of the 
formulations, in the inflections of the speaking voice [la voix qui énonce], as strange as this may 
appear, that the abysses which separate the […] messages open.”802 Thus the different tones of 
the voice can modulate essentially the meaning of what is spoken. The voice shows in this sense 
always more than it states. The mise-en-scène of the subjectivity, which takes shape in the voice, 
contains something which goes beyond the meaning of the actually „said‟. Rhetorically, this 
notion is expressed in the use of allegory or metaphor.
803
 The latter is one of the main rhetorical 
figures of poetry. In this context it is remarkable that in central places in his work Levinas uses 
citations from literature and poetry, e.g. Totality and Infinity starts with a quotation of Rimbaud 
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and ends with one of Baudelaire. In a similar way Rosenzweig constantly makes allusions to the 
work of Goethe throughout The Star of Redemption.
804
 However, Rosenzweig does this without 
quotation marks, so that a reader unfamiliar with the work of Goethe does not recognize these 
allusions at first sight. This polyphonic effect in the text is made intentionally. It shows that a text 
is always a woven texture of many voices.
805
 The echo, however, represents the part of the voice 
we cannot get rid of, even when we close our ears Ŕ echo, this immortal sister of the living voice, 
reverberates on and haunts our spirits. This facet of the voice is reflected by Levinas in his 
philosophical notes written during the fifties, mostly as preparatory notes for Totality and Infinity. 
Here Levinas emphasizes the aspect of the voice as being „outside‟ of the subject that speaks. The 
voice is produced by the body, but it is not a bodily part as such. In its sonority and resonance it 
refers rather to an exteriority, i.e. to something outside the body, as Levinas points out: “It is 
impossible to see oneself as a creature. But one can hear oneself.”806 Furthermore, in a special 
section of these philosophical notes, entitled “Fecundity”, Levinas connects the “hearing of the 
voice” with the notion of fecundity, i.e. the possibility to „create‟ an origin of a subject by giving 
birth: “The knowledge of this origin, which is the unconscious, is obtained through hearing: to 
hear the voice.”807 This shows that the voice is for Levinas connected in some sense to the 
„origin‟ of the subject, which is made covert by the unconscious, i.e. a domain over which the 
subject does not have full control: the unconscious eludes us, it slips away like the voice slips 
away from us sometimes and „betrays‟ us in letting show something which we wanted actually to 
hide in the speaking and to keep quiet about. (For instance, it is extremely hard to hide ones 
emotions in the voice, even if we do not say a word about the emotions themselves.) In this sense, 
the voice „speaks‟ for itself, beyond the message it conveys. Therefore the mere perception of the 
voice indicates that there is a signification in the voice itself, revealing its message beyond the 
content of the spoken words, which already contain a certain responsibility for the other. Or, as 
Levinas puts it: “To hear a voice speaking to you is ipso facto to accept obligation toward the one 
speaking.”808 This recalls Rosenzweig‟s notion of revelation, which connects also the moments of 
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speaking and responsibility. As Bernhard Casper underlines, “[f]or Rosenzweig the word 
revelation has so broad a meaning that it takes place in all serious speech in which a man really 
says something of his own.”809 Refering to Casper‟s article, Bettina Bergo emphasizes further 
that “responsibility and revelation prove to be interrelated”810 in Rosenzweig‟s thought. To give 
response to another is at the origin of the responsibility for Rosenzweig as well as for Levinas. 
The subject is put into question by the other. Therefore Rosenzweig refers in Book two of Part II 
of the The Star, which deals with revelation, to the Biblical account in which God seeks Adam 
and asks: “Where are you?” Ŕ and Adam answers: “יננה” (hineni), here I am.811 Rosenzweig 
describes this process as a call in The Star “to which one cannot remain deaf, the man, totally 
open, totally unfolded, totally ready, totally Ŕ soul, now answers: „I am here.‟”812 This readiness 
is also demanded of the subject, according to Levinas: to be open for the call of the other at each 
moment. Levinas connects this moment with the commandment „You shall not kill‟, which is 
expressed in the face of the other: “This infinity, stronger than murder, already resists us in the 
face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the first word: „you shall not commit murder‟.”813 
Rosenzweig connects the moment of the call which provokes the „I am here‟ with another 
commandment: the commandment of love, “Thou shalt love”.814 The appeal from outside is 
answered by a response Ŕ „hineni‟, here I am Ŕ which entails responsibility. As Ephraim Meir 
points out, it is important to stress however that not only is the commandement different, but also 
the Self is conceived differently by Levinas and Rosenzweig.
815
 For the latter, the Self (Selbst) is 
that which precedes the soul (Seele), which one receives with the divine imperative of love.
816
 In 
contrast, Levinas defines the self in Otherwise than Being as “hostage” and “substitution”.817 
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However, both thinkers link the moment of this call with exteriority, i.e. the other (in Levinas) 
and God (in Rosenzweig). The voice plays in my view a remarkable role in this context. It is the 
medium for exteriority to express itself. Hence it is not by chance that Levinas as well as 
Rosenzweig speak of a call of exteriority Ŕ and not of an image or something visible.818 In fact, 
the face cannot be seen according to Levinas, as I have pointed out in the introduction; however, 
Levinas emphasizes: “I think that the beginning of language is in the face. In a certain way, in its 
silence, it calls you.”819 The voice is thus for both thinkers the medium of the commandment to 
shake the self out of its ipseity.       
  
          Lastly, I want to draw attention to another mode of sensuality: the touch, or, more 
precisely, the caress. The musicality of the voice correlates with the caress (la caresse), which 
expresses in a similar way its reluctance regarding representation. In Totality and Infinity Levinas 
underlines: “The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what ceaselessly escapes 
[…]. […] It searches, it forages. It is not an intentionality of disclosure but of search: a 
movement unto the invisible.”820 Like the hand that caresses, listening is a moment without 
control: to perceive from the other what he feels, what he needs is not a task which could come 
easily to an end, but seems rather to be an infinite process Ŕ just as infinite as my responsibility 
for the other. The caress realizes a proximity between human beings without establishing a 
totality between them. Moreover the difference is precisely recognized in the approach. In fact, as 
Ephraim Meir points out, Levinas‟s particular contribution to Western philosophy lies in the 
special attention he gives to the caress and to eroticism in general.
821
 Levinas‟s interpretation of 
the caress contains also an ontological approach:  
 
The caress is a mode of the subject‟s being, where the subject who is in contact with another goes 
beyond this contact. […] But what is caressed is not touched, properly speaking. […] The seeking of 
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the caress constitutes its essence by the fact that the caress does not know what it seeks. This „not 
knowing‟, this fundamentral disorder, is the essential.822  
 
In this withdrawal of every representation the caress and the voice overlap. They can be 
characterized as “a contact without contact” [Berührung ohne Berührung].823 Nothing is literally 
„touched‟ by the caress Ŕ nothing is „said‟, after the voice has faded away. Both are essentially 
bound to the presence. As the caress is described as a mode of being by Levinas, so the voice can 
be seen as a mode of subjectivity in his work Ŕ as a „presence through voice‟, presenting and 
hiding the subject at the same time.         
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2.            Revelation, language and the “voice of love” in Rosenzweig‟s Star of      
                Redemption, with a view to Levinas  
 
a)     The role of love in The Star of Redemption and its connection to language 
 
 
                                                                                                                   What really makes us is beyond grasping,          
                                                                                                                   it is way beyond knowing. We give in to love  
                                                                                                                   because it gives us some sense of what is   
                                                                                                                   unknowable. Nothing else matters. Not at                   
                                                                                                                   the end. ”824 
  
                                                                                                The Revelation of the divine love is the        
                                                                                                                    heart of the All.
825
  
 
        It is astonishing that a work such as the The Star of Redemption, which is profoundly 
marked by the experience of love and is written out of this emotion, has inspired so little analysis 
about the role of love in it.
826
 Despite this fact, love is without a doubt a key issue for the whole 
system of The Star and, moreover, in particular for its central part, i.e. Book two of Part II. In this 
section, Rosenzweig writes an exegesis of the Song of Songs and expounds through this 
hermeneutical work his notion of revelation, thereby interweaving the philosophical discourse 
with the discourse on love in this central part of The Star. Indeed, recently published research on 
Rosenzweig shows that his relationship with Margrit (Gritli) Rosenstock-Huessy is of great 
importance for his work.
827
 The letters they wrote each other were a profound inspiration for 
Rosenzweig. They probably also influenced the depiction of Christianity in The Star as an equal 
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partner of Judaism. Both religions express, in their respective ways, the eternal truth: “Before 
God […] both, Jew and Christian, are workers on the same task. He cannot dispense with either. 
[…] The truth, the whole truth, belongs therefore neither to them nor to us.”828 Both religions, 
Judaism and Christianity, share in the eternal truth, which neither of them possesses alone. 
Therefore, although it is correct to point out that The Star is “a Jewish book,”829 it is noteworthy 
to highlight that it was the love for a Christian woman that inspired the author to write it in the 
way he did. The intellectual background which was provided through their love affair is reflected 
especially in the section I want to focus on here, i.e. Book two of Part II, which Rosenzweig 
dedicated to Gritli, saying that “[i]t is not „for you‟ Ŕ but „yours‟. Yours Ŕas I am. [Es ist nicht 
‚Dir„, sondern – dein. Dein – wie ich.]”830 This shows how deeply the work and the biography of 
Rosenzweig are connected.
831
 Love and the event of an overwhelming erotical relationship had 
not only deeply affected the life of Rosenzweig, but can be found, moreover, throughout The Star 
of Redemption. From the first pages onward, the author emphasizes for example the importance 
of eros. He defines it as “[t]he birth date of the Self”,832 that is to say the day the Self awakens to 
itself, as the day where it meets eros for the first time. The Self is conceived by Rosenzweig as a 
daimon [Daimon]: “[…] this blind and mute daimon, enclosed in itself, which surprises man for 
the first time in the mask of Eros, and from then on accompanies him throughout his life up to 
that moment where it removes its mask and reveals itself to him as Thanatos.”833 Eros and death 
are thus interwoven in Rosenzweig‟s system. Besides eros, he highlights also the significance of 
love and points out that the only thing that can be literally „said‟ about love is that it is as strong 
as death:  
 
Death is the ultimate point and the fulfilled end of Creation Ŕ and love is as strong as it is. This is the 
only thing that can be said about love, ex-pressed about it, re-counted about it; nothing else can „be‟ 
said „about‟ it, but only spoken by love itself. For love is completely active, completely personal, 
completely alive, completely Ŕ speaking language; all the true sentences relating to it must be words 
that came from its own mouth, words brought forth by the I. This one sentence alone, saying it is as 
strong as death, is an exception. In it, it is not it that speaks, rather it is the whole world of the 
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Creation that is placed at its feet, conquered; death, the conquerer of all, and Orcus, who jealously 
holds onto all that is mortal, collapse before its strength and the violence of its ardor; […].834  
 
In this sense, love holds a crucial place in the development of The Star, since it is the pivotal 
issue that links creation, revelation and, ultimately, redemption. Stéphane Mosès emphasizes this 
central role of love by pointing out that it “is not procreation but Eros that defines the humanity 
of man […].”835   
 
           Levinas also stresses the fact that the theme of love is a fundamental aspect of the work of 
Rosenzweig. In his preface to Stéphane Mosès‟s book System and Revelation, Levinas writes that 
the issue at stake in The Star of Redemption would be to work out the fact that the “[t]he ultimate 
bound of psychism is not the one insuring the unity of the subject, but, so to speak, the tying 
separation of society, the dia of the dialogue, of dia-chrony, of time that Rosenzweig aims to 
„take seriously,‟ the tying separation we call by a well-worn name Ŕ love.”836 Indeed, in the act of 
revelation, i.e. the opening of God to man, “the soul receives the love of God.”837 According to 
Rosenzweig,  
 
[…] [love] is not a quality of the lover; it is not a man who loves. The fact of loving is precisely not a 
determination in the definition of a man. Love in the man is ephemeral self-transformation, a self-
renunciation; he is no longer anything other than lover when he loves; the I, otherwise the bearer of 
the attributes, disappears entirely in the moment of love. Man dies in becoming lover and is reborn as 
lover. […]  So love is not attribute, but event […].838   
 
This event is realized, for Rosenzweig, in the receiving of the commandment of love Ŕ “You shall 
love the Eternal your God with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your might.”839 This 
commandment is profoundly linked to the present, since “[a]ll Revelation is placed under the 
great sign of the today; it is „today‟ that God commands and it is „today‟ that his voice is to be 
heard. It is the today in which the love of the lover lives Ŕ this imperative today of the 
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commandment.”840 However, being a divine commandment, it is linked at the same time to a 
transcendental sphere, to a „beyond‟. As Eric Santner points out in his study On the 
Psychotheology of Everyday Life. Reflections on Rosenzweig and Freud, this divine imperative 
has to be conceived of as our opening to this „beyond‟, which is realized nonetheless in the here 
and now. Santner argues that “Rosenzweig‟s paradox, if I might call it that, is that our opening to 
this „beyond‟ is the very thing that places us in the midst of life, in proximity to our neighbor.”841 
Furthermore, taking a closer look at the relationship between language and love, one discovers a 
profound parallel. Rosenzweig wrote about this relationship: “Only the one who loves, but really 
he can say and does say: Love me. From his mouth, the commandment of love is not an [sic] 
strange commandment, it is nothing other than the voice of love itself.”842 In this context, I must 
admit that I have always read this sentence in a much stronger sense than the English translation 
renders it, since Rosenzweig has written in the original German version: “Nur der Liebende, aber 
er auch wirklich, kann sprechen und spricht: Liebe mich.”843 I read this passage as if the ability 
to speak would be given, according to Rosenzweig, only to the one who loves. Everything 
depends here on how to translate the verb “sprechen”: it can mean either to talk/to speak (parler) 
or as to say (dire). However, I would prefer the first option and would translate “sprechen”, the 
word used by Rosenzweig, rather with to speak. Rosenzweig probably would have used “sagen” 
if he meant to say (dire). This would thus reformulate the translation as follows: “Only the one 
who loves, but he really, can speak and speaks: Love me.” If one reads the passage the way I 
propose, one discovers that the ability to speak is essentially connected to the command to love: 
love and language would be, in this sense, deeply intertwined in the system of The Star.  
         
         Another aspect which is similar to language as well as to love is the condition of being both 
present and transcendent, human and superhuman [über-menschlich], as Rosenzweig points out:  
 
For it is not possible for love to be „purely human‟. When it begins to speak Ŕ and this it must do, for 
there exists no other utterance spoken besides itself than the language of love Ŕ so when love speaks, it 
is already changed into something superhuman; for the sensuous character of the word is full to the 
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brim with its divine suprasensuous meaning; like language itself, love is at once sensible and supra-
sensuous. [… die Liebe ist, wie die Sprache selbst, sinnlich-übersinnlich.]844 
 
This „language of love‟, of which Rosenzweig speaks, is manifested, in a way, also in the 
epiphany of the face in Levinas‟s thought. In fact, the face too is both sensible, i.e. concretely 
visible, and supra-sensory [über-sinnlich], i.e. in-visible in its full significance. It expresses the 
transcendent and eternal commandment “Thou shalt not murder”. The impossibility of 
conceptualizing it is also one of the main characteristics of the musical idea, as Danielle Cohen-
Levinas highlights, since it “does not express a truth referring to a unity. […] It is a critique of 
representation.”845 The transcendence of language, its „supra-sensory‟ aspect, refers in this sense 
to its sonority. The inability of language to grasp an object in all its dimensions is not applicable 
to music. Music is beyond the thematization of discourse and knowledge. In its specific mode of 
sonority it takes up the issue at stake in the discourse and develops it further with a different 
approach Ŕ just at that point where the thematization of the said, „out of breath‟, had to drop it 
and let it slip away from the concatenation of words and notions.
846
 With this in mind, Danielle 
Cohen-Levinas points out that “constituted in knowledge, the words have lost the object. The 
musical idea is not knowledge, an accumulation of words, concepts and theories […]. It causes a 
content more essential than the total of all words to emerge.”847  
      
         Furthermore, another interesting aspect between Levinas and Rosenzweig shows up, in my 
view, when Rosenzweig emphasizes that “the I […] disappears entirely in the moment of love. 
Man dies in becoming lover and is reborn as lover.”848 Is this not a kind of similar situation Ŕ 
while keeping in mind however all the differences between Levinas and Rosenzweig Ŕ to that 
described by Levinas in Otherwise than Being where the subject finds itself facing “a passivity 
more passive than all passivity”?849 However the subject in Levinas is not transformed by this 
event since it finds itself, before any possible transformation, as a substitution, as the „one-for-
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the-other‟ (l‟un pour l‟autre).850 The I in Levinas is conceived of as a “Here I am”, me voici (in 
Hebrew יננה [hinneni])851 right from the very beginning of its existence, before any choice:   
 
From the moment of sensibility, the subject is for the other: substitution, responsibility, expiation. But 
a responsibility that I did not assume at any moment, in any present. Nothing is more passive than this 
challenge prior to my freedom, this pre-original challenge, this sincerity. Passivity of the vulnerable, 
condition (or incondition) by which being shows itself creature.
852  
    
          Coming back to Rosenzweig‟s line of reasoning in Part III of The Star, God himself is 
presented as “the one who loves [der Liebende]”.853 Indeed, this is the only feature that man can 
perceive of God, as Rosenzweig points out:  
 
[…] we experience his existence immediately only in the fact that he loves us, and awakens our dead 
Self into the beloved soul that loves in return. The Revelation of the divine love is the heart of the All.  
[Die Offenbarung der göttlichen Liebe ist das Herz des All.]
854
  
 
This demonstrates how eros (in the form of sensual love) and transcendence, language and love 
are closely linked in the The Star of Redemption. In fact, it is a sort of theomorphism which we 
can find not only in his theories on language, as Rivka Horwitz points out,
855
 but also in love and 
its particular role in the system of The Star. According to Rosenzweig, “in language the 
difference between „immanence‟ and „transcendence‟ is extinguished. […] Man loves because, 
and as, God loves. [Der Mensch liebt, weil und wie Gott liebt.] Man‟s human soul is the soul 
awakened and loved by God.”856 We can indeed admit that the act of falling in love is a divine act 
in the sense that we cannot choose by ourselves to fall in love or not. Like birth, which we accept 
prior to being born and without our free will, we experience falling in love without our 
agreement. For that reason, „falling in love‟ possesses also a tragic dimension. However, love has 
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to be seen as distinguished from „falling in love‟ and, therefore, it is neither tragic nor violent, 
according to Rosenzweig. Anyhow, whereas the love of God extends to the whole of humanity 
(even if it is addressed to each one of us individually by God), the human love is always directed 
to a single and unique being. In contrast to the concepts of a „universal love‟ or a love for 
„everybody‟, human love is a deeply singularly act since it means to pick out one unique being 
and to say „I love you more than anything else in the world.‟857 To be precise, in the act of loving 
we do not love „the world‟ generally speaking, but one unique human being. This can be seen as 
a moment of election, as being chosen, and in this sense it is positively linked to an exteriority, 
i.e. the command to love. According to Rosenzweig, the love, which follows this command, is in 
its immediate expression conceived as a pure commandment without explanation:  
 
The love of the lover has no other word to express itself than the commandment. Everything else is 
already no longer immediate expression, but explanation Ŕ explanation of love. The explanation of 
love is very deficient, and like every explanation, it always comes after the event; and therefore, since 
the love of the lover is in the present, it really always comes too late.
858
 
 
It seems that words have no access to this domain, which is reserved for the most unspeakable 
emotions. Here, art regains its full importance as the „language of the unspeakable‟ and as the 
only way for man to express this „unspeakable‟. However, the presence of love is inaccessible to 
words, it is pure presence Ŕ “The language of love is only present; dream and reality, sleep of the 
limbs and wakefulness of the heart […].”859 This presence is revealed by us only through the very 
essence of divine love Ŕ beyond life and death. Because, according to Rosenzweig,  
 
God is not life, God is light. He is the Lord of life, but he is as little alive as he is dead; and to state 
one or the other about him, as the ancient man states, that „he lives‟, and as the modern man states, 
that he „is dead‟, betrays equal pagan partiality. Only that neither-nor of dead and alive, only that fine 
point where life and death touch and melt into one does not forbid the typical terminology. God 
neither lives nor is dead, but he gives life to what is dead, he Ŕ loves.860 
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As a gift of the divine love, human love is indeed part of this fragile point where life and death 
touch and melt. Like the love of God, the human love too is as strong as death. Love signifies 
thus our victory over death.
861
 
 
 
 
 
b)    Love and the silent Self of Creation, or: how to become “a soul that speaks”
862
  
 
 O God how do I grasp your life 
 As that which makes the hour full, 
 As voice that‟s placed ahead of you;  
 For nothingness, this painful sensation 
            To you, you eased it with creation.
 863
  
     
         In Part I of The Star of Redemption, which describes the state of creation, Rosenzweig 
defines man under two different aspects: on the one hand, as a part of the world, as an individual, 
and, on the other as a “meta-ethical” reality, as a Self. However, neither the one nor the other can 
get into relation with that which is not him.
864
 These two aspects are characteristic for the concept 
of man, developed by Rosenzweig in the first part, as a human being characterized by being silent 
and tragic. He sees the paradigm of such an existence embodied by the tragic hero of the Greek 
tragedy, as he points out: “For that is the distinctive sign of the Self [das Merkzeichen des Selbst], 
the seal of its greatness, and the mark of its weakness: it is silent. The tragic hero has only one 
language that is in perfect accordance with him: precisely, silence.”865 This silent man exists; 
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however, he is not alive, in the proper meaning of this word, according to Rosenzweig, because 
to become a soul that speaks means, first of all, becoming alive and, moreover, becoming more 
and more alive. Properly speaking, it has to do with the coming into being of one‟s own existence 
and thus opening a way beyond the closed existence of the silent Self: “There is no road that 
leads from the […] [silent Self] buried in itself to the resounding open air [ins tönende Freie]; all 
roads lead only more deeply into the inner silence.”866 In this process, love and language have an 
essential function. In Part I Rosenzweig elaborates further upon a kind of „language‟ before man 
has access to language itself, i.e. before he is able to truly speak. Rosenzweig introduces thus the 
original words, the Urwörter: Yes, No and And.
867
 These three original words do not yet 
constitute a language, however they are the base for all language. Because of them, a pre-
language can be formed. They are thus of eminent importance because they are the indispensable 
condition for “the promise of a language which unifies all humanity.”868 
         In this context, art in all its forms plays a crucial role. According to Rosenzweig it is able to 
function as a sort of intermediary between human beings. The role of art is seen as a means of 
creating a bridge between human beings: art says the unsayable.
869
 Beyond the living speaking, it 
creates a common space where an understanding without words, “a communication before 
language”870 can take place:  
 
[…] there exists a world where this silence itself is already speech, not, of course, speech of the soul, 
and yet speech; a speech before the speech, a speech of the unexpressed, of the inexpressible. […] 
This is the world of art. […] Even before all real human language, art creates as language of the 
inexpressible the first and for all time indispensible mute understanding of the inexpressible, beneath 
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and alongside the real language. The silence of the tragic hero is silent in all art and in all art is 
understood without any words. The Self does not speak and yet is heard. The Self is seen.
871
  
 
The experience of art thus creates the possibility of a communication without language because it 
is seen. One can establish here a juxtaposition of the notions of „to see‟ and „to hear,‟ and 
respectively of the view and the sound, which is fundamental for the argumentation in The 
Star.
872
   
 
         In his article Reality and Its Shadow, Emmanuel Levinas describes the role of the artist in a 
manner resembling that of Rosenzweig. For Levinas, each “artist Ŕ even a painter, even a 
musician Ŕ tells. He tells of the ineffable. […] Where common language abdicates, a poem or a 
painting speaks.”873 Similarly to Rosenzweig, Levinas does not see the possibility of a work of art 
opening the way for true communication, because, according to Levinas, the artwork “does not 
give itself out as the beginning of a dialogue.”874 In summary, Levinas is of the opinion that “art 
does not belong to the order of revelation [l‟art n‟appartient pas à l‟ordre de la révélation].”875 
He sees it as a sort of pre-language, outside the domain of the face-to-face encounter, which is 
realized for Levinas only through the living speech, i.e in the Saying. In order to be a „real‟ 
language “one would have to introduce the perspective of the relation with the other without 
which being could not be told in its reality, that is, in its time.”876 The deficiency of art is thus the 
lack of the possibility to create a true dialogue. The beginning of language is realized for Levinas 
through the face. The face provides the indispensable condition for any event of true 
communication. In the animal world, this face-to-face encounter does not exist since the face is 
not exposed in this relation. By contrast, the face is always exposed in the human being. The face 
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is always “nude”877 before the other. Without it, the human being would fall back into the state of 
the animal.
878
 In this sense, Rosenzweig sees in the human face the premise of fraternity:  
 
The brotherliness thus weaves its bond between men of whom none is like the other; it is in no way 
identity between anything of that which bears human countenance, but unanimity precisely of men of 
most different countenance. Certainly only this one thing is needful: that men have a countenance 
altogether Ŕ that they see each other.879  
 
For Levinas as well, a true community is possible only through the face and it is the face-to-face 
encounter among men which creates the bond of fraternity between human beings. According to 
Levinas,  
 
[a] face obsesses and shows itself, between transcendence and visibility/invisibility. […] The other is 
from the first the brother of all the other men. The neighbor that obsesses me is already a face, both 
comparable and incomparable, a unique face and in relationship with faces, which are visible in the 
concern for justice.
880
  
 
Levinas refers in this context to a passage in Totality and Infinity, where he further explains his 
notion of a relationship between language, face and fraternity:  
 
The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other Ŕ language is justice. It is not that there first would 
be the face, and then the being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; the 
epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.
881
  
 
While conceiving mankind as united in the simple fact that all men have a face, it is nevertheless 
worth noting in the following pages the more troubling aspects of the notion of the face according 
to Levinas. The face calls and incites us. It offers not a knowledge which one can grasp and 
handle by means of the reason. It offers an experience which we make without our agreement, 
without having chosen this experience a priori. In the relationship to the other, an indisputable 
order is presented, according to Levinas, a commandment from which one cannot escape: “you 
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shall not commit murder.”882 This command is presented as an „ethical language‟ beyond words. 
It is received as a fact before all communication starts, yet it nevertheless shows itself in language 
under the form of the Saying [Dire]. The eminent feature of the Saying in my view is the moment 
where a relationship between men „beyond language‟ is woven as a possibility of language, that 
is to say, according to Levinas, an „ethical language‟. Saying has thus the aim of highlighting the 
original and fundamental signification of language beneath the transmission of a message, to 
which we most often reduce it:  
 
Saying is not a game. Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the 
semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the 
commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness [signifiance] of 
signification.
883
 
 
In a manner similar to the conception of Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking, Levinas points out that the 
Saying has “sense prior to the truth that it unveils, prior to the advent of the knowledge and 
information it communicates, pure of all said, saying that doesn‟t say a word, […].”884 That is, 
Saying precisely is not reduced by Levinas to communication, but moreover it defines the 
energy
885
 or the breath
886
 which gives „life‟ to language in that it is at once and always in relation 
with others. In his innovative way of philosophizing, the New Thinking, Rosenzweig underlines 
this essential importance through the aspects of having a “need for the other” and of “taking time 
seriously”.887 Saying as such Ŕ although not in the radical separated way of the interlocutors in 
which Levinas conceives this term Ŕ is thus also fundamental for Rosenzweig‟s thought.  
 
        The face opens up the possibility for fraternity and real communication, according to 
Levinas, which is nothing other than living speaking face-to-face. It is precisely that which was 
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impossible for the human being depicted in the Greek tragedy, as Rosenzweig emphasizes.
888
 
Levinas underlines this aspect in one of his early articles, written in the thirties: “Paganism is a 
radical powerlessness to leave the world. [Le paganisme est une impuissance radicale de sortir 
du monde.]”889 By contrast, for Levinas, the face possesses the capacity to cause the living 
speaking to extend, because, “[t]he face is a living presence; it is expression. […] The face 
speaks. [Le visage parle.]”890 Obviously this is a question of a language „beyond words‟ which 
Levinas defines as an ethical language. The latter is realized through the face. However, “[t]he 
relation with the face is not an object-cognition [connaissance d‟objet]. […] There is here a 
relation between me and the other beyond rhetoric.”891 In fact there is the paradoxical situation 
that, according to Levinas, the other is, at bottom, not a phenomenon of the world, although the 
encounter with the other takes place in the here and now. However, in the relation with the other, 
a transcendent relation is always at the same time present. A nucleus of transcendence resides in 
the presence of the other, which calls me and troubles me. Levinas calls this “the revelation of the 
other”, which  
 
[…] implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of 
the other to me. In other words, language is spoken where the common plane is wanting or is yet to be 
constituted. It takes place in this transcendence. Discourse is thus the experience of something 
absolutely foreign, a pure „knowledge‟, a traumatism of astonishment.892  
 
         At this point, the more troubling aspects of the notion of the face come to the fore. 
Discourse takes place over an unbridgeable abyss and it is precisely this separation between the 
interlocutors which incites them to speak to each other. Far from depicting a paralyzing and all-
embracing harmony which would reveal the fellow human being as „the same as me‟ in the long 
run, Levinas emphasizes the radical alterity of the other which he even describes, as we have 
seen, as a “traumatism of astonishment”. One can conclude that “[t]o communicate is to be 
prepared to be overthrown,”893 as Avital Ronell concisely puts it. This ambiguity of language 
must be kept in mind, while comparing Levinas‟s ideas on language with Rosenzweig‟s 
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conception of how to become “a soul that speaks”894: whereas Rosenzweig emphasizes the role of 
love as a crucial one in this process, Levinas clearly points out: “Discourse is not love.”895 There 
can be no question of bridging this gap concerning the role of love. However, I would like to 
highlight that both thinkers strongly refer in their argumentation to a commandment Ŕ Levinas to 
the commandment not to kill: “you shall not commit murder”,896 expressed in the face, and 
Rosenzweig to the commandment to love: “You shall love the Eternal your God with all your 
heart, with all your soul and with all your might,”897 expressed in the experience of revelation.898 
Both connect a sphere of transcendence with worldly experiences. Revelation is thus for both not 
something „outside the world‟, it happens as an exteriority in the here and now, i.e. as a rupture of 
totality.  
 
         Although Levinas wrote much about such notions like eros, fecundity and desire, love holds 
in the long run not the crucial place in his thinking as it does for Rosenzweig.
899
 In fact a certain 
ambiguity concerning Levinas‟s views on love can be noticed. Nonetheless the aspect of love 
should not be neglected in his work, as can be seen from the following statement, made by 
Levinas in an interview in 1985:   
 
[…] what is truly human is Ŕ and don‟t be afraid of this word Ŕ love. And I mean it even with 
everything that burdens love or, I could say it better, responsibility. And responsibility is actually 
love, as Pascal said: „without concupiscence‟ [sans concupiscence]. It is preeminently the access to 
the singular. […] Love, or responsibility, is instead that which gives meaning to singularity. The 
relation is always not reciprocal; love exists without worrying about being loved. That is my concept 
of dissymmetry. The other is, in this moment, the beloved, singular. And I am singular in another 
sense, as chosen, as being chosen for responsibility.”900  
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It seems to me thus that love is significant for Levinas. Even if he states that “discourse is not 
love”,901 love plays nonetheless its part in Levinas‟s philosophy. The moment where the notion of 
love comes to the fore in Levinas‟s view is the moment of election, of „being chosen‟, which 
reveals the uniqueness of the other. In love we experience the other as non-replaceable and as 
being unique in the world. This marks an important aspect for Levinas‟s philosophy which is, for 
instance, notably absent in the philosophy of his teacher Martin Heidegger, as Samuel Moyn 
points out: “It is of interest in this regard that, to my knowledge, Heidegger never composed a 
philosophy of love.”902 Given the ambivalent but significant status of love in his thinking, it 
comes as no surprise that Levinas elaborates a sub-chapter in Totality and Infinity entitled “The 
Ambiguity of Love”. Here he points out that the difficulty with love is that it “remains a relation 
with the Other, that turns into need, and this need still presupposes the total, transcendent 
exteriority of the other, of the beloved.”903 To say it briefly, love requires that the other remain 
transcendent, that he endlessly escape the image that one makes of him. If he were to be entirely 
comprehensible, he could never inspire such mysterious feelings of which love makes us a 
witness. The love for the other is nourished by his otherness, which endlessly escapes my 
cognition and withdraws from me.
904
 And yet, despite all this, we love and maybe this “and yet” 
[und dennoch] sums up the best the secret of love: “Love aims at the Other; it aims at him in his 
frailty [faiblesse].”905 On the other hand, however, the other is really present in love. As we are 
usually not falling in love with ghosts, but with real human beings, that are alive in flesh and 
blood, we love these human beings as they are: precisely in flesh and blood. So the lofty and the 
worldy, the transcendent and the immanent sphere are interlaced in the phenomenon of love. In 
any case, the beloved other remains the other par excellence, as Shalom Rosenberg points out: 
“We have no access to other minds. That is the hidden alterity. Other minds are infinite to us. We 
absorb the objects that we encounter into the self. Not so the Other.”906 Levinas describes in this 
sense what he calls the „ambiguity of love‟ as follows:  
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The possibility of the Other appearing as an object of a need while retaining his alterity, or again, the 
possibility of enjoying the Other, of placing oneself at the same time beneath and beyond discourse Ŕ 
this position with regard to the interlocutor which at the same time reaches him and goes beyond him, 
this simultaneity of need and desire, of concupiscence and transcendence, tangency of the avowable 
and unavowable, constitutes the originality of the erotic which, in this sense, is the equivocal par 
excellence.
907
  
 
It is interesting to notice how Levinas in the course of the statement switches in the last section of 
the phrase from the subject “love” to the “erotic”. Describing his subject of the ambiguity of love 
with the explanation of the originality of the erotic, it becomes obvious that these notions are 
interwoven in his interpretation. Both take part in the outlined ambiguity, being at the same time 
an expression of need and of metaphysical desire. Levinas alludes in this context to the myth 
Aristophanes tells in Plato‟s Symposium and depicts it as the return of the Self to itself, 
incorporating the other in itself: “This desire […] is broken and satisfied as the most egoistic and 
cruelest of needs.”908 Levinas reveals in the romantic myth of a possible total unification of two 
partners the most cruel and egoistic tendencies. Far from relegating the feminine to a „second 
sex‟, as Simone de Beauvoir argued, who has seen Levinas‟s views as typical for masculine 
thinking Ŕ “He is the Subject, he is the Absolute Ŕ she is the Other”909 Ŕ, Levinas opens up, on the 
contrary, a space for the feminine at this central point of his philosophy. Taking up the line of 
thought of Beauvoir, some feminist readings of Levinas have outlined critical gender approaches 
to his thought as not adequately taking into account the feminine.
910
 Stella Sandford, for instance, 
argues in her study The Metaphysics of Love. Gender and Transcendence in Levinas that Levinas 
made a distinction between man as „man‟ and as „woman‟: “The fact is that the feminine is 
opposed to the human in a way that the masculine is not.”911 In contradistinction to this 
statement, Jacques Derrida‟s reading of Levinas‟s philosophy highlights in particular Levinas‟s 
notion of  
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[…] the humanism of [the] „feminine alterity‟, the humanism of the other woman, of the other (as) 
woman. If woman, in the silence of her „feminine being‟, is not a man, she remains [demeure] 
human.
912
  
 
It is, in my view, beyond doubt that Levinas‟s notion of alterity was first and foremost shaped out 
of his notion of the feminine. Already in 1947 in Time and the Other Levinas defines the 
feminine as “the absolutely other”, i.e. as the other par excellence, and takes up this idea in 
Totality and Infinity, where it is further described as “the welcoming one par excellence, 
welcome in itself Ŕ the feminine being.”913 In unveiling the solipsistic tendencies of the Greek 
myth of Aristophanes of the two that become one, Levinas opened up a way to recognize alterity 
Ŕ and to recognize it first and foremost through a recognition of the feminine. Claire Elise Katz 
has pointed this out in her study Levinas, Judaism, and the Feminine, as follows:  
 
If we remember that the original other is the feminine and that the other is also my teacher, then it is 
from the traits of the feminine that we must learn. The Greek (philosophical) tradition, by silencing 
the feminine, has silenced mercy, and thus silenced ethics.
914
 
 
To become a „soul that speaks‟, to take up Rosenzweig‟s words, means therefore in Levinas‟s 
view to open oneself up to the alterity of the feminine.
915
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c)       “Schläft ein Lied in allen Dingen…” – Language as the event of Revelation: 
          The voice of love   
 
 
                                                                                      If Hellas is called the „eye of the world‟, Israel can be said to          
                                                                                      be „the ear of the world‟. Israel hears God‟s voice in revelation.   
                                                                                      Moses addresses the tribes with „Hear, O Israel‟. In the keriath   
                                                                                      schma, in „the calling to hear‟ the Jew daily assumes the „yoke   
                                                                                      of the Kingdom of Heaven‟. The true story of Israel is one of  
                                                                                      vacillation between obedience and disobedience [Gehor-sam     
                                                                                      und Ungehor-sam] toward God.
916
  
 
            As we have seen, Rosenzweig puts an important accent on spoken language. Far from being 
simply a philosophy of language, the New Thinking of Rosenzweig rather follows language as 
interlocution.
917
 In this process revelation plays a central role. What happens, in concrete terms, 
in the revelation? And how does language take part in this event? To put it quite simply: 
revelation is the experience of the opening of God to the human being. Rosenzweig describes this 
process as a stirring event which tears the self away from its original silence by giving it a loved 
soul and a living speech. The central point of this event is that in the experience of revelation, as 
Stéphane Mosès underlines,  
 
[…] being is given to the human being at the very moment when he renounces the affirmation of his 
selfness [ipséité]. It is this passivity, which is not inaction, that defines that which Rosenzweig calls 
the soul. The soul is, in the human being, the consciousness of its dependence through the relationship 
with an exteriority [extériorité]. It is the presence in him of this exteriority […] which awakens him to 
being.
918
  
 
In this passage of the silent Self towards the speaking soul, the crucial step concerns the sound, 
i.e. to hear and to become audible. Therefore I place the accent in my interpretation on orality. In 
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my view, the central point of the revelation for Rosenzweig is not the seeing, but rather the 
hearing, and more concretely, hearing the voice of an other. As I have pointed out, the 
preeminent characteristic of the voice is its ephemerality. Language qua voice essentially 
happens; it passes away as it takes place. Just as God passes before Moses and allows him only to 
see his trace, the voice too leaves only its trace as an echo in the memory of the one who heard 
it.
919
 Thus, Levinas speaks of the “the trace of saying” [“la trace du Dire”].920 In contrast to the 
face, which is at first sight difficult to imagine as not being a phenomenon for Levinas, because 
one sees the face nevertheless concretely, the voice does not offer this bodily evidence. Although 
the voice is produced by the body, it also possesses a life beyond the body Ŕ a life as pure sound. 
Moreover, its appearance is paradoxical because it appears and disappears in the same instant. In 
being pronounced, it fades away. It is created from nothing but the most volatile, invisible 
element Ŕ air.921 It is important to point out these characteristics of the voice because Rosenzweig 
sees human nature in its very essence precisely in the characteristic of being ephemeral:  
 
Man is ephemeral, being ephemeral is his essence, as it is God‟s essence to be immortal and 
unconditional, and it is the world‟s essence to be universal and necessary. […] His own nature is 
certainly not itself infinite, but „in‟ infinity; it is a singular reality and yet it is everything. Around it 
lies the infinite silence of the human not-nothing; it itself is the sound that resounds into this silence, a 
finite and yet unlimited entity.
922
  
 
In this sense that which constitutes the human being most essentially is nothing other than his 
breath which he respires and through which the sound Ŕ unique to his soul, which resonates Ŕ is 
created: “the breath starts a melody”, as Danielle Cohen-Levinas puts it.923 The breath can indeed 
be seen as offering the potential for a melody made by every individual human being, a single 
melody that composes as a whole a polyphony, i.e. a sort of a symphony of humanity, to which 
each individual adds his unique tonality. Rosenzweig alludes to this in The Star of Redemption 
when he writes that the personality of man can be conceived of as a voice, resounding among 
other voices. He describes this aspect in Part I of the Star as a process which leads from the 
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isolated and silent Self to the awakening of a personality, able to participate in a society with 
fellow human beings. This transition is crucial in The Star and is realized particularly through the 
function of the voice:  
 
The Self is simply closed in itself. It owes this to its rootedness in the character. If it were rooted in the 
individuality, […] it is not the Self, the Self closed in itself and not looking outside itself that would have 
sprung up, but the personality. As the origin of the name already indicates, the personality is man, he who 
plays the role assigned to him by fate, one role beside others, a voice in the polyphonic symphony of 
humanity. It is really a „highest good of the children of the earth‟ Ŕ one for each of them. The Self has no 
relation with the children of men, always only with one man alone, with the „Self‟ precisely. […] The Self 
does not have a plural. […] [I]t is Adam, man himself.
924
 
 
 
Alluding to Goethe by describing it as the “highest good of the children of the earth [höchstes 
Gut der Erdenkinder]”,925 Rosenzweig defines the personality metaphorically as a voice, which 
takes part in a symphony of mankind. By referring his notion of personality to the metaphor of a 
“polyphonic symphony of humanity”, Rosenzweig reveals the great significance he attaches to 
the voice. As etymologically mirrored in the word per-sonare, the „per-sonality‟ is thus first and 
foremost characterized as being sonorous, i.e. something audible. The isolated Self, “buried in 
itself”, has no ability to express his innermost feelings “to the resounding open air [ins tönende 
Freie]; all roads lead only more deeply into the inner silence.”926 This is seen as the main 
characteristic of the Self according to Rosenzweig: 
  
The Self can only be silent. In any case, it can always seek to express itself in lyrical monologues, 
although this expression, precisely as expression, is no longer quite fitting; the Self does not express 
itself, it is buried in itself. But as soon as it enters into conversation it ceases to be Self; Self is Self 
only as long as it is alone.
927
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The process from the Self to the personality is further developed in Parts II and III of The Star, 
describing respectively the transformation into „a soul that speaks‟, realized under the 
commandment to love, and finally the participation in the communal life.  
 
Rosenzweig‟s metaphorical description of man‟s personality being „a voice among other voices‟ 
has also been poetically expressed by Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) in his Notes on the Melody 
of Things [1898]:  
 
Whether it be the singing of a lamp or the voice of a storm, whether it be the breath of an evening or 
the groan of the ocean Ŕ whatever surrounds you, a broad melody always wakes behind you, woven 
out of a thousand voices, where there is room for your own solo only here and there. To know when 
you need to join in: that is the secret of your solitude: just as the art of true interactions with others is 
to let yourself fall away from high words into a single common melody.
928
  
 
Rosenzweig‟s issue, seen in the light of Rilke‟s poetical reflections, can thus be further 
interpretated in the sense that man is everywhere and always surrounded by voices. Perhaps one 
could refer again in this context to a certain influence of Kabbalah on Rosenzweig, as the 
research of Moshe Idel and Rivka Horwitz has shown.
929
 For the Zohar the power of the voice is 
a very important aspect. The recent research on Kabbalah takes the aspects of the breath and the 
voice more and more into account; however, it is still at its beginning, as Jonathan Garb points 
out: “These dimensions of the power of language have been addressed to a relatively lesser extent 
in existing research on Kabbalah. It is important to stress that the issue of breath and language 
has not yet been made the focus of any research.”930 Nonetheless, as Garb demonstrates, the 
voice is attributed an eminent power in the Kabbalah which is profoundly linked with the 
phenomenon of life.
931
 In this sense the Zohar says that “there is nothing in the world which does 
not have a sound.”932 Similar to Rosenzweig‟s thinking, the genesis of oral speech, that is to hear 
and to become audible, i.e. to have a voice, and the phenomenon of life are seen in their deep 
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connection. As I pointed out, there is a development throughout The Star which describes the 
process of the silent Self into a personality (in Part I), further into a speaking soul (in Part II) and 
as an active part in the communal life (in Part III). This shows a gradual transition from silence 
towards speech Ŕ even though it must be noted that in Part III language itself is surpassed in the 
long run by the silence of the liturgical gesture, which stands above words for Rosenzweig. 
However, for the individual man and his relationship to life the outlined gradual transition from 
„a silent Self‟ to „a speaking soul‟ is of great importance. In order to expound on this gradual 
transition in more detail, let me cite at length a passage from Part III, in which Rosenzweig 
outlines the complex relationship between silence and speech with respect to the religious 
community in which the I participates. Rosenzweig argues that, in the community,     
 
[…] in the We, finally, everything is gathered in order to enter into the unanimous rhythm of the 
chorus whose many voices sing the final song. All the voices have become independent, each sings the 
words to the melody of its own soul, and yet all these melodies yield to the same rhythm and are united 
in one harmony. Yet, they are still always words, the voices of the inspired world always agree upon a 
word. The word that they sing is We. As song this would be a last and full final agreement. But as 
word, it is as incapable as any other word is of being the last word. The word is never last; it is not 
merely spoken, it is also speaking. This is the true mystery of language, its own life; the word 
speaks.
933
 
 
This passage is remarkable for two reasons: Firstly, it shows how important the role of the voice 
is for Rosenzweig in the final part of the The Star. The independent voices are gathered in a 
chorus that chants in unanimous harmony, yet each one in its very own unique manner with “the 
melody of its own soul”.934 Secondly, Rosenzweig explains why the word is not able to have „the 
final word‟, that is to say why silence is the ultimately final point of Redemption: because the 
word „speaks‟. This means that in the very essence of language there resides an endless discourse, 
one word referring to an another, calling for new words to explain the previous ones. This auto-
reference of language is only surpassed beyond words, i.e. in the final silence of Redemption, 
described in part III of The Star. This recalls Heidegger‟s notion of a language that „speaks‟ Ŕ 
“Die Sprache spricht.”935 Referring to Heidegger‟s statement, Levinas describes this aspect of 
language in his essay on Paul Celan as “[a]n elementary communication without revelation, 
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stammering infancy of discourse, a most clumsy intrusion in the famous „language that speaks‟, 
the famous „die Sprache spricht‟: entrance of the beggar into „the house of being‟.”936 Hence, 
Levinas refers this aspect of language to a „communication without revelation‟, that is to say it 
differs essentially from Rosenzweig‟s notion of language which is connected with revelation. 
However, what is at stake here is the common aspect that language speaks endlessly: “the word 
speaks”,937 as Rosenzweig argues. In so far as the essence of man is conceived of by Rosenzweig 
as a „linguistic being‟ Ŕ the „coming to being‟ is in fact a „coming to language‟ Ŕ the essence of 
man too speaks endlessly, inspiring (Rosenzweig uses the term „beseelen‟938) and vivifying the 
world and fellow human beings through love which is connected to the ability to speak, as I 
pointed out above.
939
 Pursuing this idea further, one can conclude that in Part III, in the 
community of living everything speaks in its own way; it is only necessary to have an appropriate 
openness of the soul, in accordance with the audible world around it, to perceive the innumerable 
sounds of the world, infinitely different. The American composer John Cage expressed the cited 
insight of the Zohar in his own radical manner: “Music is everywhere. You just have to have the 
ears to hear it”.940   
 
         Taking up the hypothesis of Marc Crépon in his study Les promesses du language that “The 
Star of Redemption would speak about nothing other than speech,”941 I would like to highlight the 
function not only of speech, but more precisely the trait of speech which is audible, that is, the 
voice. In this way, Crépon‟s hypothesis offers a completely new perspective, until now neglected 
by the research on Rosenzweig. Interpreters of Rosenzweig have always placed the accent on 
language only and have forgotten what in my view is the heart of the matter for Rosenzweig: that 
is, precisely, the voice. It is through the voice that pre-language becomes “true language 
                                                 
936
 Levinas Levinas, “Paul Celan: From Being to the Other”, in: Proper Names, pp. 40-46, p. 40/“Paul Celan. De 
l‟être à l‟autre”, in: Noms propres, pp. 59-66, p. 59, emphasis in the original. 
937
 Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, p. 255/Stern, p. 264, emphasis added.  
938
 See e.g. Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, pp. 258-259, p. 264, p. 287: “the inspiring effect of love”/Stern, pp. 268-269, p. 
274, p. 300: “beseelende Wirkung der Liebe”.  
939
 See chapter IV, 2. a), “The role of love in The Star of Redemption and its connection to language”. 
940
 Cage made this idea fruitful in composing his work 4‟33‟‟, a musical piece for piano which is entirely silent. (See 
my excursus in chapter II, “At the crossroads of music, poetry and ethics Ŕ poethics in the thought of Levinas and 
John Cage”.) For the original biblical source of the phrase “the sound of silence”, understood as a murmur or rustling 
of silence, see in the Bible, Book of Kings I, 19:12: “[…] and after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the 
fire, and after the fire a still small voice [הקד הממד לוק].” Levinas refers to this expression in the title of his article 
“Roger Laporte and the Still Small Voice”, in: Proper Names, pp. 90-93/“Roger Laporte et la voix de fin silence”, in: 
Noms propres, pp. 131Ŕ137. 
941
 Crépon, Marc, Les promesses du langage, Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Heidegger, p. 133.  
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[langage] […] because the language [la langue] becomes audible”942 Ŕ and this event can be 
realized through the voice alone. It is the sonority of speech which makes it the magic key that 
opens up the silence of the Self. As Danielle Cohen-Levinas points out: “The specific orality of 
the voice is to assume human otherness [l‟altérité].”943 Conceiving language as being nothing 
less than “the seal of humanity in man,”944 Rosenzweig is of the opinion that “man became man 
when he spoke; and all the same there is until this day no language of humanity, on the contrary 
this will be only at the end.”945 The possibility of an all-embracing understanding realized in, 
what Rosenzweig calls, a “language of humanity” is thus postponed to an eschatological future. 
Man can only perceive a glance of it in the silence of the Redemption, Rosenzweig describes in 
Part III of The Star, depicting the silence of the religious gesture, used in the ceremonies of the 
liturgy. The gesture is unifying the community beyond the word. However, here too the voice 
plays a central role, because it is through the voice that the chants of the religious community are 
expressed. The voice creates among the attendees a “community of voices” 
[Stimmengemeinschaft], as Moshe Idel expressed it.
946
 The ritual community is constructed to a 
large extent through its common chant which enables the community to feel united in the song. 
The sonority plays thus an important role.      
 
        The importance of sonority can also be found in Rosenzweig‟s analysis of the “Grammar of 
Eros (The Language of Love)” in The Star.947 In this section Rosenzweig highlights in particular 
the „becoming audible‟ of the I, which he calls the “„root word‟ [„Stammwort‟]”948 of the 
Revelation: “I is always a No become audible.”949 But not only in this section is the  voice and all 
that which accompanies it (audibility, sonority, the act of hearing and listening, etc.) of great 
importance. One can find numerous references to the voice in The Star; for instance, Rosenzweig 
repeatedly speaks of “the voice of God”950 in various contexts: “the silent hearing of God‟s 
voice,”951 “the voice of the true God,”952 “the voice of the Living One,”953 and it has to be seen 
                                                 
942
 Ibid., p. 138, emphasis added. 
943
 Cohen-Levinas, Danielle, La voix au-delà du chant. Une fenêtre aux ombres, p. 123. 
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 Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, p. 120/Stern, p. 122. 
945
 Ibid., emphasis added. 
946
 Idel, Moshe, “Die laut gelesene Tora. Stimmengemeinschaft in der jüdischen Mystik”, and of the same author, 
“The Voiced Text of the Torah”.        
947
 Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, pp. 187-200/Stern, pp. 193-206.  
948
 Ibid., p. 187/p. 193. 
949
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., p. 192/p. 198. 
951
 Ibid., p. 333/p. 348.   
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also in allusion to “the voice of Revelation”954: “For only where there is life […], only there does 
the voice of the Living One find an echo.”955 The power of speech is so profound in 
Rosenzweig‟s view that he even admits that “where the world is, there, too, is language; the 
world is never without the word, and it exists only in the word, and without the word, it would 
itself also not exist.”956 In this context, “the voice of Love” holds a crucial place since it is, in my 
view, the key notion for understanding what is at stake in the event of Revelation. The experience 
of Revelation, as Rosenzweig describes it, is realized not through seeing, feeling, touching or 
speaking, but through hearing. Even though seeing is also of great significance for Rosenzweig, 
since he explicitly emphasizes in Part III that truth is experienced ultimately through vision 
(parallel in this sense to Rabbi Yehuda haLevi‟s (1024-1141) emphasis on seeing).957 However, 
for the Revelation in Part II the most important sense in my view is the hearing. Above all other 
senses, Revelation appeals to the ears. It is a call. It comes as no surprise in this context that the 
most important prayer in Judaism, the Schema Israel [לֵאָרְשִׁי עַמְש ; “Hear, [O] Israel”], is in fact “a 
call to hear”.958 It encapsulates the monotheistic essence of Judaism by connecting it to the 
hearing of the voice of God: “Hear, O Israel: the Lord is Our God, the Lord is One.” This is one 
of the most essential features in Judaism, as Jacob Taubes points out: “In the keriath schma, in 
„the calling to hear‟ the Jew daily assumes the „yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven‟.”959 With 
respect to Rosenzweig‟s thinking, it is the hearing of “the voice of Love” which opens up the 
silent Self and lets him become “a soul that speaks”.960 Although one could argue that 
Rosenzweig himself in his article “The New Thinking” explained that “the difference between 
old and new, logical and grammatical thinking does not rest on loud versus quiet, but rather on 
needing the other and, what amounts to the same, on taking time seriously,”961 which indicates 
that the act of speaking loudly is not the main feature for Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking, but 
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 Ibid., pp. 45-46/p. 41. 
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 Rosenzweig, Franz, “The New Thinking”, in: Rosenzweig, Franz, Philosophical and Theological Writings, pp. 
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moreover the other and time.
962
 Nevertheless, I would like to stress the fact that the voice 
doubtlessly is of great importance in Rosenzweig‟s argumentation, because it holds a crucial 
function in The Star: the voice is the medium through which the event of Revelation is realized. 
Furthermore it is also the medium through which the “speaking-thinking” [Sprachdenken] of the 
New Thinking realizes the approach to the other and to time, i.e. its two main characteristics, that 
is, needing the other and taking time seriously. 
        The creative power of language is furthermore revealed in the biblical account of creation 
where it is said that God uses first and foremost his language to create the world. It is through his 
speech that he called the things to be: “And God spoke: Let there be light…”; whereas it would 
have been much more simple and to the point to write: “And God made light”. However the 
Bible right from its start emphasizes the power of the creative word: God himself spoke, and so 
speaks man, according to Rosenzweig, who sees language, as love, sensual [sinnlich] and supra-
sensory [übersinnlich]. The creative word [das schöpferische Wort], an aspect elaborated also by 
Walter Benjamin in his essay “On Language as such and on Human Language”, and furthermore 
the coming into being through language are important aspects for Rosenzweig‟s thinking.963 
Concluding this chapter, I would also like to highlight the reverberation of this process of 
creation; while man, the world and all the things in it have been created through sound, i.e. 
through a voice, it necessarily must re-sound out of them. The task of man would be thus to 
unchain a hidden melody in every being and every single thing, as the German romantic poet 
Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857) wrote in his poem “Wünschelruthe” [Divining Rod]: 
“Schläft ein Lied in allen Dingen/ Die da träumen fort und fort/ Und die Welt hebt an zu singen/ 
Triffst Du nur das Zauberwort [There sleeps a song in all things/ which dream there on and on/ 
and the world begins to sing/ if only you strike the magic word]”.964 In my view, this poem sums 
up poetically what is at stake in the role and function of the “voice of love” in the event of 
Revelation in The Star of Redemption.   
 
                                                 
962
 By the way, it is striking that one of Levinas‟s book titles emphasizes exactly these two most important aspects of 
Rosenzweig‟s New Thinking: Time and the Other/Le Temps et l‟autre.  
963
 See Benjamin, Walter, “Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen”/“On Language as such and 
on Human Language”. For a comparative approach, see Mosès, Stéphane, “Langage et Mystique chez Walter 
Benjamin et Franz Rosenzweig”, in: Mosès, Stéphane, Franz Rosenzweig. Sous l‟Étoile, pp. 131-166.   
964
 Eichendorff, Joseph von, “Wünschelruthe”, p. 121. The verb “treffen” is ambiguous: it can be translated in 
English either with “strike” or “come across” which highlights either intention or chance. 
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3.     a)         The voice of the commandment (mitzvah) in Mendelssohn‟s Jerusalem,   
                    with a view to Rosenzweig and Levinas‟s lectures on “The Written and the        
                    Oral” and “Word and Silence”                              
                                                           
                                                                               Language is the fact that always one sole word is proffered: God.
965
 
 
          As I have shown, an important common theme between Levinas and Rosenzweig is the 
accent both thinkers place in their work on orality, i.e. the spoken word. In the following, I 
extend this parallel to the work of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786).
966
 Similar to Rosenzweig 
and Levinas, Mendelssohn gives more value to the spoken than to the written word. This 
corresponds with the devaluing of the written that can also be found in the work of other authors 
of the Enlightenment, such as Rousseau and Lessing, who rise up against what they called a pure 
Buchstabengelehrtheit [book knowledge]. According to this point of view, only in the spoken 
word is it possible to convey and preserve the spirit of a living and current religion. In the age of 
the Internet, email and the mobile phone, Mendelssohn‟s reflections on the value attached to 
books and letters resonate in an almost prophetic manner. In his book Jerusalem, or On Religious 
Power and Judaism, published in 1783, he expounds:  
 
The diffusion of writings and books which, through the invention of the printing press, has been 
infinitely multiplied in our days, has entirely transformed man. […] Everything is dead letter; the 
spirit of living conversation has vanished. […] Hence, it has come to pass that man has almost lost his 
value for his fellow man. Intercourse with the wise man is not sought, for we find his wisdom in 
writings. […] We do not need the man of experience; we only need his writings. In a word, we are 
literati, men of letters. Our whole being depends on letters; and we can scarcely comprehend how a 
mortal man can educate and perfect himself without a book.
967
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The cited passage comes just after Mendelssohn‟s definition of the ceremonial law 
[Zeremonialgesetz], which is doubtlessly one of the key notions of his study.
968
 In spite of the 
negative connotation which became attached to this notion in the course of the 18
th
 century Ŕ in 
fact, the representatives of the Haskala who came after Mendelssohn, such as David Friedländer, 
Lazarus Bendavid and others, see in the ceremonial law one of the main obstacles for the 
emancipation of the Jews
969
 Ŕ, Mendelssohn in contrast returns to this in his work Jerusalem as 
one of the pillars of his interpretation of Judaism. He goes even so far as to see in the ceremonial 
law the very characteristic of Judaism.
970
 He defines it as follows: “The ceremonial law itself is a 
kind of living script, rousing the mind and the heart, full of meaning, never ceasing to inspire 
contemplation and to provide the occasion and opportunity for oral instruction [… zum 
mündlichen Unterrichte Anlaß und Gelegenheit gibt].”971 To understand this question (discussed 
in Haskala) in a broader context, it has to be noted here that the issue at stake in the era of 
emancipation was the question of how to conserve Jewish religious identity without being 
completely assimilated into a majority-Christian society. Thus, the question that arose was how to 
maintain alterity, i.e. the religious „otherness‟ of the Jews, against the social pressure of society. 
It is striking in this context that in his plea for religious freedom Mendelssohn specifically 
referred to the human face, a notion so important for Levinas‟s thinking, underscoring the simple 
fact that all men have different facial features and no one looks the same as his neighbor:  
 
Brothers, if you care for true piety, let us not feign agreement where diversity is evidently the plan and 
purpose of Providence. None of us thinks and feels exactly like his fellow man; why then do we wish 
to deceive each other with delusive words? We already do this, unfortunately, in our daily intercourse, 
in our conversations, which are of no particular importance; why then also in matters that have to do 
with our temporal and eternal welfare, our whole destiny? Why should we make ourselves 
                                                 
968
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 Mendelssohn, Moses, Jerusalem, pp. 102-103/“Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum”, p. 421, 
emphasis added. See further Hilfrich, Carola, „Lebendige Schrift‟ – Repräsentation und Idolatrie in Moses 
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unrecognizable to each other in the most important concerns of our life by masquerading, since God 
has stamped everyone, not without reason, with his own facial features?
972
 
 
Obviously Mendelssohn wanted to stress that human alterity and the right to be different is 
foreseen by God himself and the way He designed the world. The human face brings to the fore 
in this way an irreducible otherness, an argument which is of particular interest with respect to 
Levinas‟s philosophy. Levinas, for his part, points out the Jewish emancipation, for which 
Mendelssohn undoubtedly stands as an important protagonist, in all its ambiguities in his 
foreword to Stéphane Mosès study System and Revelation, underscoring the pitfalls of this 
political and social process:  
 
This modernity first found its expression and its doctrine in Moses Mendelssohn‟s Jerusalem in 1783. 
And yet, was not the progressive de-Judaization of the Jewish citizens of the European national states 
in the course of the nineteenth century a clue to the fragility of this first philosophy? Emancipation, 
ensuring Jews of the continuity of a purely confessional Judaism, began to mean assimilation.
973
 
 
However, in Mendelssohn‟s view, it was precisely by upholding the ceremonial law that the 
outlined process of assimilation should be prevented.   
 
         Mendelssohn thus places emphasis on the oral education, realized in the face-to-face 
relationship between the teacher and the pupil. In this way, the meaning of the commandments 
and of the law is constantly renewed through oral transmission and avoids stagnating into dead 
letters. He defines ceremonial law in terms of writing which is „alive‟, as a kind of “living 
writing”974 Ŕ living, or alive, because it is realized not in its written form, but rather verbally and 
through gesture, that is to say, through the ritual. As an action at first sight deprived of any 
practical end, the ritual can only raise curious questions for a neophyte: why do we do this?
975
 It 
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 Mendelssohn, Moses, Jerusalem, p. 138/“Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum”, p. 456, emphasis 
added. 
973
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Foreword”, p. 17/“Préface”, p. 11. 
974
 Mendelssohn, Moses, Jerusalem, pp. 102-103/“Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum”, p. 421. 
975
 As Arnold Eisen explains in the foreword of his study Rethinking Modern Judaism, p. xi, it was an event of the 
same type which awakened his interest for this problem. At the start of Sukkot in a synagogue in Philadelphia, while 
attending the service, a strange feeling seized him: “I could not help but wonder, despite my familiarity with the 
rituals of the holiday, what on earth these people were doing and why they were doing it. A few moments later, no 
less incredulous than before, I had joined the march.” One could say that at this moment Eisen indeed lost connection 
with the transcendent content which justified the fulfillment of the rite which is supposed to represent that content.   
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is not difficult to find the model for this question in the evening ceremony of Pesach (Passover), 
where the youngest child at the table of the Seder asks questions, starting with the most 
fundamental one: “why do we do these things?” [? תולילה לכמ הזה הלילה התשנ מה ; “Why is this 
night different from all other nights?”]  Then the child must listen to an explanation comprising a 
summary of history and Jewish theology, all before dinner. In this way, the meaning of the 
commandments is brought to life again at each Seder through the performance of speaking. To 
formulate this process in a Levinasian manner: that which has already been said must be said 
anew in order not to calcify into a dead, contextless text, but rather to renew its connection to the 
saying and to remain in this way living speech within the community. That is, according to 
Levinas, the very essence of language, as he explains in the foreword of Totality and Infinity:  
 
But it belongs to the very essence of language, which consists in continually undoing its phrase by the 
foreword of the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what has 
already be [sic] ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said delights.
976
  
 
Even though this passage is not related to „liturgical‟ ceremony it is nevertheless of interest to 
point out how Levinas employs in this context the word „ceremonial‟. The “inevitable ceremony 
in which the said delights” is connected by Levinas to speaking and the spoken, which refers to 
his notions of the Saying and the Said. According to the role and function which Mendelssohn 
attributed to the living language in his definition of the ceremonial law mentioned above, one can 
draw a parallel to Levinas‟s thought. Indeed, that which Mendelssohn‟s definition brings to light 
is one of the most fundamental aspects of Levinas‟s work: the Saying and the Said.977 As I have 
demonstrated, these notions play an extraordinary role in Levinas‟s philosophy: “The Infinite 
passes in the saying. [Que l‟Infini se passe dans le Dire… .]”978 The Saying has no temporally 
fixed point, but it is realized rather in the uninterrupted process of connecting words to one 
another, and in this fashion it happens or takes place in its own fulfillment. It is the act of 
performing that constitutes the essence of speaking. Its realization occurs as a passing away. 
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Once the breath has been exhaled, its being there, its Dasein, has vanished Ŕ to this extent, 
speaking, just as the ritual, consists essentially of the very act of saying and has to be renewed 
every time. This evokes the issue of a breathed meaning, that is, a meaning which is alive only in 
that time during which it is said, in the time of saying. This is precisely why Mendelssohn sees in 
Judaism a defense against idolatry. As it takes place essentially in the ceremony, it is bound to a 
living present. This aspect is highlighted by Levinas through the emphasis he puts on the voice, 
which interrupts the solipsistic „being-for-my-own‟: “To speak is to interrupt my existence as a 
subject, a master, but to interrupt it without offering myself as spectacle, leaving me 
simultaneously object and subject. My voice brings the element in which that dialectical situation 
is accomplished concretely.”979 In a face-to-face conversation the re-spiration of the breath, 
consumed in the voice, becomes the in-spiration of the other. It is in this sense that we have to 
understand why for Levinas “the banal fact of conversation […] is the marvel of marvels [la 
merveille des merveilles].”980 Mendelssohn, too, highlights in several sections in his Jerusalem 
the importance of the voice as the mode in which God reveals Himself. He cites in this context 
the example in Exodus 33:15, where Moses wants to see the face of God; however, he is only 
allowed to see the trace of his Glory and to hear His voice.
981
 Levinas also refers precisely to this 
example in order to illustrate his notion of the trace. God‟s presence is thus revealed through His 
voice Ŕ a presence which, like the trace, is a reference to an absence which is also presence, a 
presence that has passed, just as the voice vanishes in its emerging, as I have outlined above. 
Pursuing this thought further, one can attribute to the voice a certain eschatology, as Danielle 
Cohen-Levinas does when she describes an “eschatology of the voice [eschatologie de la 
voix]”,982 emphasizing the specifically temporal feature of the voice. This is because, as I have 
shown, the voice escapes the temporal representation in „being there‟ and „being absent‟ at the 
same time: “The voice cannot therefore be defined within time since it belongs to it. [La voix ne 
peut par conséquent se définir dans le temps puisqu‟elle lui appartient.]”983 This entails so to 
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speak a particular “time of the voice [le temps de la voix]”,984 highlighting its temporal 
(perceptible through the senses) and timeless (transcending the senses) nature. The eternity of the 
moment is thus reproduced in every true face-to-face conversation by the unique melody of the 
human breath, which connects through the voice the presence with a „beyond of time‟. Levinas 
explains this profound connection between the human breath and human time in an interview 
with Bracha Ettinger as follows: “Time, our time, is already the breath of the human being. Our 
time is the breath of the spirit.”985   
 
In my interpretation of Mendelssohn‟s definition of the ceremonial law, two aspects are 
fundamental: the signification of the voice in the process of the ritual and, with it, the 
performativity of the ritual. This latter aspect is expressed first and foremost in its dynamic 
character. Although the process of a ceremony or ritual may be strictly regulated and therefore at 
first sight static in its content, in the very act, i.e. in the gestures and the saying, there remains 
always a certain degree of contingency and unpredictability which brings to the fore the same 
content anew, every time. Even if the text remains the same, the modulation of the human voice 
always brings it to life in a new way. It is because of this unbridgeable liturgical difference that 
transcendence reappears and takes place each time anew. In his innovative study on Jewish 
Liturgical Reasoning, Steven Kepnes emphasizes precisely this aspect, which hitherto has been 
given too little attention in the scholarly research:  
 
Because liturgy is performed by a specific group at a specific time and place, it is never the same. 
Because liturgy is a living performance that is dependent upon the skill and attitude of its players, it 
always varies from its script. Thus, liturgical reasoning is always new. It is neither preexistent nor 
static; it is discovered and revealed in every liturgical performance.
986
  
 
This point is also emphasized in Leora Batnitzky‟s interpretation of Mendelssohn‟s Jerusalem, 
underscoring that: “Jewish ceremonial law emphasizes performance rather than adherence to 
dogma.”987 In fact Mendelssohn underlines clearly in his Jerusalem the performativity of the 
liturgical ceremony as expression of the ceremonial law:  
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Man‟s actions are transitory; there is nothing lasting, nothing enduring about them that, like 
hieroglyphic script, could lead to idolatry through abuse or misunderstanding. But they also have the 
advantage over alphabetical signs of not isolating man, of not making him to be a solitary creature, 
poring over writings and books. They impel him rather to social intercourse, to imitation, and to oral, 
living instruction. For this reason, there were but a few written laws, and even these were not entirely 
comprehensible without oral instruction and tradition; and it was forbidden to write more about them. 
But the unwritten laws, the oral tradition, the living instruction from man to man, from mouth to heart, 
were to explain, enlarge, limit, and define more precisely what, for wise intentions and with wise 
moderation, remained undetermined in the written law. […] Thus teaching and life, wisdom and 
activity, speculation and sociability were most intimately connected; or rather, thus should it be, 
according to the initial plan and purpose of the lawgiver.
988
  
 
Thus, transmission entails an ongoing process of interpretation which takes place through the 
living speech of oral instruction as well as through a necessary social intercourse. This is 
therefore to be understood in connection with the voice Ŕ the medium through which we convey 
our messages in the social discourse. I will expound upon the aspect of sociability in more detail 
in the section after the next.
989
  
 
For now, I rather want to draw a parallel between Mendelssohn‟s notion of the ceremonial 
law and Levinas‟s views on “The Written and the Oral” [“L‟Écrit et l‟Oral”]. Under this title 
Levinas gave a lecture in Paris on February 6, 1952 at the Collège philosophique, which was 
founded by Jean Wahl. This lecture was published only recently, in February 2011, in the second 
volume of Levinas‟s Œuvres Complètes (Collected Works). It offers a fresh perspective on 
Levinas‟s points of view on the written and the oral, which I would like to set in fruitful dialogue 
with Mendelssohn‟s views on this topic. Levinas starts his considerations with the assertion that 
there are two ways in which truth manifests itself, i.e. the written and the oral form: “The Written 
and the Oral are not only two ways in which the pupils demonstrate the knowledge they have 
acquired. These are two ways for the truth to manifest itself.”990 He goes on to describe what 
characterizes these two forms, the written and the oral, with all that is entailed in their respective 
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processes of realization. Concerning the oral form, he expounds the role of sound in the 
transmission of the message: “In the living word, the sound Ŕ physical reality Ŕ is carried away 
into the world of existence of the thought itself. The physical reality disappears behind the 
expressed thought.”991 In this way, the bodily aspect of the voice disappears completely for 
Levinas behind the thought which is expressed Ŕ leaving only the pure thought as result. 
However, the written also „speaks‟ in some way, according to Levinas: “This irrevocable word Ŕ 
because written Ŕ it speaks without listening; it is law. […] the written speaks to me.”992 It is 
noteworthy, in the context of Mendelssohn‟s discussion of the ceremonial law, that Levinas does 
indeed attach to the written the status of a kind of law and that also the written words „speak‟ for 
Levinas Ŕ “however they miss a face. The written discourse does not hear my questions.”993 It is 
easier to cope with texts than with real interlocutors because there is no reply of an other which 
could come up against my understanding and interpretation. In this sense, Levinas argues that 
“[e]verything which is written is testament, the word of a dead person and the last word. […] To 
read is no longer to grasp the thought of the other, it is to judge it.”994 Hence, the written cannot 
really enact a relationship with the other. Even if the text „speaks‟, as Levinas says, there is no 
„real‟ dialogue between reader and writer because of the temporal distance which separates them. 
Therefore, the importance of the face, as profoundly linked to language, is one of the salient 
features of Levinas‟s argumentation in this lecture. In fact, one can see how the notion of the face 
is elaborated and connected to language in this early text of 1952:  
 
This presence of the thought itself, beyond all relativity Ŕ this is its presence in the word of the teacher 
[maître] since, when the teacher speaks, the thought has a face. […] That which is in relationship with 
us without being a subject of a practical activity, without being a vision within a horizon Ŕ that is a 
face. The origin of the truth is in the teaching. The face is a condition of truth.
995
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In a similar way as Mendelssohn in Jerusalem, Levinas emphasizes the oral instruction, i.e. the 
teaching through the voice. However, he goes even further than Mendelssohn and connects this 
teaching with a special feature of the body: the face. Through the human presence, the neutral 
thought becomes a face for Levinas. It becomes a meaning beyond the meaning Ŕ it becomes 
truth. Although the written truth is also a form of truth Ŕ as outlined above it is conceived by 
Levinas inter alia as law Ŕ, the oral truth has however a much greater significance for Levinas 
since it is bound to the human presence and to the face. He thus clearly points out the supremacy 
of the oral truth which supports in the end human society itself:  
 
The society is the present of teaching and not the past of the written. All the achievements of 
civilization deposited in the written Ŕ and from which surely the word between men is nourished Ŕ 
would be nothing if man were not to see the face of man.
996
  
 
In the elaboration of his theme, Levinas even goes so far as to connect the oral language with the 
divine. This is a remarkable passage because, despite Levinas‟s link of religion to the relationship 
of the same to the other, as he explains in Totality and Infinity (“We propose to call „religion‟ the 
bond that is established between the same and the other without constituting a totality”997), there 
is no section in his entire work to my mind where he makes such a strong connection between 
language, the other and the divine: 
 
Indeed, God alone speaks. Insofar as the other speaks to me Ŕ that is to say insofar as I speak to him Ŕ 
the Other is God. I do not deify the other, on the contrary it is the category of the divine Ŕ if one can 
pose the divine as category at all Ŕ which derives from the Dialogue. […] The monotheistic God 
reveals himself through the word. He surpasses all the paganisms […] because he gives the divine the 
exceptional situation of the interlocutor, the absolute character of the word.
998
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Revelation through the word and, thus, revelation coming to the self from the outside Ŕ this 
corresponds to the notion of revelation one can find in the preparatory notes for Totality and 
Infinity, where Levinas gives the following remarkable definition of revelation, underscoring 
precisely the heteronomy of the event and the fact that it is received from outside of the subject: 
 
Revelation Ŕ something given that I did not give to myself. Not to be said in terms of an experience 
that remains potent and masterful and which is assumed in the light. A past that was not present. Or 
the word of the Other [l‟Autre] which is the Other [Autrui].999 
 
Here, too, we can find the connection of language, i.e. the word, the Other and a divine or at least 
transcendent category, that is revelation. That revelation is received from outside links it with the 
voice or more precisely the sound as coming from outside, breaking through the „crust‟ of the 
subject. In this sense, Levinas introduces hearing in his argumentation and connects it with what 
he calls the „absolute thought‟:  
 
The absolute thought is inseparable from the verb to hear. […] We must therefore assume that the 
dialogue is […] {the thought itself, a radical new form of understanding.} The question of the one 
who listens is part of the expression of the one who speaks.
1000
  
 
This idea is expressed in Mendelssohn‟s Jerusalem, as I have shown, as well as in Rosenzweig‟s 
conception of „speaking-thinking‟ (Sprachdenken). In emphasizing that the question of the one 
who listens is indeed part of the expression of the response, Levinas situates his thinking in 
proximity to the process of „speaking-thinking‟ described by Rosenzweig, where both 
interlocutors (speaker as well as listener) participate equally in producing the epistemological 
outcome. The dialogue brings forth knowledge with two voices and it is in this sense a pluralistic 
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thinking that depends on the other to develop itself. In this process, the sound of the voice plays a 
crucial role. 
  
         This issue is further elaborated by Levinas in his lecture “Word and Silence” [“Parole et 
Silence”], which he also gave at the Collège philosophique in Paris, on 4 and 5 February, 1948. 
This lecture, also published only recently, just as “The Written and the Oral” [“L‟Écrit et 
l‟Oral”], in February 2011, is particularly important in this context since Levinas elaborates here 
upon what he calls a “phenomenology of sound [phénoménologie du son]”.1001 According to 
Levinas, the phenomenon of sound has to be conceived as light which stirs up the subject‟s world 
of solipsistic solitude Ŕ to speak with Rosenzweig‟s Star of Redemption, one could add: the sound 
stirs up the world of the silent Self (stumme Selbst). It thereby opens up a breach in the solitude 
of being which echoes further even if the phenomenon itself has vanished. In this reverberation, 
Levinas sees the proper character of the sound, as he points out:  
 
[…] in what does the sonority of the sound consist? In its reverberation, in its being as such, the sound 
is a burst [éclat]. Or, to put it in a way which places more emphasis on its social character Ŕ the sound 
is scandal. […] World of solitude where all that is other is also mine. However, the essence of sound 
is rupture. […] Yet pure rupture which does not lead to something luminous but which produces the 
light. Insofar as it is a quality of the senses, insofar as it is a phenomenon, the sound is light; but it is a 
point of light where the world rings out and shatters [éclate], where it is overburdened. This 
overflowing or overburdening of the sensory quality through itself, its incapacity to hold its content Ŕ 
that is the very sonority of the sound.
1002
  
 
The interweavement of different metaphors of light and sound Ŕ the sound is light and 
reverberation at the same time Ŕ makes this passage particularly difficult to situate it in the 
context of Levinas‟s reflections on language. However, there can be no doubt about the fact that 
Levinas attributes to sound a great significance and that his reflections on sound and sonority 
must be seen in context with the voice, which is the human sound par excellence. Yet it is 
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remarkable that Levinas does not elaborate upon a “phenomenology of the voice”, but in more 
general terms he speaks of a “phenomenology of sound”. This phenomenology attaches to sound 
an extraordinary importance with respect to the intersubjective relationship, i.e. the relationship 
of the I to the other. According to Levinas, “the sound breaks up the world of light and introduces 
an alterity and a beyond within the world.”1003 In connecting the phenomenon of sound to alterity, 
Levinas confirms in some sense what I have tried to demonstrate in the previous sections of this 
thesis: that there is a connection between alterity and sound in Levinas‟s thinking and that this 
has a great significance for the voice. The voice, an aspect too little considered in Levinas‟s work 
in my view, embodies Ŕ precisely in its bodiless presence Ŕ the ethical moment of 
intersubjectivity, bringing the subject in connection to the other, i.e. alterity. However, taking into 
account this only recently published lecture of his unedited writings, there can no longer be any 
doubt about the connection of sound and alterity. Against the background of my interpretation it 
becomes comprehensible why Levinas emphasizes in his lecture “The Word and Silence” 
[“Parole et Silence”]:  
 
The sound is thus the glory of the other event: the mystery of being insofar as it is other. […] The 
sonority as a whole describes the structure of a world where the other can appear. […] Language is the 
possibility for a being to appear from outside, for a reason to be a you, to present itself as face, 
temptation and impossibility of murder.
1004
 
 
The profound connection in Levinas‟s thinking of the notions of language, face and sound is here 
clearly revealed. As I have outlined in the introduction, the face is conceived by Levinas as „the 
beginning of language‟ and in this is already conveyed an ethical message Ŕ „Thou shalt not 
murder‟. One can see from the lecture “Word and Silence”, given shortly after the war, in 
February 1948, that Levinas began very early after the war to give special attention to the „face‟, 
a notion which is not present in his writings before the war, e.g. in On Escape [De l‟évasion] 
from 1935. According to Levinas in “Word and Silence”, there comes first language and 
afterwards the thought, which evolves indeed out of the language. The relationship to the other 
qua face, provided in a face-to-face conversation, is at the base of human communication and 
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makes it possible. This echoes Mendelssohn‟s views on the primacy of oral teaching, 
emphasizing “the living instruction from man to man, from mouth to heart,”1005 as Mendelssohn 
argues in Jerusalem. Similarly Levinas highlights in his lecture the importance of oral teaching 
through language and the face-to-face relationship. He outlines in this context the notion of an 
„expressed thought‟ (ein „ausdrückliches‟ Denken), as he argues:  
 
To learn is not communication of a thought […], but is rather the first relationship: to find oneself 
before a different reason, to exist metaphysically. Thus, the thought does not precede language, but it 
is rather only possible through language, that is to say through teaching and through the recognition of 
the other as teacher. […] The spoken doctrine Ŕ the Ausdrücklich denken Ŕ presupposes school and 
teaching.
1006
  
 
Further, Levinas‟s interest in the term expression (Ausdruck) finds reference in a remark in his 
philosophical notes [Notes philosophiques diverses], published in the first volume of his 
Collected Works and composed probably between the publication of Time and the Other [Le 
Temps et l‟Autre, 1948] and Totality and Infinity [Totalité et Infini, 1961]. Here Levinas already 
formulated the idea to develop a counter-position to Heidegger with respect to the notion of 
expression: “To take position regarding the way Heidegger depreciates the term Ausdruck.”1007 
Thus, a certain continuity can be traced back in Levinas‟s work regarding this aspect. The same 
applies also to his reflections on the relationship between language and sound, i.e. more precisely 
a specific kind of sound: rhythm. Already in Levinas‟s captivity notebooks one can find the 
following thoughts on this relationship: “Poetry is thus as a rhythm. The artifice of language, of 
color, can create this rhythm. The poetry music is this rhythm in its pureness. Poetry is the things 
set in music.”1008 Within the limited framework of this section I can only refer briefly to the 
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continuity of Levinas‟s discussion of these aspects in his work. However, it becomes obvious that 
the publication of Levinas‟s unedited writings within the scope of the edition of his Collected 
Works has opened up new horizons for these subjects in Levinas‟s work. The scholarly debate 
about the unedited writings has only just begun and many interesting insights remain to be 
revealed from this material, offering new interpretations of Levinas‟s work.  
 
         Taking into consideration Rosenzweig‟s point of view in the context of Mendelssohn‟s 
Jerusalem, it has to be underscored that liturgy holds a central place in The Star of Redemption, 
where it is in fact attributed an “Organonstellung”.1009 Just as the logos of mathematics in Part I, 
describing Creation, and the grammar of eros in Part II, describing Revelation hold an 
“Organonstellung”, so liturgy holds this central place in the final section, Part III, describing 
Revelation. Why does liturgy have such a great significance in Rosenzweig‟s Star? The role of 
liturgy becomes clear by taking a closer look at what is at stake in the event of Redemption: it is 
not the spoken word, but the silent gesture which allows man to experience in the here and now a 
glance of the redeemed world. Hence, liturgy as such and moreover a specific kind of “liturgical 
reasoning”1010 is of great significance for Rosenzweig‟s argumentation in The Star. On can 
conclude in some sense, as did Stéphane Mosès, that “the silence of art, which is before the word, 
joins up with that [silence] after the word, that religious symbols”1011 take form in liturgy. In this 
way, a renewed silence of a totally different order can be traced in the event of Redemption, as 
Rosenzweig emphasizes: “Hence it turns out that the height of liturgy is not the common word, 
but the common gesture.”1012 In terms of liturgy, beyond the notions of the „written‟ and the 
„oral‟ that I outlined with respect to Levinas and Mendelssohn, the problem between the law and 
its concrete realization in life was one of the most significant for Rosenzweig after having 
completed his opus magnum The Star of Redemption. In a letter to Rudolf Hallo on March 27, 
1922 Rosenzweig states that  
 
[…] the central problem of my life (after having completed the Star) […] is namely Ŕ Ŕ the law. […] 
We start with the actions. May we ourselves or others once find the principles for it. […] Judaism is 
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not law. It creates law. But it is not it.  It „is‟ being Jewish. So I pointed it out in the Star and I know 
that it is right. But now you will understand that after finishing the book (cf. its last word) the life only 
begins, the probation of the truth only after Θεωρία [vision, theory].1013 
 
Hence, Rosenzweig emphasizes the lived experience of being Jewish before the written law. 
First, there is the Jewish life for Rosenzweig and, subsequently, there are derived from it the 
specific laws and principles. This attitude is echoed also in Rosenzweig‟s leadership of the Freies 
Jüdisches Lehrhaus, which was guided by the motivation of a free research, answering the up-to-
date Jewish questions with a fresh approach and, although rooted in the commandments 
(mitzvoth) and the Jewish tradition, without determining from the outset what should be the 
outcome of the questioning. In his article “Towards a Renaissance of Jewish Learning” [“Bildung 
und kein Ende”] Rosenzweig argues against “the endless writing of books on Jewish subjects. 
Books are not now the prime need of the day. But what we need more than ever, are human 
beings Ŕ Jewish human beings […].”1014 Echoing Mendelssohn‟s plea for the real encounter with 
wise man of lived experience instead of reading only the books of them,
1015
 Rosenzweig 
emphasizes that what is needed is first and foremost a renewed sense for Jewish Being, for 
Jewishness, as he argues:  
 
[…] what we mean by Judaism, the Jewishness of the Jewish human being, is nothing that can be 
grasped in a „religious literature‟, or even in a „religious life‟; nor can it be „entered‟ as one‟s „creed‟ 
in the civil registry of births, marriages, and deaths. The point is simply that it is no entity, no subject 
among other subjects, no one sphere of life among other spheres of life; […]. It can be grasped 
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through neither the writing nor reading of books. […] It is only lived Ŕ and perhaps not even that. One 
is it. One is Jewish.
1016
  
 
It was, thus, rather an attitude, i.e. a certain Jewish lifestyle, which Rosenzweig was searching 
for, as he founded the Lehrhaus, as Stefan Meineke points out:  
 
To Rosenzweig being Jewish meant first and foremost bringing to life an attitude or life style that is 
not governed by a fixed set of laws, but is in accord with the commandment of love, making man 
responsible for the fate of his neighbor. As a didactic method, therefore, the Lehrhaus was left with 
nothing but a „principle of unprincipledness‟ (Rezept der Rezeptlosigkeit).1017  
 
Life is bound to presence Ŕ and so is the „commandment of love‟ as well as the commandment as 
such. Just like the voice, the commandment finds its realization in the presence. It is pure 
presence, as Rosenzweig concisely sums up: “The commandment is thus pure present.”1018 In the 
following sub-chapter, I will further expound upon the implications of the presence of the voice 
in this context, primarily with respect to the translation of the Bible made by Rosenzweig and 
Buber.
1019
        
 
         In conclusion, I want to extend my interpretations on Mendelssohn, Levinas and 
Rosenzweig by drawing a parallel between their points of view and contemporary art and 
literature, which will lead us to a reexamination of the event of friendship. Without in any way 
reducing religious ceremonies to purely aesthetic acts, it is nevertheless striking that this 
conception of transcendence counts also for modern art, which, in contrast to the paintings or 
sculptures of the past, has more often created performances, happenings and other temporary 
installations in public space, requiring the participation and involvement of the spectators. That is 
to say, creating works of art from material that is not to be preserved as performance or activity 
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(because this art happens, to stay with the issue at stake in the ceremonial law described by 
Mendelssohn) means that the art cannot be idolized in a museum. Instead of a picture hanging on 
a wall for an indefinite period of time, one is confronted in contemporary art more often with 
living and temporary objects of art (e.g. happenings, performances, etc.).
1020
 Coming back to 
Mendelssohn and Levinas, it is noteworthy that in his foreword to the French reedition of 
Mendelssohn‟s Jerusalem, Levinas puts precisely this aspect of performativity into relief when he 
defines the commandments, which are expressed in the ceremonial law, as  
 
[…] permanent reminders of the innate beliefs and explanations during the ritual and ceremonial 
gestures which fill the life of the faithful with revealed Law. Constant intervention of the living voice 
and reason against the intellectual aberration of dead images and signs, stuck in systems. Yoke of the 
law freeing the minds.
1021
  
 
This recalls again the power which is attributed to the voice in the Bible, where God appears to 
the Israelites first and foremost through His voice: among numerous examples, one can say 
without a doubt that one of the most significant can be found in Deuteronomy 4:12, cited also by 
Rosenzweig in The Star: “Then the Lord spoke to you out of the fire. You heard the sound of 
words but saw no form; there was only a voice [לוק יתלוז].”1022 God‟s authority is not represented 
through a visible sign but through His voice, i.e. through a sound. We saw above that 
Mendelssohn puts great emphasis on the oral education and that, for him, the ceremonial law is 
characterized by living speech and the human voice. For Levinas as well, as I have shown,
1023
 the 
voice plays a leading role, since the Levinasian subjectivity comes into being through precisely 
this process: through language addressed to an other; to be brief, through speaking. Levinas goes 
so far as to define human identity as such as a sound which escapes the temptation of naming and 
thereby escapes being captured in a concept:  
 
                                                 
1020
 See Fischer-Lichte, Erika, Ästhetik des Performativen, especially pp. 219-227, which deals with the topic of the 
voice.         
1021
 Levinas, Emmanuel, “Préface”, p. 13: “Législation et vérités historiques qui comportent, notamment, une sage 
pédagogie: permanents rappels des croyances innées et explications renouvelées à l‟occasion des gestes rituels et 
cérémoniels dont la Loi révélée emplit la vie des fidèles. Intervention incessante de la voix et de la raison vivantes 
contre l‟aberration intellectuelle des images mortes et des signes immobilisés dans les systèmes. Joug de la loi 
libérant les esprits.” Emphasis added.   
1022
 Deuteronomy 4:12; Rosenzweig, Franz, Star, p. 441/Stern, p. 465.   
1023
 See chapter IV,1. “Presence through voice Ŕ towards a new definition of Levinas‟s conception of subjectivity”.  
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Nameless identity. It says I which is identified with nothing that presents itself, if not the very sound 
of its voice. […] Unjustifiable identity, pure sign made to others, sign made of the very donation of 
the sign, the messenger being message, the signified sign without figure, without presence, outside the 
acquired, outside of civilization. Identity immediately posed in the accusative of the „here I am‟, like a 
sound audible only in its echo, delivered to the ear without taking satisfaction in the energy of its 
repercussion.
1024
  
 
However, to conceive this transcendence only through language and living speech is to confer 
upon it a capacity without limit, of which it cannot possibly boast, because to speak requires 
being spoken Ŕ and it is precisely there that silence rises up as a limit to expression, which was 
believed to be unlimited. The French philosopher Michel Serres has adequately pointed out this 
critique:  
 
This idea, so widespread, that all must be said and must be resolved through language, that any real 
problem provides material for debate, that philosophy is reduced to questions and responses, that one 
cannot look after oneself while speaking, that education passes exclusively through discourse, this 
talkative, theatrical, advertising, shameless idea without modesty ignores the real presence of the wine 
and the bread, its tacit taste, its smell, forgets the cultivation through subtle gestures, the connivance, 
the complicities, what goes without saying, the plea of distinguished love, the impossible intuitions 
which flash like lightning, the charm which lies behind a look, […] I have known all these without 
texts and from persons without grammar, children without a lexicon, elderly without vocabulary, I 
have lived a great deal as a stranger, mute, terrified behind the curtain of languages, would I have 
truly enjoyed life if I had not made listening or speaking, the very dear [thing] which I know remains 
set by silence.
1025
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Without a doubt, there is something ineffable between human beings Ŕ and it has perhaps to do 
with that which is the most precious. Is not God named the Great Ineffable since he transcends all 
names? The source from which all names derive is left without a name and remains unspeakable, 
simply referring to “the Name”, haShem. With this in mind, I agree with Everett Fox that it was 
surely  
 
[…] no accident that in his final year, Rosenzweig devoted major effort to an essay on Mendelssohn‟s 
(and his own) translation of the Tetragrammaton. What was at stake, he maintained, was the 
distinction between the „God of the philosophers‟ and the living, speaking God of faith.1026  
 
To give a voice to the unspeakable and, thereby, to bring into a philosophical language that which 
refuses to be captured by a concept, is one of the central enterprises of Levinas‟s philosophy. In 
fact, it is a matter of approaching that which one cannot grasp in words and which eludes, 
through its very essence, every attempt at thematization.
1027
 But it is perhaps the writers and poets 
who understand this better than the philosophers. The great importance of literature for Levinas, 
who once stated that “the whole of philosophy is only a meditation of Shakespeare,”1028 
underscores this. Literature and moreover poetry opens up a space between human beings where 
language is reborn. In this sense, the writer must create a unique language for what he wants to 
express. First, there is the encounter and, afterwards, the search for a language to capture what 
had been experienced in this encounter, that is, precisely the ineffable. The touching memory 
which Hélène Cixous gave of her encounter with Michel Foucault and the friendship which 
evolved between them gives an example of the ineffable experience between human beings:  
 
What happened there has no name. It happened before all names, or perhaps beyond the names, I 
don‟t know. In the quiet uncovered, where the mute languages are spoken. It happened at a place 
without war, without weapon; in another world. Only with difficulty one can speak about it in the 
world here. I cannot say who he was. Who I was. The one for the other; this was for sure; deep inside 
of us, beyond thoughts, as a knowledge. It was warmth and half-closed eyes. Tenderness. An 
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animalistic Ŕ yes, even more than human Ŕ peace. A sense of the soul: you are not hurting me, that is 
certain. […] We felt this. We have met at this place, where one feels Good and Bad. […] Where you 
are, Michel, I don‟t know, but I hear your voice very clearly. Only the time stood still, not you. I see 
your voice.
1029
  
 
It is remarkable that Cixous uses Levinas‟s expression „the one for the other‟ (l‟un pour l‟autre) 
to describe the ineffability she experienced in the encounter with Foucault. Further still, that she 
refers to his voice, not his face, which she still sees clearly before her eyes after his body (and 
with it his face) has vanished Ŕ “I see your voice”.1030 This refers to Levinas‟s reflections on the 
voice in “Word and Silence” [“Parole et Silence”] and his statement that, “being a phenomenon, 
the sound is light [… en tant que phénomène, le son est lumière; …].”1031 Thus, the literary 
description of the ineffable between human beings brings us back here to the interpretation of 
philosophy Ŕ and so my interpretation comes full circle at this point. However, I do not want to 
conclude these considerations without referring to the impressive account of Levinas‟s son 
Michaël, describing the last encounter between his father and Maurice Blanchot. The close 
friends saw each other personally for the last time in June 1961. It was the day after Levinas‟s 
defense of his Habilitation Totality and Infinity at the Sorbonne, an event which Blanchot 
attended as a listener in the auditorium. Although Michaël Levinas was only twelve years old at 
that time, he nevertheless retained a touching memory of this last encounter between Blanchot 
and Levinas:  
 
The words shattered on their first names: Maurice, Emmanuel; there was something ineffable between 
them which was expressed, more than thirty years ago, only in their letters and the dedications of their 
books. […] There was a silent emotion in the room, interspersed with attempts to speak. The 
impossible words became fragmented as stifled sobs. It remained the „you‟ and the first names, 
Maurice, Emmanuel. […] This morning in June 1961 they took time off from one another in order to 
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continue this unbreakable bond in a proximity even greater because distant and freed of any trivial 
orality. They never saw each other again face-to-face.
1032
  
 
The speechless face-to-face situation in which the last personal encounter between Levinas and 
Blanchot finally took place in some sense is reflected also in Blanchot‟s own reflections on 
friendship. For Blanchot, friendship  
 
[…] passes by way of the recognition of the common strangeness that does not allow us to speak of 
our friends but only to speak to them, not to make of them a topic of conversations (or essays), but the 
movement of understanding in which, speaking to us, they reserve, even on the most familiar terms, 
an infinite distance, the fundamental separation on the basis of which what separates becomes relation. 
Here discretion lies not in the simple refusal to put forward confidences (how vulgar this would be, 
even to think of it), but it is the interval, the pure interval that, from me to this other who is a friend, 
measures all that is between us, the interruption of being that never authorizes me to use him, or my 
knowledge of him (were it to praise him), and that, far from preventing all communication, brings us 
together in the difference and sometimes the silence of speech.
1033
  
 
The ineffable marks the source of all language, the abyss in which all words collide. And yet we 
speak because, despite the fact that the ineffable is in the long run (perhaps) more powerful than 
language, it is nevertheless precisely this failure of language which motivates us to speak to one 
another, as Levinas points out: “The Other is the ineffable, but it is for that reason that we speak 
to him.”1034  
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      b)         Some aspects on the role of the voice in the Buber-Rosenzweig Bible     
                   translation and Levinas‟s notions of the Saying and the Said   
 
   
                                                                                                                                     Every word is a spoken word.
1035
 
 
         In spring 1925 Franz Rosenzweig started together with Martin Buber the translation of the 
Bible in German. They intended to create a rather literal translation and entitled it therefore a 
“Verdeutschung der Schrift”, that is to say a „Germanization‟ of the Scripture.1036 As a result of 
this specific approach to translation they did not hesitate to modify or even to reinvent the 
German grammar in order to translate the original text as literally as possible and to make the 
subtle nuances of the original Hebrew text perceptible to a German audience. This highly creative 
work was realized in an ongoing intellectual dialogue between Buber and Rosenzweig. Regarding 
this process, Buber made the comment that “[t]he papers that were exchanged in these years 
provide together the most living commentary: the Scripture coming to light in a space of 
interaction.”1037 The very beginning of the project was marked by the question of whether the 
Bible is translatable at all [“Ist die Schrift übersetzbar?”] and whether the moment would be right 
for another translation of the Bible, as Martin Buber reflected in an essay in 1930:  
 
Does the age have the room to breathe for a new beginning? Does it have the calling, the energy, the 
support, the ear? [Hat das Zeitalter den Atemraum für einen Neubeginn? die [sic] Berufung, die Kraft, 
den Beistand, das Gehör?]
1038
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The way Buber poses the question by refering to an “Atemraum”, „a room to breathe‟, already 
highlights the issue at stake in this section: the attention Buber and Rosenzweig gave to the role 
of the voice within their translating process and how they tried to make perceptible the specific 
Hebrew voice of the original text in their German translation. That the Bible was initially 
conceived as an oral source, transmitted by mouth from generation to generation, is of great 
importance in this context. It has been pointed out by Israel Yuval that the decision for an oral 
transmission was made intentionally, in order to maintain a religious difference to Christianity:  
 
The Sages‟ ban on writing down the Oral Law may be also explained [as] [...] a conscious, thoroughly 
ideological response to the fear that the Oral Law would be universalized and expropriated from its 
internal Jewish context, as happened to the Written Law when the Hebrew Bible was translated into 
the Septuagint canonized by Christianity.
1039
 
 
 Further, with the Biblical text having been written down, the message was transformed into a 
written structure and lost its oral character.
1040
 In contrast, Buber and Rosenzweig intended to go 
back to the roots of the Biblibal message. They shared the opinion, as Ilaria Bertone points out,  
 
[...] that the biblical text was born not as a written text but rather as a spoken word, a word orally 
proclaimed. This Gesprochenheit is the actual reality of the Bible: in Jewish tradition Scripture, miqra, 
is recited aloud, as confirmed by the masoretic systems of vocalization and musical annotation 
attached to each word of the text. The fact that the Bible was eventually committed to writing was due 
to the fear of losing it, but this does not change its essentially oral character.
1041
  
 
Thus, Buber and Rosenzweig paid a lot of attention to the oral character of the text and to the 
requirements of the voice in order to read the text out loud. Their main focus was to revive the 
biblical text because, according to Buber,  
 
[…] the passage of time had largely turned the Bible into a palimpsest. […] the Hebrew sounds 
themselves have lost their immediacy for a reader who is no longer a listener; they are suffused by a 
                                                                                                                                                              
significance of the voice has been left aside in the reception of Buber‟s and Rosenzweig‟s reflections on their 
translation.       
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voiceless, theologically and literarily determined rhetoric, and are compelled by that rhetoric to speak 
not the spirit that attained its voice in them but a compromise among the spiritualities of two thousand 
years.
1042
  
 
In the process of reviving the Bible the voice holds thus a crucial place for Buber and 
Rosenzweig. In the following, I give an example of what this means concretely for their 
translation. Further, I focus on Rosenzweig‟s and Buber‟s theoretical writings which 
accompanied their Bible translation and the role which the voice held in this project. It is highly 
interesting in this context that the early years of their translation were indeed, as Daniel 
Krochmalnik points out, the “acoustic founding years [akustische Gründerjahre]”1043 when 
phonograph records became popular. The techinal progress made it possible to reproduce the 
music of the concert hall in the living room of everybody. The repercussions of this development 
can be found in Rosenzweig‟s music reviews.1044 He had great interest in music and admired for 
example the opera of Richard Wagner, whom Siegfried Kracauer in his critical review in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung pointed out as the spiritus rector of Buber‟s and Rosenzweig‟s Bible 
translation.
1045
 However, while Rosenzweig was writing on music, translation and the voice, it is 
norteworthy that he himself was already deprived of speech due to his illness. Despite 
Rosenzweig‟s physical illness, which prevented him from speaking and moving, he worked on 
the translation together with Buber. This is more than remarkable for a man in such a fragile state 
of health and it underlines the importance of the Bible translation for Rosenzweig, as Everett Fox 
points out:  
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For the ensuing four-and-a-half-year-period Ŕ the final part of his life Ŕ Rosenzweig devoted the 
greater part of his energies to translating the Hebrew Bible, and more specifically, to forging the 
German of the translation into a form that would allow it to speak in a Hebrew voice.
1046
 
 
After Rosenzweig‟s death in December 1929, Buber continued the work alone, which he finally 
finished in 1962, without, however, taking into account the corrections he added to the reeditions 
which appeared in the subsequent years.
1047
  
 
         Levinas too was very attentive to the voice in which a message was conveyed. This 
sensitivity is reflected for example in an article he wrote in 1985 to commemorate Vladimir 
Jankélévitch. The article begins with a reference to the particularity of Jankélévitch‟s way of 
speaking:  
 
Vladimir Jankélévitch had a certain way of speaking; a bit haltingly, in such a way that, in the perfect 
clarity of the statement, each word sprang up new, as if unforeseeable in the word that preceded it. 
[…] That is how I heard Jankélévitch even in his everyday utterances […]. […] The rhythm and 
breath of his spoken words still orchestrate, for my ears, the printed pages of his work.
1048
 
 
By drawing attention to the voice of Jankélévitch, Levinas connects the written text of this 
philosopher, i.e what he wrote, with the oral character of his thinking, i.e. how he spoke. In a 
similar way, Rosenzweig points out in his article “Scripture and Luther” [“Die Schrift und 
Luther”], published in July 1926, the importance of paying attention to the „tone‟ in which a 
message is proffered. Rosenzweig argues that  
 
[…] it is impossible to transmit the content without at the same time transmitting the form. How 
something is said is not peripheral to what is said. The melody makes the music. The command: 
„attention!‟ is, as regards „content‟, identical with the „your attention, please‟ of a cultivated art 
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historian or desk lieutenant, and also with the substantially irreproachable syntactic reworking, „I 
order you to pay attention‟; but it is not the same thing as either.1049  
 
In order to properly translate the original text one must listen to what I am inclined to define as 
the „voice of the textual structure‟. To meet the requirements of a faithful translation the issue at 
stake was first and foremost to reproduce the literal meaning of the text, i.e. the content in its 
specific form. To give an example of what this means concretely, I cite from the first verse at the 
beginning of the book of Genesis (Genesis 1:1) only one phrase, by means of which one sees 
clearly what the intention of Buber‟s and Rosenzweig‟s translation was: describing the primal 
scene of creation, the Hebrew text says that there was only “והבו והת” [tohu va‟bohu], which 
Luther translated as “wüst und leer”, whereas Buber and Rosenzweig opted for “Irrsal und 
Wirrsal”, trying to point out with this formulation, on the one hand, the specific rhyme and sing-
song rhythm of the Hebrew words (tohu va‟bohu), and on the other hand, that the earth was full 
in a chaotic way, without the structure of a created cosmos Ŕ however not “empty” (leer) as 
Luther says.
1050
 Bringing back in this way the literal meaning as well as a sense for the sound of 
the original, the Buber-Rosenzweig translation seeks to show “the intricate connection between 
the „What‟ (Was) and the „How‟ (Wie)”1051 of the Hebrew language, which should be made 
perceptible for the German reader in order to render the text as faithfully as possible. However, 
this approach was conceived by Rosenzweig and Buber as an “impossible task” [“eine 
grundsätzlich unerfüllbare Aufgabe”] since the uniqueness of a text cannot be reproduced in 
another language.
1052
 According to Buber, “[r]evelation is accomplished in the human body and 
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the human voice, i.e., in this body and this voice, in the mystery of their uniqueness.”1053 In this 
sense, revelation is bound to a specific moment in time and space and cannot be transferred or 
seen detached from it. As a result, Buber argues that a faithful translation can only approximately 
reproduce the text by corresponding to its patterns:  
 
The auditory patterns of German can never reproduce the auditory forms of Hebrew; but they can, in 
growing from an analogous impulse and in exercising an analogous effect, correspond to them 
Germanically, can Germanize them.
1054
  
 
Similarly, Franz Rosenzweig emphasizes at the beginning of his article “Scripture and Luther” 
that the task of translation is as such unfullfilable: “Translating means serving two masters. It 
follows that no one can do it. [Übersetzen heißt zwei Herren dienen. Also kann es niemand.]”1055 
However, as Rosenzweig argues further in this article, speech as such is already in itself always 
translation. Far from being only the work of a translator, in Rosenzweig‟s eyes, every human 
being actually translates and does so all the time in order to understand the world he lives in. This 
endless task of translating is as such a feature of human speech for Rosenzweig. To reformulate 
this task in a Levinasian manner with respect to the Buber-Rosenzweig-translation means literally 
to render the Saying perceptible and, moreover, „audible‟ in the Said, i.e. to let the Hebrew „voice 
of the text‟ resonate in the German translation, echoing in the present as an untranslatable past. It 
is the task of the translator, in this sense, to „resurrect‟ the text, to let the reader feel the primary 
thrill of the original and to render it from a mute text, whose words dream to be „heard‟, into a 
living text that vivifies its readers.  
 
         In his essay “Poetry and Resurrection: Notes on Agnon” Levinas describes the style of 
writing of Samuel Joseph Agnon (1888-1979) in this sense as “a resuscitated language [langue 
ressuscitée]”1056 which gives birth to the Jewish world of the past, vanished in the Shoah, 
however resurrected through the unique style of Agnon‟s writing with the help of the power of 
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“poetry Ŕ that last refuge of transcendence in Western humanism.”1057 In my view, there is an 
analogy here in the translation project of the Bible by Buber and Rosenzweig and Agnon‟s 
literature: both „resurrect‟ the Jewish past through the power of their words, both focusing first 
and foremost on the sonority of the language, as Levinas outlines with respect to Agnon‟s work:  
 
The Jewish way of life, rechanneled by the rite from its beginning and development in nature, thus 
mirrors, in Agnon, the sonority of the language in which it is expressed; the ambiguity of the present-
day words resounds in the text from out of their dream. That life is not just sung; it is itself song. That 
is probably what lies at the root of the strictly untranslatable dimension of Agnon‟s work.1058  
 
This untranslatable dimension had to be faced also in the work of the Bible translation: how does 
one let the Hebrew Saying resonate in the German Said (if it might be permitted to use in this 
context the Levinasian notions)? In his theoretical reflections that accompanied his Bible 
translation, Rosenzweig points out as a possible answer that the Saying of the Bible must not be 
captured in a frozen text. On the contrary, it must remain what it is Ŕ a living voice. The notion of 
the voice is thereby of great significance for the translation of the Bible, as Rosenzweig points 
out further in his essay “Scripture and Luther”:  
 
For the voice of the Bible is not to be enclosed in any space Ŕ not in the inner sanctum of a church, not 
in the linguistic sanctum of a people, not in the circle of the heavenly images moving above a nation‟s 
sky. Rather this voice seeks again and again to resound from outside Ŕ from outside this church, this 
people, this heaven. It does not keep its sound from echoing in this or that restricted space, but it 
wants itself to remain free. If somewhere it has become a familiar, customary possession, it must 
again and anew, as a foreign and unfamiliar sound, stir up the complacent satedness of its alleged 
possessor from outside.
1059
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The description Rosenzweig gives here of the role of the „voice of the Bible‟ resonates in some 
sense with his notion of the „voice of the revelation‟, a notion I have outlined in a previous 
section.
1060
 It stirs up man from his mute being as a Self and transforms him into a soul that 
speaks. The „voice‟ of the Bible, described by Rosenzweig as a foreign and unfamiliar sound 
from outside (“fremder, unvertrauter Laut von draußen”), is attributed in this context to the 
power of a revelatory voice. The aspect of being „outside‟ emphasizes again the dimension of 
revelation as received from without the subject and thus refers to the other, as being „outside‟ of 
the I. It recalls in this context Levinas‟s definition of revelation in the preparatory notes for 
Totality and Infinity, where the exteriority of the event is particularly emphasized:  
 
Revelation Ŕ something given that I did not give to myself. Not to be said in terms of an experience 
that remains potent and masterful and which is assumed in the light. A past that was not present. Or 
the word of the Other [l‟Autre] which is the Other [Autrui].1061  
 
Revelation, as being received from outside, is linked with a sound coming from outside, i.e. the 
voice. Rosenzweig refers to „sound‟ in his article in order to highlight the capacity to overwhelm 
somebody and to shake him up. In this sense, he argues: “The Luther Bible was, then, a trumpet-
call in the ear of those who had fallen asleep happy in their possession of the „received and 
certified‟.”1062 Luther has given a new „voice‟ to the Bible by translating it in a new sound. 
Changing the words of the translation means, on the one hand, changing the sense, but also, on 
the other hand, changing the tone or melody of the text. This is because words have a double 
existence: a written and an oral form. That the text can be read out loud marks the transitory 
event of a mute and „dead‟ text to an animated and „living‟ text. The written form is needed to 
conserve the content, however the transcendence is kept alive through the revival through its 
sound, i.e. its voice. In this sense Rosenzweig speaks of “the voice of the Bible [die Stimme 
dieses Buches]”.1063 Likewise Buber refers to the fact that in the traditional view of Judaism the 
Bible was to be “called out loud”, האירק, instead of being read in silence. Here again, all depends 
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on the voice and its power to revive the text. Being originally an orally transmitted text, the 
Bible, as a consequence, has to be read out loud, as Buber points out:  
 
But what originates in speaking can live again only in speaking, indeed can only in speaking be purely 
perceived and received. In Jewish tradition, Scripture is to be recited. The so-called system of accents 
that accompanies each word of the text furthers a return to its rightful spokenness; even the Hebrew 
term for „reading‟ means „to call out‟. The traditional name of the Bible is „the reading‟, i.e. the 
„calling out‟; God says to Joshua [1.8] that the book of the Torah is never to depart, not from his eyes, 
but from „his mouth‟, that Joshua is to „murmur‟ in it (that is what the following verse actually 
means), i.e., to form the intonation patterns in a low voice.
1064
  
 
This demonstrates further the profound connection between spirit Ŕ and in this context also in 
particular the „holy spirit‟ of the biblical text Ŕ, revelation and voice. Giving a new voice to the 
Bible means thus also to revive the spirit of others and to keep revelation alive by transmitting it 
orally with a new voice. Rosenzweig saw in this process a fundamental task, which was not at all 
of marginal significance for his own life. This was an insight Rosenzweig began to have 
especially after the completion of The Star of Redemption, which, however, had its importance 
before as well. In a letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg in October 1917, Rosenzweig already emphasized 
the great importance of translating: “Translating is in fact the very task of the spirit; only when 
something has been translated, does it become really audible [laut], no longer to be dismissed 
from the world.”1065 Seen in the context of “Scripture and Luther” nine years afterwards, in 1926, 
where Rosenzweig argues that all speaking is in fact already translation because “when we speak, 
we translate from our intention into the understanding we expect in the other,”1066 this line of 
thought shows not only the great importance of translation for Rosenzweig, but also the necessity 
of the other person and, further, the aspect of exteriority which marks all real speaking. For 
Rosenzweig, all speaking is dialogical speaking, addressed towards the outside and towards the 
other. That which is at stake in a dialogue resides in that which remains fundamentally „outside‟ 
of any thematization. Martin Buber emphasizes this in his speech “The Word That Is Spoken” 
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[“Das Wort das gesprochen wird”], which he held at a conference organized by the Bavarian 
Academy of Fine Arts in 1960. Buber argues in his lecture that even  
 
[…] if we could take an inventory of all the physical and psychic phenomena to be found within a 
dialogical event, then there would remain something sui generis outside that could not be included Ŕ 
and this is just that which does not allow itself to be understood as the sum of the speech of two or 
more speakers, together with all the accidental circumstances. This something sui generis is their 
dialogue.
1067
  
 
This shows that the dimension of exteriority is crucial in the moment of speaking. As Bernhard 
Casper points out with respect to Rosenzweig and Levinas, this moment can be conceived of as a 
Saying that delivers itself in the gift of the Said.
1068
 Casper shows further that Levinas‟s notions 
of the Saying and the Said can be used for a fruitful discussion of Rosenzweig‟s views on 
translation. For both thinkers, the linguistic dimension implies also a transcendental dimension 
since speaking refers to the other and even needs the other. The interpersonal relationship 
constituted in language is defined by Levinas as nothing less than religion, as he argues in 
Totality and Infinity: “[…] thought consists in speaking. We propose to call „religion‟ the bond 
that is established between the same and the other without constituting a totality.”1069 Speaking 
and translation entail responsibility for Rosenzweig as well. Not only as being simply a response 
to the other Ŕ response as connected to respons-ibility Ŕ, but moreover as being a service for the 
other. This can be seen in Rosenzweig‟s work for the Jüdisches Lehrhaus in Frankfurt, but also in 
his assessment that his work would be “a gift” to the German people.1070 With respect to the 
development of Rosenzweig‟s work after the completion of The Star of Redemption, it becomes 
thus comprehensible why he devoted the waning energy of the last years of his life to the 
translation of the Bible, being a logical consequence of his considerations in The Star.  
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         In a highly poetical style Rosenzweig emphasizes in his article “Scripture and Luther” the 
significance of the role of the voice for a reader devoted to the study of the Scipture. Through his 
belief, Scripture will reveal itself to this attentive reader little by little, just  
 
[…] as a spotlight brings one sector of the landscape out of darkness, then another, then is dimmed, so 
for this person the days of his life illuminate Scripture, and let him see sometimes, amidst Scripture‟s 
human traits, also what is more than human Ŕ today here, tomorrow there, but with today‟s event 
implying no guarantee of tomorrow‟s. Yet everywhere these human traits can, in the light of a lived 
day, become transparent, so that suddenly they are written into the center of his own heart, and the 
divinity in what has been humanly written is, for the duration of this heartbeat, as clear and certain as 
a voice calling in this moment into his heart and being heard.
1071
  
 
The transformation of the written text, that is to say the thematized and the Said, into a Saying, 
that is a voice, is thus the crucial event in the process of the study of the Bible. The 
transcendence, i.e. what Rosenzweig refers to as “what is more than human” and which exceeds 
the human limits physically and mentally, shows itself as a voice calling into the heart of the 
reader. As the voice combines both spheres, the physical and the spiritual one, it lies precisely at 
the intersection between the „graspable‟ and the „un-graspable‟. The transcendence of the 
revelation, conveyed by the voice, shows itselfs in hiding, in fading away like the breath. Jean-
Luc Marion calls this event “a voice without name” since the appeal of the voice cannot be 
summed up in a name, defining its essence. It withdraws from any conceptualization and thereby 
offers the very possibility for the event of revelation. According to Marion, “the voice which 
reveals […] remains without Name.”1072 The voice in its ineffable essence offers the moment for 
revelation. Thus, to hear a voice out of the written text, a voice that calls the reader and that 
shakes him out of his silent reading Ŕ herein lies the very function of the the role of the voice in 
the context of the Bible translation. Rosenzweig uses the notion of the voice at numerous places 
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in this article, and, in my view, this is a highly interesting aspect with respect to Levinas‟s 
notions of the Saying and the Said. Something comes to the fore through the voice, something 
which is not entirely summed up by the words that are proffered, something ineffable though 
mirrored in words Ŕ the transparent „face‟ (to refer to another key notion of Levinas‟s thinking) 
of the breath of the Hebrew voice, light as air, appears out of the pages of the Buber-Rosenzweig 
translation while reading it out loud. The transcendence of the translation is in this way 
transmitted through the Saying, i.e. through the voice.           
 
         In an other essay from this period, “Scripture and Word: On the New Bible Translation” 
[“Die Schrift und das Wort. Zur neuen Bibelübersetzung”], published in 1925, the year of the 
beginning of the Bible translation, Rosenzweig elaborates in more detail the relationship between 
the written and the oral. He begins his article by pointing out that “[e]very word is a spoken 
word. The book originally served the word, whether declaimed, sung, or spoken; it sometimes 
still serves it today, as in theatrically living drama or opera.”1073 However, in the present days this 
has fundamentally changed. Nowadays the book rules over the spoken word, as Rosenzweig 
asserts:  
 
The book no longer serves the word. It becomes the word‟s ruler and hindrance; it becomes Holy 
Scripture. And with Holy Scripture, with letter-by-letter commentaries on the soundless and dumb 
word [dem laut-losen, stummen Buchstaben] […] we have the end of the book subservient to the word 
[…].1074  
 
Regarding the Bible this situation is particularly unacceptable for Rosenzweig, who sees in fact 
the very essence of the Bible endangered by this development. Similarly to Mendelssohn in his 
Jerusalem, as I have shown in the previous chapter,
1075
 Rosenzweig emphasizes the oral 
character of the Bible, which highlights its special character among all other books:  
 
This book alone must […] remain word. It cannot attain the autonomous, aesthetic value of Schrift 
because it cannot attain the distance that is the precondition of this value. Its content, the essential part 
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1074
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of its content, refuses displacement into objectivity, the separatedness, the madeness [das Verfaßte] 
that characterizes all that becomes literature.
1076
  
 
A certain parallel to Levinas‟s notions of the Saying and the Said appears obvious in this context. 
Both thinkers underscore the significance of saying and the spoken word before that which is said 
and thematized. Similar to Levinas‟s argumentation that emphasizes the transcendence of the 
Saying,
1077
 Rosenzweig points out that “the essential content [of the Bible] is precisely what 
escapes the specifying and distancing power of Schrift: the word of God to man, the word of man 
to God, the word of men before God.”1078 Hence, emphasis is put on the “word”, i.e. the spoken 
word transmitted through the voice. Further, and like Buber, Rosenzweig draws attention to the 
idea of the Bible as “the qer‟iah, the „calling-out‟”, according to the Hebrew tradition.1079 
Therefore the translation of Buber and Rosenzweig is intended to take into account the human 
breathing and also the necessary segmentation of speech which is entailed by the breathing.
1080
 
This requires an occasional alternance of silence and speech, which Rosenzweig calls a “breath-
renewing silence [atemerneuerndes Schweigen]”.1081 A faithful translation must take this into 
account, according to Buber and Rosenzweig. In the emphasis which Rosenzweig puts on the 
breath one can see another parallel to Levinas‟s notion of the Saying, which draws on the 
significance of the human breath in the event of the Saying. Particularly in the last chapter of 
Otherwise than Being, entitled Outside, Levinas underlines this aspect:  
 
That the breathing by which entities seem to affirm themselves triumphantly in their vital space would 
be a consummation, a coring out of my substantiality, that in breathing I already open myself to my 
subjection to the whole of the invisible other, that the beyond or the liberation would be the support of 
a crushing charge, is to be sure surprising. It is this wonder that has been the object of the book 
[Otherwise than Being] proposed here.
1082
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Breathing holds thus a remarkable place for Levinas‟s thinking. He defines it as a form of 
„opening-up‟ of the subject toward the other:  
 
[…] breathing is transcendence in the form of opening up. […] In human breathing, in its everyday 
equality, perhaps we have to already hear the breathlessness of an inspiration that paralyzes essence, 
that transpierces it with an inspiration by the other, an inspiration that is already expiration, that 
„renders the soul‟! It is the longest breath there is, spirit.1083  
 
Similarly, Rosenzweig emphasizes in his article “the obligation to let the Scripture be suffused 
once again with the breath of the word [die Schrift wieder vom Atem des Worts durchziehen zu 
lassen]”1084 and “the obligation of hearing the breathing movement of the word from the pen-
strokes of the Scripture [die Atemzüge des Worts allein aus den Schriftzügen der Schrift zu 
erhorchen]”.1085 This is because the transcendence that comes to the fore in the words of the 
Bible cannot be subsumed into the meter of any grammar and syntax. The inspired words require 
thus an inspirational reading, that is to say, to „resurrect‟ them through the Saying and with the 
breath of one‟s voice.1086 In this context Rosenzweig refers again to the sonority and musicality 
of the voice that transmits a meaning beyond the written text:  
 
The apparent singsong of Talmud study, i.e., the „musical‟ setting of the sentence as read, sets up the 
logical understanding of it; Hermann Cohen similarly „set‟ difficult sentences of Plato and Kant even 
in reading them aloud. Those who comprehend such experiences will understand how logical meaning 
can be based on musical value in the biblical punctuation as well.
1087
 
 
Hence, the oral form, the Saying of a text, is as important as the silent reading, and even more 
helpful to understand its full meaning. The spoken word is able to express a transcendent 
meaning and to enter in this way into dialogue with the other and to open oneself up to the word 
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of the other. This process is described by Rosenzweig, who concludes his article with the 
following pathetic words:  
 
Henceforth the gate into the nocturnal silence that enveloped the human race in its origins, dividing 
each from each other, and all from what was outside and what was beyond Ŕ henceforth the gate is 
broken and cannot altogether be closed again: the gate of the word.
1088
 
 
The gate of the word is, in Levinas‟s eyes, the infinity which passes in the Saying. The spoken 
word enables the time to become a messianic time, because within it each tiny second represents 
“the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter”, as Walter Benjamin pointed out in his 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History”.1089 
 
         Concluding, I want to highlight the power of language from another point of view: the 
revival of Hebrew as a modern, spoken language. This correlates to Rosenzweig‟s and Buber‟s 
project in the sense of bringing a voice to a „mute‟ text, in which the Hebrew language survived, 
encapsulated in the „square letters‟ that pious Jews used throughout the centuries in a religious 
context only. In a text written for Franz Rosenzweig on the occasion of his fortieth birthday in 
December 1926, Gershom Scholem, three years after his arrival in Palestine, points out the great 
dangers entailed in the „secularization‟ of Hebrew:  
 
This country is a volcano, and language is lodged within it. People here talk of many things that may 
lead to our ruin, and more than ever of the Arabs. But there is another danger, much more uncanny 
than the Arab nation, and it is a necessary result of the Zionist enterprise: what of the „actualization‟ 
of the Hebrew language? That sacred language on which we nurture our children, is it not an abyss 
that must open up one day? […] But if we transmit the language to our children as it was transmitted 
to us, if we, a generation of transition, revive the language of the ancient books for them, that it may 
reveal itself anew through them, shall not the religious power of that language explode one day?
1090
 
 
Just as Rosenzweig saw the Bible endangered by its „petrification‟ in a book that becomes „Holy 
Scripture‟ and therefore sacrosanct, untouchable and dead, Scholem sees the life of the Jewish  
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people endangered by the secularization of the Hebrew language into a modern, spoken language. 
The question of whether Scholem‟s predictions have become reality cannot be examined here, 
more than eighty years after he wrote his text. Rather, it is of utmost interest to put Scholem‟s 
reflections and Rosenzweig‟s views on language into dialogue. It is for instance striking that 
Scholem, while laying out his argument, underlines like Rosenzweig the great significance of the 
„name‟ in language:  
 
Language is name. The power of language is enclosed in the name; the abyss of language is sealed 
within it. […] And yet, out of the spectral degradation of our language, the force of the holy often 
speaks to us. For the names have a life of their own; […].1091  
 
Describing the process of linguistic secularization up to its end, it is further striking that Scholem, 
like Rosenzweig and Buber, refers to the notion of the voice as the ultimate kernel of language:  
 
Because at the heart of such a language, in which we ceaselessly evoke God in a thousand ways, thus 
calling Him back into the reality of our life, He cannot keep silent. This inevitable revolution of 
language, in which the Voice [sic] will again become audible, is the only subject never discussed in 
this country.
1092
  
 
This short analysis of Scholem‟s text shows that the notion of the voice is taken up with regard to 
many aspects, however the main focus in all these considerations lies, in my view, in a 
connection between God‟s voice and the voice of man: His voice reverberates in the voice of 
man. This recalls Rosenzweig‟s theomorphism of human language and love in The Star, where he 
points out:  
 
Only the one who loves, but really he can say and does say: Love me. From his mouth, the 
commandment of love is not an [sic] strange commandment, it is nothing other than the voice of love 
itself. […] Once again, let us seek the word of man in the word of God. […] Man loves because, and 
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as, God loves. [Der Mensch liebt, weil und wie Gott liebt.] Man‟s human soul is the soul awakened 
and loved by God.
1093
  
 
Hence a parallel with respect to the significance of the voice in Scholem‟s and Rosenzweig‟s 
points of view can be seen in the aspect of an „actualization‟ of language. This aspect is taken up 
by Rosenzweig in his article “Modern Hebrew? On the occasion of the translation of Spinoza‟s 
Ethics”.1094 Far from only having the task of transmitting content, speech, seen under the aspect 
of the voice, is in fact much more than that: it is, as Rosenzweig puts it in The Star, the voice of 
love itself. This can be read in the context of Adriana Cavarero‟s book For More Than One 
Voice. Cavarero points out that the idea of communication that can be traced back in the Hebrew 
tradition takes on a different approach:  
 
This idea affirms that speakers communicate themselves to one another, in the voice of God, which 
reverberates in the sound of their language. The reverberation of the divine qol in articulate speech is 
in fact the originary communication that makes communicable every further act of communication.
1095
 
 
The voice ties together all these threads Ŕ the divine and the human, the language and the 
ineffable, the presence and the absence. Like a red thread it runs through the texts I have 
examined in this section and offers much potential for further exegesis, as I have tried to show in 
these concluding remarks.  
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4.     a)        Transmitting the fire – the renewal of tradition through the living speech   
       
                                 
                                                 Tradition is the transmission of the fire, instead of the adoration of the ashes.1096                                                                                                                                                           
 
         Taking up Mendelssohn‟s statement that the ceremonial law requires constant social 
intercourse in order to be explained and interpreted every time anew, I would like to draw 
attention in the following to the notion of sociality that arises from this context. It is nothing new 
to start with the consideration that Judaism places a much greater significance in the doing than 
in the believing. In this sense, Mendelssohn emphasizes in Jerusalem:  
 
Among all the prescriptions and ordinances of the Mosaic law, there is not a single one which says: 
You shall believe or not believe. They all say: You shall do or not do. Faith is not commanded, for it 
accepts no other commands than those that come to it by way of conviction.
1097
 
 
Pursuing this idea further, it is logical that he concludes Jerusalem with his famous plea for 
religious freedom, advising the rulers of the government that they should pay attention to the 
deeds of men and in return should permit the freedom of thought and religion to all their citizens: 
“Pay heed to the [right] conduct of men; upon this bring to bear the tribunal of wise laws, and 
leave us thought and speech which the Father of us all assigned to us as an inalienable heritage 
and granted to us as an immutable right.”1098 In one of his anthologies of Talmudic lectures, In 
the Time of the Nations, Levinas reports an anecdote about Hannah Arendt which illustrates 
excellently this emphasis of the doing vis-à-vis the belief:  
 
The Christians attach great importance to what they call faith, mystery, sacrament. Here is an anecdote 
on this subject. Hannah Arendt, not long before she died, told the following story on French radio. 
When she was a child in her native Königsberg, one day she said to the rabbi who was teaching her 
religion: „You know, I have lost my faith.‟ And the rabbi responded: „Who‟s asking you for it?‟ The 
response was typical. What matters is not „faith‟, but „doing‟. Doing, which means moral behavior, of 
course, but also the performance of ritual. Moreover, are believing and doing different things? What 
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does believing mean? What is faith made of? Words, ideas? Convictions? What do we believe with? 
With the whole body! With all my bones (Psalm 35:10)! What the rabbi meant was: „Doing good is 
the act of belief itself.‟ That is my conclusion.1099  
 
In his article “Judaism”, written for the Encyclopaedia Universalis in 1971 and republished in his 
anthology Difficult Freedom, Levinas underlines this aspect in other words, emphasizing that 
“[i]t is perhaps in a ritualism, regulating all the gestures of the complete Jew‟s day-to-day life, in 
the famous yoke of the Law, which the pious experience as something joyful, that we find the 
most characteristic aspects of Jewish existence.”1100 The observation of the commandments 
(mitzvoth) thereby causes a community to arise, which discloses itself as a religious and a social 
unity. In the previous section, I have outlined the importance of speaking for Levinas, 
Rosenzweig and Mendelssohn, with special attention to the liturgical sphere. However, this social 
unity is not reduced to the religious sphere. It extends to more general questions of cohabitation 
amongst human beings. This Jewish model of a society, which is created and supported by the 
mitzvoth, finds its node in its universality, that is to say that the values which are lived and 
expressed through Judaism concern, at base, all human beings. They are, upon closer inspection, 
not limited specifically to the Jewish community. Nota bene: although the religious 
commandments appeal only to the particular Jewish community, they bring to the fore a social 
community which contributes universal social and ethical values to the society. In this way, 
considered as a civilizing force, Judaism brings to light through its tradition (תרוסמ) values which 
are as such an integral part of human rights, i.e. the Ten Commandments („Thou shall not 
murder!‟ etc.).1101 This conveys the hope to see the realization, hitherto utopian, of a peaceful 
cohabitation which brings together different cultures and religions. This is because “no religion is 
an island”,1102 and the idea that all human beings are connected with one another through the 
simple fact of being human represents a keystone of this project of living together: “We are all 
brothers, all sisters. From such intimacy comes the hope of our humanity.”1103  
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         The notion of fraternity, in its first formulation in the Enlightenment, must be thought of as 
a concept encompassing generations, nations and cultures.
1104
 The Jewish vision of history as 
composed of toldot (תודלות), i.e. of successive generations connected with one another through 
their birth and death, rests on the idea that human beings are united in time and era. The 
transmission of what I am inclined to call the „fire of tradition‟ consists thus in maintaining this 
continuity through the generations. The idea of intergenerational oral transmission has been 
recently studied by Catherine Chalier in her book Transmettre, de génération en génération.
1105
 
Chalier supports the thesis that, in living speaking transmitted from one human being to another, 
something happens that goes beyond mere communication Ŕ and it is precisely that which 
reunites the human community as such. She illustrates her reflections notably by referring to the 
fundamental texts of human civilization: “The act of recounting Ŕ „You shall say to your son‟ 
(véhigadta leBinekha [ךְָנ ִׁבְל ָתְדַג ִׁהְו]) (Ex. 13:8) Ŕ thus constitutes a leitmotiv in the Bible. All 
cultures are transmitted at first in this fashion, from generation to generation.”1106 In this way, we 
have to imagine this process as a sort of uninterrupted dialogue which comes about through the 
saying.
1107
 It is held and maintained between two people, then extended through a dialogically 
structured community, and finally reflected and taken up, beyond cultural and national borders, in 
the context of a worldwide conversation.
1108
 The vital power of speech and the power of the spirit 
are in this sense united in the „transmitting of the fire‟, conceived as an ongoing dialogue between 
men, as Abraham Joshua Heschel underlines in Man‟s Quest for God: “We shall never be able to 
understand that the spirit is revealed in the form of words unless we discover the vital truth that 
speech has power, that words are commitments.”1109      
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b)         Walking on the moon – on the significance of talking face-to-face in politics     
 
                                                                              Abel, stand up / so that it might begin differently / amongst us all
1110
 
 
                                                                                      
 In the face-to-face speaking there is something revealed which exceeds the dimension of 
the political, something which is reflected in the ethical sphere, beyond communication. In this 
context, Levinas speaks repeatedly in Beyond the Verse of a “continued revelation” which takes 
place in the saying, notably in that of exegesis, for which a plurality of speakers is indispensible, 
for no man has access to the truth alone. On the contrary, according to Levinas, it is necessary to 
understand  
 
[…] the very plurality as an unavoidable moment of the signification of meaning, and as in some way 
justified by the destiny of the inspired word, so that the infinite richness of what it does not say can be 
said or that the meaning of what is does say can be „renewed‟, to use the technical expression of the 
Rabbis.
1111
  
 
The idea that the “struggle for shared meaning [is] essential to humanity”1112 was also 
emphasized by Martin Buber in his lecture “The Word That Is Spoken” [“Das Wort das 
gesprochen wird”]. Buber argues that “[i]t is the communal nature of the logos as at once „word‟ 
and „meaning‟ which makes man man, and it is this which proclaims itself from of old in the 
communalizing of the spoken word that again and again comes into being.”1113 This way of 
„coming into being‟ of the word is paved however through the breath of the voice, which puts 
men in relation to one another, as Harold Stahmer points out, citing Walter J. Ong: “Voice is the 
foundation for role-playing among men in the sense that the use of voice and its understanding 
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[…] forces man to enter into others.”1114 It is precisely for this reason that the face-to-face 
conversation, in my view, matters so much in the political realm. To take into consideration a 
pluralistic structured signification of meaning would lead to more open-mindedness and to more 
recognition of the arguments of the „other‟ political side. This would bring about the hope one 
day to attain a peace which is not only an armistice between two wars, but a lasting peace. 
Levinas refers to this notion by outlining a messianic peace, conceived as a state situated beyond 
war and beyond history. Although war is an important point of reference for Levinas‟s thinking 
(see e.g. the foreword of Totality and Infinity), his conception of history and time nevertheless 
transports us beyond time.
1115
 Through the notion of the Saying (le Dire), Levinas outlines 
something „outside time‟ (hors temps) which must always be re-captured and re-actualized 
through a re-saying face-to-face. This necessitates another way of addressing others and, 
consequently, another way of having a conversation. In contrast to a discourse thematizing the 
other and a communication reduced to the simple exchange of information, Levinas works out the 
model of a conversation directed towards the other. He argues that in the very possibility to speak 
resides in nuce the possibility for peace: “Peace is produced as [...] aptitude for speech.”1116 The 
loss of language between men and the breakdown of real communication, produces a kind of 
mutism which provides the primary condition for war and all the cruelties entailed with it, as 
Antje Kapust has argued in her intriguing study Der Krieg und der Ausfall der Sprache.
1117
 
However, in language resides also the power of a revival of language and the power to re-new the 
conversation, every time anew Ŕ even in times when it seems that men have lost their capacity to 
speak to each other. Language is newly reborn in every new conversation that starts and in this 
power of actualization lies the very characteristic of language, as Bernhard Casper emphasizes: 
“Language is in fact always re-newed conversation. [Sprache ist in Wirklichkeit sich immer neu 
ereignendes Gespräch.]”1118     
 
To speak to someone means in the first place to give time to the other, that is to say, to set 
up and arrange a common space. The idea of hospitality, of welcoming the stranger, expresses 
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itself in the first instance through what is said to him.
1119
 Indeed, the lack or the loss of the sense 
of hospitality can be thought of as the most fundamental symptom of xenophobia, as Nicolas 
Weill argues: “When a society […] no longer questions the limitations and defects of its own 
capacity to welcome the other, but rather projects onto the stranger the responsibility of the 
failure of this welcoming, the alarm signals are in the red.”1120 The challenge resides in the task to 
render the stranger no longer a stranger, but a brother, by maintaining his right to be different 
amongst an otherwise homogenous group. The lack of communication, widespread in the 
political domain as well as in daily life, makes the establishment of peace unlikely. Already in 
1953, Martin Buber pointed out with clear-sightedness this loss of language among people in his 
acceptance speech for the German bookseller‟s Peace Prize (Friedenspreis des Deutschen 
Buchhandels): “That the people can no longer lead a real conversation with one another is not 
simply the most recent phenomenon; it is also the most urgently demanding phenomenon of the 
pathology of our time.”1121 It is therefore not surprising that the paradigm of conversation has 
maintained its relevancy also with respect to the most recent ethical theories, such as that found 
for instance in the work of Kwame Anthony Appiah. In one of his recent studies, Appiah argues: 
“That‟s why the model I‟ll be returning to is that of conversation Ŕ and, in particular, 
conversation between people from different ways of life. [...] [C]onversations across boundaries 
can be delightful, or just vexing: what they mainly are, though, is inevitable.”1122 Levinas also 
refers repeatedly to the importance of a face-to-face conversation which would go beyond the 
political, but which could be realized only at rare and precious moments in the political sphere. 
The example Levinas gives in this context is that of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadate‟s 
visit to Israel in 1977, which, according to Levinas, illustrates a trans-historic event, in some 
ways comparable to the first steps of man on the moon:  
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The peace concluded between Israel and Egypt, the unusual conditions in which it had been brought 
about by President Sadat‟s trip to Jerusalem on 19 November 1977 and which, on the small screen [of 
the television], must have seemed like man‟s first steps on the moon (though no more irrational), 
represents in our eyes [...] the very path on which reconciliation had a chance to occur. [...] Hence 
Sadat‟s grandeur and importance. His trip has probably been the exceptional transhistorical event that 
one neither makes nor is contemporaneous with twice in a lifetime.
1123
   
 
This demonstrates that that which takes place in a conversation is not, we can see, completely 
translatable or to be summed up into words; and it is perhaps precisely this feature of face-to-face 
conversations that makes them so important, especially in the realm of politics. The model of 
conversation can be seen as an event constituting what we see as „politics‟ as such. With his 
notions of the face and the Saying, Levinas, in my view, has contributed greatly to the task of 
rethinking and taking a fresh approach to politics. As man is not alone in this world, the „trans-
historical‟ journey of Sadat Ŕ this little step between men which seems as incredible as „walking 
on the moon‟ Ŕ has to be renewed, every time anew, through the saying face-to-face. As we are 
bound to others through creation, this brings about fraternity and responsibility Ŕ a notion 
Levinas never tired of stressing in his philosophical as well as confessional texts. In his Talmudic 
lecture “As Old as the World?” Levinas underlines that liberty necessarily entails fraternity and 
that these two notions cannot be conceived as independent from one another: 
 
For the human world to be possible Ŕ justice, the Sanhedrin Ŕ at each moment there must be someone 
who can be responsible for the others. Reponsible! The famous finite liberty of the philosophers is 
responsibility for that which I have not done. Condition of the creature. Responsibility that Job, 
searching in his own impeccable past, could not find. „Where were you when I created the World?‟ 
the Holy One asks him. You are a self, certainly. Beginning, freedom, certainly. But even if you are 
free, you are not the absolute beginning. You come after many things and many people. You are not 
just free; you are also bound to others beyond your freedom. You are responsible for all. Your liberty 
is also fraternity.
1124
  
 
Taking into consideration these reflections, a new approach to politics should be worked out on 
the basis of an intercultural face-to-face dialogue.  
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Conclusions – Levinas and Rosenzweig: 
Impulses for an ethical approach to postmodern philosophy 
  
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                    Who is a hero? One who turns an enemy into a friend.  
                                                                                                                                                      Avoth deRabbi Nathan  
 
 
         The present thesis has tried to outline the complex interweaving of Judaism, philosophy and 
language in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Franz Rosenzweig. Special attention was 
given to the voice in this context. In conclusion, I would like to highlight from the foregoing 
chapters certain insights that have been outlined with respect to ethics and aesthetics by 
emphasizing their importance for a new approach to postmodern philosophy and putting them in 
dialogue with the points of view of postmodern thinkers, e.g. Simon Critchley. In this context, the 
project of a postmodern Jewish philosophy, outlined by Yudit Kornberg Greenberg, Steven 
Kepnes, Robert Gibbs and others, will be given special attention.
1125
  
 
         To begin with, it seems to me no exaggeration when Levinas is described in an anthology of 
the key figures of postmodernism as “the most original and important ethical figure in 
postmodernism.”1126 As Levinas is largely conceived nowadays as “a transdisclipinary 
thinker,”1127 frequently crossing between the borders of the philosophical (Greek) and the 
spiritual (Jewish) sides in his writings, his work inspires many innovative approaches also for 
other fields of knowledge, e.g. biomedicine, as has been worked out by Corine Pelluchon.
1128
 
However, the question remains: what is Levinas‟s specific contribution to postmodern philosophy 
and in which way might his thought be useful for the purposes of elaborating an ethical approach 
to postmodern philosophy? Firstly, an aspect which is often neglected should be kept in mind; 
namely, that Levinas‟s work in the first instance is not intended to set up rules for ethics, but 
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rather to describe the possibilities of the condition under which ethics, i.e. the relation of the I to 
the other, takes place. Furthermore, Levinas‟s thinking regarding ethics is not epistemologically 
founded, but instead is grounded in the non-thematizable Saying and the proximity of the I to the 
other. This aspect is important for his whole work, and not just his philosophical writings, as 
Ephraim Meir points out:  
 
In his texts on Bible and Talmud as well as in his metaphysics, Levinas strived to show the primacy of 
ethics as an irreducible structure on which all other structures rest. His ethics is not epistemologically 
founded; it is not based upon reason as in Kant, but upon the normative relationship, i.e., upon the 
concrete command of the other man.
1129
  
 
Just as the Saying escapes its thematization, one can never be wholly grasped by philosophy, 
because one essentially escapes narrativity. The task of the „ethical language‟, outlined by 
Levinas, is therefore to allow for an endless approach to the other, which I would like to call an 
asymptotical narrativity. This aspect of Levinas‟s philosophy is highlighted by Shalom 
Rosenberg, who describes Levinas‟s style of writing as an innovative interweaving of novelty 
and philosophy that is sometimes difficult to understand at first sight:  
 
Levinas‟ writings are full of intuitions and images that are many times transformed into a novel 
philosophical terminology. This, together with his wish to go back to the original meaning of the 
words, makes the understanding of his works more difficult. Sometimes, he puts in the old linguistic 
vessels new semantic meaning. And what is more, as we shall see, the novel and the original 
coexist.
1130
  
 
Therefore, the notion of an asymptotical narrativity best describes in my eyes the paradoxical 
mode in which Levinas‟s concept of an ethical language is realized in the scope of the 
philosophical discourse.   
 
                                                 
1129
 Meir, Ephraim, Levinas‟s Jewish Thought between Jerusalem and Athens, p. 30. See further on this topic the 
study of Chalier, Catherine, What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas/Pour une Morale au-delà du Savoir: 
Kant et Levinas.  
1130
 Rosenberg, Shalom, “Levinas and Infinity”, p. 13. See further Wyschogrod, Edith, “Emmanuel Levinas and the 
Problem of Religious Language”. 
 260 
         Taking into consideration Levinas‟s statement that his “critique of the totality has come in 
fact after a political experience that we have not yet forgotten,”1131 we should not neglect to note 
here that an adequate place for the Shoah within an historical narrative remains  to be found. The 
historian Dan Diner underlines this aspect as follows:  
 
The integration of the Holocaust into the course of history, the construction of an appropriate 
historical narration for an event unprecedented in its brevity and extremity, somehow disconnected 
from past and future, still remains an insurmountable task. It seems that the only serious attempt to 
deal with it historiographically is to accept its fundamental irreconcilability with the saeculum‟s core 
narratives.
1132
  
 
As Levinas tries to find an adequate philosophical expression for his thought that takes into 
account the Shoah as a traumatic event of mankind, in some sense he has to manage the same 
narrative problems as his colleagues in the history department. In this context Maurice Blanchot 
pointed out the impossibility of fulfilling the task that Levinas‟s philosophy sets out. This 
ambiguity can be revealed, according to Blanchot, in the entire plan of Levinas‟s thinking, trying 
to integrate the ineffable into a philosophical language:  
 
How can one philosophize, how can one write within the memory of Auschwitz of those who have 
said, oftentimes in notes buried near the crematoria: know what has happened, don‟t forget, and at the 
same time, you won‟t be able to. It is this thought that traverses, that bears, the whole of Levinas‟s 
philosophy and that he proposes to us without saying it, beyond and before all obligation.
1133
  
 
This has its echo in Levinas‟s style of writing, first and foremost in Otherwise than Being.1134 
The notion of the trauma plays a crucial role for Levinas in this context, as Simon Critchley 
points out in his study Infinitely Demanding: “Trauma was not a theoretical issue for Levinas, but 
a way of dealing with the memory of horror. […] In short, the Levinasian ethical subject is a 
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traumatic neurotic.”1135 However, concerning this conclusion, I must respectfully disagree with 
Critchley‟s fine study, although I agree with it in large, especially regarding the assumption “that 
there is a motivational deficit at the heart of liberal democratic life, where citizens experience the 
governmental norms that rule contemporary society as externally binding but not internally 
compelling.”1136 Facing this central problem of current ethics and politics, Critchley takes up the 
thought of Levinas, among others, and tries to develop a theory of ethical subjectivity which 
faces the ethical experience of an unfullfillable demand. According to Critchley, the ethical 
subject of Levinas  
 
[...] is a split subject divided between itself and a demand that it cannot meet, a demand that makes it 
the subject that it is, but which it cannot entirely fulfil. The sovereignty of my autonomy is always 
usurped by the heteronomous experience of the other‟s demand. The ethical subject is a dividual 
[sic].”1137 
 
Critchley‟s characterization of ethical language in Levinas‟s work misinterprets the notion of 
trauma in my view. Of course, trauma comes from “outside of the self”1138 and “can strike 
without warning, like a terrorist explosion,”1139 but it is not to be understood as a psychological 
notion in Levinas‟s thought.1140 It is true that Levinas‟s subject is a „non-identical subject‟ and 
that “otherness is in the self,” as Ephraim Meir points out.1141 However, this has to be seen in the 
context of metaphysical transcendence Levinas outlines in his work and not of psychoanalysis. 
When one focuses first and foremost on the aspect of a split-up subject, as Critchley does, one 
disregards that the most important aspect of Levinas‟s „ethical language‟ is the proximity to the 
other, which is realized in the Saying. An infinite approach to the other corresponds to the infinite 
demand. Yet during the moment of the Saying, proximity is realized. It is an enigmatic moment 
that uproots the subject from itself through its breath by giving itself to the other. In this 
eschatological moment the subject is somehow out of time, somewhere between life and death. 
Or, as Foucault puts it in his essay Language to Infinity:  
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Writing so as not to die, as Blanchot said, or perhaps even speaking so as not to die, is a task 
undoubtedly as old as the word. The most fateful decisions are inevitably suspended during the course 
of a story. We know that discourse has the power to arrest the flight of an arrow in a recess of time, in 
the space proper to it.
1142
  
  
         Furthermore, the philosophy of Levinas is not to be understood as martyrdom or as 
masochistic ethics that requires nothing other than sacrifices from the subject. Since Levinas 
outlines a radical notion of responsibility in his work, this had lead sometimes to an issue of 
psychological misinterpretation. However,    
 
[w]e are far from a love for the criminal, far from those who like the Carmelites prayed in Auschwitz 
for both the victims and the executioners. Levinas never writes that one must love the executioner, he 
does write however that we are not free from a responsibility without limit.
1143
 
 
This has to be taken into account also by politics which is required, as demanded by the ethical 
call. Levinas‟s philosophy is not understood as masochistic ethics because the Saying gives us the 
possibility to start again with a new beginning, leaving behind all that which has already been 
said, by reformulating it into other words Ŕ autrement dit.1144 The Saying face-to-face realizes 
this moment of responsibility. In my opinion, the fundamental ethical contribution of Levinas‟s 
thinking to postmodern philosophy lies in this aspect. Beyond all the contingent moments in 
postmodern thought there is at least one fact that is absolute: the infinite demand for 
responsibility experienced through the face of the other. Levinas can thus even be seen as „anti-
postmodern‟ in this respect.1145 This language before words, this proximity conveyed in the 
Saying, commands “Thou shalt not kill”, a command which expresses itself in the face and the 
saying, i.e., the voice. In this context, I would also underscore that language consists basically of 
our voice, and that it is through the voice that the ethical moment of the Saying is realized. With 
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this in mind, one can read the following statement by Giorgio Agamben as an indissoluble 
connection between language, ethics and the voice: “So, language is our voice, our language. As 
you now speak, that is ethics.”1146 Through the saying, ethics is realized Ŕ notwithstanding the 
endless misunderstandings implied in the saying. On the contrary, it is exactly this shift in 
meaning that so often occurs in a dialogue between two people that keeps philosophy busy and is 
the reason why it can never come to rest, as John Cage‟s anecdote highlights: “What he said was 
one thing; what I understood, another.”1147 This tiny shift of meaning, that happens in fact 
everyday around the world, keeps the dialogue among people going and, further, emphasizes a 
crucial element of  „speaking-thinking‟ (Sprachdenken) of Franz Rosenzweig. In my view, the 
outlined concept of Rosenzweig‟s „speaking-thinking‟ can offer an innovative approach for a 
fresh interpretation of what is precisely at stake in postmodern philosophy: recovering the 
possibility for a common language in a society of strangers living in a world après le deluge.
1148
  
 
         Further, I want to draw attention in this context to some aspects of Steven Kepnes‟s book 
Jewish Liturgical Reasoning. Kepnes argues that  
 
[t]he resurgence of religion in politics, culture, and war marks a profound disillusionment with the 
modern secular ideologies of capitalism, socialism, democracy, and nationalism, and a sense of 
disappointment with the consequences of modern institutions for the meaning-making enterprise, for 
the material conditions of those who live outside the richest nations, and for the life-sustaining 
capacity of the global environment.
1149
  
 
Against this background, Kepnes develops the hypothesis that truth as such is liturgical.
1150
 As I 
have shown, liturgy indeed holds a special place in Rosenzweig‟s thinking.1151 Kepnes further 
draws the conclusion of the necessity for the practice of scriptural reasoning that takes shape in 
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an interreligious dialogue and in collective discussions on the Jewish, Christian and Muslim 
forms of liturgy.
1152
 This approach seems to me particularly fruitful for taking into account 
Rosenzweig‟s philosophy in postmodern thinking. It is noteworthy in this context that Steven 
Kepnes is part of a group of Jewish scholars, amongst them Yudit Kornberg Greenberg, Robert 
Gibbs, Peter Ochs, Ephraim Meir, and others, that have set out for themselves the task of 
discussing and defining what is at stake for Judaism in postmodern philosophy and how Jewish 
philosophy can be put into dialogue with postmodernism.
1153
 This ongoing research process 
searchs for Jewish approaches to postmodern philosophy, “reintroducing guidelines for moral and 
religious reasoning into public debates Ŕ guidelines that are neither relativistic nor imperialistic 
but at once definitive and pluralistic, in the manner of classical rabbinic inquiry.”1154 Coming 
back to Levinas, I think that the saying, as well as the voice, plays a crucial role here, since what 
lies at the heart of all discussions and inquiries is always the spoken word face-to-face among 
men. In this sense, saying is all that remains to keep our human society alive and worth living. 
The word, the simply spoken word face-to-face, is all that remains, after all; it is not much, but it 
is all we have to keep alive “the little humanity that adorns the earth [...].”1155 
 
          Regarding the outlined project of a postmodern Jewish philosophy, I share with Robert 
Gibbs the point of view that Rosenzweig‟s thinking has affinities with trends in 
postmodernism.
1156
 However, the ethical claims which are present in Rosenzweig‟s, as well as in 
Levinas‟s, work are even more important to highlight in my view, because this is an aspect which 
is too often neglected in postmodernist thinking. As this is a philosophical approach that seems 
sometimes to lose the ground of the terminologies it uses while attempting to maintain a 
balancing act between reality and intellectual game, it is important to recall that there are ethical 
claims which are more important than all the word-games of postmodernism.
1157
 Shalom 
Rosenberg makes this issue clear, underscoring in simple words the profound significance of 
ethics: “How is ethics possible? Why is ethics binding? I shall not kill, therefore you exist. The 
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ethical Biblical message takes us beyond phenomenology,”1158 and, in a broader sense, also 
beyond postmodernism. In times of a vivid discussion of a “clash of civilizations”1159 and a 
worldwide mobility of millions of people from a wide range of different cultures, we have to face 
the task of finding a new charter of human rights, one which cannot be put into question by any 
of the cultural-ethnical groups living in this world.
1160
 This is indispensable for creating a basis 
for a peaceful coexistence and acknowleding the unsubsumable alterity of the other and with it 
“the rights of others”, to allude to the important study of Seyla Benhabib.1161 Levinas was well 
aware of the difficulties that arise when people encounter other fellow human beings, as well as 
of the difficulties that arise when men want to establish a society in which justice would be 
realized, as he points out: “Nothing is more strange or foreign than the other man, and it is in the 
light of utopia that man shows himself. Outside all enrootedness and all dwelling: statelessness as 
authenticity!”1162 By outlining the main features of a “humanism of the other man”,1163 Levinas 
has contributed a major part to this project. The outlined impulses of Rosenzweig‟s and Levinas‟s 
work for an ethical approach to postmodern philosophy make their thinking particularly fruitful 
for the present times. Not only for philosophy, but even for something much more important Ŕ 
life.
1164
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Summary of the thesis  
“Language, Philosophy and Judaism in the Work of Emmanuel Levinas and 
Franz Rosenzweig” in German according to § 7, subsection 2, of  
the Ph.D. regulations of the Hochschule für Jüdische Studien Heidelberg 
 
Zusammenfassung der Dissertation „Language, Philosophy and Judaism in the Work of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Franz Rosenzweig“ auf Deutsch gemäß § 7, Absatz 2 der  
Promotionsordnung der Hochschule für Jüdische Studien Heidelberg 
 
 
         Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den komplexen Zusammenhang von Sprache, 
Philosophie und Judentum im Werk von Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) und Franz Rosenzweig 
(1886-1929) im Lichte neuer Forschungsliteratur sowie bisher unveröffentlichter Schriften 
Emmanuel Levinas‟. Unterschiedliche Denker haben das Werk Levinas‟ beeinflusst: Hierzu 
zählen vor allem Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) und Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), deren beider 
Schüler Levinas‟ war. Einen großen Einfluss hatte aber auch das Werk Franz Rosenzweigs, 
insbesondere dessen Hauptwerk Der Stern der Erlösung (1921), auf dessen grundlegende 
Bedeutung Levinas explizit verweist im Vorwort von Totalité et Infini (1961).
1165
 Deshalb ist 
eine Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs von Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs Denken vor dem 
Hintergrund der nun veröffentlichten neuen Schriften Levinas‟ von zentraler Bedeutung für die 
Levinas-Forschung. 
 
         Die neuen in dieser Arbeit vorgestellten Erkenntnisse sind vor allem der Miteinbeziehung 
bisher unveröffentlichter Schriften Levinas‟, die im Rahmen der ersten zwei Bände der Edition 
seiner Gesamtausgabe (Œuvres Complètes) erschienen sind, zu verdanken.1166 Denn diese 
Schriften ermöglichen neue Einblicke in die Entwicklung der Philosophie Levinas‟. Eine 
besondere Rolle spielen hierbei Levinas‟ Tagebücher während der Kriegsgefangenschaft 
                                                 
1165
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Totalität und Unendlichkeit. Versuch über die Exteriorität, Freiburg/München: Alber, 2002: 
„Der Widerstand gegen die Idee der Totalität hat uns im ‚Stern der Erlösung„ von Franz Rosenzweig frappiert; diese 
Schrift ist zu häufig in diesem Buch gegenwärtig, um zitiert zu werden.“, S. 31.  
1166
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Carnets de captivité, suivi de Écrits sur la captivité et Notes philosophiques diverses, hg. 
von Rodolphe Calin und Catherine Chalier, Vorwort von Jean-Luc Marion, Paris: Bernard Grasset/IMEC, 2009, 
sowie Levinas, Emmanuel, Parole et Silence, et autres conférences inédites au Collège philosophique, hg. von 
Rodolphe Calin und Catherine Chalier, Paris: Bernard Grasset/IMEC, 2011.  
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(Carnets de captivité), die umfangreichen vorbereitenden Notizen (Notes philosophiques) für sein 
erstes Hauptwerk Totalité et Infini sowie Levinas‟ bisher unveröffentlichte Vorlesungen am 
Collège de philosophie in Paris in den Vierziger und Fünfziger Jahren. Darüber hinaus basiert 
meine Dissertation auf einer umfangreichen Berücksichtigung der in den letzten Jahren 
erschienenen internationalen Forschungsliteratur (vor allem in Amerika, Frankreich und Israel) Ŕ  
insbesondere zum  Begriff der „Stimme“, den ich für eine neue Interpretation der Philosophie 
Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs fruchtbar mache.          
 
         Die Arbeit ist in drei Teile gegliedert: Judentum, Philosophie und Sprache, die jeweils 
unterschiedliche Aspekte der Werke Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs untersuchen und in Beziehung 
zueinander setzen. Die Grenzen sind hierbei nicht statisch zu verstehen, sondern gehen vielmehr 
thematisch ineinander über. Der erste Teil (Kapitel I) ist der Untersuchung des Themas des 
„Judentums“ gewidmet. Dieses Thema spielt eine wesentliche Rolle für Levinas‟ Werk (vgl. 
seine Talmud-Interpretationen) als auch für sein Leben und Wirken. Hierbei ist der Einfluss 
Rosenzweigs, dessen Stern der Erlösung Levinas um die Mitte der Dreißiger Jahre las, zentral. 
Die Entstehung und Entwicklung dieses Einflusses wird zunächst anhand einer Analyse des 
Frühwerks Levinas‟ erörtert. Besonders relevant sind in diesem Kontext Levinas‟ Artikel 
Quelques réflexions sur le Hitlérisme (1934) sowie sein Essay De l‟évasion (1935). Wesentliche 
Impulse für eine neue Interpretation dieser Schriften konnten durch die Analyse neuer Quellen 
gewonnen werden, besonders Levinas‟ Kriegstagebücher, die neue Interpretationen und 
Rückschlüsse auf seine Rosenzweig-Rezeption ermöglichen. Ferner wird untersucht inwiefern 
der Begriff des Judentums als einer „Kategorie des Seins“ („Judaisme comme catégorie de 
l‟être“), der sowohl in Levinas‟ Kriegstagebüchern als auch in seinen Artikeln über Rosenzweig 
nach dem Krieg auftaucht, als ein Resultat seiner Rosenzweig-Rezeption zu bewerten ist und wie 
diese Rezeption Levinas‟ Denken nach dem Krieg weiter beeinflusste. Abschließend wird vor 
dem Hintergrund der biographischen und werkgeschichtlichen Bezüge versucht, eine Skizze der 
Verhältnisbestimmung von Judentum und Philosophie im Werk Levinas‟ unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des Einflusses Rosenzweigs zu geben.         
 
         Das Thema der „Philosophie“ wird im zweiten Teil (Kapitel II) untersucht, das die  
begonnenen Analysen fortführt und sie in den Kontext der philosophischen Fragestellungen 
Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs stellt. Zunächst wird die Problematik des Todes in Verbindung 
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gebracht mit Levinas‟ Begriff des Es gibt (il y a), den er vor allem in seiner Schrift De l‟existence 
de l‟existant (1947) darlegt. Vorarbeiten hierzu lassen sich in seinen Kriegstagebüchern finden, 
wo Levinas den Begriff bereits in nuce entwirft und ihn nach dem Krieg theoretisch ausführlich 
entwickelt. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt der Einfluss von Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) auf 
Levinas eine wichtige Rolle. Der Aspekt des Todes wird im Folgenden in Beziehung gesetzt zu 
den Begriffen Eros und Schöpfung im Werk Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs. Ferner wird dem 
zeitlichen Modus der Eschatologie und seiner besonderen Bedeutung für Levinas‟ Denken, 
insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Sprache in seiner Philosophie, Beachtung geschenkt. 
In diesem Kontext wird auch Jacques Derridas (1930-2004) kritische Rezeption von Levinas‟ 
Totalité et Infini in seinem Essay Violence et Métaphysique (1964) vorgestellt und in Verbindung 
gesetzt mit dem Problem der Narrativität bei Levinas. Letzterer Aspekt wird dann in einem 
weiteren Zusammenhang problematisiert, Bezug nehmend auf die Schwierigkeiten der 
Produktion literarischen Schreibens im Allgemeinen. In einem abschließenden Exkurs werden 
Bezüge zwischen dem Schaffen des US-amerikanischen Komponisten und Künstlers John Cage 
(1912-1992) und dem Werk Levinas‟ herausgearbeitet, wobei aufgezeigt wird, dass sich 
Momente der philosophischen Problematik Levinas‟ in dem musikalischen und theoretischen 
Werk Cages widerspiegeln bzw. auf künstlerische Weise Ausdruck finden.  
 
         Kapitel III und IV wenden sich vorrangig Themen der „Sprache“ zu. Zunächst wird in 
Kapitel III der Zusammenhang von Sprache und Sprachdenken im Werk Rosenzweigs dargelegt 
und in Beziehung gesetzt zum Begriff der Sprache bei Levinas. Ausgehend von Rosenzweigs 
Artikel Das neue Denken (1925) wird untersucht, was Rosenzweig unter dem Begriff eines 
„Neuen Denkens“ versteht und wie sich dieses widerspiegelt in seinem theoretischen und 
biographischen Schaffen, u.a. durch die Gründung des Freien Jüdischen Lehrhauses in Frankfurt. 
Zwei Aspekte sind bei dieser Analyse zu betonen: Sprache und Offenbarung. Die enge 
Verknüpfung dieser beiden Aspekte im Werk Rosenzweigs wird dann in Verbindung gesetzt zu 
ihrer Bedeutung bei Levinas. Im weiteren Verlauf wird Rosenzweigs Konzept einer 
messianischen Erkenntnistheorie (messianic epistomology) und sein Begriff der Wahrheit 
erörtert. Abschließend wird die Rolle der Sprache für Rosenzweigs Wahrheitsbegriff 
problematisiert und dargelegt, dass das Schweigen und die Vision des göttlichen Antlitzes, wie 
Rosenzweig es im dritten Teil des Sterns der Erlösung darlegt, letztlich einen höheren 
Stellenwert für ihn einnehmen als Sprache. Eine Darstellung des Einflusses der Kabbala und 
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deren Rezeption im Werk Rosenzweigs erhellen die Hintergründe für die Entwicklung seines 
Wahrheitsbegriffes als Licht und Vision, jenseits der sprachlichen Ausdruckskraft.        
 
         Schließlich untersucht Kapitel IV das Phänomen der Stimme im Werk Rosenzweigs und 
Levinas‟. Zunächst wird der Begriff der Stimme fruchtbar gemacht für eine neue Interpretation 
des Subjektbegriffs bei Levinas. In einem zweiten Schritt wird der komplexe Zusammenhang von 
Offenbarung, Sprache und Liebe im Werk Rosenzweigs eingehender erörtert, mit einem 
speziellen Augenmerk auf die Rolle der „Stimme der Liebe“ im Stern der Erlösung. Hierbei wird 
der zentrale Stellenwert der Stimme im Offenbarungsgeschehen bei Rosenzweig herausgearbeitet. 
Es wird dargestellt wie aus dem „stummen“ Selbst eine „sprechende“ Seele wird und aufgezeigt, 
welche zentrale Funktion der „Stimme der Liebe“ (Rosenzweig) hierbei zukommt. Diese Aspekte 
werden jeweils in kritischem Bezug zum Werk Levinas‟ gesehen und in Auseinandersetzung mit 
dessen Denken fortgeführt. Darüber hinaus wird die Rolle der Stimme in Moses Mendelssohns 
(1729-1786) Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (1783) untersucht und dessen 
Gedanken über die ständige Erneuerung der „Stimme des Gesetztes“ durch mündliche Lehre in 
Verbindung gesetzt zu Rosenzweigs Denken über Gesetz und Judentum einerseits und Levinas‟ 
Reflektionen über Sprache und Stille andererseits. Letzteres geschieht vor allem Bezug nehmend 
auf Levinas‟ bisher unveröffentlichte Vorlesungen Parole et Silence und L‟Écrit et l‟Oral Ende 
der Vierziger bzw. Anfang der Fünfziger Jahre.
1167
 Ferner wird die Bedeutung der Stimme in der 
Bibelübersetzung, die Franz Rosenzweig ab 1925 gemeinsam mit Martin Buber (1878-1965) 
unternahm, herausgearbeitet und in Beziehung gesetzt zu Levinas‟ Begriffen des Sagens (le Dire) 
und Gesagten (le Dit). Abschließend wird die gesellschaftliche und politische Funktion der 
Stimme, insbesondere im Hinblick auf eine Aktualisierung der jüdischen Tradition sowie deren 
Weitergabe, erörtert.    
    
               Im Fazit wird die vorgestellte Interpretation des Denkens Levinas‟ und Rosenzweigs in 
den Kontext der postmodernen Philosophie gestellt. Hierbei wird veranschaulicht, welche 
Impulse von ihren Werken für die zeitgenössische philosophische Debatte ausgehen und für diese 
fruchtbar gemacht werden können. Denn insbesondere das jüdische Denken der beiden 
Philosophen bietet interessante und innovative Anstöße für eine ethische Neuorientierung der 
postmodernen Philosophie. 
                                                 
1167
 Levinas, Emmanuel, Parole et Silence, S. 69-104 und S. 199-229. 
